State of Louisiana v. Marcus Deangelo Tennors

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-538

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MARCUS DEANGELO TENNORS

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 273265
HONORABLE THOMAS MARTIN YEAGER, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy H. Ezell, and J.
David Painter, Judges.

CONVICTIONS REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

James C. Downs
District Attorney - 9th Judicial District Court
701 Murray Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
Telephone: (318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

Thomas Carl Walsh, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Drawer 1472
Alexandria, LA 71309
Telephone: (318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

Edward Kelly Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
Telephone: (337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Marcus Deangelo Tennors

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

The Defendant, Marcus Deangelo Tennors, appeals his jury convictions

for aggravated burglary and simple burglary. Because the trial court committed legal

error by discharging a juror to allow that juror to fulfill a personal obligation prior to

deliberations, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

ISSUES

The Defendant wishes us to determine whether:

(1) the trial court erred in substituting a juror prior to
deliberations;

(2) the trial court erred in admitting prejudicial “other
crimes” evidence; and,

(3) there was insufficient evidence to support
convictions for aggravated burglary and simple
burglary.

Because we find merit in the erroneous substitution of a juror prior to

deliberations, we pretermit a consideration of the other issues.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

At the conclusion of the first day of jury selection, the trial court advised

the six jurors who had not been excused as to when they should return, and advised

them that they would be called by the court if excused by backstrike the following

day. The court then addressed Dr. Robert Howell, and the following discussion took

place:

BY THE COURT:

Dr. Howell, you have a class tomorrow?

BY DR. HOWELL:

1

I do, yes. My question was whether or not we can be
reasonably sure as being let go whether the trial is over or
not by 5:30 tomorrow evening?

BY THE COURT:

Yes. Even if we don’t take a break for lunch, we’ll
be through by 5:30 tomorrow. You have to go somewhere?

BY DR. HOWELL:

I’m suppose to be officiating a football game and it’s
not the kind of thing you can call somebody 15 minutes
before and get them to replace you, so that’s why I asked.

BY THE COURT:

All right. Do you think that will be a problem, Mr.
Walsh [assistant district attorney]?

BY MR. WALSH:

Judge, I’m looking at five or six witnesses. I don’t
think it’s going to take that long.

BY MR. WILLIAMS [defense counsel]:

Judge, I believe that the time is always being
underestimated on what it will take. I don’t know how
long these witnesses are going to take and I feel very --

BY THE COURT:

Well, we will know at 12:00 so we can tell Dr.
Howell.

BY MR. WILLIAMS:

We should be able to get a better idea by then, but
rather -- as of right now, I don’t know how long this will
take.

BY THE COURT:

And, if we have to, we can just use an alternate for
that. Dr. Howell, that’s what we have an alternate for, if
you need to go officiate a football game, we’d want you to
do that and we’d substitute an alternate.

2

Prior to charging the jury, the question of what should be done to

accommodate juror Howell was raised by the court. The following dialogue forms

the basis for this assigned error:

BY THE COURT:

I need to read you jury instructions right now. Do
any of y’all need a break, a couple of you looked a little
uncomfortable. It will take about 15 minutes for me to
read this. Maybe not that long, just depending upon how
I stumble across it. Dr. Howell, it’s 4:25. Do you wish to
be excused sir?

BY MR. HOWELL:

I really hate to leave people in a very bad situation,
but I need to leave at 5:30, yes, sir.

BY THE COURT:

Well, we need to make that decision before we take
a break because I can’t let you go back there and if y’all
don’t render a verdict. I don’t know how long it will take
to render a verdict, but I can’t take the chance. I can’t keep
the alternate here. If they go back to deliberate he has to be
there. Would there be any problem if I would excuse him?
I promised him I would excuse him and substitute him --

BY MR. WALSH:

No, Judge, because you had made that commitment,
I think you made that commitment. I mean I’d rather not,
but I am not going to lodge an objection and that -- it
comes down to Mr. Williams.

BY MR. WILLIAMS:

Judge again, you -- I’m in a bad situation here. I
understand he’s got a commitment but the problem is I --
I can’t go along with excusing him at this point. I have to
lodge an objection.

BY THE COURT:

All right.

3

BY MR. WILLIAMS:

And not because I want to be a cold heart and I want
him to miss the game, but –

BY THE COURT:

I understand.

BY MR. WALSH:

May I approach the bench with counsel?

BY THE COURT:

Yes.

BY THE COURT:

I tell you what, let us take a break, we’ll go ahead
and take a break for 5 minutes. If y’all will be excused and
come right back. We can go off the record and we can take
this up in just a little bit.

