State of Louisiana v. Timothy J. Ryan

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-504

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TIMOTHY J. RYAN

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 69903
HONORABLE JOHN C. FORD, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

COOKS, J., DISSENTS AND WOULD AFFIRM THE DEFENDANT’S
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE.

CONVICTION REVERSED; SENTENCE
VACATED; ORDER OF ACQUITTAL
ENTERED.

Honorable William E. Tilley
District Attorney - Thirtieth Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71446
Telephone: (337) 239-2008
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

Carey J. Ellis, III
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 719
Rayville, LA 71269
Telephone: (318) 728-2043
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Timothy J. Ryan

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

The Defendant, Timothy J. Ryan, was convicted of stalking, a violation

of La.R.S. 14:40.2, and appeals on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence.

Because we agree that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a verdict of

guilty, we reverse and enter a judgment of acquittal.

FACTS

The Defendant parked his vehicle in front of the residence of Christopher

and Amanda Wright for approximately two minutes. Mr. Wright is a state trooper.

The Defendant then left, turned around in a nearby driveway, and drove back, again

passing in front of the Wrights’ residence. After reaching an apartment complex one-

half mile from the residence, he turned around and again drove past the Wrights’

residence, while staring at Mrs. Wright. This same sequence occurred several times

during a single day.

The Defendant and the Wrights did not know each other. Mrs. Wright

testified that she became frightened by the Defendant’s behavior.

The Defendant testified that he had been driving down that particular

road because he had been looking for a state trooper and because he was picking up

firewood left by a tree cutting crew in the area. Defendant slowed down and stopped

for a minute to look when he saw a state trooper’s vehicle parked in the driveway.

Defendant recalled that a male came outside, but the man did not look like Trooper

Wright, the husband of the alleged victim.

Defendant had read an article in the Alexandria Town Talk about a state

trooper named Johnny Parker who had been involved in an incident at Beauregard

Hospital, and Defendant wanted to see what Trooper Parker looked like. When he

saw Trooper Wright, Defendant saluted him because he thought that state troopers

saluted each other. Defendant did not recall how many times he drove by the Wright

residence at midday, but agreed that it was several times. After driving by during the

noon hour, Defendant returned twice to see if the tree cutting crew had finished its

trimming.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant asserts that “[t]here was insufficient evidence to convict

Defendant of stalking.” Defendant argues that there is no evidence to support a

finding that he intentionally acted in a malicious manner, that he repeatedly followed

or harassed Mrs. Wright, or that he acted with the intent to cause Mrs. Wright to feel

alarmed or emotional distress.

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised
on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State ex rel.
Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v.
Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393
So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witness. Therefore,
the appellate court should not second-guess the credibility
determination of the trier of fact beyond the sufficiency
evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See
King, 436 So.2d 559, citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d
1228 (La.1983).

State v. Lambert, 97-64, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/30/98), 720 So.2d 724, 726-27.

Thus, “[i]t is not the function of an appellate court to assess credibility or reweigh the

evidence.” State v. Smith, 94-3116, p. 2 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442, 443.

At the time of the offense, the statute prohibiting stalking read, in

pertinent part, as follows:

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A. Stalking is the willful, malicious, and repeated
following or harassing of another person that would cause
a reasonable person to feel alarmed or to suffer emotional
distress. Stalking shall include but not be limited to the
willful, malicious, and repeated uninvited presence of the
perpetrator at another person’s home, workplace, school, or
any place which would cause a reasonable person to be
alarmed, or to suffer emotional distress as a result of verbal
or behaviorally implied threats of death, bodily injury,
sexual assault, kidnaping, or any other statutory criminal
act to himself or any member of his family or any person
with whom he is acquainted.

....

C. For the purposes of this Section, the following
words shall have the following meanings:

(1) “Harassing” means the repeated pattern of
verbal communications or nonverbal behavior without
invitation which includes but is not limited to making
telephone calls, transmitting electronic mail, sending
messages via a third party, or sending letters or pictures.

(2) “Pattern of conduct” means a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, evidencing an intent
to inflict a continuity of emotional distress upon the
person. Constitutionally protected activity is not included
within the meaning of pattern of conduct.

La.R.S. 14:40.2.

