Vs.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-20

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF R. J. H.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF GRANT, NO. J-3336
HONORABLE WARREN DANIEL WILLETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

D. KENT SAVOIE
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell, and D. Kent
Savoie, Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Honorable James Patrick Lemoine
District Attorney
Thirty-Fifth Judicial District
Post Office Box 309
Colfax, Louisiana 71417-0309
(318) 627-3205
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Katherine M. Franks
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 1677
Slidell, Lousiana 70459-2341
(985) 847-1212
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
R. J. H.

SAVOIE, Judge.

On July 21, 2020, the State filed a petition seeking to declare Juvenile R.J.H.

delinquent for committing first degree rape of A.M.F., a child under the age of

thirteen, a violation of La.R.S. 14:42.1 The commission date range listed in the

petition was January 1, 2016, to January 1, 2018. On August 12, 2020, a denial of

the charge was entered, and on October 7, 2020, the matter was before the court for

a pre-adjudication conference. The adjudication hearing was set for November 4,

2020. On October 29, 2020, on joint motion of the parties, the adjudication

proceeding was continued to December 2, 2020. The adjudication proceeding was

held as scheduled, and after hearing the evidence, the judge found that the State

met its burden of proof and adjudicated the Juvenile delinquent. Shortly thereafter,

the judge moved on to disposition. Whether he ordered that the Juvenile be placed

in secure custody until he reaches the age of twenty-one is a disputed issue

discussed below. The court indicated it was providing the Juvenile with a copy of

an article setting forth the sex offender registration requirements. The Juvenile is

before this court appealing both his adjudication and disposition.

ERRORS PATENT

Although the Louisiana Children’s Code is silent as to whether a juvenile

criminal proceeding is entitled to an error patent review, this court has found that

such a review is mandated by La.Ch.Code art. 104 and La.Code Crim.P. art. 920.

See State in the Interest of J.C.G., 97-1044 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/98), 706 So.2d

1081. After reviewing the record, we find several issues with the record.

1
Initials of the Juvenile and the victim are being used pursuant to Uniform Rules—Courts
of Appeal, Rule 5-2 and La.R.S. 46:1844(W).

First, the minutes do not indicate that the Juvenile was present for the

answer hearing.2 According to the minutes, the attorney for the State was present,

the attorney for the Juvenile was present, the attorney for the Juvenile’s brother

(co-defendant) was present, and the Juvenile’s mother and father were present.

The purpose of a juvenile’s presence at the answer hearing is so the trial court can

advise him of the allegations against him and his rights in accordance with

La.Ch.Code art. 855. After being so advised, the Juvenile must answer the

allegations against him as provided for in La.Ch.Code art. 856:

A. After the child has been advised pursuant to Article 855, the
court shall inquire how the child responds. The child may:

(1) Deny the allegations of the petition, in which case the court
shall set the matter for an adjudication hearing.

(2) Deny the allegations of the petition and contest the request
for adjudication due to insanity as defined in this Title, in which case
the court shall not adjudicate the child without a hearing, at which
time the child has the burden of establishing this defense.

(3) Admit the allegations of the petition, in which case the court
shall further inquire to determine whether there is a factual basis for
adjudication. If so, the court may then adjudicate the child delinquent.

(4) With the court’s permission, enter a response of nolo
contendere. If, in its discretion, the court accepts such response, the
court shall further inquire to determine whether there is a factual basis
for adjudication, and it may then adjudicate the child delinquent.

B. A child shall plead when called upon to answer. If he stands
mute, refuses to plead, or pleads evasively, a denial of the petition
shall be entered of record.

La.Ch.Code art. 856. According to the minutes, the attorneys for both of the

Juveniles entered denials.

2
The minutes also fail to reflect that the Juvenile was present for the hearing at which the
adjudication and disposition were held; however, it is clear from the transcript that the Juvenile
was present.

2

We found no articles in the Children’s Code specifically addressing a

juvenile’s absence from the answer hearing. Louisiana Children’s Code Article

104 states the following regarding the proper procedure when the Children’s Code

is silent:

Where procedures are not provided in this Code, or otherwise
by law, the court shall proceed in accordance with:

(1) The Code of Criminal Procedure in a delinquency
proceeding and in a criminal trial of an adult.

(2) The Code of Civil Procedure in all other matters.

La.Ch.Code art. 104.

The presence of an adult defendant at arraignment is mandated by La.Code

Crim.P. art. 831. However, the supreme court has stated that the provisions of

La.Code Crim.P. art. 831 are not absolute and may be waived by the lack of a

contemporaneous objection. State v. Broaden, 99-2124, p. 15 (La. 2/21/01), 780

So.2d 349, 360, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 884, 122 S.Ct. 192 (2001). Furthermore,

La.Code Crim.P. art. 555 provides:

Any irregularity in the arraignment, including a failure to read
the indictment, is waived if the defendant pleads to the indictment
without objecting thereto. A failure to arraign the defendant or the fact
that he did not plead, is waived if the defendant enters upon the trial
without objecting thereto, and it shall be considered as if he had
pleaded not guilty.

La.Code Crim.P. art. 555.

Since the Juvenile in the present case entered a denial to the allegations

against him through his attorney and proceeded to the adjudication without

objecting to his absence from the answer hearing, we find any error is waived.

Next, the Juvenile did not answer the allegations of the petition within

fifteen days as required by La.Ch.Code art. 854:

3

A. If the petition is filed prior to or during the hearing to
determine continued custody, the court may order the child to answer
the petition upon completion of the hearing. If not so ordered and the
child is continued in custody, he shall be ordered to appear to answer
the petition within five days after the filing of the petition.

B. In all other cases, the child shall be ordered to appear to
answer the petition within fifteen days after the filing of the petition.

C. For good cause, the court may extend such period.

It appears the Juveniles in the present case were not in custody since the

minutes of the answer hearing state that the Juveniles were to have no contact with

the victim for two years, were to have no contact with minor children in the home

in which they reside, and were to enroll in Spring Garden High School in

Piedmont, Alabama. Thus, the answer hearing should have been held within

fifteen days of the filing of the petition. In this case, the petition was filed on July

21, 2020, and the answer hearing did not occur until August 12, 2020. According

to the method of computation provided for in La.Ch.Code art. 114, the answer

hearing took place one week beyond the fifteen-day period. This court has held,

however, that the remedy for the untimely answer hearing is release of the juvenile

from custody, a remedy which is rendered moot once adjudication has already

taken place. State in Interest of L.D., 14-01, pp. 10-11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/14), 139

So.3d 679, 685, affirmed, 14-1080 (La. 10/15/14), 149 So.3d 763. Accordingly,

the untimely answer hearing in this case has been rendered moot by the Juvenile’s

adjudication.

Additionally, the adjudication hearing was not held within the time period

set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 877. The time for holding an adjudication hearing

is provided for as follows:

A. When the child is charged with a crime of violence as
defined in R.S. 14:2(B) and the child is continued in custody pursuant

4

to Chapter 5 of this Title, the adjudication hearing shall commence
within sixty days of the appearance to answer the petition. In all other
cases, if the child is continued in custody pursuant to Chapter 5 of this
Title, the adjudication hearing shall commence within thirty days of
the appearance to answer the petition.