COURT RECESSES

COURT RECONVENES

BY THE COURT:

All right, Dr. Howell, I had previously -- I told you
yesterday, you said that you could not serve if you were
going to be here around 5:30 and it is now 4:37 and I’m
about to give the jury instructions and so that would mean
you would be getting to deliberate about 5 minutes until
5:00 which would give you about 20 minutes to deliberate
and then run home and then so get to where you need to be
at 5:30, so I want you to do that. And what I’m going to
substitute you with the alternate, Ms. Bynog, and I said
something to Ms. Bynog about that the other day that you
may be substituted and that you need to pay attention. So,
Dr. Howell, I apologize that you had to be here yesterday
and today and you don’t get to deliberate. You’d miss
class at Louisiana College and I apologize to you, I thought
the case would be over before then, but I appreciate your
service and I’ll excuse you. I’m going to find at this time
you’re unable to perform your duties as a juror and I will
excuse you at this time. And I’m going to order that Ms.
Bynog substitute for Dr. Howell. She will be juror number
4. All right, you’re free to go. Thank you, sir.
4

JUROR HOWELL IS EXCUSED

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 789 states the law

applicable to alternate jurors. It provides in pertinent part:

A. The court may direct that not more than six jurors in
addition to the regular panel be called and impaneled to sit
as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors, in the order in which
they are called, shall replace jurors who become unable to
perform or disqualified from performing their duties.
Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall
have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges for cause, shall take the same
oath, and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities,
and privileges as the principal jurors. If the court
determines that alternate jurors are desirable in the case,
the court shall determine the number to be chosen. The
regular peremptory challenges allowed by law shall not be
used against the alternate jurors. The court shall determine
how many additional peremptory challenges shall be
allowed, and each defendant shall have an equal number of
such challenges. The state shall have as many peremptory
challenges as the defense. The additional peremptory
challenges may be used only against alternate jurors.
Except in capital cases, an alternate juror who does not
replace a principal juror may be discharged when the jury
retires to consider its verdict.

(Emphasis added).

The trial court, over defense objection, replaced a juror with an alternate

juror, finding the juror “unable to perform” his duties due to a prior commitment to

officiate at an athletic event. When the court first indicated an intent to accommodate

Dr. Howell during voir dire, defense counsel expressed concern that the trial might

extend later than expected, but he did not formally object to the court’s stated intent.

The impropriety of releasing a juror to allow him to fulfill a personal

obligation appears to be one of first impression by this court in the context presented.

In State v. Brossette, 93-1036 (La.App. 3 Cir.), 634 So.2d 1309, writ denied, 94-0802

(La. 6/24/94), 640 So.2d 1344, this court found no error when the trial judge excused

a juror, over defense objection, who brought to his attention an employment relation

5

with a witness who testified by stipulation. The defendant contended that it was

improper to excuse a juror who was not incompetent. Even though the juror testified

that she would not be swayed to change her vote as a result of her supervisor’s

testimony being offered by stipulation, this court found that the judge could have

reasonably concluded that the juror could be affected or biased by the employment

relationship. State v. Brossette, 634 So.2d 1309.

Also, in State ex rel. Skipper v. State, 03-842, 03-844, 03-845 (La.App.

3 Cir. 12/10/03), 861 So.2d 796, writ denied, 03-3083 (La. 12/12/03), 860 So.2d

1164, writ denied, 04-03 (La. 4/23/04), 870 So.2d 298, this court found no error when

the trial court replaced a juror with an alternate juror after finding out that the juror

had an out-of-state rap sheet and time did not allow the court to ascertain immediately

if the conviction shown was a felony.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. White, 153 So.2d 401

(La.1963), found the facts to be that a juror, on the fifth day of a six-day trial, advised

the trial judge that he thought he was disqualified. In the presence of counsel for both

the state and defense, but outside the presence of the defendant, the judge, without

asking the juror specifics of why he felt he had a conflict of interest, inquired whether

the juror could decide the case on the evidence and disregard the alleged conflict.

The juror responded: “It would tax me to do so.” Thereafter, the judge released the

juror and replaced him with an alternate.

The supreme court, in reversing the trial court, first discussed the

evolution of the law allowing the use of alternate jurors. The court then held in

White, 153 So.2d at 408:

It would appear to us that under the clear language
of the pertinent provisions of R.S. 15:362, reflected by the
underscored portion hereof appearing in Footnote No. 6,
the judge is without authority to excuse a juror and
substitute the alternate unless and until a juror dies, is too
6

ill to serve, or there is a Legal cause that renders him
incompetent to serve.

Interpretation of the present law found in La.Code Crim.P. art. 789

remains consistent with State v. Square, 244 So.2d 200, 237 (La.1971), vacated and

remanded on other grounds, 408 U.S. 938, 92 S.Ct. 2871 (1972), wherein the court

held, “[w]e are of the opinion that under Article 789 the jurors once selected are

expected to serve, save in cases of death, illness or other cause which renders the

juror unfit or disqualified to perform his duty.”

The issue of the removal of a juror and the substitution of an alternate

juror has almost exclusively been reviewed in the context of a juror who has become

disqualified after being empaneled. In State v. Rounsavall, 337 So.2d 190 (La.1976)

and State v. Buggage, 351 So.2d 95 (La.1977), both of which were later expressly

overruled in State v. Marshall, 410 So.2d 1116 (La.1982), the Louisiana Supreme

Court refused to countenance replacing jurors who became disqualified or unable to

serve after having been sworn with alternate jurors, holding that once sworn, jurors

could be discharged only if found to be incompetent. In Rounsavall, 337 So.2d 95,

a juror failed to disclose during voir dire his acquaintance with a member of the

district attorney’s office, and in Buggage, 351 So.2d 95, a juror, after being sworn in

a capital murder case, made known that she had misunderstood questions in voir dire

and was opposed to the death penalty.

