State of Louisiana v. Bradley James Noel

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-1129

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

BRADLEY JAMES NOEL

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 05-229500
HONORABLE JOHN E. CONERY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Jeffrey J. Trosclair
Assistant District Attorney
St. Mary Parish Courthouse
Franklin, LA 70538
(337) 828-4100, Ext. 550
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Mark O. Foster
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 2057
Natchitoches, LA 71457
(318) 572-5693
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Bradley James Noel

PETERS, J.

The defendant, Bradley James Noel, appeals the sentence imposed upon him

for his conviction of second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.1. In his one

assignment of error, he asserts that the sentence imposed is cruel, unusual, and

excessive, thus violating La.Const. art. I, § 20. For the following reasons, we reject

the defendant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial court sentence in all respects.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

The incident giving rise to the criminal charge occurred on January 1, 2005, at

the home of Faye Alex in St. Martin Parish, Louisiana. The defendant originally

entered a plea of not guilty to the charge, but on October 10, 2005, pursuant to a plea

agreement, changed his plea to that of nolo contendere. The trial court accepted the

defendant’s plea pursuant to the authority provided for in La.Code Crim.P. art.

552(4). At the October 10, 2005 hearing, the State of Louisiana presented the factual

basis for the charge through the testimony of Faye Alex.

According to Faye Alex, who at the time of the incident was the defendant’s

girlfriend, she and the defendant became involved in a verbal dispute at her home on

January 1, 2005. Faye Alex testified that when the defendant attempted to strike her,

Anna Alex, her mother, intervened in the altercation, and that the defendant and Anna

Alex then exchanged blows. As the defendant continued to strike her mother, Faye

Alex left the house to obtain assistance. Anna Alex lost consciousness as a result of

the defendant’s attack and was later diagnosed as having sustained a closed head

injury and a fracture of her maxillary sinus and mandible. She remained comatose for

several days, and a tracheotomy was performed to sustain her breathing.

After accepting the defendant’s plea, the trial court ordered a pre-sentence

investigative report and set sentencing for February 6, 2006. At that sentencing

hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve three years at hard labor with

credit for time served. The trial court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to

reconsider his sentence and the defendant perfected this appeal.

OPINION

In sentencing the defendant, the trial court considered the content of the pre-

sentence investigative report, the victim’s medical records, photographs of the victim,

the testimony of both Faye and Anna Alex, and the statement of the defendant. The

trial court further articulated its consideration of the sentencing guidelines found in

La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, and, in doing so, concluded that the defendant was a very

controlling person with a family history of violence. Specifically, the trial court

concluded that the defendant had abused Faye Alex in the past and was attempting

to abuse her when her mother intervened. Having made that finding, the trial court

concluded that application of the factors found in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(A)

mandated an incarceration sentence. The trial court then considered the factors found

in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(B) and concluded that a number of those factors

applied to the detriment of the defendant. Specifically, the trial court found that the

defendant was “persistently involved in domestic violence before this incident took

place,” that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the

offense, and that he was previously involved with controlled dangerous substances.

The only mitigating factors present, according to the trial court, were that the

defendant was a first felony offender, was employed, and was now involved with

another woman.

The defendant argues in brief that Faye and Anna Alex fabricated their

testimonies to the trial court at the sentencing hearing to create an impression that

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they were in constant and present danger from him. He points to the fact that, despite

this purported fear, Faye Alex resided with him for most of 2005. The defendant also

argues that the trial court failed to consider his personal, educational, and lack of

criminal history in sentencing him. We do not find that the record supports the

defendant’s arguments in this regard.

In considering the testimony of Faye and Anna Alex, the trial court found them

credible and accepted their testimonies as true. On the other hand, the trial court

found the defendant’s explanation of the offense “unbelievable.” It is the fact finder’s

role to weigh witness credibility, and the reviewing court should not second-guess

those credibility determinations beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the standard

of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). State

ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983). Here, the defendant complains

of credibility determinations made in the sentencing proceedings, not at the trial on

the merits as contemplated by the Jackson standard of review. However, the

credibility determinations remain with the trial court regardless of the nature of the

hearing at issue. We find no error in the trial court credibility determinations in this

matter.

We also find no merit in the defendant’s argument that the trial court did not

consider the mitigating factors. The trial court specifically addressed the defendant’s

background and gave him credit for a clean felony record. While the trial court did

not specifically address the defendant’s educational background, we note that the

defendant presented no evidence on that issue. We do not know if the pre-sentence

investigative report contains any reference to the defendant’s educational background

because it was not made a part of the appeal record. While La.Code Crim.P. art.

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894.1(C) requires that the trial court must “state for the record the considerations

taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence,” the trial court

is not required to use La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(B) as a check list or to articulate

every circumstance as long as the record sufficiently establishes that the trial court

adequately considered the codal guidelines in particularizing a particular defendant’s

sentence. State v. Anderson, 95-1688 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96), 677 So.2d 480. In the

matter before us, the trial court more than adequately complied with the sentencing

guidelines.

In considering the defendant’s argument that his three year sentence is

excessive, we first note that La.R.S. 14:34.1 provides a maximum sentence of five

years with or without hard labor for the offense of second degree battery. Therefore,

the defendant’s sentence is within the statutory range. Still, a sentence which falls

within the statutory limit may be excessive under the particular circumstances of a

given case. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979).

This court, in State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir.

1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-0838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d

331, stated the following concerning the reviewing court’s role in excessive sentence

claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is

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whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

In order to decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[A]n appellate court may consider several factors including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose
behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for
similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00); 766 So.2d 501.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize
the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

Second degree battery is a serious crime of violence that requires as an element

the imposition of serious bodily injury. In this case, Anna Alex sustained serious

bodily injury at the hands of the defendant. Additionally, the circumstances were

such that no justification existed for the defendant’s actions. The legislative purpose

of the significant penalty available under the statute is obviously to punish, prevent,

and protect. Finally, sentences imposed for similar offenses compare favorably to the

sentence imposed. See State v. Robertson, 98-883 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/98), 723

So.2d 500, writ denied, 99-658 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1187 (The victim

momentarily lost consciousness, suffered a three-inch laceration to her forehead and

scalp requiring seven stitches, suffered a laceration over the bridge of her nose, and

sustained bruises to her arms and legs. The defendant received a four year hard labor

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sentence) and State v. Jackson, 02-1250 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/03), 838 So.2d 841, writ

denied, 03-832 (La. 10/17/03), 855 So.2d 759 (The victim suffered a dislocated jaw

requiring corrective surgery. The defendant received a four year hard labor sentence).

Given our review of the record, we find that the trial court considered the

sentencing guidelines of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, and individualized the sentence

to the defendant. We do not find that the sentence imposed is excessive, nor do we

find that the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion in imposing the

sentence.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s sentence in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

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