State of Louisiana v. Mervin Latigue

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-1403

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MERVIN LATIGUE

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 15761-04
HONORABLE ROBERT LANE WYATT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED AND REMANDED.

Sherry Watters
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 58769
New Orleans, LA 70158-8769
(504) 723-0284
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Mervin Latigue

John F. DeRosier
District Attorney
P. O. Box 3206
Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206
(337) 437-3400
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Carla S. Sigler
Assistant District Attorney
1020 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-3400
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

DECUIR, Judge.

Defendant, Mervin Latigue, was convicted of aggravated burglary, in violation

of La.R.S. 14:60; attempted aggravated rape, in violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:42;

and aggravated battery, a lesser included offense to the charge of attempted second

degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. The trial court sentenced

Defendant to serve fifteen years at hard labor for the aggravated burglary conviction,

ten years at hard labor without benefits for the attempted aggravated rape conviction,

and five years at hard labor for the aggravated battery conviction. The sentencing

court then gave Defendant credit for time served and ordered the sentences to run

concurrently.

Defendant now appeals arguing that the State failed to meet its burden of

proving that Defendant committed attempted aggravated rape.

FACTS

At trial, the prosecution first called S.B. as a witness.1 S.B. testified that she

has been close friends with Defendant’s sister for twenty-five years. Because of

S.B.’s relationship with Defendant’s sister, Defendant had been a friendly

acquaintance. Through comments Defendant made, S.B. became aware that

Defendant was interested in her.

On July 10, 2004, S.B. went out with a couple of her friends, leaving her son,

one-and-a-half-year-old R.B., at home in the care of her daughter, sixteen-year-old

C.B. Around 1:30 a.m., S.B. received a phone call from a friend who told her

something had happened. When S.B. arrived at the friend’s house a block away from

her own home, C.B. and R.B. were there. Although C.B. said that she was okay, her

shirt was bloody, her eyes were bloodshot, her neck was marked, and she was visibly

shaking.

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In accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844, initials have been used in order to protect
the identity of the minor victim.

After speaking with C.B., S.B. went home. S.B.’s friend had called the police,

and they arrived on the scene shortly after S.B. The officers also told S.B. to remain

outside while they looked inside the house for Defendant, who C.B. had identified as

her attacker. Prevented from entering her domicile, S.B. returned to her children who

were still at her friend’s house. One of the detectives accompanied S.B. and C.B. to

the hospital so that C.B. could be examined. Once the investigation was complete,

S.B. returned home. She noticed that a window had been broken, its screen had been

torn, and things had been knocked down onto the floor. Further examination revealed

that the bed had been moved and the sheets disheveled.

C.B. confirmed that she was sixteen on July 10, 2004. On that evening, her

mother had gone out. C.B. had been taking care of her brother, R.B., and had allowed

him to sleep in her bed with her. C.B. awoke when she felt a chain loop around her

neck. C.B. recognized Defendant as he began strangling her and pulling her onto the

floor. C.B. stated that Defendant had pulled her off the end of the bed and that he had

pushed her into a position where they were still standing, but she was bending with

her face down on the bed. While behind C.B. in that position, Defendant tugged her

shorts down midway as he continued to choke her. Though startled, C.B. fought

Defendant as he strangled her. C.B. bit Defendant’s hand during the struggle. C.B.

continued to fight until she lost consciousness. C.B. also fought to prevent Defendant

from pulling down her shorts because she was sure that he was going to rape her. She

thinks that she was successful in fighting him off, but she was unsure because she

passed out.

When C.B. awoke on the floor, she saw that R.B. had gotten out of the bed and

had crawled onto the floor nearby. C.B. also noticed that Defendant was sleeping in

the bed. C.B. took R.B. and went to her next door neighbor’s house. When the next

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door neighbor did not come to the door quickly enough, C.B. took R.B. to another

neighbor’s house.

After speaking with the police, C.B. went to the hospital where a nurse

examined her. The exam revealed that Defendant had not raped her. Otherwise, C.B.

had neck injuries and marks from being strangled with the chain and bloodshot eyes

from her loss of oxygen.