B. If the child is not continued in custody, the adjudication
hearing shall commence within ninety days of the appearance to
answer the petition.

C. If the hearing has not been commenced timely, upon motion
of the child, the court shall release a child continued in custody and
shall dismiss the petition.

D. For good cause, the court may extend such period.

La.Ch.Code art. 877.

Since the present Juvenile was not in custody, the adjudication hearing

should have been held within ninety days of the Juvenile’s appearance to answer

the petition. The Juvenile appeared to answer the petition on August 12, 2020;

thus, the adjudication hearing should have occurred by November 10, 2020.

According to the minutes of the answer hearing, the adjudication was set for

November 4, 2020. On October 29, 2020, a joint motion for continuance was filed,

requesting the adjudication be continued until December 2, 2020. The trial court

granted the continuance and set the adjudication for December 2, 2020. Since the

Juvenile joined in the request for a continuance and, therefore, did not object to the

setting of the hearing outside of the time period, the time period was extended for

good cause, and no error patent should be recognized. See State in the Interest of

K.K., 14-479, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/17/14), 153 So.3d 1280, 1283 n.4 and State

in the Interest of S.D., 13-1028 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14) (unpublished opinion).3

3
2014 WL 576265.

5

Next, the judge erred in failing to impose a disposition in this case which

requires the case be remanded for the imposition of a disposition. Following the

adjudication, the judge stated:

Children’s Code Article 897.1 indicates that after an adjudication for a
felony grade delinquent act based upon a violation of Revised Statute
14:42, First Degree Rape, the Court shall commit the child who is
fourteen (14) years or older at the time of the commission of the
offense, to the custody of Department of Corrections to be confined
and secure placement until the child obtains the age of twenty-one
without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence or suspension
of imposition or execution of sentence.

Um, therefore, the statute mandates a specific period of
custody. Mr. Smith did also reference that the fact that you’ll be
required to register as a sex offender. Upon your release from the
State’s custody, that notification is set forth in Children’s Code
Article 884.1.

The Court is going to provide you with a copy of that article so
that you can be sure that you are familiar with your requirements to
register, and also so that you can insure compliance with it because
when you are released, you will be an adult, and violations of that
registration requirement uh, carry a minimum sentence of two (2)
years at hard labor, and therefore, it is very important that you comply
with those requirements.

Although it is obvious what the judge intended to impose as the disposition,

he did not actually order that the mandatory disposition be imposed. In State v.

Charles, 19-745, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/24/20), 299 So.3d 688, 690-91, this

court held:

Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to impose a
sentence on either count; thus, the sentences must be vacated, and the
case remanded for resentencing. In particular, Defendant contends the
trial court failed to actually impose a sentence for the first-degree rape
conviction and failed to clearly state how much time was to be served
without benefits for the second-degree kidnapping conviction. In its
brief, the State acknowledges that the trial court failed to impose a
sentence for the first-degree rape conviction.

At sentencing, the trial court stated the following:

THE COURT:

6

Thank you. Let the defendant rise. Let the record
reflect the Court, as Defense Counsel suggested, is
mandated under Louisiana law, under Louisiana R.S.
14:42, First-Degree Rape:

“Whoever commits the crime of first-
degree rape shall be punished by life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit
of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence.”

Again, as the defendant has learned through this trial, Mr.
Charles, that Louisiana law is a solemn expression of legislative will.
So, this Court is mandated under law that, if a jury of your peers or a
jury chosen by the State and by counsel, has made a decision, they
have decided your fate under Louisiana law.

As it relates to the second charge conviction - - that’s 14:44.1,
Second Degree Kidnapping, the statute reads in pertinent part:

“Whoever commits the crime of second-degree
kidnapping shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less
than five nor more than forty years. At least two years of
the sentence imposed shall be without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence.”

The Court, having considered the matter and having followed
the lead in this conviction by a jury of your peers, the Court is going
to sentence Mr. Orlando Charles to 25 years at hard labor, and that
sentence shall run concurrent with the life sentence imposed for first-
degree rape.

This court agrees with Defendant and the State that the trial
court failed to impose a sentence for first-degree rape. Thus, we
remand for the trial court to impose a sentence for first-degree
rape. See, e.g., State v. Coward, 18-951 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/5/19)
(unpublished opinion) (2019 WL 2366740). The trial court is
reminded that the sentencing guidelines of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1
should be articulated and that if a downward departure from the
mandatory life sentence is argued by Defendant, it should make such
findings as may be warranted by the law and evidence. See id.

Therefore, this case must be remanded for the imposition of disposition. We

advise the trial court to impose a separate disposition for each of the Juveniles.

7

See State ex rel. S.C.J., 09-1272 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 28 So.3d 1206, writ

denied, 10-496 (La. 4/5/10), 31 So.3d 363.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

The Juvenile contends that the evidence introduced at the adjudication

hearing was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the

first-degree rape of the victim, A.M.F. Additionally, if the evidence is found

sufficient by this court, the Juvenile contends there was insufficient evidence to

prove that he was fourteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of

the offense which was required to invoke both a more stringent penalty as well as

lifetime sex offender notification requirements. This issue will be addressed in a

separate section below.

Rape is defined in La.R.S. 14:41 in pertinent part as follows:

A. Rape is the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse with
a male or female person committed without the person’s lawful
consent.

B. Emission is not necessary, and any sexual penetration, when
the rape involves vaginal or anal intercourse, however slight, is
sufficient to complete the crime.

The applicable first degree rape provision is that the rape is deemed to be

without the lawful consent of the victim because the victim is under the age of

thirteen years. La.R.S. 14:42(A)(4).

The Juvenile and his twin brother co-defendant, C.C.H., were tried together

but represented by different attorneys at the December 2, 2020 adjudication

hearing. At the hearing, Detective Ryan James of the Grant Parish Sheriff’s Office

testified that he began his investigation in December 2019, when the victim’s

mother reported to him that her daughter told her that the Juvenile and his twin

brother (C.C.H.) had “held her down on the bed and . . . described. . . contact with

8

the anus region with a penis.” According to the victim’s mother, the incidents

began occurring in June 2017, which, by Detective James’ calculation, meant the

Juveniles were fourteen to fifteen years old.4 The victim was under the age of

twelve. At the time, the Juveniles were living on Grey’s Creek Road in Dry Prong

in Grant Parish. After hearing the mother’s allegations, Detective James set up an

interview for the victim at the local Advocacy Center. According to Detective

James, the victim was interviewed by Annelise Eaglin, and during the interview

she “allocated [sic] to at least two (2) times that she was uh, anal sex had been

performed on her.” The Juveniles were arrested near Piedmont, Alabama where

they were living at the time.

