State of Louisiana v. William A. Goodwin, Jr.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-659

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

WILLIAM A. GOODWIN, JR.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, NO. CR878-2004
HONORABLE STUART S. KAY, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

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J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, J. David Painter, and
James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Richard Frederick Blankenship
David W. Burton
District Attorney, 36th Judicial District
P. O. Box 99
DeRidder, LA 70634
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Charles Carmen Foti, Jr.
Attorney General, State of Louisiana
P. O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

David L. Wallace
P. O. Box 489
DeRidder, LA 70634
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant:
William A. Goodwin, Jr.

PAINTER, Judge.

The Defendant, William A. Goodwin, Jr., appeals the sentence imposed in

connection with his conviction for accessory after the fact to simple escape. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

The factual basis for the offense does not appear of record except in the police

report provided to Defendant in response to his Motion for Discovery and Inspection,

from which the following facts have been extracted. On November 9, 2004, trustee

inmate Frederick Bester escaped from the Beauregard Parish jail. He was captured

in Lake Charles, Louisiana along with his wife, Charise Bester. While in custody at

the Calcasieu Parish jail, Charise reported that Defendant helped Bester after his

escape. Defendant took Bester into his house, picked up Charise, and reunited the

couple at his house. Later that day, he took the two to Leesville and gave Bester

$300.00 in cash. On November 11, 2004, a deputy contacted Defendant regarding

several phone calls the Besters made to his house. He denied any contact with the

Besters.

Defendant was arrested and charged with accessory after the fact to simple

escape. He initially pled not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty as charged.

He was sentenced to twenty-four months at hard labor with credit for time served, that

sentence to be served consecutively to any previous sentence remaining unserved.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.

Defendant now appeals the sentence as excessive.

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DISCUSSION

In his motion to reconsider sentence, Defendant did not assert a specific ground

upon which he alleged his sentence to be excessive. He only stated that “[t]he

sentence imposed on the defendant is grossly out of proportion to the crime

committed . . . . Defendant would request that this Honorable Court reconsider and

change the sentence to a lesser sentence . . . .” “The failure to file a motion to

reconsider sentence, or to state a specific ground upon which the motion is based,

limits a defendant to a review of the sentence for constitutional excessiveness.

LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E).” State v. McGee, 04-963, p. 20 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/11/05),

894 So.2d 398, 412, writ denied, 05-593 (La. 5/20/05), 902 So.2d 1050.

Defendant pled guilty to accessory after the fact to simple escape, a violation

of La.R.S. 14:25 and 14:110. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:25 states, in pertinent

part, that:

Whoever becomes an accessory after the fact shall be fined not
more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard
labor, for not more than five years, or both; provided that in no case
shall his punishment be greater than one-half of the maximum provided
by law for a principal offender.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:110(B)(3) provides:

A person imprisoned, committed, or detained who commits the
crime of simple escape as defined in Paragraph A(1) of this Section shall
be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than two years nor
more than five years; provided that such sentence shall not run
concurrently with any other sentence.

At sentencing, the trial court gave reasons for the sentence, noting a prior

felony conviction for distribution of marijuana and two serious misdemeanor

convictions which were originally charged as felonies. The trial court further noticed

that Defendant’s probation on the felony offense was revoked when he committed a

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subsequent offense. Although Defendant was subsequently paroled and successfully

completed his parole, the trial court stated that it did not feel that probation and parole

were effective tools to manage Defendant’s behavior because he continued to violate

the law. The trial court stated its belief that Defendant’s behavior suggests disregard

for society’s rules and a predisposition to commit crimes.

In reviewing excessive sentence claims, this court uses the standard set forth

in State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-

43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331 (citations omitted):

La.Const. art I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence make no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. The trial court has wide discretion in
the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence
shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been
more appropriate.

To decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court considers factors

including “the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative

purpose behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for

similar crimes.” State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786,

789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061. Sentences are to be

individualized to the offender and the offense. This is the job of the trial court, which

is “in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances

presented by each case.” Id., (quoting State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674

So.2d 957, 958.)

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The maximum sentence to be imposed upon a defendant found guilty of being

an accessory after the fact to simple escape is thirty months. Defendant’s twenty-four

month sentence fell short of the maximum by six months. Considering this along

with Defendant’s prior criminal history, we find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in imposing a sentence of twenty-four months.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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