In Marshall, 410 So.2d at 1118, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that

the trial court correctly discharged a juror who, after being sworn, was determined to

be “not impartial,” as “unable to perform or disqualified from performing” her duty

under La.Code Crim.P. art. 789. Both State v. Rounsavall, 337 So.2d 190 and State

v. Buggage, 351 So.2d 95, which had held that jurors, once sworn, could not be

discharged unless they became incompetent to serve were overruled.

7

In State v. Cass, 356 So.2d 396, 397 (La.1977), the supreme court

reversed a conviction, finding the judge erred in replacing a juror whom he thought

to be sleeping. The court stated:

Defendant contends in these assignments of error
that the trial judge erred in removing a juror during trial
and substituting an alternate juror in his place when the
juror allegedly fell asleep during the victim’s testimony on
cross-examination. Defendant argues that the conduct of
the juror did not render him unfit or disqualified to perform
his duties and, hence, he was improperly removed. In
explaining his reasons for removing the juror, the trial
judge stated that when he observed the juror sleeping he
became concerned that he was ill. After the juror was
removed and replaced, defendant moved for a mistrial,
which the trial judge denied.

The record indicates that shortly before the end of
the first day of trial the judge apparently noticed that one
of the jurors appeared to be asleep. The judge indicated
that the juror’s head was hanging low, often-times bobbing
or nodding, and his eyes were closed. After two to four
minutes of such observation the judge summarily ordered
the removal of the juror. Before leaving the courtroom the
juror twice stated aloud that he had not been asleep.

Article 789 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure provides in pertinent part:

“The court may direct that one or two jurors
in addition to the regular panel be called and
impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate
jurors, in the order in which they are called,
shall replace jurors who become unable to
perform or disqualified from performing their
duties prior to the time the jury retires to
consider its verdict. . . .” (emphasis ours).

In two recent decisions rendered by this Court we
have had the opportunity to discuss the serious nature of a
trial court’s removal of a juror and the circumstances under
which such a procedure would be deemed proper. In State
v. Buggage, 351 So.2d 95, 96, decision rendered October
10, 1977 this Court, per the Chief Justice, cited the
following language authored by Justice Summers in State
v. Rounsavall, 337 So.2d 190 (La.1976) relative to the
replacing of a regular juror with an alternate:

8

“Alternate jurors are drawn and serve to
replace jurors who become unable to perform
or who are disqualified from performing their
duties prior to the time the jury retires to
consider its verdict. La.Code Crim.Pro. art.
789. And, while the court may disqualify a
prospective juror from service in a particular
case when for any reason doubt exists as to
the competency of the prospective juror to
serve in the case, ibid. arts. 783, 787, once the
trial has begun by the swearing of the first
juror selected, ibid. art. 761, and the jurors are
accepted and sworn, they may not be removed
unless they are ‘incompetent to serve’, ibid.
art. 796.

“Once a jury has been selected and sworn the
accused has a right to have his fate decided by
the particular jurors selected to try him. The
phrase ‘incompetent to serve’ embodied in
Article 796 refers to death, illness or any
other cause which renders a juror unfit or
disqualified to perform his duty as prescribed.
The right of the accused to have a juror
selected by him try the case is a substantial
one, the improper deprivation of which is
prejudicial. The doctrine of harmless error is,
therefore, inapplicable. State v. White, 244
La. 585, 153 So.2d 401 (1963); State v.
Willie, 130 La. 454, 58 So. 147 (1912).”

Consistent with State v. Buggage, supra, and State
v. Rounsavall, supra, and applying C.Cr.P. Art. 789, we
determine that even if the juror in question did briefly doze
off, such is not per se proof of inability to perform, or any
character of disqualification. Thus, there would be no legal
cause for removing him. Had the juror been shown to have
been sleeping through a substantial part of the trial or had
he been unable to stay awake despite warnings or efforts to
arouse him, and had Defendant and the State been afforded
an opportunity to explore on the record the Defendant’s
inability to perform on this account, we would be presented
with a substantially different question for review.

Under the circumstance present here, the assignment
has merit. We hold that the trial judge erred in summarily
removing the juror under the circumstances and in the
manner which he did, and in refusing Defendant’s motion
for a mistrial. For this reason, we reverse Defendant’s
conviction and sentence and remand the case for a new
trial.
9

Cass, 356 So.2d at 397-98 (footnote omitted) (emphasis and alterations in original).

Cass, 356 So.2d 396, which predated Marshall, 410 So.2d 116, and

cited with approval language found in Rounsavall, 337 So.2d 190, and Buggage, 351

So.2d 95, both of which were expressly overruled by Marshall, was not overruled and

continues to be cited as authority. In State v. Clay, 441 So.2d 1227, 1230 (La.App.

1 Cir. 1983), writ denied, 446 So.2d 1213 (La.1984) (citing Cass, 356 So.2d 396), the

court stated:

La.Code Crim.P. art. 789 provides for the
replacement of a juror with an alternate juror in the event
the former becomes unable to serve or is disqualified.
Once a jury has been selected and sworn the defendant has
a right to have his case decided by the particular jurors
selected to serve.

See also State v. Williams, 500 So.2d 811 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1986).

