State of Louisiana v. Robert Glenn Jones A/K/A Ernest Hancock

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

03-0180

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ROBERT GLENN JONES A/K/A ERNEST HANCOCK

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 00-K-3191-D
HONORABLE DONALD W. HEBERT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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JOHN D. SAUNDERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, John D. Saunders, and Billy Howard
Ezell, Judges.

Thibodeaux, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Earl B. Taylor
District Attorney, 27th Judicial District Court
Alisa Ardoin Gothreaux
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Drawer 1968
Opelousas, LA 70571-1968
Telephone: (337) 948-3041
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward Kelly Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
Telephone: (337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Robert Glenn Jones a/k/a Earnest Hancock

SAUNDERS, Judge.

Defendant, Robert Glenn Jones a/k/a Earnest Hancock,1 was charged by bill of

information on September 27, 2000, with simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling,

a violation of La.R.S. 14:62.2, conspiracy to commit simple burglary of an inhabited

dwelling, a violation of La.R.S. 14:26 and La.R.S. 14:62.2, aggravated flight from an

officer, a violation of La.R.S. 14:108.1(C), and attempted first degree murder of a

peace officer, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:30. On April 17, 2001, the

Defendant pled guilty to simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, conspiracy to

commit simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, and aggravated flight from an

officer. Trial by jury proceeded on the charge of attempted first degree murder. The

jury returned a verdict of guilty of attempted second degree murder. On October 26,

2001, the Defendant was sentenced as follows:

1) Simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling - ten years
at hard labor;

2) Conspiracy to commit simple burglary of an
inhabited dwelling - five years at hard labor;

3) Aggravated flight from an officer - two years at hard
labor; and

4) Attempted second degree murder - forty years at
hard labor.

All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The Defendant appeals his conviction of attempted second degree murder on

the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction and

sentence.

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The bill of information lists Defendant’s name as Robert Jones a/k/a Earnest Hancock. The
Defendant’s fingerprints were submitted to the FBI who confirmed the Defendant’s identity as
Robert Glenn Jones.

FACTS

On August 1, 2000, the Defendant, along with another man, burglarized the

home of Rocky Edwards, stealing a television, a watch, and various other items. Larry

Mire, Mr. Edwards’ neighbor, saw the two men enter Mr. Edwards’ home and called

911. The men were driving a black truck with a net tailgate.

Deputy Andrew Green, an employee of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff’s

Department, was on radar patrol on August 1, 2000, when he heard a radio

transmission that police were in pursuit of a black Sonoma truck with a dent in the

front quarter and an air gate. The vehicle passed Deputy Green traveling at one

hundred ten miles per hour. Deputy Green then began to pursue the vehicle. The

vehicle eventually turned onto Robert Bihm Road, a dead end street. The vehicle

came to a stop about three to five feet from a large fence located at the end of the

street. Deputy Green parked his vehicle on the road, got out of the car with his

weapon drawn, and ordered the occupants of the truck to surrender. After a minute

or two, the truck engine revved and the vehicle started backing toward Deputy Green

at a high rate of speed. Deputy Green tried to run to the rear of his car for cover, but

he had to jump on top of the trunk of his car. The truck continued an additional one

hundred and fifty yards and attempted to make “some type of Hollywood whip around

turn.” The truck then flipped over. The Defendant and the other occupant of the truck

were then arrested by Deputy Green.

ERRORS PATENT

Reviewing the record, we find two errors patent concerning the Defendant’s

sentences.

First, the judge sentenced the Defendant to serve forty years at hard labor for

attempted second degree murder. A sentence imposed for attempted second degree

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murder is to be without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. See

La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1). Thus, the Defendant’s sentence should have been imposed

without benefits. Nonetheless, La.R.S. 15:301.1(A) provides:

When a criminal statute requires that all or a portion of a sentence
imposed for a violation of that statute be served without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, each sentence which is
imposed under the provisions of that statute shall be deemed to contain
the provisions relating to the service of that sentence without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The failure of a sentencing
court to specifically state that all or a portion of the sentence is to be
served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence
shall not in any way affect the statutory requirement that all or a portion
of the sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence.

