State of Louisiana v. Chad E. Batiste

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-482

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHAD EVERETTE BATISTE

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 05-3023
HONORABLE ALONZO HARRIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN
JUDGE

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Michael G. Sullivan, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Earl B. Taylor
District Attorney
Alisa Ardoin Gothreaux
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Drawer 1968
Opelousas, Louisiana 70571
(337) 948-0551
Counsel for:
State of Louisiana

James E. Beal
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 307
Jonesboro, Louisiana 71251-0307
(318) 259-2391
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Chad Everette Batiste

SULLIVAN, Judge.

Defendant, Chad Everette Batiste, was charged by bill of indictment with

second degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant waived his right

to trial by jury and, after a bench trial, was found guilty of the responsive verdict of

manslaughter, in violation of La.R.S. 14:31. Defendant was sentenced to twenty

years at hard labor. He filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence which was denied.

Defendant is now before this court asserting one assignment of error, that his

sentence is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On June 28, 2005, Defendant and Tyra Dale Hicks got into an argument. At

some point, Defendant got into his truck and Hicks approached the passenger

window, leaning in to tell Defendant “he would f_ _ k him up.” Defendant then got

out of the truck and hit Hicks in the head with a stick. Three days later, Hicks died.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court failed to give

sufficient consideration to the mitigating factors in fashioning a sentence, such that

a twenty-year sentence is excessive for this offender in this case.

Defendant was found guilty of manslaughter. The maximum sentence for

manslaughter as set forth in La.R.S. 14:31 is forty years at hard labor. Defendant was

sentenced to serve twenty years at hard labor. He argues that a twenty-year hard labor

sentence is excessive for a thirty-three-year-old first offender who has no criminal

record. Additionally, he argues that there is no evidence in the record that a less

harsh sentence or a period of supervised release would not be appropriate.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for Louisiana appellate courts in
determining whether a sentence levied upon a particular defendant was
excessive is the manifest-abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Guzman,
99-1753 (La.5/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158. A trial judge has considerable
latitude in imposing sentences within the constraints provided by law.
State v. Thompson, 02-0333 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 330. However, in
State v. Marshall, 94-0461, p. 24 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 819, 829, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that “[a] sentence may violate a
defendant’s constitutional right against excessive punishment even if it
is within the statutory limit,” citing State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762
(La.1979). Furthermore, under both United States and Louisiana law,
a sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it “(1) makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering;
or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982
(1977); State v. Handy, 96-2505, p. 1 (La.1/6/97), 686 So.2d 36, 37,
citing State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993). The Louisiana
Supreme Court has provided a list of several factors that appellate courts
are to consider in ascertaining whether a sentence, by its excessive
duration or severity, is grossly disproportionate to the underlying
offense. State v. Baxley, 94-2982 (La.5/22/95), 656 So.2d 973, citing
State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251, 1253 (La.1983). The appellate court’s
analysis of the sentence is cumulative and centers on an amalgam of
relevant factors. Id. Among these factors the supreme court notes, are
“the nature of the offense and the offender, a comparison of the
punishment with sentences imposed for similar crimes, the legislative
purpose behind the punishment, and a comparison of the punishment
provided for this crime in other jurisdictions.” Baxley, 656 So.2d at 980,
citing Telsee, 425 So.2d at 1253-54.

State v. Wilturner, 03-719, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/03), 858 So.2d 743, 746.

ANALYSIS

The trial court stated the following at Defendant’s sentencing hearing:

The Court found that the defendant in this case had the last opportunity
to either drive off to avoid the victim and not exit from his vehicle but
instead the defendant exited his vehicle, walked around to the other side
of the vehicle where the victim was and struck him in the head with one
blow to the head.

The mitigating circumstances show that the victim had been
taunting the defendant and had been picking at Chad to fight him the
entire evening of the incident in question. The victim entered the

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vehicle from the passenger side with a forty (40) ounce beer in his hand
and threatened to do harm to the defendant.

The medical evidence showed that the victim, Tyra Dale Hicks
had ingested cocaine, marijuana, alcohol and some unknown substance
captioned Benzu . . . in his system at the time of his death.

The defendant was charged with Second Degree Murder and the
Court found him guilty of Manslaughter. The Court did [not] accept the
defense of self-defense or did not accept that theory by the defense in
this case at this trial.

The defendant, Chad Batiste[,] has no prior record whatsoever
other than the instant offense. No juvenile. No adult record. . . .

At the hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Sentence, defense counsel

argued that Defendant’s sentence was excessive based on the following: Defendant

was a first offender; Defendant did not contemplate his conduct would cause or

threaten serious harm; Defendant acted under strong provocation; and, there were

substantial grounds tending to justify the criminal conduct of Defendant.

The trial court reminded the parties that Defendant was convicted and

sentenced after a bench trial and that all of the grounds argued by Defendant in his

motion to reconsider sentence, especially Defendant’s lack of criminal record, had

been taken into consideration. In denying the motion, however, the trial court

focused on the fact that Defendant could have walked away but did not, and a man’s

life was taken as a result.

In State v. Griffin, 06-543 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So.2d 845, writ denied,

07-2 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.2d 995, this court was called upon to decide, among other

issues, whether the defendant’s sentence of thirty-five years at hard labor after being

convicted of manslaughter was excessive. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court

stated the following:

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You can’t have someone come over and mouth off to you and there’s not
a weapon, he’s just mouthing off. And you can’t . . . there can’t be
precedent which would allow you to stick them . . . stab them with a 3.5
inch knife of that type or any kind of a knife in the gut. There are too
many other methods of retreat.

Id. at 856-857. In affirming the sentence imposed by the trial court, we noted that this

court has upheld lengthy sentences for manslaughter.

In State v. Batiste, 06-875 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06), 947 So.2d 810, the

defendant was convicted of manslaughter for shooting the victim once over a twenty-

dollar bet on a domino game. During the game, the defendant and the victim argued

and the victim told the defendant to go to his truck and get his “s***,” meaning his

gun. Defendant retrieved his gun and returned to the domino table. He and the

victim continued to argue, and the victim grabbed the defendant in a bear hug. The

men scuffled and the defendant shot the victim. The fourth circuit noted that:

[T]he fight resulting in the victim’s death arose from “trash talking” that
ultimately provoked the shooting. Nonetheless, the [trial] court noted
that the altercation resulted in the death of one person. The [trial] court
stated that if the [defendant] had not armed himself, he would not be
standing before the court convicted of shooting someone. The [trial]
court reiterated that it had taken into consideration the [defendant’s] age
and physical condition,[1] but the [trial] court believed that the sentence
of twenty years was warranted even though the [defendant] was a first
offender.

Id. at 820.

It is clear that the trial court carefully considered the circumstances

surrounding the offense and Defendant’s lack of criminal record. Defendant faced

a sentence of no more than forty years at hard labor after being convicted of

manslaughter. La.R.S. 14:31. Based on our review of the record and the cases cited

herein, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing

1
The defendant was in his seventies at the time of the crime.

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Defendant and that Defendant’s mid-range sentence is not grossly disproportionate

to the severity of the offense.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s claim that his sentence is excessive lacks merit, and his sentence

is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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