On cross-examination, Detective James testified that the victim said the

Juveniles put a blanket over her and although there was sexual contact, it was not

forcible. She said this occurred at least two times. He acknowledged that it

sounded like it occurred twice, but he acknowledged that it could have been once.

A.M.F., the victim, testified that she was born September 25, 2009. She

testified that she, her sister, her brothers, her mom, and sometimes her dad, used to

go over to Ms. Toni Giarrusso’s house a lot. Living there with Ms. Giarrusso

were her six children, including the twin boys, and another person whom A.M.F.

believed to be Ms. Giarrusso’s husband. Years after they occurred, A.M.F. told

her mother about the incidents that happened while she was at Ms. Giarrusso’s

house. When asked why it took her so long to tell her mother, A.M.F. responded

that she “guess[ed] [she] kind of thought like it was [her] fault.” When A.M.F.

4
Detective Ryan testified that the Juveniles were sixteen when they were arrested, and he
confirmed that their date of birth was February 25, 2003.

9

told her mother, she said her mother jumped up out of bed, went outside, and

called Ms. Giarrusso.

At the hearing, A.M.F. testified that the incidents occurred while her mother

was distracted or when she went to the store with Ms. Giarrusso. The boys, who

A.M.F. identified as C.C.H. and R.J.H. 5 “would ask her to play Lego’s or

something like that. . . and when we went into the room it was just [her] and one of

them or both of them.” They would “take [her] into the room, lock the door, put

[her] over one of the beds that was next - - right next to the closet, um, with a

blanket over to [her] waist, but before that they would pull [her] pants and

underwear down, and lay [her] down in the bed.” A.M.F. described the room and

said that the lock on the door handle was a “twist lock.” She testified that it was

either C.C.H. or R.J.H. or both who took part in the first incident. She was

confused about which of the two boys was in the room the first time this happened.

A.M.F. said the boys pushed her, putting her stomach on the bed with her

legs off the bed and her feet touching the floor. The blanket placed over her

prevented her from seeing them. A.M.F. said they would then take their “no no”

and “stick it in [her] butt,” and she confirmed that this would happen almost

immediately after she was put on the bed. A.M.F. clarified that a “no no” is what

boys “pee out of,” and she had seen her brother’s once when he was urinating.

When asked how she knew it was their “no no,” she replied, “[b]ecause . . . it felt

slimy” and she said they had nothing around them or on the floor that looked or

felt slimy. She confirmed that she did not see their “no no’s,” and she did not see

whether their pants were up or down. When asked why she thought their pants

were down, she said, “[t]hey had nothing slimy in the room, and I couldn’t see

5
A.M.F. referred to R.J.H. as “Trey.”

10

anything, but I felt something . . . and it felt slimy.” A.M.F. was asked where the

“slimy” was, and she said, “it like went in my butt hole . . . [u]p my butt.” A.M.F.

confirmed that the Juveniles said nothing during these incidents, and she never

heard any noise. When asked how it felt, she said, “[i]t felt like something just

done over and over again . . . like something jamming me over and over again into

my butt.” She said she remained quiet and still while this was going on.

A.M.F. testified that the Juveniles stopped when her siblings banged on the

door “or [the incident] would just take minutes or so.” She confirmed that she

never heard the boys’ clothes moving. To stand up again, A.M.F. said she would

take the blanket off and “they would pull [her] out.” She testified the Juveniles

would “blame the whole thing on [her],” because they would say, “A.M.F., pull

your pants up, something like that.” When she got up, she did not see anything on

the floor. The same thing happened every time. When asked if there was always

just one boy in the room, she responded, “yes, ma’am, it was [sic] always go in a

pattern as I remember it, it [would] go in a pattern, [C.C.H.] then [R.J.H.], [C.C.H.]

then [R.J.H.], [C.C.H.] then [R.J.H.].” Only one Juvenile would be in the room at

a time, and they would alternate. Each time, she felt “[j]amming over and over

again.” According to A.M.F., she did not really know how many times this

happened, but she knew it was “over a period of years,” and she knew it was more

than once. A.M.F. was never told not to tell anyone, and once the Juveniles moved

out of town, A.M.F. told her mother what happened. According to A.M.F., she

was six years old when the incidents began, and she thought they continued until

she was eight. At the time of the adjudication hearing, she was eleven.

On cross-examination, C.C.H.’s attorney asked A.M.F. why she did not tell

the female detective about the repeated “jamming.” She said the detective did not

11

ask her about that. She also said in her statement that the boys’ “no no’s” were

cold. A.M.F. was asked how many others were present in the house when these

incidents occurred. She said there were six others in the house, but she never

called out to them. A.M.F. also testified that she did not experience pain during

these incidents.

On cross-examination by R.J.H’s attorney, A.M.F. explained that the first

few times, the Juveniles got her into the room by asking her to play Legos with

them. Other times, they put her in front of them “and [would] act like security

guards or something,” prohibiting her from going back. She clarified that the first

time this happened, both boys were in the room, but after that, it was “one [1] boy

after the other.” She saw which boy it was each time before the blanket was put

over her head. Although she was “not sure” how many times this happened, she

confirmed that it occurred more than twenty times. She explained that she did not

tell her mother until the boys moved because she was afraid her mother might do

something to the boys, and on re-direct examination, she said she did not want her

mother to get into trouble.

Annelise Eaglin, a forensic interviewer from the Children’s Advocacy

Center, testified that A.M.F. was very outgoing and “bubbly” at the beginning of

her interview, but she became reserved and quiet when she was questioned about

the incidents. Then, at the end of the interview, A.M.F. became talkative and

animated again. Ms. Eaglin explained that it is not unusual for a child’s interview

to vary from their testimony in court.

The video of the interview was played at the adjudication hearing. In it,

A.M.F. provided a few more details than she did in her trial testimony. When she

was asked about the boys pulling down their pants and underwear, she said she

12

“knew . . . they had to because . . . if they were doin’ that to me then I know it’s

something that they wouldn’t do to anyone else and they wouldn’t want me to

see . . . what’s going on so they just put a blanket over me.” She said she felt slimy

things in her butt. She thought it was something else, but she knew it had to be

their “thing.” She thought it was something like slime, and it was sticky. She then

said she knew it wasn’t slime because “how can you get it out after a while?” so

she knew it had to be their “thing” or “no no,” which she later clarified was a penis.

She described it as really cold and slimy. She said the first time this happened,

C.C.H. took her in the room and locked the door. He pulled down both his pants

and underwear and hers, and he started sticking his penis in her butt. When asked

how she knew it was his penis, she said, “[b]ecause I heard him pull down his

pants and his underwear.” A.M.F. was asked, “I know you said uh that [C.C.H.]

pulled down his pants and put his penis in your butt, um did [R.J.H.] ever do that?

Okay, tell me about that.” A.M.F. responded, “[R.J.H.] would do the same thing

[C.C.H.] would do and well it was just the different thing was him and nothing else

would ever change.” She said thinks she told her mom about these incidents in

either October or November.

She said she knows this happened more than once, and the boys moved

away to Georgia probably last year. She said the last time this happened to her was

in 2016 or 2017.

