State of Louisiana v. Steven Russell Sedlock

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 04-564

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

STEVEN RUSSELL SEDLOCK

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CAMERON, NO. 111122-23
HONORABLE H. WARD FONTENOT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Glenn B. Gremillion, and Billy Howard
Ezell, Judges.

“Peters, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.”

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED
FOR RESENTENCING.

Cecil R. Sanner
Jennifer Jones Bercier
Jones Law Firm
P. O. Drawer 1550
Cameron, LA 70631
(318) 775-5714
Counsel for:Appellee
State of Louisiana

Clifford L. Newman
The Newman Law Firm
1925 Enterprise Blvd.
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 439-1060
Counsel for: Defendant/Appellant
Steven Russell Sedlock

Cecil R. Sanner
District Attorney 38th Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 280
Cameron, LA 70631
(337) 775-5713
Counsel for: State of Louisiana

Steven Russell Sedlock
Cameron Parish Jail
P. O. Box 1250
Cameron, LA 70631

EZELL, JUDGE.

On April 29, 2003, the Defendant, Steven Russell Sedlock, was charged in a

bill of information with second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.1. In a

separate bill of information filed on the same day, the Defendant was charged with

cruelty to juveniles, a violation of La.R.S. 14:93. The Defendant entered pleas of not

guilty to each charge.

On February 2, 2004, the Defendant waived his right to trial by jury, the

matters were consolidated for trial, and a bench trial commenced. After presentation

of the evidence, the trial court found the Defendant guilty of simple battery and

cruelty to juveniles. On February 9, 2004, the Defendant was sentenced to serve six

months in the parish jail for simple battery, with credit for time served. For cruelty

to juveniles, the Defendant was sentenced to two years in the parish jail, all

suspended but time served, and the Defendant was placed on supervised probation for

the remainder of the two years. The two sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

A motion and order for appeal was filed on February 18, 2004.

In brief to this court, the Defendant states that he filed a motion for appeal as

to both his convictions, but “specifically waives and abandons the appeal as to the

conviction for Simple Battery and appeals only the conviction of Cruelty to a

Juvenile.” Accordingly, we will address only the conviction for cruelty to juveniles.

FACTS

The Defendant is the father of J.T.,1 the victim in this matter. J.T was a fourth

grade student at Grand Lake School on April 7, 2003. On that day, the assistant

principal, Jacqueline Holmes, called J.T.’s parents to inform them that he had been

sent to the office due to disciplinary problems. J.T.’s parents had a conference with

1
The victim in this matter is a minor. Accordingly, his initials will be used in
accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844(W).

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Ms. Holmes, and the Defendant then checked J.T. out of school. When leaving the

office, the Defendant kicked J.T. in the buttocks and then kneed him in the back.

Ms. Holmes was concerned about J.T.’s well-being, so she called the police.

Deputy Larry Broussard responded to Ms. Holmes’ call and then went to the

Defendant’s residence. While at the Defendant’s residence, Deputy Broussard

observed various injuries to J.T. and arrested the Defendant. Paramedics

subsequently examined J.T. at the residence.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by the

court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find

there is one error patent involving the sentence imposed for cruelty to juveniles.

For the offense of cruelty to juveniles, the trial court imposed the following

sentence: “The Court is going to sentence him to two years in the parish jail. I’m

going to suspend all but time served of that two years. I’m going to place him on

supervised probation for the balance of that two-year period . . . .” Rather than

specify the period of probation, the trial court placed the Defendant on probation for

“the balance of” the two-year period. In other words, the trial court placed the

Defendant on probation for whatever time remained after the “time served” portion

was deducted from the two years. Since the “time served” portion of the sentence

was not specified, we find the trial court imposed an unspecified and indeterminate

period of probation. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 893(A) provides

in pertinent part: “The period of probation shall be specified and shall not be less

than one year nor more than five years.” Since the probation period imposed in the

present case was not specified and is indeterminate, we find that the sentence imposed

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for cruelty to juveniles should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing

specifying the period of probation in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 893.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In his first assignment of error, the Defendant contends the verdict was not

supported by the law and the evidence.

When sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal, this court has held:

In considering questions of sufficiency of the evidence, a
reviewing court must consider the evidence presented in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and consider whether a rational trier of fact
could have concluded that the essential elements of the offense were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The reviewing court defers
to rational credibility and evidentiary determinations of the trier of fact.
State v. Marcantel, 00-1629 (La.4/3/02), 815 So.2d 50.

State v. Chesson, 03-606, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/03), 856 So.2d 166, 172, writ

denied, 03-2913 (La. 2/13/04), 867 So.2d 686.

