State of Louisiana v. Patrick Brian Clark

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-508

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

PATRICK BRIAN CLARK

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 275,211
HONORABLE BENJAMIN CLYDE BENNETT,
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, PRO TEMPORE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Harold A. Van Dyke, III
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 1472
Alexandria, Louisiana 71309-1472
(318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

James E. Beal
Post Office Box 307
Jonesboro, Louisiana 71251-307
(318) 259-2391
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Patrick Brian Clark

GENOVESE, Judge.

On October 1, 2004, the Defendant, Patrick Brian Clark, was charged by bill

of information with one count of attempted second degree murder, a violation of

La.R.S. 14:30.1 and La.R.S. 14:27. On October 18, 2005, the Defendant waived his

right to a jury trial, and on October 19, 2005, a bench trial was held whereupon the

trial court found the Defendant guilty of the offense as charged.

The Defendant then filed a motion for new trial; that motion was denied by the

trial court on October 27, 2005. After observing a twenty-four-hour delay, the trial

court sentenced the Defendant to imprisonment for a term of twenty-five years at hard

labor, without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The

Defendant orally moved for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied by the

trial court.

The Defendant has appealed, asserting that his sentence is excessive. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On June 9, 2004, Tandra Clark went to the Wal-Mart store in Alexandria,

Louisiana, with her daughter, Destiny Green, Victoria Briggs and David Briggs, and

their daughter India Smith. After leaving Wal-Mart, Victoria Briggs noticed their car

being followed by the Defendant in his car. The group then drove to Lesser Grocery,

and the Defendant parked his car immediately adjacent to theirs. The Defendant

spoke to Tandra Clark, his former wife, and then exited his car. Ms. Clark showed

the Defendant a restraining order and requested that he stay away. Ms. Clark then

attempted to go into the store, but before she could do so, the Defendant struck her

in the back of the head. He verbally threatened Ms. Clark and then returned to his

car. The Defendant then exited his car, carrying a “crowbar tool,” which he then used

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to strike Ms. Clark. The Defendant then struck the victim twice with the tool and fled

the scene.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that there

is one error patent.

The trial court improperly informed the Defendant “that any application for

post-conviction relief must be filed within two years before this conviction - before

this sentence becomes final.” According to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, however, an

application for post-conviction relief must be filed within two years after the

judgment of conviction and sentence has become final. Therefore, we remand this

matter to the trial court with instructions to inform the Defendant of the correct

provisions of article 930.8 by sending appropriate written notice to the Defendant

within ten days of the rendition of this opinion and to file written proof that the

Defendant received the notice in the record of the proceedings. State v. Roe, 05-116

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1265, writ denied, 05-1762 (La. 2/10/06), 924

So.2d 163.

ANALYSIS

In his only assignment of error, the Defendant asserts that the twenty-five year

sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive and that it is not supported by the

evidence. The Defendant asserts that the sentence was excessive because the

evidence, while not sufficient for acquittal of the attempted second degree murder

charge, showed that he voluntarily left the scene, and that he did not intend to kill the

victim. Further, the Defendant claims that the trial court failed to follow the

requirements of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, and that the trial record does not clearly

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reflect whether he has a prior felony conviction nor does it show his age at the time

of the offense. Therefore, the Defendant concludes that the sentence is excessive, that

his sentence should be vacated, and that the trial court should be ordered to impose

a sentence particularized to the offender and the offense.

Initially, the record indicates that the Defendant orally moved for

reconsideration of sentence at the sentencing hearing on October 28, 2005:

BY MR. LAMPERT:

Your Honor, on behalf of the defendant I would now like to move
for a reconsider - an oral motion for reconsideration of sentence based
on our allegation that this sentence is excessive and other - and what I
think will become broadly known as the Dorthey Consideration is that
this would not serve a penal interest.

When a defendant fails to assert specific grounds for excessiveness, he is then limited

on appeal to a review of a bare claim of excessiveness. State v. Mims, 619 So.2d

1059 (La.1993).