The Juveniles’ mother, Toni Hoffpauir Giarrusso, testified that she has lived

in Alabama for two years. Prior to that, she lived in Spring Garden, Alabama, for

six months. Before that, she lived in Dry Prong on Gray’s Creek Road, where the

family lived for a little over a year. During the time she and her family lived there,

her family and the victim’s family visited almost daily. In the house on Gray’s

13

Creek Road, the twin boys, whose birthdays are February 25, 2003, shared a room

with three of their brothers. She confirmed they had a box of Lego’s in their room.

Ms. Giarrusso first testified there were no locks on any of the doors but then

confirmed that there were locks on the doors, but they did not work. She

confirmed that A.M.F.’s mother called her, but she said no details were discussed

and they did not have a “full blown conversation.” Ms. Giarrusso told A.M.F.’s

mother that she did not believe her and hung up on her.

Based on the foregoing evidence, the court found that the State met its

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Juveniles committed first-

degree rape by having anal intercourse with the victim, who was nine or younger at

the time. The judge’s findings, in pertinent part, were as follows:

There - - the - - the primary testimony that has been presented
in this case comes from the victim, and the victim has testified both
personally in court today, we also have as evidence the interview that
was conducted um, at the Advocacy interview.

A.M.F. testified today as an eleven (11) year old girl, she
testified that between the ages of six (6) and eight (8) that the
defendants, [C.C.H.] and who he [sic] identified as [T.], being
[R.M.H.], that on numerous occasions they would lure her into their
room under the (indistinct) of playing Legos or something else, that
they would lock the door, that they would bend her over their bed, the
bed near the closet, not the bed near the door, that they would put a
blanket over her - - from her waist to her head, pull her pants and
panties down, and they would stick their no no in her anus.

Today she testified that there was ramming. Asked when they
would stop, well they would stop when Jacob or Annelise [sic] would
knock on the door, and then they would tell her to pull her pants up to
make it her fault so that whoever was knocking at the door would
understand that the reason her pants were down was because she took
her pants down.

Mr. Wilson has noted some concerns of her testimony. She
described their no no’s as being slimy. Mr. Wilson explained that no
no’s aren’t slimy until after, not before, they’re also not cold.

14

There’s been no evidence today to describe how no no’s get
slimy or whether they’re hot or cold by experts so we’re going to have
to use common sense.

Mr. Wilson, I do believe there’s a way that no no’s on fifteen
(15) and sixteen (16) year old boys get slimy, it’s called lubricant, and
not all those lubricants are heated, some of them may be cold. That
might also explain some other things. Might also explain why it
didn’t hurt.

Question is who do you believe? Do you believe the testimony
of a ten (10) year girl, because that’s how old she was when she
disclosed this information.

First question we asked is why did you wait? Because she was
afraid her mom was going to hurt them. Well why does she think her
mom is going to hurt these young men for something that’s her fault?
Is it possible that a nine (9) year girl who has seen only one (1) penis
before might be confused about what was happening, and whether it
was her fault or not?

I think that is possible. I think it is possible that a nine (9) year
old girl who doesn’t know anything about sex might feel something,
not a Pinnocchio effect, but guilt for being involved in something that
she shouldn’t have been involved in. Fortunately, children that age
know when something is wrong, and I think she knew that whatever
was slimy in her anus was wrong.

Those were the only inconsistencies I heard. Cold and slimy
otherwise, as Mr. Smith indicated, she was very believable, and I
think that her credible testimony is sufficient.

The Court finds that the State has met it’s [sic] burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants has [sic] committed
the offense of 1st degree rape that being having anal intercourse with a
victim who at the time of the alleged acts, of the proven acts, were
under the age of thirteen (13), in fact, at the time she was nine (9) or
younger. Those acts having occurred at the home of [Toni] on 1125
Gray’s Creek Road in Dry Prong, Louisiana right down the road from
Brother Sherman’s church which is in Grant Parish where they lived
for over a year.

The Juvenile challenges the credibility of the victim and contends that her

testimony did not establish the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

She did not testify nor state during her Advocacy Center interview that she ever

saw R.J.H.’s penis and only assumed that his penis was used. Her description of

15

the thing inserted in her “butt” as slimy suggested that it could possibly have been

a finger.6 The fact that she did not report the “jamming over and over again”

during her interview at the Advocacy Center but she did at the adjudication hearing

suggests she discussed the matter since her interview, according to the Juvenile.

The Juvenile contends the victim only assumed there was penile penetration and

she never described ejaculation or ejaculate in her clothing. Because penile

penetration was not established beyond a reasonable doubt, the Juvenile contends

the responsive verdict of sexual battery should be entered.

In State in Interest of C.D., 11-1701, pp. 4-10 (La. 7/2/12), 93 So.3d 1272,

1275-78, the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the applicable standard of review

in juvenile cases as follows:

In vacating the juvenile court’s delinquency adjudication of
defendant, the court of appeal noted the state’s case rested entirely on
the uncorroborated testimony of Officer Dobard, which, in the court’s
view, “[did] not negate every reasonable probability of
misidentification, especially given C.D.’s different clothing [at the
time of arrest], the lack of drugs on his person, and his lack of

6
It appears the word “slim” was mistakenly typed instead of “slime” at several points in
the transcript of the adjudication hearing:

Q Okay. You’re doing fine. Now, um, it’s slimy, tell me a little bit more about
how that felt.

A Like it felt like slim in your hand, it just felt like it was on my butt.

....

[A]s a matter of fact, on page 11 of the same transcript, she said something really
slimy like slim. Now what is slim? Slim is a kid’s toy.

....

So apparently, there was no residue testified as to her on her anal area, and she’s
describing slim which is basically a children’s toy.

....

Well, it - - the adults in the room know that if someone is having sex, the penis is
not slim - - is not cold. So that’s inconsistent with a sexual assault.

16

connection to this part of the neighborhood and the 2033 Wagner
residence.” C.D., 11-0121 at 7, 69 So.3d at 1223. Although
acknowledging that “eye witness testimony alone can be sufficient
evidence to satisfy the State’s burden,” the court of appeal observed
that “Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized that there are instances
in which ‘numerous eccentricities, unusual coincidences and lack of
corroboration’ make such testimony so unreliable that even a
reasonably pro-prosecution rational fact finder must have a reasonable
doubt about the identification.” Id., 11-0121 at 7-8, 69 So.3d at 1223
(quoting State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La.1988)). In
concluding the present case offered one such instance, the court of
appeal took into account the failure of the state to produce any
evidence in support of its hypothesis that defendant could have
changed clothes and slipped out of the back of 2033 Wagner
undetected by police surveillance even as he crossed the street and
stood in front of the residence where Dobard found him after the
officer returned to the scene with the warrant team. Id., 11-0121 at 8,
69 So.3d at 1224. The court of appeal further noted the police had
made no attempt to bring Mary Charles back to the scene to identify
the person who sold her the heroin, an omission that spoke “volumes”
about the state’s failure to corroborate Dobard’s eyewitness
identification of defendant. Id., 11-0121 at 9, 69 So.3d at 1224.
Finally, the court of appeal emphasized that juvenile delinquency
proceedings are essentially civil in nature, State in the Interest of
Batiste, 367 So.2d 784, 789 (La.1979), and that review of a
delinquency adjudication is therefore subject not only to the due
process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781,
61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), but also to a broader standard by which an
appellate court reviews both the facts and law, specifically, the trial
court’s factual findings, for clear or manifest error, “to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to satisfy the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.” C.D., 11–0121, p. 6, 69 So.3d at 1223
(citation omitted). Given the loose ends in the state’s case, the court of
appeal concluded “the trial court was clearly wrong in determining
that the state had proven the identification of C.D. beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id., 11-0121 at 10-11, 69 So.3d at 1224-25.