The Defendant was convicted of cruelty to juveniles, which is defined in

La.R.S. 14:93(A) as “the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect,

by anyone over the age of seventeen, of any child under the age of seventeen whereby

unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused to said child.”

The term “intentional,” within the meaning of this statute, has been
defined as requiring only “general criminal intent,” and not specific
intent to cause a child unjustifiable pain and suffering. State v.
Morrison, 582 So.2d 295 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991); State v. Green, 449
So.2d 141 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984). La.R.S. 14:10(2) provides:

General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific
intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the
ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the
prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from
his act or failure to act.

In State v. Comeaux, 319 So.2d 897,899(La.1975), the Louisiana

Supreme Court stated:

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“Mistreatment” is in common usage and is equated
with “abuse.” See Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, Verbo abuse. In our opinion, “mistreatment”
has a commonly understood meaning.

(Emphasis supplied.)

In Morrison, the court recognized that: “As an alternative to
proving that an accused intentionally mistreated or neglected a child,
LSA-R.S. 14:93 permits the state to prove the accused was criminally
negligent in his mistreatment or neglect of the child.” 582 So.2d at 302.
La.R.S. 14:12 defines criminal negligence as follows:

Criminal negligence exists when, although neither
specific nor general criminal intent is present, there is such
disregard of the interest of others that the offender’s
conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of
care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man
under like circumstances.

(Emphasis added.)

State v. Cortez, 96-859, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/18/96), 687 So.2d 515, 519-20.

However, an offender’s conduct is “justifiable, although otherwise
criminal,” when the “offender’s conduct is reasonable discipline of
minors by their parents.” See La.R.S. 14:18(4). “Since ‘justification’
defenses are not based on the nonexistence of any essential element of
the offense, but rather on the circumstances which make the accused’s
conduct excusable on policy grounds, such defenses should be treated
as affirmative defenses which the accused must establish by a
preponderance of evidence.” State v. Cheatwood, 458 So.2d 907, 910
(La.1984).

State v. Miller, 98-1873, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 118, 119, writ

denied, 99-3259 (La. 5/5/00), 761 So.2d 541.

Thus, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant

intentionally mistreated or criminally neglected J.T. in such a manner as to cause

unjustifiable pain and suffering.

Photographs of J.T. were taken by Deputy Broussard on the day of the incident.

The photographs depict marks on J.T.’s back, abdomen, chest, face, neck, and leg.

The Defendant disputes that he caused any injuries to J.T.’s neck, leg, and face.

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Deputy Broussard testified that he saw blood oozing out along the edges of a

wound on J.T.’s chest and the wound between his shoulder blades. Charles Thacker,

who responded to Deputy Broussard’s call for an ambulance, examined J.T. and

testified that none of his injuries were oozing blood, but there was an injury to the

abdomen where the skin was split and there was surface blood. Additionally, Mr.

Thacker testified that J.T. had minor lacerations. Jeffrey Thibodeaux, who also took

part in examining J.T., testified that his injuries were not oozing, but he did have

blood blisters. J.T.’s mother testified that he had no open cuts.

The Defendant admitted he whipped J.T. on April 7, 2003. Additionally, he

admitted that he may have left whelps on J.T. and “anything that was on him that was

made with a belt I did that . . . .” The Defendant further testified that he meant to

cause pain when he hit J.T. with the belt, but denied intentionally whipping J.T. in

any manner that would cause extreme pain and harm. Additionally, the Defendant

testified that he did not realize how many marks he left on J.T. and did not intend to

cause the marks. The Defendant further testified that if he “wanted to beat somebody,

a belt wouldn’t be nowhere in the picture.” The Defendant testified regarding how

he felt about whipping J.T. and stated “I hated so much that I whipped him . . .”

Deputy Broussard testified that while at the Defendant’s residence, J.T. said it was

his fault, the Defendant did not hurt him, and he was alright.

The Defendant alleged he whipped J.T. because of his conduct at school, one

six-weeks he made five F’s, and he was possibly going to fail the fourth grade for the

second time.

Several defense witnesses testified regarding how long the marks depicted in

the photographs were visible on J.T.’s body. Several witnesses testified that the

marks were faint between April 10 and 13, 2003. One witness testified that the marks

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were gone by April 14, 2003, while the others testified they were completely gone on

April 16 and 17, 2003.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court found the Defendant guilty, stating

the following:

[O]n the charge of Second Degree Battery . . . . We do have, in the
record, an absence of just how -- the level of physical pain suffered by
the child. Obviously, there was pain involved. The Court can use
circumstantial evidence to reach the point that there was pain. Cannot
receive the marks without pain; however, the level of extreme is the
burden of the State. And the Court finds that that level was not reached.
So, the Court is going to find the defendant guilty of the responsive
charge of Simple Battery.