Thus, there is no need for correction as the Defendant’s sentences are deemed to

contain this restriction per La.R.S. 15:301.1(A).

Next, one year of the sentence imposed for simple burglary should have been

imposed without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. See

La.R.S. 14:62.2 and State v. Conley, 411 So.2d 448 (La.1982). However, pursuant

to La.R.S. 15:301.1, the sentence is deemed to contain this provision. Therefore, there

is also no need for correction of this sentence.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Defendant contends the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty of

attempted second degree murder.

In State v. Lambert, 97-64, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/30/98), 720 So.2d 724,

726-27, this court held:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.

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2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436
So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State
v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witness [sic]. Therefore, the
appellate court should not second guess the credibility determination of
the trier of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson
standard of review. See King, 436 So.2d 559, citing State v. Richardson,
425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983).

The Defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder. Attempt is

defined in La.R.S. 14:27(A), which provides:

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does
or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the
accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense
intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances,
he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

The elements of second degree murder are set forth in La.R.S. 14:30.1, which

provides, in part:

A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm.

Thus, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant

specifically intended to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a human being and

that he “committed an ‘act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the

accomplishing of’ that intent.” State v. Williams, 95-879, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir.

1/31/96), 670 So.2d 414, 416 (citation omitted). “Specific criminal intent is that state

of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively

desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”

La.R.S. 14:10(1). “[S]pecific criminal intent need not be proven as fact but may be

inferred from the circumstances of the case and actions of the defendant.” State v.

Robertson, 98-883, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/98), 723 So.2d 500, 504 (citations

omitted), writ denied, 99-0658 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1187.

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Once on Robert Bihm Road, Deputy Green stopped his patrol car, leaving it

more to the right side of the road. Deputy Green testified it appeared to him that the

Defendant looked in the rearview mirror and observed that Deputy Green was

standing in the roadway to the left side of his driver’s door, which was slightly open.

After a minute or two, the truck engine revved and the vehicle started backing toward

Deputy Green at a high rate of speed. Deputy Green testified the Defendant was

looking back and coming straight toward him at thirty-five to forty miles per hour.

The vehicle kept getting faster and faster as it neared Deputy Green and kept going

straight toward him, never veering away. Deputy Green testified there was a yard to

the right and left of his car which the Defendant could have used to turn around or

pass him. There was approximately sixty to sixty-five feet between the roadway and

the houses. Deputy Green tried to run from the vehicle toward the rear of his car, but

he had to jump on top of the trunk of his car in order to avoid being hit.

Angela Leger lives in the last house on the right on Robert Bihm Road. Mrs.

Leger testified Deputy Green’s car was parked on the road, “more to the right side, but

not completely over.” Mrs. Leger saw both men look back at the deputy and the

driver floored the gas, backing up directly toward the deputy at full speed. She

testified the truck never slowed down and the deputy had to jump on the back of his

car or he would have been hit. The truck did not veer, but could have driven in her

yard or the yard across the street. The truck never slowed down when it got close to

the deputy, and it continued to increase its speed until it flipped.

In State v. Taylor, 96-320 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/96), 683 So.2d 1309, writ

denied, 96-2828 (La. 6/20/97), 695 So.2d 1348, the defendant was charged with

attempted first degree murder. However, he was found guilty of attempted

manslaughter. The defendant struck a police officer’s bicycle tire propelling him onto

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the hood of the car. The defendant continued to accelerate while zigzagging a block

and a half with the officer on the hood hanging onto the driver’s side windshield

wiper. As the defendant made a sharp right turn, the wiper broke and the officer fell

off the hood and landed in the street. This court concluded the evidence was sufficient

to infer that the defendant had the specific intent to kill the officer.