However, as a matter of due process, the court of appeal erred
in losing sight of the basic principle on review that the rational fact
finder test of Jackson v. Virginia, “does not permit a reviewing court
to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the [fact
finder].” State v. Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847, 850 (La.1990) (citing State
ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983)). Thus, an
appellate court should ordinarily not assume “the role of the fact-
finder to weigh the respective credibilities of the witnesses” and
thereby “second guess the credibility determinations of the trier of fact
beyond . . . sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review.” Graffagnino, 436 So.2d at 563.

17

As the court of appeal acknowledged in the present case,
“[e]yewitness testimony alone is usually sufficient in the mill run of
cases.” Mussall, 523 So.2d at 1311. Mussall stands as the single, sui
generis, exception to that rule in this Court’s jurisprudence, and it is
distinguished by its truly bizarre facts. Id., 523 So.2d at 1312 (“With
the addition of the eccentricities of [the victim’s] story any rational
trier of fact must take a dim view of the state’s case even in its most
favorable light: a frugal young man who saves a nest egg on minimum
wage, responds to a call out of the blue from a virtual stranger about a
boat owned by the caller’s friend by liquidating his $4,000 savings,
borrowing $2,000 more from his sister at 18 ½%, and rushing off to
meet the caller with $6,000 in his pocket, without first inspecting the
boat or talking to the owner of the boat about price; and an armed
robber who calls in advance of the crime to renew acquaintances with
his victim, uses his correct name and leaves his home phone number
so that he cannot fail to be identified.”).

The decision in Mussall has no bearing on the outcome in the
present case because there was nothing “eccentric” or “unusual” about
the testimony of Officer Dobard, an experienced narcotics officer who
conducted a routine drug investigation in a routine manner, a “mill run
case” in which the police acted on a tip from a confidential informant,
established a surveillance of the suspect location, and observed what
then happened in an attempt to verify the information. See, e.g., State
v. Williams, 250 La. 64, 193 So.2d 787 (1967); State v. Robertson,
02–0156 (La.App. 4th Cir.2/12/03), 840 So.2d 631; State v. Lawrence,
02–0363 (La.App. 4th Cir.5/8/02), 817 So.2d 1216; State v. Bryant,
98–1115 (La.App. 4th Cir.8/4/99), 744 So.2d 108. Officer Dobard
would not give his location or exact distance from 2033 Wagner
Street but he did state he was “not 200 feet” away and was using a
pair of binoculars. He then observed defendant conducting two or
possibly three transactions, including the exchange with Mary
Charles. The officer thus had more than an ample opportunity to view
his suspect, an important factor bearing on the reliability of
eyewitness identification testimony. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977) (reliability is the lynchpin
of the admissibility of identification testimony and is determined by
several factors, foremost of which is the opportunity to view).

In addition, while the state failed to produce “surveillance
video, maps, or the like,” C.D., 11-0121 at 8, 69 So.3d at 1224, to
show the various entrance and exit points of 2033 Wagner Street,
Dobard testified explicitly the residence had front and back
approaches. His surveillance point had afforded him a view of the
front porch and the officer assigned to watch the house while Dobard
went for his police cruiser to accompany the warrant team presumably
continued the surveillance from Dobard’s vantage point. That the
officer may have missed defendant’s departure, perhaps through the
back exit, and subsequent appearance across the street wearing

18

different clothing than worn by the suspected heroin dealer, did not
negate the reasonable probability Dobard made a reliable
identification, based his hours-long observation of the seller through
binoculars, because Dobard remembered what defendant looked like,
notwithstanding he had changed outfits. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 466, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1581, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Facial features are the primary means by which human
beings recognize one another. That is why . . . the Lone Ranger wears
a mask instead of a poncho . . . and . . . why a criminal defense lawyer
who seeks to destroy an identifying witness by asking ‘You admit that
you saw only the killer’s face?’ will be laughed out of the
courtroom.”). Given the circumstances under which Dobard
conducted the surveillance and viewed the heroin trafficker, the
failure of the police to keep Mary Charles on the scene for two or
more hours until the surveillance wrapped up and the warrant for 2033
Wagner Street was executed may have reflected no more than a
rational assessment by officers on the scene that Dobard was in a
position to make a reliable identification and that they did not need
additional input from a heroin user.

Argument of counsel at the close of the hearing brought all of
the circumstances considered by the court of appeal to the attention of
the juvenile court, including discrepancies in the defense case with
respect to where and how defendant spent the afternoon before his
arrest and whether defendant did, or (in his opinion) did not resemble
anyone else in the Fischer Housing Development. In the end, the
juvenile court found Dobard’s testimony sufficient to negate any
reasonable probability of misidentification and because that credibility
determination appears rationally based on the evidence presented at
the adjudication hearing, the court’s finding forecloses second
guessing by an appellate court under the rational fact finder test of
Jackson v. Virginia. Moreover, even under a broader, civil standard of
review, we find no clear or manifest error in the trial court’s
credibility determination. See Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844–45
(La.1989) (“When findings are based on determinations regarding the
credibility of witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard
demands great deference to the trier of fact’s findings. . . . [unless]
documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness’s story, or
the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face,
that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness’s story. . . . a
factfinder’s finding . . . based on its decision to credit the testimony of
one of two or more witnesses . . . can virtually never be manifestly
erroneous or clearly wrong.”) (citing, inter alia, Mussall); see also
Foley v. Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 06-0983, p. 10 (La.11/29/06), 946
So.2d 144, 153 (“If the factual findings are reasonable in light of the
record reviewed in its entirety, a reviewing court may not reverse even
though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would
have weighed the evidence differently.”) (citation omitted).

19

In State v. Moser, 588 So.2d 1243 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 594

So.2d 1314 (La.1992), the defendants were convicted of aggravated rape. On

appeal, they argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove they penetrated the

victim’s anus with their penises; rather, they claimed that the evidence established

that they inserted a beer bottle into her anus. Accordingly, they contended that

their convictions should be reduced to sexual battery. The first circuit affirmed the

aggravated rape convictions, finding:

Defendants’ position is based on the following factual allegations.
During the offense, the victim was not able to observe what happened
behind her, but she felt something which hurt her badly. The victim
never saw Moser with an erection; and she was not questioned as to
whether or not Page had an erection. No semen was detected during
the victim’s rape examination, and no fecal matter was detected on
defendants’ penises during their examinations. The emergency room
doctor who examined the victim testified that any object which had
been introduced into the victim’s anus would have been covered with
feces. Significantly, a beer bottle containing human fecal matter was
found near the victim’s clothing at the scene of the offense.