I’ll turn my attention now to Cruelty to a Juvenile. Cruelty to a
Juvenile must be either an intentional act or criminally negligent act. In
this instance, the Court can rely even on the testimony of Mr. Sedlock
himself -- may not be exact, my quotation, but he says I hate it that I
whipped my son or I hated it. I hated that I whipped him at the time.
Because by his own testimony, he had apparently lost control, and the
amount of pain which he inflicted upon the child was not justified by the
child’s grades in school or misbehavior in school. And although, he
may not have intended to impose the pain he did -- it doesn’t have to be
extreme pain. It just has to be unjustifiable pain, and certainly, the child
did not deserve the punishment which he received. And all other
elements of that crime are met.

The Defendant argues that considering the testimony of Deputy Broussard

compared to the other witnesses, the record “clearly shows the inaccuracies,

embellishment and enhancement of Deputy Broussard’s testimony”; and that

therefore his testimony is inaccurate and incredible and should be “disregarded and

discounted as to his description of the alleged injury sustained” by J.T.

The Defendant attacks the investigation done by Deputy Broussard prior to his

arrival at the Defendant’s residence. The Defendant additionally contends that

Deputy Broussard enhanced and exaggerated his testimony regarding injuries to J.T.’s

face. The Defendant also argues that Deputy Broussard again exaggerated his

testimony when he testified that he saw blood oozing from J.T.’s wounds. The

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Defendant brings out inconsistencies in Deputy Broussard’s testimony and that of Ms.

Holmes regarding whether or not she requested a conference with J.T.’s parents.

The Defendant admitted he whipped J.T., causing injuries to him; therefore, the

investigation done by Detective Broussard prior to his arrival at the Defendant’s

residence and testimony regarding whether or not Ms. Holmes intended to have a

conference with J.T.’s parents is irrelevant as to whether the Defendant intentionally

mistreated or criminally neglected J.T. Additionally, whether the Defendant injured

J.T.’s face, neck, or leg is also irrelevant since he admitted he caused various other

injuries found on J.T.’s body. Deputy Broussard did testify that one to two of J.T.’s

injuries were oozing blood. Even if this was a mischaracterization, Mr. Thacker

testified there was dried blood on an injury to J.T.’s abdomen.

The Defendant also points out the testimony of Deputy Broussard wherein he

stated J.T. told him the Defendant did not hurt him. He alleges that the trial court,

during closing arguments, acknowledged that it did not recall that portion of Deputy

Broussard’s testimony. The Defendant then goes on to state that he pointed out to the

trial court that the testimony was on the record and could be heard if replayed but that

the trial court apparently did not listen to that portion of the tapes of trial.

During closing arguments, defense counsel told the court that J.T. told Deputy

Broussard he was not hurting. The court then asked defense counsel if that was in the

record; defense counsel indicated that it was, and closing arguments continued. The

record does not indicate the trial court acknowledged that it did not recall that portion

of Deputy Broussard’s testimony nor does the record reflect that defense counsel

asked the court to listen to tapes of trial testimony.

The trial court could have chosen to accept certain portions of Deputy

Broussard’s testimony as true and reject other portions thereof. See State v. Blake,

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03-1465 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/04), 872 So.2d 602. The trial court found the Defendant

guilty of cruelty to juveniles. It clearly made a credibility determination regarding the

witnesses in this case, and that credibility determination should not be second-

guessed by this court.

The Defendant noted several reasons why his actions were justified and did not

cause J.T. unjustifiable pain and suffering, including the following:

1) He explained to J.T. the reasons why he whipped J.T.;

2) There was no pain and suffering “incurred as required to the
degree of the statute” inasmuch as J.T. did not seek medical treatment
for his injuries;

3) He folded the belt in half when whipping J.T., so, even though
there may have been a number of marks on J.T., each mark was not a
blow;

4) Part of his right wrist joint was blown away when he was shot
with a shotgun, he had twenty-six screws in his right hand, which was
disfigured, and only the two outer fingers could be used; and

5) J.T. was almost as big as the Defendant, being five-foot-six inches
to five-foot-seven inches tall and weighing approximately one hundred
thirty five to forty pounds and, in comparison, the Defendant was five-
foot-ten inches tall and weighed one hundred seventy pounds.

