State of Louisiana v. Deurlo Derrick Champagne

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-97

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DEURLO DERRICK CHAMPAGNE

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. CR-360-05-1
HONORABLE WENDELL R. MILLER, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Oswald A. Decuir, and Marc T. Amy, Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Michael Cade Cassidy
District Attorney
Post Office Box 1388
Jennings, LA 70546
(337) 824-1893
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

W. Jarred Franklin
Louisiana Appellate Project
3001 Old Minden Road
Bossier City, LA 71112
(318) 746-7467
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Deurlo Derrick Champagne

AMY, Judge.

On April 19, 2005, the defendant, Deurlo Derrick Champagne, was driving a

rental vehicle from Texas to Florida when he and his passenger were stopped by a

Louisiana State Trooper for a traffic violation. Thirty pounds of marijuana were

subsequently discovered in the vehicle’s trunk. The defendant and his passenger

were arrested and charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a

violation of La.R.S. 40:966. The defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to ten

years at hard labor, with the first five years to be served without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He was given credit for time served.

Upon the denial of his motion to reconsider sentence, the defendant perfected this

appeal, arguing the excessiveness of his sentence. For the following reasons, we

affirm as amended and remand with instructions.

Discussion

Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find one error

patent in need of correction.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:966(B)(3) states that the penalty for possession

of marijuana with intent to distribute is imprisonment at hard labor “for not less than

five nor more than thirty years” and “a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars.”

Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years at hard labor, with the first

five years to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence. The statute does not require or authorize the denial of these benefits.

Therefore, pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 882, we amend the defendant’s sentence

to delete the denial of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the first five

years of his sentence. See State v. Yarbrough, 596 So.2d 311 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ

denied, 599 So.2d 317 (La.1992) (wherein this court amended the portion of the

defendant’s sentence that precluded parole, probation, or suspension of sentence

where the preclusion of those benefits was not authorized by statute). The trial court

is instructed to note the amendment in the court minutes.

Excessive Sentence

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that his sentence “is

excessive for this offender and offense.” He contends that the trial court did not

adequately consider certain mitigating factors. The defendant points out that prior to

his arrest in this case, he “had led an otherwise law-abiding life, been a productive

member of society (as evidenced by his work record) and supported his family.” He

contends that his imprisonment would cause excessive hardship on his dependents.

In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p.12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d

1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, this court articulated

the standard for reviewing excessive sentence claims:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

2

Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:966(B)(3), a person convicted of possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute shall serve “a term of imprisonment at hard labor

for not less than five nor more than thirty years, and pay a fine of not more than fifty

thousand dollars.” Here, the defendant received a ten-year sentence at hard labor.

In its reasons for sentencing, the trial court explained:

You graduated from Woodham School in Pensacola, Florida. You also
attended Pensacola Junior College for one (1) year where you studied
criminal justice. Growing up, you worked for your grandfather doing
logging work. You also stated that you started your own auto detail
business in 1998 which you ran for three (3) or four (4) years. You sold
the business in 2001, and then obtained your CDL license and started
driving trucks across country with Wallace Sanders Trucking. You now
own your dump truck and drive locally.

The Pre-Sentence Investigation states that you do not have a
juvenile criminal history. You have several criminal charges in your
history beginning in 1994, although the majority of the charges against
you were traffic violations. You were convicted of Possession of a
Controlled Substance without a Prescription in Florida on May 14, 1996,
and were sentenced to probation; however, your probation was revoked,
and you served six months in the county jail. You were also arrested on
new drug charges in Texas less than one (1) month after your arrest in
this matter. You were sentenced in June 2006 to eight (8) years deferred
probation in Jefferson County, Texas.

According to the Pre-Sentence Investigation, on April 19, 2005,
you were arrested by the Louisiana State Police for POSSESSION OF
MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. . . . On May 22,
2006, you pled guilty to the charge of POSSESSION OF
MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. . . . It should be
noted, however, that this is your second felony conviction.

In reviewing the Pre-Sentence Investigation, the Court takes note
of the fact that you are thirty-three (33) years of age and that you have
five (5) children in your household. This has been taken into
consideration in mitigating against imposition of the maximum sentence
in this matter. However, the Court can find no other mitigating factors.

Your involvement in criminal activity involving drug offenses
demonstrate[s] to this Court that you cannot live in society and that this
community must be protected from you. You are certainly in need of
correctional treatment in a custodial environment for a significant period
of time. Anything less would deprecate from the seriousness of your

3

offense, would not promote respect for the law, and would not provide
a just punishment for the crime of which you stand convicted. This
Court has an obligation to protect the public from you and will do so by
removing you from society.

After reviewing the record, we do not find that the defendant’s sentence is

excessive. We note that this is the defendant’s third drug conviction and that he was

sentenced to one-third of the statutory maximum for this offense. Because the

defendant did not raise in his motion for reconsideration of sentence, the mitigating

factors of his “otherwise law-abiding life” and the excessive hardship on his

dependents, he cannot raise those issues for the first time on appeal. See La.Code

Crim.P. art. 881.1(E) and Uniform Rules – Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3. However, we

note that the trial court gave adequate consideration to those mitigating factors, as

evidenced in its reasons for sentencing. Given the circumstances, we find that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence.

This assignment is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s sentence is affirmed. The

defendant’s sentence is amended to delete the denial of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence for the first five years of his sentence. This matter is

remanded to the trial court with instructions to make a notation in the minutes

reflecting the amendment.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

4