These allegations, however, are an incomplete review of the
evidence introduced in this case. Without reservation, the victim
repeatedly testified that the penis of each defendant penetrated her
anus during the incident. She persisted in this testimony despite
extensive questioning on the point. Even in the absence of scientific
evidence of sexual intercourse (such as the finding of sperm in the
victim’s anus), the testimony of a rape victim alone is sufficient to
establish the element of sexual penetration. See State v. Rives, 407
So.2d 1195, 1197 (La.1981); State v. Robinson, 471 So.2d 1035,
1040 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 476 So.2d 350 (La.1985).
Furthermore, as the doctor noted, the absence of sperm in the victim’s
anus and the absence of tearing was not unexpected. Although the
victim noted that Moser had trouble maintaining an erection during
oral sex, she also stated that he inserted his penis into her anus. For
sexual intercourse to occur it was not necessary that he ejaculate or
have an erection as “any sexual penetration . . . however slight is
sufficient to complete the crime.” La.R.S. 14:41(B). Additionally,
the clear implication from the victim’s testimony was that the victim
observed Page to have an erection.

Defendants point out that no feces was detected on their bodies
as would be expected had their penises been inserted into the victim’s
anus. However, defendants were arrested in a hotel room and their

20

medical examinations were conducted several hours after the incident.
Despite the delay, fecal matter was found in the genital area on Page’s
shirt and pants and in a similar location on Moser’s shirt. A paper
towel containing human excrement was located by a law enforcement
officer at the scene of the rape.

This physical evidence, combined with the diagnosis of anal
rape issued by the doctor who examined the victim, corroborates the
victim’s testimony of penile penetration. The victim admitted that it
was possible that an object other than the defendants’ penises might
also have been inserted into her anus, and she testified that during a
“portion” of the time when Page was raping her “it hurt very bad.”
The possibility that the beer bottle also might have been inserted into
her anus does not discredit her remaining testimony of anal rape.

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
establish defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s
assignment of error is meritless.

Moser, 588 So.2d at 1250-51 (footnote omitted).

Finally, in State v. Williams, 11-79, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/29/11), 80 So.3d

626, 631, the court stated:

Circumstantial evidence involves, in addition to the assertion of
witnesses as to what they have observed, a process of reasoning, or
inference by which a conclusion is drawn. State v. Chism, 436 So.2d
464, 469 (La.1983). The trier of fact must decide what
reasonable inferences may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence,
the manner in which competing inferences should be resolved,
reconciled or compromised, and the weight and effect to be given to
each permissible inference. Id.

The law does not require the reviewing court to determine
whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes that the
evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Spears,
05-0964, p. 3 (La.4/4/06), 929 So.2d 1219, 1222; State v. Mussall,
523 So.2d 1305, 1309 (La.1988). Rather, the fact finder is given
much discretion in determinations of credibility and evidence, and the
reviewing court will only impinge on this discretion to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental protections of due process of
law. Spears, 05-0964 at 3, 929 So.2d at 1222-23.

Although there was no physical evidence to corroborate the victim’s

testimony in this case, “[i]n the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable

conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the fact

21

finder, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion.” State v. Robinson,

02-1869, p. 16 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 66, 79, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1023, 125

S.Ct. 658 (2004). We defer to the trier of fact’s credibility determination and the

reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence presented concerning the use of the

Juvenile’s “no-no” as opposed to another object and the sensation experienced by

the victim being attributable to the use of a lubricant. Based on the foregoing, we

find that the evidence was sufficient to prove the Juvenile’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Additionally, since there was no evidence presented that

contradicted A.M.F.’s story and since the story is not so internally inconsistent on

its face that a reasonable fact finder would not credit her story, we find that the

judge’s finding is not manifestly erroneous, and the conviction is affirmed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

The Juvenile contends that there was insufficient evidence presented to

establish his age at the time of the offense for the appropriate penalty and provision

imposed in accordance with La.R.S. 15:542.

The petition alleged that the acts occurred between January 1, 2016, and

January 1, 2018. The Juvenile’s date of birth is February 25, 2003. Detective

James testified that the victim’s mother told him that the incidents started in June

2017, which was when R.J.H. was fourteen. Detective James testified that the

Juvenile and his brother were sixteen when they were arrested, so they were

fourteen to fifteen when the acts occurred.

The victim testified that she could not recall the last time she went to Ms.

Giarrusso’s house, she was asked “[w]ould you say it was this year? Last year?” to

which she responded, “[l]ast year,” which would have been 2019. Later, when the

victim was asked whether this had just happened at Ms. Giarrusso’s house, the

22

victim responded, “[n]o ma’am. This happened uh, years ago.” She later testified

that she was six when the incidents started (which would have been between

September 25, 2015, and September 24, 2016), and probably eight when they

ended (which would have been until September 24, 2018). A.M.F. testified that

the Juvenile and his family moved “I think two (2) years ago or a year ago” (which

would have been 2018 or 2019), and she confirmed that she told the interviewer at

the Advocacy Center that it occurred between 2016 and 2017. R.J.H. would have

been fourteen only after February 25, 2017.

Ms. Eaglin conducted the interview of A.M.F. on December 13, 2019. In

the interview, A.M.F. said the last incident happened between 2016 or 2017, and

she thought the boys moved to Georgia the previous year, which would have been

2018.7

Thus, the only conclusive evidence that established that R.J.H. committed

rape of A.M.F. after he was fourteen years old was Detective James’ testimony that

A.M.F.’s mother told him the incidents started in June 2017.

In State in the Interest of E.S., 18-1783 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So.3d 1046, the

supreme court found that the evidence was insufficient to show the juvenile was at

least fourteen years of age at the time of the offense, which was required for the

trial court to impose a mandatory disposition of secure placement until age twenty-

one and lifetime sex offender registration. In so finding, the court stated:

Although the parties appear to be in agreement concerning the
State’s burden of proof with respect to the juvenile’s age – that the
State was required to prove such a fact beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that this Court will review a finding of guilt under
the Jackson standard for sufficiency of the evidence – this Court has

7
In the interview, Ms. Eaglin asked A.M.F. the age of the Juvenile and his twin brother.
She said she was not sure at this point, but she thinks they “were” sixteen. (It is not clear whether
A.M.F. meant at the time of the interview or the time of the incidents.)

23

yet to opine as to the applicable burden of proof and corresponding
standard of review on appeal for the element of age under Ch. C. art.
897.1 and R.S. 15:542.