In State v. Delore, 381 So.2d 455, 459 (La.1980), the supreme court first

addressed the issue of substitution of jurors for physical reasons. The court stated:

After twelve jurors had been selected, court
adjourned for the day. A panel of potential alternate jurors
was summoned for the next day. During the overnight
recess, one of the jurors, Mrs. Della Perkins, became ill and
was taken to her personal physician, Dr. Edgar Landry, for
treatment. Dr. Landry testified that she was incapable of
serving, and she was excused. Counsel for defendant
contends that his motion for mistrial should have been
granted at that point.

A juror who is disabled by illness is “incompetent to
serve.” LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 796; State v. Rounsavall, 337
So.2d 190 (La., 1976). When a juror becomes incompetent
during the course of trial and no alternate is available, a
mistrial may legally be ordered because “It is physically
impossible to proceed . . . .” LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 775; State v.
Bennett, 341 So.2d 847 (La., 1977).

The trial court concluded that it was possible to
proceed with this trial “in the ordinary course,”
LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 796, because selection of the jury was not
complete. The court had directed that a panel of alternate
jurors be summoned before Mrs. Perkins became ill.
LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 789.
10

Defendant relies on State v. Carmouche, 141 La.
325, 75 So. 68 (1917) and State v. Hataway, 144 La. 138,
80 So. 227 (1918). In Carmouche and Hataway, jury
selection had been completed, and the indictment had been
read. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 765. Those trials had gone another
step in the normal order.

Absent mandatory grounds for a mistrial, it is the
function of the trier of fact to determine whether a trial
should continue. Any error in that decision is reversible
only when denial of a mistrial results in substantial
prejudice to the defendant. State v. Sepulvado, 359 So.2d
137 (La., 1978); State v. Overton, 337 So.2d 1058 (La.,
1976).

Counsel for defendant contends that his defense
strategy was hampered by the trial court’s ruling because
his twelve peremptory challenges had been exhausted. The
court minutes reflect that there was one remaining
challenge. The trial court granted the defense two
additional peremptory challenges to be used for selection
of the twelfth juror and two to be used in selection of the
two alternates. The defense used three peremptory
challenges in the process of selecting the twelfth juror and
the two alternates. The defendant’s rights were fully
protected. No prejudice is discernable.

Delore, 381 So.2d at 459-60 (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).

In State v. Spencer, 446 So.2d 1197 (La.1984), the supreme court again

confronted the issue of juror dismissal for physical reasons. In this capital case, a

juror who was confined to a wheelchair stated that he would only be unable to serve

if the housing accommodations did not have accessible restroom facilities. After

making inquiry, the judge informed the juror that the hotel could accommodate any

special needs. After the sequestered jury arrived at the hotel, it was determined that

the bathroom doors were too narrow to accommodate the juror’s wheelchair. The

trial judge, without informing either the state or defense of the problem, discharged

the juror. The supreme court held in Spencer, 446 So.2d at 1199:

First, under the circumstances of this case the
discharged juror was, because of his handicap, unable to
perform his duties as a juror. Although the jury ultimately
returned a second degree murder verdict, this was a capital
11

case in which it was required that each juror be sequestered
after he was sworn. Code of Crim.Proc. art. 791(B). The
purpose of the sequestration is to insulate the jurors from
outside influence or the possibility thereof, even
unconscious; and, in capital cases especially, the
sequestration is strictly enforced so that, upon a separation
of a juror after he is sworn, a rebuttable presumption of
misconduct and reversible error arises. State v. Parker,
372 So.2d 1037 (La.1979). To move the entire jury to
another hotel without any prior arrangements would have
been impracticable and disruptive. To separate the
handicapped juror from the jury on the chance that he
could be housed in another hotel with wider bathroom
doors would have invited reversible error. Consequently,
although the juror’s confinement to a wheel chair may not
have rendered him unable to perform his duties in another
type of case or in a situation in which more careful
prearrangements had been made, in the context of this case,
he was not able to perform as a juror.

See also State v. Womack, 592 So.2d 872 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 600

So.2d 675 (La.1992), wherein the trial court’s dismissal of a juror who continuously

complained of headaches, continuously mopped her brow with a towel, fell asleep

several times, and of whom other jurors complained that she was inflaming them by

her crying, was affirmed.

The most recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court is State v.

Fuller, 454 So.2d 119, (La.1984). The trial judge disqualified a juror after

determining that the juror had violated the sequestration order by going to the bar in

the hotel in which the jury was housed. In determining the correctness of the trial

court action, the supreme court stated:

The next morning the judge conducted a hearing and
conscientiously examined that juror and the other jurors to
determine the extent of the transgression. The juror
claimed that the only person with whom he conversed was
the barmaid. The other jurors testified that they had not
discussed the case with anyone.

Although the juror denied discussing the case or the
fact that he was a juror with the barmaid, there is no doubt
that the juror willfully disobeyed the sequestration order
and was not “secluded from outside communication”.
12

Confronted with this situation in a capital case (where
sequestration is mandatory), the judge chose to replace the
transgressing juror with an alternate. Defense counsel
objected to this action and moved for a mistrial based on
the juror’s misconduct.

