State of Louisiana v. Kevin D. Rogers

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-276

STATE OF LOUISIANA

V.

KEVIN D. ROGERS

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, NO. CR-703-04
HONORABLE HERMAN I. STEWART, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

David W. Burton
District Attorney - 36th Judicial District
Post Office Box 99
DeRidder, Louisiana 70634
(337) 463-5578
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Laura M. Pavy
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 750602
New Orleans, Louisiana 70175-0602
(504) 833-2910
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Kevin D. Rogers

GENOVESE, Judge.

Defendant, Kevin D. Rogers, was charged by amended bill of information on

July 24, 2006 with one count of negligent homicide, a violation of La.R.S. 14:32, and

one count of hit-and-run driving, a violation of La.R.S. 14:100. In accordance with

his plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to the one count of negligent homicide on

October 16, 2006. In exchange for his guilty plea to negligent homicide, the State

dismissed the charge of hit-and-run driving. Defendant was sentenced to

imprisonment of three and one-half years at hard labor with credit for time served. He

was also ordered to pay a fine of one thousand dollars, plus cost of court.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, alleging that the sentence

was excessive under the circumstances of the case. The trial court denied

Defendant’s motion to reconsider, without written reasons, on December 22, 2006.

Defendant has perfected a timely appeal, asserting that the sentence of three and one-

half years imprisonment is excessive.

FACTS:

Defendant pled guilty to the charge of negligent homicide. It is noted that at

the guilty plea hearing, the trial court did not state the facts of the case. The

following facts are taken from the trial court’s written reasons for sentencing.

The victim in this case died as result of a single car accident. Late in the

evening, Defendant was driving the victim and her young son home. An accident

reconstructionist calculated the car was traveling at a speed of ninety miles an hour

when it left the roadway and struck a tree. The victim’s body was burned beyond

recognition. Defendant and the boy survived without serious injury. Defendant took

the boy and hitchhiked to his grandmother’s house, where he left him on the front

porch. Defendant then went home and did not report the accident.

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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

In Defendant’s sole assignment of error he alleges that the sentence of three

and one-half years at hard labor is constitutionally excessive, considering the

circumstances of the case. Because he was only nineteen years of age at the time of

the accident and had never been in trouble with the law before this incident,

Defendant asserts that the term of imprisonment imposed should have been less,

rather than more, than one-half of the maximum term permitted by statute.

Our negligent homicide statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes 14: 32(C), provides

for a range of punishment “with or without hard labor for not more than five years,

fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both.” Defendant was sentenced to three

and one-half years at hard labor and fined one thousand dollars, plus cost of court.

Article 1, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, prohibits
“cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.” A sentence which falls
within the statutory limits may nevertheless be excessive under the
circumstances. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979); State v.
Naquin, 527 So.2d 601 (La.App. 3 Cir.1988). To constitute an
excessive sentence this court must find that the penalty is so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is nothing more than needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981); State v. Everett, 530 So.2d 615 (La.App. 3 Cir.1988), writ
denied, 536 So.2d 1233 (La.1989). The trial judge is given wide
discretion in imposing a sentence, and a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits will not be deemed excessive in the absence of manifest
abuse of discretion. State v. Howard, 414 So.2d 1210 (La.1982).

State v. Walker, 96-112, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/5/96), 677 So.2d 532, 534-35, writ

denied, 96-1767 (La. 12/6/96), 684 So.2d 924.

A trial court must look at the particular circumstances of the case
and the defendant’s background in order to impose a sentence that is
suited for him. On review, the issue is not whether another sentence
would have been more appropriate; rather, it is whether the trial court
abused its discretion.

State v. Beverly, 03-1348, p.2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d 107, 110 (footnotes

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omitted); See also State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996).

In its written reasons for imposing the three and one-half year term of

imprisonment at hard labor, the trial court noted that it had reviewed a pre-sentence

investigation report and read the letters sent on behalf of Defendant and the State.

The trial court stated:

You profess to not remember the event of the accident and even
state that you do not believe you were driving. On your initial interview
with the Probation and Parole Officer, Paul Cryer, you stated: “I’m sorry
for what I done[.] I believe it wasn’t my fault. I can’t remember driving.
I don’t think I was. I took the plea for the lessor [sic] charge. If I could
change one thing. I would be not going out that night.”

In short you deny responsibility for the accident and for the death
of Sonia Reid. You have no sense of personal accountability.

This court is very skeptical of your lapse of memory pertaining to
the actual occurrence of the accident. Your memory is selective in that
you clearly remember events shortly before and after the accident. On
the other hand your statements of “I don’t remember” are quite
consistent with your total lack of acceptance of responsibility for this
tragedy. The Court does not share your view that you are not at fault.

....

You are twenty-one years of age and you are a first felony
offender. As stated I have read all of the submissions made by your
attorney and by the District Attorney’s Office, and all of the information
found in the Court record. I have carefully studied the PSI. I have taken
into consideration all of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 894.1. Although you are a first offender I do not believe that a
probated sentence would be appropriate in this case since such a
sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the crime.

In State v. Hughes, 03-420 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/31/03), 865 So.2d 853, writ

denied, 04-663 (La. 12/24/04), 882 So.2d 1165, the maximum sentence of five years

imposed on a conviction for negligent homicide was found not to be excessive even

though Hughes was a first time felony offender and the mother of four children. In

that case, Hughes attempted to commit suicide by driving at a high rate of speed into

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the path of an oncoming pick-up truck. The driver of the pick-up was killed. This

court stated:

The trial court cited the applicable factors set forth in La.Code Crim.P.
art. 894.1, noted Defendant’s lack of a criminal record and letters of
support in her favor; but, concluded Defendant’s “wanton and reckless
disregard for the lives and safety of others . . . dictates a sentence that
fits the nature of this offense.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing this Defendant to the five-year maximum term of
imprisonment.

Id. at 860.

In State v. Gregrich, 99-178 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 745 So.2d 694, this

court affirmed a sentence of three years imposed on a conviction for negligent

homicide. Gregrich, who was legally intoxicated at the time, drove his car left of

center and hit an oncoming car head on, killing the driver. In State v. Clark, 529

So.2d 1353 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1988), the fifth circuit affirmed a three-year sentence

imposed on a conviction for negligent homicide. In that case, Clark was also

determined to be intoxicated at the time and drove through a stop sign, striking the

victim’s vehicle. The victim died as a result of the accident. Clark had previous

convictions for driving while intoxicated.

The above cited cases show that Defendant’s sentence of three and one-half

years is comparable to other sentences imposed for the same offense in similar

situations. While Defendant was not intoxicated, as in Clark and Gregrich, he was

also charged with hit-and-run driving. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State

agreed to dismiss the charge of hit-and-run driving. Louisiana Revised Statutes

14:100(C)(2) provides for a range of punishment of not more than ten years

imprisonment and a fine of not more than five thousand dollars. As noted, Defendant

took the victim’s infant son out of the car, hitchhiked home, left the boy on his

grandmother’s porch at three o’clock in the morning, and never reported the accident.

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Defendant received a benefit when he pled guilty to negligent homicide in exchange

for the dismissal of the hit and run driving charge. He could have received a more

onerous sentence. A trial court may take into consideration the benefit received in

exchange for a guilty plea when imposing a sentence. State v. Spencer, 04-857

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/04), 888 So.2d 1128.

For the reasons set forth above, we find that Defendant’s sentence is not

constitutionally excessive and that the trial court did not abuse its considerable

discretion when it sentenced Defendant to three and one-half years imprisonment on

his conviction of negligent homicide.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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