State of Louisiana v. James B. Williams
State of Louisiana v. James B. Williams, No. KA-0007-0490 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2007).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Mallett 357 So. 2d 1105
- State v. Crosby 338 So. 2d 584
- State v. Fuslier 954 So. 2d 866
- State v. Turner 896 So. 2d 286
- Lane v. Kennan 917 So. 2d 1084
- Stockle v. Zimmer, USA 619 So. 2d 1059
- State v. Mims 626 So. 2d 856
- State v. Mims 634 So. 2d 373
- State v. Barling 779 So. 2d 1035
- Butler v. Allen 808 So. 2d 331
- State v. Campbell 404 So. 2d 1205
- State v. Etienne 746 So. 2d 124
- State ex rel. Marshall v. State 765 So. 2d 1067
- State v. Cook 674 So. 2d 957
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
07-490
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JAMES B. WILLIAMS
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 70039
HONORABLE VERNON B. CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
MARC T. AMY
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Michael G. Sullivan, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.
AFFIRMED.
William E. Tilley
District Attorney
Post Office Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71446-1188
(337) 239-2008
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana
Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
James B. Williams
AMY, Judge.
Factual and Procedural Background
The defendant, James B. Williams, was charged with possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, and with possession of drug
paraphernalia, in violation of La.R.S. 40:1023. He pled guilty to the lesser charge of
possession of cocaine and to possession of drug paraphernalia. On the possession of
cocaine charge, he was sentenced to five years at hard labor, which is to run
consecutive to any other sentence that he may be subject to. He was also ordered to
pay a $1,500.00 fine plus court costs. For the possession of drug paraphernalia
charge, the defendant was sentenced to six months in the parish jail and was fined
$500.00 plus court costs. This sentence was ordered to run concurrently with the
defendant’s sentence for possession of cocaine, but consecutively to any other
sentence.
Upon the denial of his motion to reconsider sentence, the defendant perfected
this appeal, arguing the excessiveness of his sentences. For the following reasons,
we affirm.
Discussion
Errors Patent
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for
errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find one error
patent.
In the same bill of information, the defendant was charged with possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, a felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a
misdemeanor. The penalty for possession of drug paraphernalia is imprisonment in
the parish jail for not more than six months and/or a fine of not more than $500.00.
La.R.S. 40:1025(A). Thus, the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on that
offense. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 779. Because the defendant was entitled to a jury
trial for the felony charge of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and was
not entitled to a jury trial on the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, the offenses
were not triable by the same mode of trial and should not have been charged in the
same bill of information. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 493. However, because the
defendant failed to file a motion to quash the bill of information based on the
misjoinder, he waived any objection to the error. La.Code Crim.P. art. 495 and State
v. Mallet, 357 So.2d 1105 (La.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074, 99 S.Ct. 848
(1979). Further, the defendant entered a guilty plea without reserving any objection
to the misjoinder. See State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976). Accordingly, we
find that the issue of misjoinder noted in our error patent review is waived.
Because the possession of drug paraphernalia charge is a misdemeanor, it was
not triable by jury; therefore, the proper mode of appellate review is by writ rather
than appeal. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 912.1. However, because the defendant’s
sentences were ordered to run concurrently, they are intertwined with each other.
Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, we will not sever the misdemeanor
conviction but will address it on appeal. See State v. Fuslier, 06-1438 (La.App. 3 Cir.
4/4/07), 954 So.2d 866. Cf. State v. Turner, 04-1250 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 896
So.2d 286, writ denied, 05-871 (La. 12/12/05), 917 So.2d 1084 (wherein this court
severed a misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana from the defendant’s
appeal of two felony convictions because the defendant did not make any specific
arguments regarding the misdemeanor conviction).
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Excessive Sentences
The defendant argues that his sentences are constitutionally excessive. He
contends that he “clearly is in need of treatment for his drug addiction, treatment
which would best be served in a non-custodial environment.” Because the defendant
did not assert any specific grounds for excessiveness, we will evaluate his claim as
a bare claim of excessiveness. State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La.1993), appeal after
remand, 626 So.2d 856 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 93-2933 (La. 2/11/94),
In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779
So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, this court set
forth the standard to be used in reviewing excessive sentence claims:
La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).
By pleading guilty to possession of cocaine, the defendant faced imprisonment
“with or without hard labor for not more than five years and, in addition, may be
sentenced to pay a fine of not more than five thousand dollars.” La.R.S. 40:967. For
this conviction, the defendant received the maximum sentence and was fined
$1,500.00. The penalty for possession of drug paraphernalia is “a fine not in excess
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of five hundred dollars, or imprisonment of not more than six months, or both.”
La.R.S. 40:1025(A). For that offense, the defendant was sentenced to the statutory
maximum and was ordered to pay the maximum fine.
When imposing sentence, the trial court explained:
In considering the Article 894.1 factors, I found the following to be
pertinent. First, this is a drug case and there is significant economic
harm or impact on society in general when one deals in the use or
distribution of illegal drugs. There are no substantial grounds which
would tend to excuse or justify his conduct nor did he act under
provocation by anyone. He’s forty-one years old. He’s married and has
three children. He is in good health. He has worked primarily as a
laborer detailing cars. He was also in the United States Army and was
court-martialed and discharged. He has a high school education. He has
a history of use of marijuana and cocaine, ecstacy, hydrocodone, xanax
and codeine syrup. He has been treated, in 1996, in the Blue Walters
facility and, in 1997, in the Red River facility. He is classified as a third
felony offender in that his record reflects that on October 8th, 1991 in the
30th Judicial District Court he was convicted of three counts of
distribution of cocaine and given seven years on each count. He was
paroled three times and each time his parole was revoked. He’s still
doing time on these charges. On January 8th, 2003 in the 30th Judicial
District Court he was convicted of possession of Schedule II and
Schedule III, given four years on each count. He has benefitted
significantly from this plea agreement in that his exposure has been
reduced quite a bit by the plea to the lesser charge of the possession.
After reviewing the record, we find that the defendant’s sentences are not
excessive. This is the defendant’s third drug conviction. He was originally charged
with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, for which the penalty is a sentence
of up to thirty years, with the first two years being served without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence, and a possible fine of up to fifty thousand
dollars. La.R.S. 40:967(B)(4)(b). By entering into a plea agreement, the defendant’s
potential maximum sentence was reduced significantly, and the State agreed not to
file a habitual offender bill. Given the circumstances, we find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing its sentence.
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Therefore, this assignment is without merit.
DECREE
For the above reasons, the defendant’s sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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