The trial judge was called upon to decide whether
the juror had become disqualified to perform his duties
and, if so, what action to take. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 789. The
judge acted properly in holding an evidentiary hearing,
with all parties present, to determine the existence of a
violation of his order, the nature and extent of the
violation, and the appropriate solution to the problem.

The juror assured the judge that he did not, while in
the bar, compromise his position by discussing the case or
his status as a juror. Although a judge under some
circumstances may have been satisfied that such a showing
overcame the presumption of prejudice flowing from a
sequestration violation, the judge in this instance
determined that the essential fairness of the proceeding
could best be preserved by replacing the juror with the
properly qualified and duly selected alternate. Moreover,
the judge’s decision to replace the juror, rather than to
declare a mistrial, was largely justified by the facts that the
violation had occurred during the evening recess and that
the other jurors had denied that they were exposed to any
outside influence possibly resulting from the violation.

The trial court has discretion to utilize the service of
an alternate juror, rather than to grant a mistrial, upon a
proper finding that this is the best course of action. Thus,
when it was shown that a juror was unable to continue to
serve because of the physical disability that was involved
in State v. Spencer, 446 So.2d 1197 (La.1984), or was
“disqualified” from further service because of the blatant
display of prejudices and partiality that was involved in
State v. Marshall, 410 So.2d 1116 (La.1982), the
replacement of the juror with the alternate has been
approved by this court.

The trial judge in this case acted in a fair and
deliberative manner when he decided that the juror’s
willful violation of the order by going to the motel bar was
a sufficient ground to disqualify him from further service.
The judge also considered alternative courses of action.
Replacing the juror with the alternate under the overall
circumstances was a proper exercise of the trial judge’s
discretion.

Id. at 123.
13

In State v. Mohamed, 96-845 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/17/97), 700 So.2d 881,

the court recited a history of cases in which employment problems, although different

from the case presented herein, justified replacement of a juror. In that case, a juror

expressed his dissatisfaction with having to miss work to serve as a juror, but after

a challenge for cause was denied with the trial judge finding that an economic

situation “was not sufficient grounds for cause,” he was selected to serve. After the

juror failed to remain with other jurors during a lunch recess, and continued to

complain that the trial was costing him too much money, the trial judge ordered he

be replaced, but also ordered that he must remain for the entirety of the trial. In

affirming, the court noted:

Although the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
does not provide a definition of “incompetent,” the
Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of
“incompetent” in State v. Cass, 356 So.2d 396, 397-398,
(La.1977). In Cass, a juror allegedly fell asleep during
testimony and the trial judge summarily ordered the
removal of the juror. Prior to leaving the courtroom, the
juror twice stated aloud that he had not been sleeping.
Holding that the trial judge erred in summarily removing
the juror, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that
“incompetent,” as used in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 796, refers to
“death, illness, or any other cause which renders a juror
unfit or disqualified to perform his duty as prescribed.” Id.
Although this Court has no published opinions discussing
this particular article, other appellate courts have
interpreted it.

In State v. Robertson, 518 So.2d 579, 582-583
(La.App. 1 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 523 So.2d 227
(La.1988), a juror failed to return to the courthouse the day
after she was selected to serve on the jury because she had
learned her employer would not pay her for the days she
would spend on jury duty. Following the issuance of a
summons, the juror reported back to court. When asked by
the prosecutor whether she could be a fair and impartial
juror in light of this situation, the juror explained that she
could not because her mind would not be on the trial. The
First Circuit held that because the juror’s answers indicated
that she did not wish to serve on the jury and that she
would not be paying attention to the trial, the trial judge

14

had no choice but to excuse the juror pursuant to
LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 796.

In State v. Taylor, 545 So.2d 1237 (La.App. 2 Cir.
1989), judgm’t amended on other grounds, 551 So.2d 1332
(La.1989), a juror notified the court that he was losing
business due to his inability to work and that this situation
was causing him to be distracted from the case. The
Second Circuit held that due to the juror’s testimony that
he was unable to concentrate on the case, the trial judge’s
ruling was not an abuse of discretion. See also State v.
Wiley, 513 So.2d 849 (La.App. 2 Cir.1987), writ denied,
522 So.2d 1092 (La.1988)(trial judge properly dismissed
juror whose decision-making ability was probably impaired
and who could not concentrate on the trial because no one
was home to take care of her children).

Id. at 883.

In State v. Burns, 35, 267, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/31/01), 800 So.2d 106,

108 (alteration in original), the court, in reversing a conviction obtained after the trial

judge, on his on motion, replaced a juror he had observed to be sleeping, stated, “[a]s

noted by the supreme court in State v. Cass, supra at 397, ‘[t]he right of the accused

to have a juror selected by him try the case is a substantial one, the improper

deprivation of which is prejudicial. The doctrine of harmless error is, therefore,

inapplicable. (Citations omitted).’”

This historical retrospective makes definitive that La.Code Crim.P. art.

789 permits replacement of a juror with an alternate juror when the juror is physically

unable to serve, or when the juror is found to have become disqualified, or to have

either the real or potential for bias in the deliberations. What is not gleaned is

whether a juror’s personal business or social obligations, of which the trial court is

aware prior to his being sworn, renders that juror, after he has heard all of the

testimony, and is to be excused just as deliberations are to begin, “unable to perform

or disqualified from performing his duties.”

