State of Louisiana v. Jefferson W. Gill

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

04-287

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JEFFERSON W. GILL

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, NUMBER 460-2001
HONORABLE HERMAN I. STEWART, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD
JUDGE

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Court composed of Chief Judge Ulysses G. Thibodeaux, Billie Colombaro Woodard,
and Oswald A. Decuir, Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

Richard A. Morton, Assistant District Attorney
David W. Burton, District Attorney
36th Judicial District
Post Office Box 99
DeRidder, Louisiana 70634
(337) 463-5578
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Jefferson W. Gill

WOODARD, Judge.

Jefferson W. Gill appeals his conviction of vehicular homicide, a violation of
La.R.S. 14:32.1, contending the evidence is not legally sufficient to support the
verdict. We affirm the judgment, amending only by removing the words “as a
condition of parole” in the judgment.

*****

On May 22, 2001, passers-by noticed a burning truck in the woods about 50
feet off of Highway 190 near DeRidder sometime between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. The
witnesses called 911. One of the witnesses saw a black male with his back on fire get
out of the driver’s side of the truck, stumble backwards ten feet, and fall down,
unconscious. The male was later identified as Jefferson Gill. The witness
approached the truck and saw a woman lying on the ground about five feet away from
the passenger side of the truck. She was later identified as Lisa Faye Thomas.
Rescue personnel arrived and extinguished the truck fire. The driver’s side and
the front of the truck were wrecked, and the roof was crushed. Gill regained
consciousness and told one of the firefighters his knee and right shoulder hurt. State
Trooper Rogers arrived on the scene at 12:17 a.m. and began questioning him while
he was in the ambulance. Gill told Rogers that he was not the driver and was asleep
when the accident occurred. After some questioning, the ambulance took him to the
hospital for treatment.
Gill had burns on his feet and lower legs, injuries to his face, head, and a
fracture of his cervical spine. Lisa Faye Thomas was pronounced dead at the
hospital. Her cause of death was listed as massive chest trauma resulting from the
crash.
When Trooper Rogers arrived at the hospital, he advised Gill of his Miranda
rights and questioned him further about the accident. Rogers testified that Gill
“stated that he had gone to Club 68 here in DeRidder, where he had picked up Ms.
Thomas. At that time he just said it was his girlfriend. He didn’t know who she was.
From there, they had gone to Leesville and he had drank a beer. Then he had gone
to sleep, didn’t remember anything else.” Again, Gill denied he was driving when the
accident occurred. Based on his investigation and questioning, Rogers asked him to

2

consent to a chemical test of his blood. The result of this test was .09 grams percent.
Rogers issued Gill a citation for vehicular manslaughter, to which Gill pled not guilty
on March 5, 2002. After a three day jury trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The
trial court sentenced Gill to nine years at hard labor, two without benefit of probation,
parole or suspension of sentence, and fines in the amount of $5000.00. Gill appeals
the verdict, alleging the evidence is not legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

ERRORS PATENT
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we review all appeals for errors
patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find one. The trial
court incorrectly required Gill’s participation in a court-approved, substance-abuse
program and a driver-improvement program as a condition of his parole.
A trial court exercises no authority over the penalty phase of the sentence “and
can impose no condition on the parole responsibility of the parolee.”1 The penalty
provision of the vehicular homicide statute requires the defendant’s participation “in
a court-approved substance abuse program or a court-approved driver improvement
program or both.”2 The only discretion the trial court has is whether a defendant
participates in one program, or in both programs. Nevertheless, the trial court
required defendant’s participation in both programs as a condition of parole.
Therefore, we delete the portion of the sentence, ordering the participation in the
programs as a condition of parole, and we require Gill’s participation in both
programs.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an appeal which alleges that the evidence is not legally
sufficient to support the verdict, we review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, the Supreme Court enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia.3 We

1
State v. Bradley, 99-364, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99), 746 So.2d 263,
267.
2
La.R.S. 14:32.1.
3
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979);
State v. Myers, 02-1296 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/05/03), 839 So.2d 1187, writ denied,
3

determine whether the any rational trier of fact could conclude that all essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.4 The trier of fact
weighs the credibility of witnesses; and therefore, we do not second-guess his or her
credibility determinations beyond that of the sufficiency standard.5 Ultimately, all
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to satisfy
a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.6 For
circumstantial evidence to convict, “it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.”7

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:32.1 define the elements of vehicular homicide
as:
A. Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human being
caused proximately or caused directly by an offender
engaged in the operation of, or in actual physical control
of, any motor vehicle ... whether or not the offender had the
intent to cause death ... whenever any of the following
conditions exists:

(1) The operator is under the influence
of alcoholic beverages as determined
by chemical tests...

