State of Louisiana v. Francis Loncar

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-0738

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

FRANCIS LONCAR

************

APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, NO. 05-0837
HONORABLE LEO BOOTHE, DISTRICT JUDGE

************

JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

************

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Jimmie C. Peters, and
James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Bradley R. Burget
Assistant District Attorney
Seventh Judicial District
4001 Carter Street, Suite 9
Vidalia, LA 71373
(318) 336-5526
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

James E. Beal

Post Office Box 307
Jonesboro, LA 71251-0307
(318) 259-2391
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Francis Loncar

Francis Loncar
Pro Se
D.O.C. # 509080, Walnut #4
Louisiana State Penitentiary
Angola, LA 70712

PETERS, J.

A jury convicted the defendant, Frances Loncar, of the offense of second

degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. After the trial court sentenced him to

serve life imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence, he appealed. In his appeal, his appellate counsel asserted one assignment

of error, and the defendant asserted eight pro se assignments of error. For the

following reasons, we affirm the conviction in all respects.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

The charge against the defendant arises from the robbery and shooting of

Richard Allen Cupstid on Roundtree Road in Concordia Parish, Louisiana, sometime

around midnight between April 4 and April 5, 2005. Kenneth Barker and Katrina

Hudson observed Mr. Cupstid laying next to the roadway as they traveled together

to their midnight work shifts. They notified law enforcement authorities, and Mr.

Cupstid was transported to a local facility for medical care. He died the next day. An

autopsy established that Mr. Cupstid had injuries consistent with being struck by a

vehicle and that he had been shot in the head with a .22 caliber weapon. It further

established that the gunshot wound was the cause of death.

The law enforcement investigation discovered that Mr. Barker and Ms. Hudson

had passed the location where they observed Mr. Cupstid’s body two times within

five minutes. After leaving for work, Mr. Barker realized that he had forgotten his

wallet that morning, and they traversed Roundtree Road to retrieve it from his home.

The first time they passed the point they ultimately saw the body, they observed a

parked silver Mustang occupied by two men. After retrieving the wallet, they passed

the location again. This time, they observed Mr. Cupstid’s body, but the Mustang had

left the scene.

The followup investigation established that Jason Short generally drove a silver

Mustang. Based on this information, several deputies traveled to Mr. Short’s

residence, where they encountered Mr. Short and his girlfriend, Ginger Campbell.

The deputies found a recently washed, silver Mustang parked behind the residence

and a barbeque grill in which clothes and shoes were being burned. The Mustang’s

passenger side windshield had been smashed. During the investigation at Mr. Short’s

residence, the deputies recovered a .38 revolver. After observing the damage to the

Mustang, some of the officers returned to the scene of the offense and recovered a

piece of a windshield wiper which matched exactly the missing portion of the

Mustang’s windshield wiper on the passenger side.

When questioned concerning the accumulated evidence, Mr. Short informed

the investigating officer that he had loaned the Mustang to the defendant and a friend

named Bobby Beard. However, at trial, Mr. Beard presented a different story.

According to Mr. Beard, he spent the afternoon of April 4, 2005 at Mr. Short’s

residence drinking alcohol with Mr. Short and Ms. Campbell. He testified that the

defendant, Angela Mapp (the defendant’s girlfriend), and Keysha Freeman (Ms.

Mapp’s niece) appeared at the residence at approximately 10:00 p.m., and shortly

thereafter he went with the defendant and Mr. Short to his residence to smoke crack

cocaine. Later, they returned to Mr. Short’s residence.

Mr. Beard testified that while on the way to Mr. Short’s residence, Mr. Short

and the defendant discussed robbing a drug dealer they knew to obtain drugs and

money. When he arrived at Mr. Short’s residence the second time, he laid on the

couch. While on the couch, he heard the defendant and Mr. Short discussing the

acquisition of weapons. With regard to weapons, Mr. Beard testified that he knew

2

Mr. Short possessed a .22 rifle because Mr. Short had shown it to him a few days

before the shooting. Soon after the weapons discussion, Mr. Short and the defendant

left the residence. When the two men returned, approximately thirty minutes later,

Mr. Beard overheard Mr. Short tell Ms. Campbell to wash the car. Sometime later

Ms. Mapp arrived to pick up the defendant, and Mr. Beard obtained a ride with the

couple.