The trial court found Defendant to be guilty of stalking and issued oral

reasons for its ruling:

All right. Well, when I look at the statute[,] stalking
is the intentional and repeated following, harassing of
another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel
alarmed or suffer emotional distress. Alarmed is what I’m
looking at and emotional distress. Then when I look over,
as Mr. Anderson pointed out, about a pattern of conduct
means a series of acts over a period of time, however short,
evidencing an intent to inflict a continuity of emotional
distress upon the person. So, what I have to find is that his
driving up and down that road constitutes a pattern of
conduct evidencing his intent to inflict a continuity of
emotional distress upon the person of the victims. Now,
when I consider all the facts[,] I do believe that there was
emotional distress on the part of the victims and that’s

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reasonable to understand because, as I’ve stated before, the
suspicious conduct in a neighborhood causes a certain
amount of - - degree of emotional distress especially with
the womenfolk. Mr. Ryan’s explanation of what he was
doing there is pretty flimsy as far as the looking for this
officer that he didn’t know what he looked like [sic] the
reasons he stopped there. I don’t know if I buy that or not.
He may have been over there looking for firewood
according to him, but I have to find that his pattern of
conduct was designed by him, was intended by him, to
cause emotional distress on the victims, on the Wrights.
There’s no prior contact whatsoever between these people;
nobody knew one another here. It’s difficult for the Court
to find a motive for him to be intending that his conduct
should cause emotional distress, at least the point where he
stopped at the - - in front of the residence. Thereafter as
the conduct continued, this slow driving back and forth in
front of the residence, that may be quite another thing. At
some point it could be - - this conduct could be construed
or evidence of his intent to inflict a continuity of emotional
distress upon these people, especially after he had seen
them come out of the house and standing [sic] there
looking at him and all that and so forth.

The Court therefore finds this defendant guilty of
that offense under that provision and under those
circumstances.

In State v. Higginbotham, 00-1782 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/16/01), 790 So.2d

648, writ denied, 01-1756 (La. 5/3/02), 815 So.2d 95, the fifth circuit examined the

sufficiency of the evidence introduced to support a stalking conviction. In his appeal,

the defendant asserted that the evidence of his standing near the victim’s home and

passing her home in his truck did not establish “following” and that his activities did

not constitute “harassing” because they were constitutionally protected. The fifth

circuit agreed that there had been no evidence submitted to fulfill the “following”

element of the stalking statute. Id. However, the fifth circuit concluded that the

defendant’s actions had been “harassing” as contemplated by the statute.

Higginbotham’s victim had seen him near her home on several

occasions. During two of the incidents, Higginbotham had menaced her. The

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defendant also called the victim’s house several times a day at all hours. During two

of the calls, the defendant had threatened to kill the victim, and one of the death

threats included sexual violence. The fifth circuit held that the collective incidents

clearly demonstrated that the defendant had willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly

harassed the victim over a period of time with the intent to inflict a continuity of

emotional distress upon the victim including the fear of death or bodily injury.

Accordingly, the fifth circuit found sufficient evidence to support Higginbotham’s

stalking conviction.

In State v. Rico, 99-158 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/99), 741 So.2d 774, writ

denied, 99-1883 (La. 12/10/99) 751 So.2d 244, this court found insufficient evidence

to support the defendant’s stalking conviction. This court concluded that the

defendant’s actions of “following” someone while that person drove to a series of

three different locations constituted one “following” instead of the repeated

“followings” required under the stalking statute. This court further found that the

defendant had not verbally threatened the person he had been “following.”

Additionally, this court held that the defendant’s actions did not constitute a physical

threat. Rico did not verbally threaten the victim. Although he followed closely, he

did not stop when the person he was following exited her car and went inside her

house; he passed the person’s home and turned around; the defendant did not use his

vehicle to ram or hit the person’s automobile; and, the defendant did not follow as the

other car drove behind a building but waited for the vehicle to emerge from behind

the building. This court determined that stalking is a specific intent crime and these

actions did not evidence the requisite specific intent.

In State v. Young, 96-2079 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/1/98), 712 So.2d 273, writ

denied, 98-1598 (La. 2/5/99), 737 So.2d 740, the first circuit reversed a defendant’s

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stalking conviction. Young had been convicted of stalking a judge who had ruled

against him in civil proceedings. The defendant, who was a pro se litigant, had made

several calls to the judge’s staff in the attempt to either speak to the judge or obtain

a status conference. Young had been present at the courthouse or in the judge’s

courtroom on a number of occasions when the defendant’s case was not docketed.

During those times, Young reportedly stared disdainfully at the judge. The defendant

had also called the judge’s former secretary. The judge had seen a parked car with

an unidentified occupant parked near his home. Finally, as the judge returned to work

after seeing the car parked near his residence, he saw Young exit an alleyway near the

courthouse and stare at him.