(2) The operator's blood alcohol
concentration is 0.08 percent or more
by weight based upon grams of alcohol
per one hundred cubic centimeters of
blood.

Gill alleges that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1)
he was driving the truck when the accident occurred, and (2) that he was intoxicated
at the time of the accident. After reviewing all the evidence under the Jackson

03-0991 (La. 10/10/03), 855 So.2d 330.
4
State v. Cortez, 96-859 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/18/96), 687 So.2d 515.
5
Id.
6
State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984)
7
La.R.S. 15:438.
4

standard, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that Gill crashed the truck
while intoxicated.

GILL DROVE THE TRUCK CAUSING THE ACCIDENT
Gill contends that the evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he drove the truck when it was involved in the one vehicle-accident. We do not
agree. At trial, a witness testified that after the accident, he crawled out of the
driver’s side of the vehicle. The witness saw the body of the victim five feet behind
the passenger side of the vehicle. Gill’s treating physician in the ER testified that Gill
told him that he was driving the vehicle when the accident occurred. Trooper Rogers’
testimony indicates that Gill told him twice that he had not been driving at the time
of the accident, but had been driving earlier and had one beer. Rogers testified that
he assumed Gill was driving when Gill told him he fell asleep before the accident.
Further, several witnesses testified that the victim never learned how to drive
a car, never obtained a driver’s license, never drove a car, and never owned a car
because of a seizure disorder. Gill produced nothing at trial contravening this
evidence. Looking at this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this
strong circumstantial evidence negates any reasonable claim by Gill that the victim
was driving when the accident occurred.

GILL DROVE THE TRUCK WHILE INTOXICATED

Gill next contends that the state failed to prove that he drove the truck
while intoxicated and that the intoxication caused the accident.
The evidence does not support his contention. Trooper Rogers testified that
when he interviewed Gill at the scene, he noticed a strong alcohol odor, slurred
speech, and red eyes. The first blood sample, taken from Gill by hospital personnel
for treatment purposes, read .145 grams percent. A second blood sample, taken for
law enforcement purposes about four hours after the accident, showed Gill’s blood
alcohol concentration was .09 grams percent. Further, Gill admitted to the trooper
and the ambulance personnel that he was drinking before the accident. The victim’s
brother-in-law testified that Gill drove to his house and was drinking a beer about
three hours before the accident.

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We conclude there is enough evidence in the record to support the jury’s
conclusion that Gill was driving while intoxicated at the time of the accident.

The vehicular homicide statute also requires proof of causation. In State v.
Gibson, this court stated:

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “under the vehicular
homicide statute, the state, in order to convict, must prove that an
offender’s unlawful blood alcohol concentration combined with his
operation of a vehicle to cause the death of a human being.” “It is
insufficient for the state to prove merely that the alcohol consumption
‘coincides’ with the accident.”8

In the case at bar, there is sufficient evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that Gill’s intoxication cased the accident. Trooper Rogers’ investigation
of the accident scene revealed Gill’s truck ran off the right side of the road through
a ditch, spun around, crashed through a fence, and into three trees before coming to
a stop. No evidence was offered suggesting any other cause of the crash, such as
another vehicle, mechanical defect or failure, weather conditions, or a defect in the
roadway.

*****

CONCLUSION
We conclude that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Gill was
intoxicated at the time of the accident which caused Lisa Faye Thomas’ death, and
that his impaired driving was a contributing factor in the wreck. We amend the
judgment, only, to remove the words “as a condition of parole.”

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

8
97-108, p.7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/97), 693 So.2d 286, 290 (internal
citations omitted).
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