Angela Mapp supported Mr. Beard’s testimony concerning the events of the

evening, stating that at approximately 3:00 a.m., she picked up the defendant and Mr.

Beard at Mr. Short’s residence. According to Ms. Mapp, while on the way to the

defendant’s residence that morning, he informed her that Mr. Short had shot someone

beside the roadway. Specifically, he told her that he was a passenger in Mr. Short’s

1999 silver Mustang, and while traveling along Roundtree Road, the two men

observed Mr. Cupstid walking along the roadway. He further told her that Mr. Short

stopped the vehicle and the two men beat and robbed Mr. Cupstid, leaving him laying

on the side of the road; that after they left the scene, they realized they had only

obtained $3.00 in the robbery; that they then turned around and returned to find Mr.

Cupstid again walking along the roadway; and that Mr. Short then intentionally

swerved the vehicle to strike Mr. Cupstid, throwing him into the windshield.

According to Ms. Mapp, the defendant informed her that they again drove away, only

to return a few moments later. This time when they returned, Mr. Cupstid was

struggling down the road and approached the Mustang seeking help. According to

the defendant’s statement to Ms. Mapp, the .38 pistol was under the passenger seat,

and the .22 rifle was in his lap. When Mr. Short told the defendant to give him a gun,

3

the defendant provided the .22 rifle. Mr. Short then shot Mr. Cupstid at point blank

range.

Ms. Mapp testified that immediately upon returning to the defendant’s

residence, they quickly packed and left for Florida, picking up Ms. Freeman before

they left the state. Ms. Freeman did not become aware of what had happened until

the three arrived in Florida. When she was told of the shooting, she became so upset

that she made arrangements to return to Louisiana. The day after Ms. Freeman left

for Louisiana, Ms. Mapp and the defendant were apprehended by Florida law

enforcement officials and were ultimately returned to Louisiana to stand trial. At the

time of the defendant’s trial, Ms. Mapp had entered a guilty plea to accessory after

the fact to second degree murder and was awaiting sentencing.

OPINION

Appellate Assignment of Error Number One
and
Pro Se Assignment of Error Number Eight

Both of these assignments address the sufficiency of the evidence presented by

the State of Louisiana (state). In the single assignment of error filed by his appellate

counsel, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of

second degree murder. The defendant makes the same argument in his pro se

assignment, but suggests that the state’s evidence was insufficient because it “relied

on both the principal and conspiracy theories.” We find no merit in either of these

assignments of error.

The inquiry on appeal when the insufficiency of evidence is asserted is well

settled in our jurisprudence.

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the

4

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436
So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982);
State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). The role of the factfinder is
to weigh the respective credibility of each witness. Therefore, the
appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations
of the fact finder beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson
standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559, citing
State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983).

State v. Miller, 98-1873, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 118, 120, writ

denied, 99-3259 (La. 5/5/00); 761 So.2d 541.

In arguing the insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant readily admits his

knowing involvement in the robbery of Mr. Cupstid. Nonetheless, he asserts that the

robbery was complete and accomplished before Mr. Short murdered Mr. Cupstid.

That is to say, his participation in criminal activity ceased with the robbery; and it

was Mr. Short who became enraged because the robbery netted only $3.00, and who

then ran down and shot Mr. Cupstid.

With regard to the offense charged, La.R.S. 14:30.1(A) provides in pertinent

part that:

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm; or

(2)(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of . . . assault by drive-by shooting, armed
robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery,
. . . even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

Additionally, “[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present

or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and

abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit

5

the crime, are principals.” LSA-R.S. 14:24. However, “[o]nly those persons who

knowingly participate in planning or executing a crime are principals to that crime.

Mere presence and subsequent flight from a crime scene is not enough to make one

a principal. An individual may be convicted only for the crimes for which he

personally has the requisite intent.” State v. Wiley, 03-884, pp. 13-14, (La.App. 5 Cir.

4/27/04), 880 So.2d 854, 863-64, writ denied, 04-1298 (La. 10/29/04), 885 So.2d 585

(footnote omitted). Citing State v. Smith, 98-2078, p. 7 (La.10/29/99), 748 So.2d

1139, 1143, the Wiley court further noted that

[h]owever, under general principles of accessorial liability, “all parties
[to a crime] are guilty for deviations from the common plan which are
foreseeable consequences of carrying out the plan . . . Acting in concert,
each man then [becomes] responsible not only for his own acts but for
the acts of the other.”