The Defendant cites State v. Schultz, 01-995 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/10/02), 817

So.2d 202, writ denied, 02-1320 (La. 11/27/02), 831 So.2d 270, for the proposition

that medical treatment must be sought for injuries inflicted in order for a defendant

to be found guilty of cruelty to juveniles. In Schultz, the defendant sprayed her

daughter with pepper spray. The defendant contended she acted in self-defense. The

fifth circuit concluded that the defendant did inflict pain upon her daughter.

However, she did not inflict unjustifiable pain and suffering which was evidenced by

the fact that the child did not seek medical treatment. The child was examined by her

father, a physician, who determined that medical treatment was unnecessary. The

court held that the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove the daughter

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experienced unjustifiable pain and suffering, which is a necessary element of the

offense.

In State v. Chacon, 03-446 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/28/03), 860 So.2d 151, the

defendant was convicted of cruelty to juveniles. It was undisputed that the defendant

struck the victim in the left arm. Photographs taken two days after the incident

showed a large bruise in the shape of a fist on the victim’s arm. The defendant argued

that he did not have the intent to mistreat the victim, he was not angry when he hit the

victim, he only hit the victim twice, the victim did not cry, and the victim was not

thrown off balance by the impact of the punches. The fifth circuit stated that the fact

that the victim did not cry or was not thrown off balance from the force of the blows

was not determinative of whether the victim experienced unjustifiable pain and

suffering. The court went on to note that “[a] bruise of the severity and magnitude

exhibited by the photographs clearly demonstrates that unjustifiable pain and

suffering were inflicted upon” the victim. Id. at 154. The court then held that the

defendant either intentionally mistreated or was criminally negligent in his

mistreatment of the victim when he chose to punch an eight-year-old with such force

that it left a fist-shaped bruise.

In State v. Swan, 544 So.2d 1204 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1989), the defendant was

convicted of cruelty to juveniles after two victims testified that he beat them. The

court noted that defense counsel alleged in his brief that he examined photographs of

the victims with a magnifying glass and detected “‘a tiny mark on the forehead on one

of the boys . . . .’” Id. at 1207. The court upheld the defendant’s convictions.

We find based on Chacon and Swan, a victim need not seek medical treatment

for the court to find he endured unjustifiable pain and suffering. We also find the

injuries to the Defendant’s hand and shoulder could affect the degree of force used

9

when whipping J.T.; however, the photographs speak for themselves. Based on the

facts and circumstances of this case, the photographs of J.T., Mr. Thacker’s testimony

that the skin was open and surface blood was present on a wound on J.T.’s abdomen,

and Mr. Thibodeaux’s testimony that blood blisters were present, a rational trier of

fact could have found that the State proved all elements of the offense.

The Defendant argues that his actions were justified as punishment for J.T.’s

behavior at school. “Justification can be claimed when the conduct is reasonable

discipline of minors by a parent.” Comeaux, 319 So.2d 897. In State v. Barnett, 521

So.2d 663 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1988), the defendant was convicted of attempted cruelty

to juveniles after spanking his child with a belt. On appeal, the defendant argued the

evidence was insufficient to establish the intent element of the crime. Additionally,

he argued he was justified in spanking his son and the real issue was whether or not

his exercise of discipline was reasonable. The defendant testified that he spanked his

child with a dress belt and was not angry when he did so. He quit spanking the child

when he noticed red marks on the child’s buttocks. The victim’s cousin observed the

spanking, and when asked whether the defendant’s actions exceeded the ordinary

realm of a spanking, said no. Photographs taken eight hours after the spanking

depicted severe bruises on the child’s buttocks and thighs. A physician who

examined the child on the day of the spanking testified that he had bruises all over his

body and that the bruises on one area of his leg were overlapping and were too

numerous to count. The court concluded that the spanking inflicted on the victim was

intentional mistreatment which caused pain and suffering exceeding the bounds of

reasonable discipline.

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We find that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the spanking

Defendant administered upon J.T. caused pain and suffering that exceeded the bounds

of reasonable discipline and was, therefore, not justified. Accordingly, this

assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In his second assignment of error, the Defendant contends the trial court should

have granted a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case.

In a bench trial, the trial court shall enter a judgment of acquittal if the evidence

is insufficient to sustain a conviction. La.Code Crim.P. art. 778. The denial of a

motion for judgment of acquittal “may be reversed on appeal only if there is no

evidence of the crime or an essential element thereof or where the denial is a palpable

abuse of discretion.” State v. Hargrave, 411 So.2d 1058, 1061 (La.1982); see also

State v. Williams, 34,370 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/28/01), 781 So.2d 682.

We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s

motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, this assignment lacks

merit.