Given the de minimus evidence presented, however, we find the
State failed to meet its burden under any standard of review to prove
that the district court reasonably found that E.S. was fourteen years
old when he raped N.H. The record is completely devoid of any
concrete evidence establishing when the abuse happened except that it
clearly occurred before February 2017 when N.H. made the initial
disclosure. The State did present evidence, based on the testimony of
M.S. and the victim’s grandmother, that N.H. visited E.S.’s house
after E.S. had turned fourteen years old. However, the State produced
no evidence as to when the abuse occurred. N.H. did not testify as to
any specific dates or give any information that would identify a
season or holiday, let alone a specific date, on which the abuse
occurred. Likewise, she was never asked whether the abuse occurred
every time she visited E.S.’s home. Though the victim first reported
the abuse to her grandfather in February 2017, there was no attempt to
establish how recently the abuse had occurred.

To be clear, as discussed in depth above, the record supports a
finding that E.S. abused N.H. and did so at least once. Thus, the
evidence supports two general conclusions: (1) E.S. raped N.H. at
least on one occasion; and (2) N.H. visited E.S.’s home after he turned
fourteen years old. Making the quantum leap from those two
conclusions, however, to infer a third conclusion that E.S. must have
therefore committed at least one act of rape beyond his fourteenth
birthday is not supported by the record. As such, we find the State has
failed to present sufficient evidence that E.S. was fourteen years of
age at the time of the offense. Having thus concluded that lifetime sex
offender registration pursuant to R.S. 15:542 is inapplicable to this
case, we are unable to reach the constitutional issue for which we
granted the juvenile’s writ.

Id. at 1060-61.

The supreme court found there was insufficient evidence to support the

finding that E.S. was fourteen at the time of the offense. Accordingly, the court

affirmed the delinquency adjudication but reversed the court of appeal’s finding

that there was sufficient evidence to establish E.S.’s age at the time of the offense.

The disposition was vacated, and the case was remanded for redisposition.

24

We find that Detective James’ testimony that A.M.F.’s mother told him the

incidents started in June 2017, as unobjected to hearsay, became substantive

evidence. State v. Pierre, 14-1071 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/15), 170 So.3d 348, writ

denied, 15-1151 (La. 5/13/16), 191 So.3d 1054; State v. Howard, 04-499 (La.App.

3 Cir. 11/17/04), 888 So.2d 375, writ denied, 04-3216 (La. 4/8/05), 899 So.2d 13.

Thus, there was sufficient evidence to establish that R.J.H. was fourteen at the time

of the offense; however, as will be discussed below, we find that the Juvenile’s

claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to this testimony as

hearsay has merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR

We will address this assignment out of order as it addresses an issue raised

in Assignment of Error Number Two. The Juvenile contends that his trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to object to Detective James’ hearsay testimony offered

at the adjudication hearing and in failing to object to the immediate disposition

proceeding.

The Juvenile argues Detective James’ testimony that A.M.F.’s mother told

him that the incidents in question began in June 2017 was hearsay. The declarant

did not testify at trial, and this date conflicted with the date range provided by

A.M.F. in her interview - that the last incident was between 2016 and 2017.

Further, she did not indicate which of the twins committed the last offense.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under
the two-prong test developed by the United States Supreme Court
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish his attorney was ineffective,
defendant must first show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he
was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. The relevant inquiry is whether counsel's
representation fell below the standard of reasonableness and

25

competency as required by prevailing professional standards
demanded for attorneys in criminal cases. Strickland, supra. The
assessment of an attorney’s performance requires his conduct to be
evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the occurrence. A
reviewing court must give great deference to trial counsel’s judgment,
tactical decisions, and trial strategy, strongly presuming he has
exercised reasonable professional judgment. State v. Cambre, 05–888
(La.App. 5 Cir. 7/25/06), 939 So.2d 446, 460, writ denied, 06–2121
(La.4/20/07), 954 So.2d 158.

Second, defendant must show that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. This element requires a showing
that the errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, i.e., a trial which result is reliable. The defendant must show
actual prejudice before relief will be granted. It is not sufficient for the
defendant to show the error had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceedings. Rather, he must show that but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability the
outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland, supra.

State in the Interest of S.L., 11-883, pp. 16-17 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/24/12), 94 So.3d

822, 835.

In S.L., the court also discussed a reversible hearsay issue:

Defendant next argues that the only evidence of his identity as
the perpetrator of the simple burglary was the description offered by
the police dispatch, which he contends is inadmissible hearsay. He
further asserts the admission of the hearsay evidence was not harmless
because it was the only evidence establishing his identity as the
perpetrator and the use of it violated his constitutional right to
confront his accusers.

The State responds that the information in the police dispatch
was properly admitted to prove the course and conduct of the police
investigation which led to S.L.’s arrest. The State further asserts
defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated because a police
dispatch is not testimonial.

Hearsay is an oral or written assertion, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the present trial, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. La. C.E. art. 801(C). Hearsay
evidence is inadmissible except as specified in the Louisiana Code of
Evidence or other legislation. La.C.E.art. 802. Such evidence is
excluded because the value of the statement rests on the credibility of
the out-of-court asserter, who is not subject to cross-examination and
other safeguards of reliability. State v. Smith, 03–866 (La.App. 5 Cir.

26

11/25/03), 862 So.2d 240, 244, writ denied, 04–0050 (La.5/7/04), 872
So.2d 1078.

Police officers may refer to statements made to them by other
persons involved in the case in order to explain their actions. State v.
Watson, 449 So.2d 1321, 1328 (La.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181,
105 S.Ct. 939, 83 L.Ed.2d 952 (1985); State v. Ballay, 99–906
(La.App. 5 Cir. 2/29/00), 757 So.2d 115, 127, writ denied, 00–908
(La.4/20/01), 790 So.2d 13. Such statements are admissible not to
prove the truth of the statement being made, but rather are offered to
explain the sequence of events leading to the arrest of the defendant
and, as such, are not hearsay. State v. Calloway, 324 So.2d 801, 809
(La.1975).

In State v. Broadway, 96–2659 (La.10/19/99), 753 So.2d 801,
808, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1056, 120 S.Ct. 1562, 146 L.Ed.2d 466
(2000), the Louisiana Supreme Court commented on the admissibility
of information received by a police officer:

Admission of information received by a police
officer in the investigation of a crime, on the basis that
such information explains the officer’s presence and
conduct and therefore does not constitute hearsay
evidence, is an area of widespread abuse. McCormick on
Evidence § 249 (E. Cleary 3d ed.1984). Such information
frequently has an impermissible hearsay aspect as well as
a permissible nonhearsay aspect, and the court in
determining admissibility should balance the need of the
evidence for the proper purpose against the danger of
improper use of the evidence by the jury. Id. The fact that
an officer acted on information received in an out-of-
court assertion may be relevant to explain his conduct,
but this fact should not become a passkey to bring before
the jury the substance of the out-of-court information that
would otherwise be barred by the hearsay rule. G.
Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 429–431 (1974).