The Young court concluded that any rational trier of fact would have had

reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of stalking. The first circuit found that

the prosecution had failed to prove one of the elements of stalking: “following.” The

Young court also concluded that the prosecution had failed to satisfy the element of

stalking alternate to “following”: “harassing.” The first circuit conceded that the

defendant’s behavior had been annoying, but Young had a constitutionally protected

right to be present in or around the courthouse even on days when his case was not

on the docket because the building was open to the public. Moreover, the defendant’s

phone calls and letters seeking to speak with the judge had been inappropriate before

he became a pro se litigant, but once Young began representing himself, that contact

became reasonable for court business. Additionally, the defendant’s call to the

judge’s former secretary could reasonably have been for the purpose of gathering

information to add to the disciplinary complaint Young had been in the process of

compiling against the judge.

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The first circuit also determined that stalking is a specific intent crime

and found that, even assuming that the State had successfully proven willful,

malicious, and repeated “harassing,” the trial court should have had reasonable doubt

that Young acted with the requisite specific intent. Notably, the prosecution failed

to demonstrate both that the defendant had ever spoken to the judge outside of the

courtroom except in relation to his civil case and that Young had ever conveyed a

threat or a semblance of a threat either orally, in writing, or physically. Thus, the

State failed to prove that the defendant had the specific intent to place the judge in

fear of death or bodily injury.

The difference between the reversals issued in Rico and Young and the

affirmance in Higginbotham appears to be whether the State presented evidence that

the defendant made any overt threat of death or bodily injury to the victim in order

to prove the specific intent requisite to support a stalking conviction. In this case,

there is no evidence that Defendant followed the Wrights. Thus, in order to prove

stalking, the State must have proven that Defendant harassed the Wrights, which

means that the prosecution must have introduced evidence showing that Defendant

committed a series of acts, i.e., verbal or nonverbal communications addressed to the

Wrights, evidencing his specific intent to inflict a continuity of emotional distress

upon them. La.R.S. 14:40.2.1

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:40.2 does not specifically define

“following,” and the Higginbotham, Rico, and Young courts all seemed to apply the

standard interpretation of the term “following” to their cases: pursuit by traveling

after. The Higginbotham court determined that driving past or standing near

1
The statutory definition of “harassing” defines it as a “repeated pattern of verbal
communications or nonverbal behavior”; however, the examples of nonverbal behavior given in the
statute are all communicative in nature: e-mailing or sending messages via other means. La.R.S.
14:40.2(C) (emphasis added). This appears to clarify and codify the principles set forth in the
jurisprudence regarding the need to have the threat communicated by the defendant.

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someone’s abode did not constitute “following.” Higginbotham, 790 So.2d at 650.

The Rico court found a “following” when the accused closely pursued the victim.

Rico, 741 So.2d at 777. The Young court concluded that parking near someone’s

home and frequenting areas where and at times the alleged victim would typically be

present did not constitute “following.” Young, 712 So.2d at 285. Therefore, as

Defendant did not pursue the Wrights, the State failed to establish a “following” in

this instance.

A stalking may occur when a perpetrator willfully, maliciously,

repeatedly, and uninvitedly is present at someone’s home and the perpetrator makes

verbal or behaviorally implied threats that would cause a reasonable person to

become alarmed or suffer emotional distress. Id. Because constitutionally protected

activity is not included in the prohibited actions; because Defendant had the right to

travel on the public roadway, use the parking area of the public walking park, and

access the public areas of the apartment complex; and, because driving on the road

and turning around in public parking areas do not constitute communication, those

actions should not be considered a series of acts constituting harassment.

Since the State failed to prove that Defendant had the specific intent to

commit stalking through submitting evidence showing that Defendant verbally or

behaviorally communicated a threat to either of the Wrights, the prosecution failed

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty of either stalking

or attempted stalking. Therefore, the trial court, as a reasonable trier of fact, should

not have found the essential elements of stalking proven beyond a reasonable doubt

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

Accordingly, we reverse Defendant’s conviction, vacate Defendant’s sentence, and

enter an order of acquittal.

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Our decision on the issue of insufficiency of the evidence renders moot

the Defendant’s contention that his waiver of a jury trial was invalid.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the conviction of the Defendant,

Timothy J. Ryan, vacate his sentence, and enter an order of acquittal.

CONVICTION REVERSED; SENTENCE VACATED; ORDER OF

ACQUITTAL ENTERED.

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