In State v. Percy, 02-255 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/26/02), 822 So.2d 823, the court

concluded the jury’s finding that the defendant had specific intent to kill a peace

officer, who was hanging in the driver’s side window, was reasonable where the

defendant continued to swerve his vehicle in a parking lot full of cars, fought with the

officer for his weapon, and dragged the officer around trees and maneuvered close to

a light pole, all while driving at a high rate of speed.

Looking to the above cited cases, and when viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, we find the jury had sufficient evidence to infer the

Defendant had the specific intent to kill Deputy Green. The Defendant drove straight

toward Deputy Green, continually increasing his speed, and testimony revealed that

the Defendant could have turned his truck around at various locations or driven

through yards adjacent to the street in order to avoid Deputy Green.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed in their entirety.

AFFIRMED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

03-180

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ROBERT GLENN JONES A/K/A ERNEST HANCOCK

THIBODEAUX, J., dissenting.

The majority’s reliance on State v. Taylor, 96-320 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/6/96), 638 So.2d 1309, writ denied, 96-2828 (La. 6/20/97), 695 So.2d 1348 and

State v. Percy, 02-255 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/26/02), 822 So.2d 823 is misplaced. The

facts in Taylor and Percy were far more egregious than the facts which exist here.

Those facts are adequately detailed in the majority’s opinion and need not be repeated.

The Defendant along with an accomplice were leaving the scene of a

home burglary when they were pursued by Deputy Green. The Defendant drove down

Robert Bihm Road, a dead-end street. Deputy Green followed the Defendant onto

Robert Bihm Road, stopped his patrol car and left it parked more to the right side of

the road. The deputy testified it appeared that the Defendant looked in the rearview

mirror and saw that Deputy Green was standing in the street to the left of the driver’s

door of his patrol car, which was slightly open. After the lapse of a minute or two,

Deputy Green heard the Defendant’s truck engine “rev” and saw that the truck started

backing out of the road at a high rate of speed. Deputy Green testified that the

Defendant was looking back and coming straight toward him at thirty-five to forty

miles per hour and kept getting faster and faster. The truck came very close to hitting

the deputy such that he had to jump on top of the trunk of his patrol car. The

Defendant’s truck continued to increase its speed after passing Deputy Green and

eventually flipped over.

Ms. Leger’s testimony corroborates that of Deputy Green with respect

to the location of his patrol car on the road. She further corroborated Deputy Green’s

testimony regarding the speed and direction with which the Defendant backed his

truck out of the road. She saw Deputy Green jump on top of his trunk when the

Defendant’s truck passed the deputy’s patrol car.

There is no doubt that the Defendant backed his car out from a dead-end

street instead of turning around in one of the yards to do so. However, the

Defendant’s specific acts directed toward Deputy Green involved swerving his vehicle

toward the deputy’s patrol car, while in the process of backing out of a street. The

Defendant’s truck did not contact or cause damage to the patrol vehicle. In fact, after

passing the deputy’s patrol car, the Defendant, as testified to by Ms. Leger and Deputy

Green, continued to go even faster until he flipped the truck. I am convinced that this

evidence did not provide a sufficient basis for a rational trier of fact to conclude

beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed attempted second degree

murder. Neither the circumstances of the chase—escaping from a recent burglary, no

contact between the vehicles, and no damage to the deputy’s vehicle as well as the

Defendant’s speed when backing out of the one-way street—nor the testimony of Ms.

Leger that the Defendant could have turned around in her yard to get out of the street

supplies proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had the specific intent

to kill Deputy Green. The fact that the Defendant could have turned around is of no

consequence when, because he was on a dead-end-street, he still would have had to

pass near Deputy Green. This evidence, without more, shows the Defendant’s intent

was merely to escape to avoid arrest. Because the State’s evidence was insufficient

to establish the essential element of intent to kill, I would reverse the Defendant’s

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attempted second degree murder conviction, vacate the forty-year sentence imposed,

and order the entry of an acquittal.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

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