This court has set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

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In order to decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[A]n appellate court may consider several factors including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose
behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for
similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize
the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

The Defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a violation

of La.R.S. 14:30.1 and La.R.S. 14:27. A person convicted of attempted second

degree murder shall be imprisoned for “not less than ten, nor more than fifty years

without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.” La.R.S. 14:27.

When sentencing the Defendant, the trial court stated:

The Court has examined your record and find [sic] that this is not
the first crime of violence of which you’ve been convicted. That you
have displayed violence toward your fellow man on more than one
occasion before and not simply fights, I’m talking about putting people
in jeopardy of losing their lives, taking somebody’s life. In this
particular case it was testified by several witnesses that you said, I’m
going to kill you. You knocked this lady down, you got a tire tool and
you hit her in the head twice. Unless you get some correctional
treatment, in which you need [sic], I’m afraid you’re going to end up
taking somebody’s life. I don’t know if it’s a violent temper you have or
what but you - you need - you are in the need of correctional treatment.
If there is any suspended sentence of probation I would be fearful for
your wife’s life. At any - and I’m going to impose a sentence and
determine that any lesser sentence would not address the seriousness of
the crime.

I have considered all the - the guidelines under Article 894.1 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure and before I impose the sentence I want
you to understand that any application for post-conviction relief must be

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filed within two years before this conviction - before this sentence
becomes final. I now sentence you to the custody of the Department of
Corrections of the State of Louisiana, to serve a period of twenty-five
years without the benefit of parole. That’s all.

The Defendant’s sentence is in the middle of the range between the minimum

ten years and the maximum fifty years for the convicted offense. A pertinent review

of sentencings for attempted second degree murder is set forth in State v. Napoleon,

01-1222, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/26/02), 811 So.2d 980, 983-84, as follows:

A review of the jurisprudence indicates that similar sentences
have been upheld for defendants without prior felony records. In State
v. Ethridge, 96-1050 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/97), 688 So.2d 1274, 1276, the
Third Circuit upheld defendant’s 45 year sentence for attempted second
degree murder despite the fact defendant had no prior criminal record.
The defendant had fired six shots into the victim’s residence through a
bedroom window severely wounding the victim.

In State v. Owens, 606 So.2d 876 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992), the
Second Circuit affirmed defendant’s 30 year sentence for attempted
second degree murder despite defendant’s claim the sentence was
excessive based on his youthful age of 25 years old and the fact he had
no prior felony convictions. Defendant had fired several shots at the
victim in a crowded barroom.

In State v. Camese, 00-1943 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/11/01), 791 So.2d
173, the Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant’s 50-year sentence for
attempted second degree murder despite the fact defendant had no prior
criminal record. Defendant approached the victim at the security gate
of the victim’s apartment, pointed a gun to his head, and demanded the
victim’s car. The victim gave defendant the car at which time defendant
shot him in the head.

In the present case, defendant tricked his victims by asking for a
ride home. He pulled a gun on the high-school aged victims who were
merely being nice by giving the perpetrators a ride home. Defendant
forced Shane McCloud at gunpoint to disconnect the speakers in the
trunk of the car and hit Shane McCloud several times with the gun,
demonstrating deliberate cruelty. Shockingly, defendant then shot the
victim after he handed over the very item the perpetrators requested.
Despite defendant’s claim the shooting was an accident, the record
shows shots were fired at the prior armed robbery and there was
discussion between the perpetrators about shooting someone. Based on
these facts, we find the 25-year sentence imposed is not grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the offense nor does it shock the
conscience.

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DECREE

In view of the jurisprudence, and the detailed reasons given by the lower court,

we find that the Defendant’s sentence is not excessive. Therefore, we affirm the

Defendant’s sentence. However, this matter is remanded to the trial court with

instructions that the trial court inform the Defendant of the correct provisions of

La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 by sending appropriate written notice to the Defendant

within ten days of the rendition of this opinion and to file written proof in the record

of the proceedings that the Defendant received such notice.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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