Richard Gott, a drugstore manager, testified that he was working on July 10,

2004, when a store clerk called him to handle a problem with a customer. Defendant

had opened and consumed beer in the store, but he refused to pay for it. When Mr.

Gott confronted Defendant, Defendant told him that he wanted to go to jail. After the

police arrived and had read Defendant his rights, Defendant told them that he had

broken into a house and attacked a girl, but she had beat him up and gotten away.

Tammy Bailey, a nurse at Lake Charles Memorial Hospital, testified that she

is a sexual assault examiner. Ms. Bailey was called from home to examine C.B. Ms.

Bailey recounted what C.B. had told her, “She said that he came in, he put a chain

around her neck, pulled her out of the bed, and began to strangle her and tried to pull

her pants down.” There was no evidence of genital trauma.

The State also introduced Defendant’s videotaped confession into evidence.

Defendant told his interviewers that he had been trying to date S.B., but she rejected

him even though he bought her things. When Defendant drank alcohol and got high

that evening, he became very angry at S.B.’s ill treatment. Defendant went to her

house and became even angrier because she was not there; her car was gone.

Defendant took a chain off of S.B.’s fence; he wanted to choke her with it.

Defendant thought that he might have killed her if she had been home. Since S.B.

was not there to strangle, Defendant decided to choke her daughter instead.

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Defendant entered the house by breaking out the back window and crawling through.

Defendant cut himself on the glass, but he did not feel any pain because he was high.

C.B. was sleeping in the bed with her brother when Defendant entered the

room. Defendant wrapped the chain around C.B.’s neck and began to strangle her.

Defendant dragged C.B. off the bed and choked her unconscious. Defendant recalled

struggling with C.B., but did not remember her biting him. Once she was

unconscious, Defendant remembered putting her back on the bed and leaving the

house. Defendant did not remember whether he had pulled C.B.’s shorts down, but

denied entering the house with the intention of raping her. Defendant also denied

falling asleep on the bed; he was sure that C.B. was on the bed when he left.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are

two errors patent involving the sentence imposed for attempted aggravated rape.

Although the minutes of sentencing indicate that the trial court imposed the

attempted aggravated rape sentence at hard labor, the transcript of sentencing

indicates that the trial court failed to specify whether the sentence imposed for that

offense was to be served at hard labor. A sentence imposed for attempted aggravated

rape is necessarily punishable at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:42 and 14:27. Accordingly,

we amend the Defendant’s sentence to affirmatively reflect that it is to be served at

hard labor. State v. Loyden, 04-1558 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/05), 899 So.2d 166. The

district court is directed to make an entry in the minutes reflecting this amendment.

Likewise, there is no indication in the record that the trial court advised the

Defendant of the prescriptive period for filing post-conviction relief. Louisiana Code

of Criminal Procedure article 930.8 requires the trial court to advise a defendant of

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the prescriptive period at sentencing. Accordingly, the case is remanded and the trial

court instructed to inform Defendant of the La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 prescriptive

period by sending appropriate written notice to Defendant within ten days of the

rendition of this opinion and to file written proof that Defendant received the notice

in the record.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that “[t]he State failed to prove the specific intent to have

sexual intercourse necessary for attempted aggravated rape beyond a reasonable

doubt, in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Defendant contends that the

State failed to meet its burden of proof because there was no evidence of genital or

sexual contact, no evidence of an attempt to make sexual contact, and no threat or

verbalization of intent to have sexual contact. Based thereon, Defendant asks this

court to find him not guilty. Alternatively, Defendant asks this court to find that the

prosecution only proved attempted forcible rape.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, a
reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential
elements of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99
S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676,
678 (La.1984).

State v. Leger, 05-0011, p. 91 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 170.

This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.C.Cr.P. art. 821, does
not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own
appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact-finder. State v.
Robertson, 96-1048, p. 1 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165; State v.
Lubrano, 563 So.2d 847, 850 (La.1990). A reviewing court may
intervene in the trier of fact’s decision only to the extent necessary to
guarantee due process of law. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310
(La.1988).

State v. Pigford, 05-0477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 521.