CONCLUSION

The Defendant’s conviction for cruelty to juveniles is affirmed. However, the

sentence imposed for cruelty to juveniles is vacated and the case remanded for the

imposition of a determinate sentence wherein the trial court must specify any period

of probation imposed pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 893.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; CASE
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

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NUMBER 04-564

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

STEVEN RUSSELL SEDLOCK

PETERS, J., dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion in this matter insofar as it

affirms the defendant’s conviction of cruelty to a juvenile. In my opinion, the State

of Louisiana (state) failed to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.

It is abundantly clear to me that J.T. required some degree of discipline. He

had already failed the fourth grade once and was well on his way to failing a second

time. The record reveals that J.T.’s attitude toward his educational and behavioral

obligations left much to be desired, and this attitude had existed for an extended

period of time. Thus, the defendant was faced with the task of, in some manner,

redirecting J.T.’s attention to his shortcomings at school—both from an academic and

a behavioral perspective. I do not disagree with the conclusion that the defendant’s

disciplinary measures were excessive. The question is whether they crossed the line

into criminal activity.

As pointed out by the majority, the state may prove a violation of La.R.S.

14:93(A) by establishing that the defendant intentionally mistreated or neglected J.T.

or that he did so in a criminally negligent manner. The state must also prove that the

mistreatment or neglect caused the child “unjustifiable pain or suffering.” Id.

My review of the record suggests that the state did not assert whether its case

was based on intent or negligence. However, in finding the defendant guilty of

cruelty to a juvenile, the trial court clearly rejected any conviction on the intent

provisions. In finding the defendant guilty, the trial court made the following

statement:

Cruelty to a Juvenile must be either an intentional act or criminally
negligent act. In this instance, the Court can rely even on the testimony
of Mr. Sedlock himself -- may not be exact, my quotation, but he says
I hate it that I whipped my son or I hated it. I hated that I whipped him
at the time. Because by his own testimony, he had apparently lost
control, and the amount of pain which he inflicted upon the child was
not justified by the child’s grades in school or misbehavior in school.
And although, he may not have intended to impose the pain he did -- it
doesn’t have to be extreme pain. It just has to be unjustifiable pain, and
certainly, the child did not deserve the punishment which he received.

(Emphasis added.)

Because the trial court specifically found that the defendant “may not have

intended” to impose unjustifiable pain or suffering, the only question is whether he

acted in a criminally negligent manner. As suggested by the majority, this requires

that the defendant’s conduct amount “to a gross deviation below the standard of care

expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances.”

La.R.S. 14:12.

The entire matter began with a complaint from school officials that the

defendant kicked and kneed J.T. as they left school. However, when questioned

concerning the nature of the defendant’s actions at school, all witnesses for the state

testified that they did not classify the defendant’s actions as violent but as merely

degrading or demeaning. The evidence of the degree of J.T.’s punishment at home

is conflicting. While the investigating officer claimed to have found severe injuries,

2

the trained medical personnel who examined J.T. at approximately the same time

concluded that he suffered only minor lacerations and bruises which required no

medical treatment. While the photographs do certainly serve as admissible evidence

of the alleged offense, the best evidence is that of the trained medical personnel called

to the scene.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court found no gross deviation below the

reasonably careful man standard. It found only that “the amount of pain [the

defendant] inflicted upon the child was not justified by the child’s grades in school

or misbehavior in school.” This finding is insufficient to convict the defendant under

La.R.S. 14:93.

The trial record establishes that the defendant has a criminal history. It also

seems to establish that the defendant’s motivation in punishing his child was to

impress upon J.T. his father’s desire that J.T. not repeat his father’s mistakes. The

punishment’s emphasis was on the importance of education, not the defendant’s

desire to impose physical punishment. I do not condone the defendant’s imposition

of punishment in this case. In fact, I agree with the trial court and the majority that

the punishment imposed on J.T. did not fit the offense he committed. However, I

cannot conclude that it reached a level such that it constituted a criminal offense.

While the defendant could benefit from parenting classes, I do not believe that

La.R.S. 14:93 was intended to apply to such a situation, especially given the fact that

the defendant could actually loose his parental rights for this conviction. See

La.Ch.Code art. 1050.

Additionally, by finding the defendant guilty of the felony offense of cruelty

to a juvenile, this court sends a chilling message to parents that corporal punishment

3

may well be a path to criminal prosecution. This opinion clearly establishes that this

punishment is not only not acceptable for J.T.’s behavior, but that it is criminal.

Should it be within our province to draw a line to state specifically the acceptable

parameters of discipline for certain behaviors? I would think not and would reverse

the conviction.

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