15

Dismissal of a juror under these facts is not a recognized or permissible

course of action under La.Code Crim.P. art. 789. Dr. Howell’s prior commitment to

officiate at a football game rendered him neither “unable to perform,” nor

“disqualified from performing” his duties. While the trial court’s desire to

accommodate jurors is commendable, such accommodation should not preempt a

defendant’s right to be tried by a properly empaneled jury selected by him.

As complained of by Defendant, equally troubling is the manner in

which the decision was made to excuse Dr. Howell, and replace him with an alternate.

In the previously quoted colloquy from the voir dire proceedings, defense counsel

expressed concern over the court’s estimation of the length of trial. The court

indicated it should be known in time to allow the juror to seek a replacement to

officiate at the football game, and then discussed the possibility of replacing him with

an alternate. However, there was no definitive ruling by the court at that time to

which Defendant could object.

When confronted with having to decide whether to release Dr. Howell,

and after defense counsel had objected to his being replaced, not only was a hearing

not held to consider the propriety of the juror’s replacement, but the matter was

apparently argued off of the record during a recess. The cited colloquy of the court’s

action in replacing Dr. Howell indicates that the court ruled following this off-record

discussion.

Defense counsel also contends that it would be a fatal error to discharge

a juror in an ex-parte hearing, outside the presence of the Defendant. This principle

has been long recognized. In White, 153 So.2d at 408-09 (footnotes omitted), the

court explained:

It would appear to us that under the clear language
of the pertinent provisions of R.S. 15:362, reflected by the
underscored portion hereof appearing in Footnote No. 6,
16

the judge is without authority to excuse a juror and
substitute the alternate unless and until a juror dies, is too
ill to serve, or there is a Legal cause that renders him
incompetent to serve. Moreover, we think, as was also
contended by defense counsel, that the ex parte hearing in
the judge’s chambers was a clear violation of the
well-settled rule universally obtaining that an accused must
be present at each and every stage of the trial from
arraignment to sentence. Under this jurisprudence and law
it is well established in Louisiana that the absence of the
defendant from the courtroom during the questioning,
challenging, and/or selecting of a juror as competent to
serve has the effect of vitiating the entire proceedings.
State v. Thomas, 128 La. 813, 55 So. 415; State v. Futrell, 159 La. 1093, 106 So. 651; State v. Layton, 180 La. 1029,
158 So. 375; and State v. Peyton, 193 La. 354, 190 So. 579.
See, also, 4 Louisiana Law Review 620 and 12 Louisiana
Law Review 178, as well as 1 Marr’s Criminal
Jurisprudence 407, Section 275.

This being so, once a juror has been qualified as
competent to serve and sworn--all in the presence of the
defendant--he cannot thereafter be disqualified as
incompetent to serve unless the defendant is present.

Subsequently, this rule was codified in La. Code Crim. P. art. 831, which provides

in pertinent part:

A. Except as may be provided by local
rules of court in accordance with Articles 522
and 551, a defendant charged with a felony
shall be present:

(1) At arraignment;

(2) When a plea of guilty, not guilty, or
not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity
is made;

(3) At the calling, examination,
challenging, empanelling, and swearing of the
jury, and at any subsequent proceedings for
the discharge of the jury or of a juror;

(4) At all times during the trial when
the court is determining and ruling on the
admissibility of evidence;

(5) In trials by jury, at all proceedings
when the jury is present, and in trials without
17

a jury, at all times when evidence is being
adduced; and,

(6) At the rendition of the verdict or
judgment, unless he voluntarily absents
himself.

While any discussion or argument on the discharge of Dr. Howell, out

of the presence of Defendant, would constitute reversible error absent exigent

circumstances, the record is unclear as to whether such violation occurred, and the

minutes are of no assistance. While the judge’s comments indicate the intent to

discuss this issue off the record, there is nothing in the record to establish that the

Defendant was not present during the entirety of any discussions.

There is nothing in the record establishing that the Defendant was not

present at any discussion about the discharge of the juror. This issue is best presented

in an application for post-conviction relief where a hearing on the issue can be

ordered if appropriate.

However, the record makes clear that a hearing to determine whether to

discharge Dr. Howell was not conducted. Both counsel made known to the court

their opposition to the discharge of the juror. Defense counsel objected to the action

of the court, and counsel for the State declined to object, while noting that he would

rather not have the juror discharged. In considering the propriety of the discharge of

the alleged sleeping juror in Cass, 356 So.2d at 398, the court stated:

Consistent with State v. Buggage, supra, and State v.
Rounsavall, supra, and applying Art. 789 C.Cr.P. we
determine that even if the juror in question did briefly doze
off, such is not per se proof of inability to perform, or any
character of disqualification. Thus, there would be no legal
cause for removing him. Had the juror been shown to have
been sleeping through a substantial part of the trial or had
he been unable to stay awake despite warnings or efforts to
arouse him, and had defendant and the state been afforded
an opportunity to explore on the record the defendant’s
inability to perform on this account, we would be presented
with a substantially different question for review.
18

Under the circumstance present here, the assignment has
merit. We hold that the trial judge erred in summarily
removing the juror under the circumstances and in the
manner which he did, and in refusing defendant’s motion
for a mistrial. For this reason, we reverse defendant’s
conviction and sentence and remand the case for a new
trial.

