State of Louisiana v. Kaishus K. King

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-1502

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

KAISHUS K. KING

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 8430-03
HONORABLE DAVID A. RITCHIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Jimmie C. Peters, and Glenn B. Gremillion,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John F. Derosier
District Attorney
Ric Oustalet
Carla S. Sigler
Assistant District Attorneys
Fourteenth Judicial District
1020 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Sherry Watters
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 58769
New Orleans, LA 70158-8769
(504) 723-0284
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Kaishus K. King

PETERS, J.

The defendant, Kaishus King, appeals the sentence imposed as a result of his

conviction for armed robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:64. In his one assignment of

error, he asserts that the trial court imposed an unconstitutionally excessive sentence.

For the following reasons, we affirm the sentence in all respects.

On January 24, 2003, the defendant entered the home of seventy-six-year-old

Mary Gani, produced a gun, pointed the gun at Ms. Gani, demanded money from her,

and subsequently bound her with duct tape. As a result of the defendant’s actions on

that date, the State of Louisiana (state) charged him with aggravated burglary, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:60; false imprisonment while armed with a dangerous

weapon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:46.1; and illegal possession of a stolen firearm, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:69.1, in addition to the offense of armed robbery. Pursuant

to a plea agreement in which the state dismissed a number of charges,1 the defendant

entered a guilty plea to the armed robbery charge. Thereafter, the trial court

sentenced him to serve twenty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant then filed a motion to reconsider

his sentence. In response to that motion, the trial court vacated the twenty-year

sentence and sentenced the defendant to serve twelve years at hard labor, without

benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court subsequently

rejected the defendant’s motion to reconsider that sentence, and he perfected this

appeal.

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant asserts that his sentence is

excessive in that the trial court failed to consider certain mitigating factors.

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The state dismissed the other charges arising from this incident as well as well as four other
felony charges which arose from the defendant’s acts or omissions while awaiting trial on the instant
offense.

Specifically, the defendant asserts that the trial court failed to consider that he had a

drug problem, that he did not physically harm Ms. Gani nor did he intend to harm her,

that he accepted responsibility for his actions, and that he expressed remorse for his

actions at the plea hearing.

In initially sentencing the defendant, the trial court stated that it had read a

number of letters filed on behalf of the defendant which indicated that he was raised

in a respectful home and was exposed to the Church as he grew up. However, the

trial court then noted that, despite these positive influences on his life, he choose a

different, inexcusable, path in life. The trial court further noted that, when bonded

out of jail, the defendant immediately went back to his criminal activities. Thus, there

was obviously little or no assistance from those who had written letters on his behalf,

and the trial court chose not to give any credence to those letters. In other words, the

defendant “was raised better than most people” but this was not “an excuse to keep

[him] out of jail.” The trial court further recognized that the defendant had potential,

but that he had squandered that potential, and that the victim requested that the

defendant receive the maximum sentence. After reading the victim’s letter into the

record, the trial court commented on the effect the defendant’s actions had on Ms.

Gani, including her immediate fear at the time of the offense and the residual fear that

she has suffered. In finally sentencing the defendant, the trial court stated the

following:

I have considered a lot of, a lot of numbers. I have considered a pretty
high number, Mr. King. The only, the only thing that keeps me from
giving you 30 or 40 or 50 years is that, is that I do think, based on all the
letters that I have received from people who have stated that they know
you well, I guess they believe that you went through a, I guess a period
in your life that might allow you to have some redemption at some point
when you get out of jail, and that - - and I know Ms. Gani is 78 years
old, and my intention is to make sure that I give you a sentence that

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makes her feel comfortable that she never has to worry about ever seeing
you ever again in her lifetime.

The trial court subsequently set aside the initial sentence and sentenced the defendant

to twelve years instead of twenty. In doing so, the trial court stated that the basis for

the reduction was to treat the defendant substantially the same as his co-defendant

had been treated.2

As we pointed out in State v. Gregrich, 99-178, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10/13/99), 745 So.2d 694, 697:

La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 contains a series of factors to be
considered by a trial court in sentencing a defendant. In considering
these sentencing guidelines, the trial court must “state for the record the
considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in
imposing sentence.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(C). However, to
comply with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(C), the trial court is not
required to “articulate every circumstance or read through a checklist of
items.” State v. Anderson, 95-1688, p.4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96); 677
So.2d 480, 483. Still, the record should sufficiently establish that the
trial court adequately considered the codal guidelines in particularizing
a defendant’s sentence. Id. In this case, we find that the trial court did
adequately comply with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(C), although it did
not specifically state in each instance which section or subsection of the
Article it was considering and merely stated that it had “reviewed
Article 894.1 sentencing guidelines.” We note that “[i]f there is an
adequate factual basis for the sentence contained in the record, the trial
court’s failure to articulate every circumstance listed in Article 894.1
will not necessitate a remand for resentencing.” Anderson, 677 So.2d
at 483.

While the trial court did not expressly address the factors found in La.Code

Crim.P. art. 894.1, it did specifically address the effect the sentence would have on

the defendant, given his age, as well as the defendant’s expression of remorse.

Additionally, we note that the defendant benefitted significantly from the plea

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His co-defendant and older cousin, Bryan King, received a sentence of twenty years with ten
years suspended and five years probation.

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agreement by drastically limiting his incarceration exposure through the dismissal of

the other felony charges.

[A] substantial advantage obtained by means of a plea bargain is a
legitimate consideration in sentencing. Where a defendant has plead
guilty to an offense which does not adequately describe his conduct or
has received a significant reduction in potential exposure to confinement
through a plea bargain, the trial court has great discretion in imposing
even the maximum sentence possible for the pled offense.

State v. Wynne, 40,921 p.11 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/12/06), 926 So.2d 789, 797 (citations

omitted).

Finally, we note that the maximum incarceration sentence for armed robbery

is “ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”

La.R.S. 14:64(B). Thus, the defendant’s sentence is well within the statutory limits

of that statute. The trial court has wide discretion in sentencing a defendant and a

sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be set aside as excessive absent

a manifest abuse of that wide discretion. State v. Howard, 414 So.2d 1210 (La.1982).

We find no abuse of the trial court’s wide discretion in the sentence imposed on the

defendant.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s sentence in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule
2-16.3, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.

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