KA-0007-0008 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Tracey H. Westfall

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed May 2, 2007

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-8

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TRACEY H. WESTFALL

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, DOCKET NO. CR-26-06
HONORABLE HERMAN I. STEWART, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Osward A. Decuir, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Mary Constance Hanes
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 4015
New Orleans, Louisiana 70178-4015
(504) 866-6652
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Tracey H. Westfall

David W. Burton
District Attorney - Thirty-sixth Judicial District
ADA James R. Lestage
Post Office Box 99
DeRidder, Louisiana 70634
(337) 463-5578
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

GENOVESE, Judge.

On January 19, 2006, Defendant, Tracey H. Westfall, was charged by bill of

information with four counts of obtaining a controlled dangerous substance (CDS)

by fraud, in violation of La.R.S. 40:971(B)(1)(b). On August 23, 2006, Defendant

pled guilty to all four counts. Defendant was sentenced on October 26, 2006 to two

and one-half years at hard labor on each count with the sentences to run concurrently.

The trial court also imposed a $250.00 fine and court costs on each count. On

November 2, 2006, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence which was

denied on the same day. On November 6, 2006, Defendant filed an appeal and is now

before this court alleging that her sentence is excessive. We find Defendant’s

sentence is not excessive.

FACTS

The following facts were adduced at Defendant’s plea hearing: During the

months of September and October of 2005, Defendant fraudulently obtained

Hydrocodone and Alprazolam (Xanax).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In her sole assignment of error, Defendant asserts that her sentence of two and

one-half years on each count is excessive as applied to the particular circumstances

of her case, which is the same assertion she made in her motion to reconsider

sentence. As Defendant’s only assignment of error is that her sentence is excessive,

we will evaluate her claim as a bare claim of excessiveness.

This court has set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive

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sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether
the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether
another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook,
95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43,

writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

In order to decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[A]n appellate court may consider several factors including the
nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative
purpose behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences
imposed for similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-606 (La. 7/6/00), 766
So.2d 501
. While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes
may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize
the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

In this case, Defendant pled guilty to four counts of obtaining a CDS by fraud,

in violation of La.R.S. 40:971(B)(1)(b). The sentence for obtaining a CDS by fraud

is up to five years in jail, and up to a $5,000.00 fine. See La.R.S. 40:971(B)(2).

Subsequent to pleading guilty to four counts of obtaining a CDS by fraud, Defendant

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was sentenced on each of the four counts to two and one-half years at hard labor and

was ordered to pay a $250.00 fine as well as court costs, with the sentences on all

four counts to run concurrently with each other. In imposing its sentence, the trial

court reviewed Defendant’s criminal history, which included: a previous conviction

for ten counts of obtaining a CDS by fraud on January 30, 2003; bank fraud on April

19, 2004; six counts of obtaining a CDS by fraud and one count of identity theft on

April 5, 2006; and felony theft on June 19, 2006. In summarizing Defendant’s

criminal history, the court stated, “[y]ou now have six separate felony convictions

. . . . To my knowledge, you have not previously been incarcerated for any of your

convictions, except perhaps for a short period following your arrest.” The trial court

went on to comment, “I find that the aggravating conditions of your criminal history

far outweigh the mitigating factors; and based on your criminal history, I do not find

that you would be a good candidate for probation.” In this case, Defendant, a

registered nurse with a history of this type of activity, wrote herself prescriptions for

Hydrocodone and Alprazolam (Xanax), allegedly for depression.

We find that the sentence imposed by the court is supported by the record and

is not excessive. See State v. Buckhalter, 480 So.2d 839 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1985), in

which the court affirmed a two-year sentence for attempting to obtain a CDS by fraud,

holding the sentence was not excessive. In Buckhalter, at the conclusion of her trial,

Defendant was sentenced to two years at hard labor, and the court noted that because

of Defendant’s history of drug involvement, there would be an undue risk that she

would commit a similar crime. Id.

It is noteworthy that Defendant’s sentence of two and one-half years is half of

the maximum that she could have received under the statute. Based on the facts and

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circumstances presented in the record, we find that Defendant’s sentence was not

excessive.

DISPOSITION

We find that the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendant to two and one-

half years at hard labor on each count plus a $250.00 fine and court costs subsequent

to her pleading guilty to four counts of obtaining a CDS by fraud, as said sentence is

supported by the record. Consequently, Defendant’s sentence is affirmed in its

entirety.

AFFIRMED.

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