In Spencer, 446 So.2d 1197, the court recognized that there are

acceptable exceptions to the mandate of La.Code Crim.P. art. 831. In discussing the

discharge of the wheelchair-bound juror who could not be accommodated by the hotel

when neither the defendant nor his counsel was present, the court held:

Second, Code of Criminal Procedure article 831(3)
provides that a defendant charged with a felony shall be
present at the calling, examination, challenging,
empanelling, and swearing of the jury and “at any
subsequent proceedings for the discharge of the jury or a
juror.” Id. See State v. White, 244 La. 585, 153 So.2d 401
(1963). This rule is broader than the defendant’s
constitutional right to be present at all stages of the trial
where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the
proceedings, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.
15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), see
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-08, 54 S.Ct.
330, 332-33, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); United States v.
Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516, 521 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 922, 92 S.Ct. 959, 30 L.Ed.2d 793 (1972),
however, and does not prevent a trial court from acting
summarily to dismiss a juror in an emergency unless the
defendant can show that he has been prejudiced thereby.
Although every effort should be made to afford the
defendant and his attorney an opportunity to be present and
to be heard before a juror is discharged, situations may
sometimes arise when a respect for the rights of jurors will
require the judge to take immediate action without
consulting counsel, e.g., if a juror is taken so ill that he
cannot come to court or has a family emergency requiring
him to leave during the night or over a weekend. United
States v. Garafolo, 385 F.2d 200 (1967); vacated on other
grounds, 390 U.S. 144, 88 S.Ct. 841, 19 L.Ed.2d 970
(1968); United States v. Houlihan, 332 F.2d 8 (2d
Cir.1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 828, 85 S.Ct. 56, 13
L.Ed.2d 37 (1964).

In the present case, the judge’s proper respect for the rights
and needs of the handicapped juror required him to take
immediate action without consulting counsel. The
19

handicapped juror had placed the court and counsel on
notice of the risk that he would be unable to serve if the
hotel bathroom facilities were inadequate. Accordingly,
when it was learned at 6:30 p.m. after the court had
recessed for the day, that the handicapped juror who had
been sequestered in this capital case was unable to use the
toilet facilities in the hotel where the jury was sequestered,
the trial judge was presented with an emergency justifying
his summary action. In the absence of such an exigency, of
course, the judge would have been obliged to conduct a
hearing or at least confer with counsel in chambers or by
telephone before taking action. However, under exigent
circumstances summary action does not constitute error in
the absence of a showing of prejudice, and defendant has
shown none.

Id. at 1199-1200.

In Fuller, 454 So.2d 119, the Louisiana Supreme Court again recognized

the propriety of holding an evidentiary hearing. This court in a civil context has

reviewed much of the jurisprudence cited herein as to both the necessity of holding

an evidentiary hearing, and the exceptions thereto. In Green v. K-Mart, 01-675, pp.

3-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/18/03), 849 So.2d 814, 819-21, rev’d, in part, on other grounds,

03-2495 (La. 5/25/04), 874 So.2d 838 (alterations in original), the court in elaborating

on the correctness of its interlocutory ruling on the dismissal of a juror, stated:

While we find that our former ruling denying writs
pertaining to juror Williams’ dismissal is conclusive, we
elaborate on the reasons why we denied writs in the first
instance. “Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are
called, shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury
retires to consider its verdict, become unable or
disqualified to perform their duties.” La.Code Civ.P. art.
1769(B). On the day the trial court disqualified Williams,
it stated its reasons for doing so as follows:

We have a juror, a Mr. Carlton Williams who
has not appeared for jury duty this morning.
It is now ten minutes to ten. All the jurors
were instructed to be here promptly at nine
o’clock. The Court wants to note for the
record that since the selection of Mr.
Williams on Monday that attorneys from both
sides have expressed some concern about Mr.
Williams not paying attention, perhaps
20

sleeping from time-to-time. The Court has
also noted that and had conversations with the
attorneys concerning that and expressed the
Court’s concern at Mr. Williams’ lack of
attention. He has been late and has in effect
disappeared from time to time at recesses
causing even more concern for the Court. So,
his failure to appear this morning even though
we’ve waited for fifty minutes for him, his
failure to appear this morning is no surprise to
the Court. For those reasons the Court is
going to declare that--a vacancy due to his
absence, and will appoint the first alternate
juror, Mr. Melancon. . . .

After counsel for K-Mart objected to the
appointment of the alternate juror, the trial court went on
to say:

I forgot to mention that I personally attempted
to call the residence of Mr. Williams
immediately before coming into court, that I
secured the phone number from a
questionnaire that was previously sent to all
jurors just to provide their name, address,
phone number, and basic information. I
phoned that--called that number personally,
there was no answer after a number of rings
that anyone who would’ve been there would
have heard and would have answered the
telephone.

....

Let me state also for the record that since the
concerns began with Mr. Williams that the
Court has tried to observe him from
time-to-time and his actions, and he does
appear at most times not to be paying
attention. He appears to be looking down at
his note pad, but does not appear to be writing
anything, although the Court could be
misinterpreting that. Nevertheless, it’s my
view that his absence is indicative of his
performance as a juror throughout the trial. .
..