Id. at 864.

Applying these legal principles to the matter now before us, we note that there

is no dispute that the defendant planned to rob someone. Additionally, the defendant

and Mr. Short armed themselves with at least two weapons. Following the initial

robbery and beating of the victim, they returned for the apparent purpose of imposing

additional punishment on the defenseless man for the sole reason that he did not have

more money for them to take. Still not being satisfied with the damages imposed,

they returned a third time and Mr. Short shot him. The defendant furnished the

weapon to Mr. Short and took no steps to extricate himself from the continuing series

of events or to protect Mr. Cupstid. We conclude that in viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury, as a rational trier of fact, could have

found the essential elements of second degree murder proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Wiley, 880 So.2d 854; State v. Hayes, 01-736 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/26/01),

6

806 So.2d 816, writ denied, 02-263 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1169; State v. Hill, 98-

1087 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99), 742 So.2d 690, writ denied, 99-2848 (La. 3/24/00),

758 So.2d 147. In reaching this decision, we further note that the defendant was not

charged with conspiracy to commit second degree murder.

Pro Se Assignment of Error Number One

In this assignment of error, the defendant asserts that evidence of other crimes

introduced at trial violated the prohibition found in La.Code Evid. art. 404(B) and

was prejudicial to his defense. Specifically, he refers to evidence related to his use

of crack cocaine, solicitation for prostitution, shoplifting, and criminal conspiracy.

The defendant argues that the jury convicted him of second degree murder, not

because he committed the offense, but because he was a bad man.

In considering this assignment of error, we initially note that the state did not

charge the defendant with any of the above recited offenses, although there was

testimony concerning each. Mr. Beard testified as to the conversation he overheard

between the defendant and Mr. Short concerning arming themselves to commit a

robbery. He also testified that he used crack cocaine with the defendant and Mr.

Short on the evening of the murder. Additionally, Ms. Mapp testified concerning the

use of crack cocaine as well as prostituting her niece in Florida and shoplifting in

Florida in order to obtain food and money.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B)(1) provides:

Other crimes, wrong, or acts. (1) Except as provided in Article
412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends

7

to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that
constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of
the present proceedings.

In State v. Colomb, 98-2813, pp. 3-4 (La.10/1/99), 747 So.2d 1074, 1075-76,

the supreme court stated:

This Court has long approved of the introduction of other crimes
evidence, both under the provisions of former R.S. 15:448 relating to res
gestae evidence and as a matter of integral act evidence under La.C.E.
art. 404(B), “when it is related and intertwined with the charged offense
to such an extent that the state could not have accurately presented its
case without reference to it.” State v. Brewington, 601 So.2d 656, 657
(La.1992). This doctrine encompasses “not only spontaneous utterances
and declarations made before and after commission of the crime but also
testimony of witnesses and police officers pertaining to what they heard
or observed before, during, or after the commission of the crime if the
continuous chain of events is evident under the circumstances.” State
v. Molinario, 383 So.2d 345, 350 (La.1980). We have required a close
connexity between the charged and uncharged conduct to insure that
“the purpose served by admission of other crimes evidence is not to
depict the defendant as a bad man, but rather to complete the story of the
crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in
time and place.” State v. Haarala, 398 So.2d 1093, 1098 (La.1981)
(emphasis added); see also 1 McCormick on Evidence, § 190, p. 799
(4th ed., John William Strong, ed., 1992) (other crimes evidence may be
admissible “[t]o complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in
the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings.”)
(footnote omitted). The res geaste [sic] or integral act doctrine thus
“reflects the fact that making a case with testimony and tangible things
not only satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful
story with descriptive richness.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S.
172, 186, 117 S.Ct. 644, 653, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). The test of
integral act evidence is therefore not simply whether the state might
somehow structure its case to avoid any mention of the uncharged act or
conduct but whether doing so would deprive its case of narrative
momentum and cohesiveness, “with power not only to support
conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the
inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.”
Id.