When an out-of-court statement, such as
information received by a police officer during an
investigation of a crime, has both an impermissible
hearsay aspect and a permissible nonhearsay aspect, the
issue of relevancy becomes significantly interrelated with
the hearsay issue. If the nonhearsay content of the
statement has little or no relevance, then the statement
should generally be excluded on both relevance and
hearsay grounds. Marginally relevant nonhearsay
evidence should not be used as a vehicle to permit the
introduction of highly relevant and highly prejudicial
hearsay evidence which consists of the substance of an

27

out-of-court assertion that was not made under oath and
is not subject to cross-examination at trial.

The police dispatcher’s physical descriptions of the juvenile
suspects were not needed to show why the officers reported to the area
of the burglary. The officers’ testimony was used to show not only
why the officers acted as they did, but also to prove identity of the
perpetrators. When Sgt. Arnold spotted S.L. riding his bike towards
the eastbound ramp of I–10, he recognized that S.L. fit the description
he had heard over the police radio. When the officers apprehended
S.L. in the parking lot of the Susan Park playground, they did so
because S.L. met the clothing description relayed by the police
dispatcher who had obtained the description of the suspects from an
unidentified source.

In State v. Arbuthnot, 367 So.2d 296 (La.1979), the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed a defendant’s conviction on the basis of a
police officer’s hearsay testimony regarding a non-testifying witness’
positive identification of the defendant. Although another eyewitness
identified the defendant, the supreme court reasoned that the hearsay
description of the non-testifying witness improperly bolstered the
State's identification testimony by its only identification witness. Id. at
298–99.

In this case, both Officer Matise and Sgt. Arnold were notified
of the offense and the suspects’ descriptions by a police dispatcher,
who received the information from an unidentified caller. Other than
the police officers who responded to the dispatch call, Mr. Franklin,
the victim of the simple burglary, was the only other witness to testify
and his testimony was very limited. He did not testify that he observed
the individuals who burglarized his car, and he did not testify that he
provided a description of the suspects to the police. Further, Mr.
Franklin did not make an in-court, or out-of-court, identification of
S.L. as the individual who burglarized his car. The State called no
other witnesses to explain the origin of the police transmission or to
identify S.L. as the perpetrator.

The erroneous admission of hearsay testimony is subject to a
harmless error analysis. State v. Wille, 559 So.2d 1321, 1332
(La.1990); State v. Davis, 06–402 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/28/06), 947
So.2d 48, 57, writ denied, 07–0003 (La.9/14/07), 963 So.2d 996. The
proper inquiry is whether the guilty verdict rendered was surely
unattributable to the error. Factors to be considered in making this
determination include: (1) the importance of the witness' testimony;
(2) the cumulative nature of the testimony; (3) the existence of
corroborating or contradictory evidence regarding the major points of
the testimony; (4) the extent of cross-examination permitted; and
(5) the overall strength of the State’s case. Id. at 57.

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We cannot say the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence
was harmless error in this case. The State’s case against defendant
was circumstantial. The physical description given by an unknown
person to the police dispatcher was clearly used to link S.L., who was
not in possession of any stolen goods at the time of his arrest, to the
burglary of Mr. Franklin’s car. Accordingly, we find the erroneous
admission of the police dispatch regarding the physical description of
the perpetrators was not harmless because it was used to directly link
defendant to the crime. As such, defendant is entitled to a new trial on
the charge of simple burglary.

Id. at 832-34 (footnotes omitted).

We find that the Juvenile’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim has merit

and can be resolved on the record before this court. The only evidence that clearly

established that the Juvenile was fourteen years of age at the time of the

commission of the offense was Detective James’ hearsay testimony. Although

police officers may refer to statements made to them by other persons involved in

the case in order to explain their actions, that was not the purpose for which the

information was used in this case. It was used to establish the Juvenile’s age as

fourteen (or over) at the time of the commission of the offense. Counsel erred in

failing to object to this hearsay testimony, and the Juvenile was prejudiced in that a

harsher penalty was imposed on him because of it. Therefore, the trial court’s

finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish R.J.H. was fourteen years of

age at the time of the offense is reversed and remanded for disposition accordingly.

The Juvenile also contends counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the

immediate summary disposition proceeding because he was unable to file a motion

to vacate the adjudication or prepare for a disposition hearing.

Louisiana Children’s Code Article 892 requires the court to conduct a

disposition hearing prior to entering a judgment of disposition. This hearing may

be conducted immediately after the adjudication but must be conducted within

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thirty days after the adjudication unless the period is extended for good cause.

Article 893(A) requires the court to hear evidence at the disposition hearing as to

whether the child needs treatment or rehabilitation unless the child waives the

presentation. A failure to object does not serve as a waiver. State in the Interest of

T.W., 09-532 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/09), 21 So.3d 465; State in the Interest of K.G.,

34,535 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/24/01), 778 So.2d 716; State in the Interest of O.R., 96-

890 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/25/97), 690 So.2d 200.

There was no waiver of the hearing in this case. Therefore, upon remand for

the imposition of disposition, in the absence of a clear waiver, a disposition hearing

should be held.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

The Juvenile raises several errors that he contends are patent error in this

assignment of error.

First, he contends that the written judgment of disposition imposed an illegal

disposition in that it denied parole eligibility and that the disposition set out in the

written judgment conflicts with the disposition ordered in open court. We find this

issue to be moot due to the recommendation that the case be remanded for a

disposition to be imposed as discussed in the error patent section.

Next, the Juvenile contends that the trial court erred in failing to advise him

of the time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief. Louisiana

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8 requires the trial court to inform a

defendant at sentencing that he has two years from the finality of his conviction

and sentence to file an application for post-conviction relief. Although the

Louisiana Children’s Code contains no similar provision, this court has required

this notice be given to juveniles. See State in the Interest of J.J.M., 16-347

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(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/9/16), 207 So.3d 609; State in Interest of C.C., 13-417 (La.App.

3 Cir. 10/9/13), 124 So.3d 56. Thus, we order the trial court to advise the Juvenile

of the time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief at the

imposition of disposition.

Next, the Juvenile also correctly notes that the trial court failed to award

him credit for time served. Louisiana Children’s Code Article 898(A) requires the

court to “give a child credit for time spent in secure detention prior to the

imposition of disposition.” Therefore, the trial court is instructed to comply with

La.Ch.Code art. 898(A) upon entering a disposition on remand.

Finally, the Juvenile claims the judge neither explained the requirements of

sex offender registration nor obtained R.J.H.’s signature on the sex offender

registration form. Because this case needs to be remanded for imposition of

disposition, this issue is moot.

DECREE

The trial court’s ruling that R.J.H. committed the first degree rape of A.M.F.

is affirmed. The trial court’s finding that R.J.H. was fourteen or older at the time

of the commission of the offense is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial

court for the imposition of a disposition, and in the absence of a clear waiver, a

disposition hearing should be held. After disposition is imposed, the Juvenile must

be given credit for time served in accordance with La.Ch.Code art. 898(A) and be

advised of the time limitations for filing an application for post-conviction relief

pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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