When juror Williams was questioned as to his
tardiness, he responded that he was late because he “was
watching [his] little brother and we don’t have no
phone. . . . We don’t have no car, no transportation or
21

nothing.” K-Mart argues that, if we find that Williams was
properly disqualified, we are in effect saying that jurors
must be able to afford reliable transportation and have a
telephone in order to serve on a jury. We disagree.

While these particular facts have not presented
themselves in this court before, our colleagues in the first
circuit addressed facts similar to those presented here. In
State v. Williams, 500 So.2d 811 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1986),
court was scheduled to commence at 10:30 a.m., but one
juror, Ms. Hatch, was not present at roll call. The bailiff
telephoned the Hatch home, but no one answered. At
10:40 a.m., the court ordered that an alternate juror replace
Hatch. Thereafter, while routine procedural matters were
being handled, but before the commencement of the trial,
Hatch arrived. The court ordered her to be jailed for failing
to notify the court that she would be late. At that point,
Hatch replied that she had car trouble and could not get to
a telephone. The court proceeded with the alternate.

The first circuit stated that a “juror may not be
discharged unless he is found incompetent to serve because
of death, illness, or any other cause which renders a juror
unable or disqualified to perform his duty.” Id. at 814.
The court went on to discuss State v. Cass, 356 So.2d 396
(La.1977), where the trial court dismissed a juror for
sleeping for two to four minutes while testimony was being
presented. The supreme court found that this behavior did
not constitute cause to discharge the juror and that the trial
court erred in failing to allow the defendant an opportunity
to explore the juror's inability to perform.

The appellate court then examined the case of State
v. Clay, 441 So.2d 1227 (La.App. 1 Cir.1983), writ denied,
446 So.2d 1213 (La.1984), where the juror was discharged
because she called the morning of the second day of trial to
say she could not attend due to a family problem. On
appeal, the first circuit distinguished Clay from Cass,
because in Clay, the juror was unavailable for questioning
as to her ability to serve. In Cass, the juror was present to
be questioned in front of the defendant. Therefore, the
finding of the trial court was upheld by the first circuit
because it acted in a reasonably prudent manner in
replacing the juror.

The appellate court further stated that at the time the
trial court was called upon to make a decision whether to
replace Hatch with the alternate, she was unavailable, as
her whereabouts and reason for absence were unknown;
her subsequent arrival was irrelevant. Thus, in accordance

22

with Clay, the appellate court found the trial court acted in
a reasonably prudent manner in replacing the juror.

Likewise, we find that the trial court acted in a
reasonably prudent manner in replacing Williams, who was
fifty minutes late for court, did not telephone to indicate he
would be late, was not available at the telephone number
he provided to the court, and was not performing his duties
as a juror. We agree with the first circuit that an absent and
unavailable juror cannot be questioned as to his inability to
perform his duties. Williams’ eventual appearance was of
no moment as the trial court could not predict when he
would appear. After making reasonable efforts to contact
him and delaying the progress of the trial by fifty minutes,
we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
disqualifying Williams from jury service. This assignment
of error is dismissed as being without merit.

The trial court’s well-intentioned release of a juror to allow him to fulfill

a personal or business obligation deprived the Defendant of his “substantial” right to

be tried by a jury selected by him. Further, summarily dismissing the juror without

holding an evidentiary hearing, particularly since the juror was available, constitutes

reversible error. None of the recognized exigent circumstances justifying summary

action by the court was present.

In its brief, the State informs us that the verdict was unanimous, thus

implying that the alleged error was harmless. We disagree. In State v. Cass, 356

So.2d 396, 397 (La.1977), the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the application of

a harmless error analysis without referencing either the United States or Louisiana

Constitution. The court, citing State v. Rounsavall, 337 So.2d 190 (La.1976) stated:

Once a jury has been selected and sworn the accused has a
right to have his fate decided by the particular jurors
selected to try him. The phrase ‘incompetent to serve’
embodied in Article 796 refers to death, illness or any other
cause which renders a juror unfit or disqualified to perform
his duty as prescribed. The right of the accused to have a
juror selected by him to try the case is a substantial one, the
improper deprivation of which is prejudicial. The doctrine
of harmless error is, therefore, inapplicable. State v. White,

23

244 La. 585, 153 So.2d 401 (1963); State v. Willie, 130 La.
454, 58 So. 147 (1912).1

Moreover, the discharge of a juror for personal or business reasons prior

to deliberations, as in this case, is a structural error which “affects the framework

within which the trial proceeds, rather than an error in the trial process. It defies

harmless error standards and cannot be quantitatively measured.” State v. Jones, 98-

1165 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/99), 734 So.2d 670, 673. See also, State v. Langley, 04-269

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/29/04), 896 So.2d 200.

Therefore, this assignment has merit. We reverse the Defendant’s

convictions for aggravated burglary and simple burglary and remand for a new trial.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions for

aggravated burglary and simple burglary and remand to the trial court for a new trial.

CONVICTIONS REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED FOR A

NEW TRIAL.

1
State v. Marshall, 410 So.2d 1116 (La.1982) overruled State v. Rounsavall. State v. Cass
pre-dated Marshall, but continues to be cited as sound jurisprudential authority.

24