While finding no merit in the defendant’s argument with regard to this

assignment of error, we further note that the defendant did not object at trial to these

8

statements of other crimes. Thus, he is precluded from raising this claim on appeal.

La.Code Crim.P. art. 841.

Pro Se Assignment of Error Number Two

In this assignment of error, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in

allowing the state to introduce statements made by Mr. Short as reported by various

witnesses. Specifically, the defendant asserts that these statements purported to show

a conspiracy and were not admissible without first establishing a prima facie case of

conspiracy.

The defendant’s argument as to this assignment of error is premised on the

misconception that he was charged with a criminal conspiracy. In support of this

argument, he directs this court to La.Code Evid. art. 801(D)(3)(b), which provides

that a statement is not hearsay if it is made by “a declarant while participating in a

conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objective of the

conspiracy, provided that a prima facie case of conspiracy is established.”

Not only was the defendant not charged with a criminal conspiracy, but he does

not direct us to any particular statement as being inadmissible and at no time during

any witnesses’ testimony did he object to any reference to statements made by Mr.

Short. Thus, he did not preserve the assignment of error and cannot now seek

appellate review of those statements. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841. We find no merit in

this assignment of error.

Pro Se Assignment of Error Number Three

Still under the apparent misconception that he was charged with conspiracy to

commit second degree murder, the defendant argues in this assignment of error that

9

the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury concerning the law of conspiracy.

Again, as previously noted, the defendant was not charged with conspiracy, and

conspiracy to commit second degree murder is not a responsive verdict to second

degree murder. La.Code Crim.P. art. 814(A)(3). That being the case, there was no

reason for the trial court to give such an instruction. We find no merit in this

assignment of error.

Pro Se Assignment of Error Number Four

In this assignment of error, the defendant asserts that he was denied due

process of law because he was required to defend himself against the charges of

criminal conspiracy, coercion to commit prostitution, and use and possession of crack

cocaine without proper notice. For all the reasons stated in response to the

assignments set forth above, we find no merit in this assignment of error.

Pro Se Assignment of Error Number Five

In this assignment of error, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in

allowing hearsay statements made by Mr. Short to be introduced as evidence. For all

the reasons stated in response to the assignments set forth above, we find no merit in

this assignment of error.

Pro Se Assignment of Error Number Six

Citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004), the

defendant asserts in this assignment of error that his constitutional right to confront

Mr. Short with regard to his statement as testified to by a police investigator was

violated. Although he does not specify which detective’s testimony he is referring

to, we find only one statement by an investigator which related to Mr. Short’s out of

court utterances. Jimmy Darden, the lead investigator with the Concordia Parish

10

Sheriff’s Office, testified that Mr. Short told him the defendant and Mr. Beard had

borrowed his Mustang and returned it with a shattered window.

As was the case with the other complaints, the defendant did not object when

the testimony was offered. That being the case, he did not preserve the objection and

cannot now raise it on appeal. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841.

Pro Se Assignment of Error Number Seven

In this assignment of error, the defendant asserts that the state impermissibly

bolstered the credibility of its own witnesses by questioning them concerning their

plea of accessory after the fact to second degree murder. This assignment addresses

the testimony of Angela Mapp and Ginger Campbell, both of whom testified that they

had pled guilty to accessory after the fact before the defendant’s trial and were

awaiting sentencing. This testimony was in response to questions from the state.

However, the defendant does not explain how asking the witnesses whether they were

convicted of an offense pertaining to the current matter was an impermissible act of

bolstering. Moreover, in both instances, there were no objections made to the

questions and answers. Accordingly, the issues cannot be raised on appeal. La.Code

Crim.P. art. 841.

Errors Patent

As required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we have reviewed this record for

errors patent on the surface of the record. In doing so, we find one error patent that

requires addressing.

In sentencing the defendant, the trial court advised the defendant that he had

two years from the “date of your sentence” to file for post-conviction relief.

11

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8 states that a defendant has two

years from the finality of his conviction and sentence to seek post-conviction relief.

We remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to inform the defendant of

the correct provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the defendant’s conviction in all respects. We remand the matter to

the trial court and instruct the trial court to inform the defendant of the correct

provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 by sending appropriate written notice to the

defendant within thirty days of the rendition of this opinion and to file written proof

that the defendant received the notice in the record of these proceedings.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of
Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

12