In 2004, aggravated rape was defined, in pertinent part, as:

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[A] rape committed . . . where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual
intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim because
it is committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:

(1) When the victim resists the act to the utmost, but whose
resistance is overcome by force;

....

(3) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act because
the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.

La.R.S. 14:42; 2003 La. Acts No. 795, § 1. Attempt occurs when any person

specifically intends to commit a crime, and he does or omits an act for the purpose of

committing the crime when the act tends directly toward the accomplishment of his

objective. La.R.S. 14:27(A).

In the instant case, Defendant admitted that he had attacked C.B., but he had

been too high to say much of anything. Instead, Defendant demonstrated his intent

to have sex by wrestling C.B. into a vulnerable position and pulling down her shorts.

C.B. resisted to her utmost by fighting, but Defendant overcame her resistance by

throttling her unconscious. Additionally, Defendant used a dangerous weapon to

commit the crime; he used a chain to strangle C.B. The force implemented by

Defendant left bruises on C.B.’s throat and ruptured blood vessels in both of her eyes.

Defendant cites to State v. Trackling, 609 So.2d 206 (La.1992) in support of

his complaint. In Trackling, the supreme court found that there was insufficient

evidence to prove that the defendant had committed attempted aggravated rape

because “[t]he record is bereft of evidence that the sexual act the defendant attempted

to accomplish was either vaginal or anal intercourse.” Id. at 208. During the attack,

Trackling stated his intention to have the victim perform oral sex on him and also

testified at trial that oral sex was his intent. At the time of the offense, oral sex was

not included in the aggravated rape statute. La.R.S. 14:42; 1984 La. Acts No. 579,

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§ 1. Even though the Trackling court noted that evidence showing a defendant

forcibly grabbed a victim while announcing his intent to have sexual intercourse was

sufficient to support an attempted rape conviction, the supreme court did not limit

proof of specific intent to announcement. Trackling, 609 So.2d at 206.

Defendant also cites to State v. Parish, 405 So.2d 1080 (La.1981) in support

of his argument. In Parish, the supreme court, on rehearing, reduced the defendant’s

conviction for attempted aggravated rape to attempted forcible rape. The supreme

court determined that, in order to have proven the offense, the State must have

introduced evidence showing that Parish had the specific intent to commit aggravated

rape and that he performed an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward

accomplishing aggravated rape. Id.

The instant case is distinguishable from Parish. Parish declared his intent to

have sex. Parish used minimal force, initially grabbing his victim by the throat, but

releasing her throat before he dragged her toward her bedroom. As he never fondled

or groped his victim, Parish only had minimal contact with his victim. The victim in

Parish did not physically resist, fight to get away, or physically try to stop the attack.

Defendant in the instant case used a dangerous weapon, used a much greater amount

of force to subdue a struggling victim, and actually tried to disrobe C.B.

In contrast, the facts of Defendant’s case are closer to the facts found in State

v. Williams, 490 So.2d 255, 261 (La.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct.

3277 (1987). Contrary to Defendant’s arguments, the Williams court found evidence

sufficient to support attempted aggravated rape where the defendant did not verbalize

his intent and where the defendant did not grope the victim’s anus or genitals. The

evidence presented at trial showed that the victim had entered her bathroom; and after

sitting on the toilet, she noticed Williams standing with his pants off behind the

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bathroom door. When the victim began to scream, Williams locked the bathroom

door and stabbed her with a knife. The supreme court determined that “[t]he most

reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case would

support a finding that the defendant attempted to commit aggravated rape on” the

victim. Id. at 261.

Under the reasoning in Williams, the trial court could have found proof beyond

a reasonable doubt that the State proved Defendant attempted to commit aggravated

rape when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

Accordingly, Defendant’s assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed. We amend the sentence imposed for

attempted aggravated rape to affirmatively reflect that it is to be served at hard labor.

The district court is directed to make an entry in the minutes reflecting this

amendment. Additionally, we remand the case with the instructions that the trial

court inform the Defendant of the La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 prescriptive period by

sending appropriate written notice to Defendant within ten days of the rendition of

this opinion and the district court is to file into the record written proof Defendant

received the notice.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED AND REMANDED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules,
Courts of Appeal.

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