State of Louisiana v. Trent Everett Seay

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-772

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TRENT EVERETT SEAY

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. CR-683-05
HONORABLE WENDELL R. MILLER, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Jimmie C. Peters, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Paula C. Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 80006
Lafayette, LA 70598
Telephone: (337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Trent Everett Seay

Michael Cade Cassidy
District Attorney - 31st Judicial District Court
Kevin D. Millican
Assistant District Attorney - 31st Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 1388
Jennings, LA 70546
Telephone: (337) 824-1893
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

The Defendant, Trent Everett Seay, appeals his twenty-year sentence for

manslaughter on the basis of excessiveness. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On October 26, 2005, a dispute arose between the Defendant and the

victim at the victim’s residence in Lake Arthur, Louisiana. The Defendant left the

residence and retrieved a forty-five caliber pistol from his home located near the

victim’s residence. The Defendant returned to the victim’s residence and shot the

victim twice, fatally wounding him. The weapon used in the offense was found at the

residence of the Defendant’s parents.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, the Defendant argues that his twenty-year

sentence is excessive. The Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider his amended

sentence. His excessiveness claim is, therefore, barred by La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1.

However, in the interest of justice, this court has chosen to review such an assignment

as a bare claim of excessiveness. State v. Hargrave, 05-1027 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06),

926 So.2d 41, writ denied, 06-1233 (La. 11/22/06), 942 So.2d 552.

This court has set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall
subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To
constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must
find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the
sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404
So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion
in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and
such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a

manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 [p.
5] (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant
question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 [p. 3]
(La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043,
117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43,

writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

To decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors including
the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender,
the legislative purpose behind the punishment and a
comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes.
State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501. While
a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must
be individualized to the particular offender and to the
particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d
1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the
purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence
because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

The Defendant pled no contest to the charge of manslaughter, a violation

of La.R.S. 14:31, a crime for which a maximum forty-year sentence may be imposed.

Thus, the Defendant received only one-half of the possible maximum sentence.

Additionally, the Defendant derived a benefit from his plea in that a charge of illegal

use of a weapon was dismissed.

The trial court stated that it carefully studied the Defendant’s presentence

investigation (PSI) and noted that it was very thorough. Next, the trial court declared

2

that it considered the factors of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, as well as the nature of

the offense, in determining an appropriate sentence. From the PSI, the trial court

observed the following:

The Pre-Sentence Investigation indicates that you are
thirty-one (31) years of age, born October 29th, 1975. You
were married to Natasha Spell in October of 1998, and you
have two (2) children from that marriage. You currently
live with Danielle Carlson and her two (2) children. You
graduated from Hackberry High School in Hackberry,
Louisiana, in 1996. You joined the U.S. Army in May of
2000. You did diesel mechanic work while in the Army,
but were discharged after three (3) years because of two (2)
alcohol-related incidents, receiving an Honorable
Discharge in 2003. After your discharge, you moved to
Florida with Ms. Carlson, and later you moved together to
Lake Arthur, Louisiana. You have worked in the
construction, carpentry, pipefitting, and mechanic fields
since your discharge from the Army.

The Pre-Sentence investigation states that you do not
have either a juvenile or adult criminal history; this being
your first offense -- offense. However, you appear --
appear to have a history of the use of alcohol and illegal
drugs.

....

I’m going to file the Pre-Sentence Investigation, the
victim-impact statements which I have received, and the
letters on your behalf into the record for further reference,
if necessary.

In reviewing the Pre-Sentence Investigation, the
Court takes note of the fact that you are thirty-one (31)
years of age and you have two (2) young children, and that
this is your first offense. That has been taken into
consideration in mitigating against the imposition of the
maximum sentence in this matter.

You have said you have no memory of the offense
and are sorry. The Court does not find any other mitigating
factors.

Additionally, the Court has been given statements
from relatives of the victim who ask that the sentencing
judge realize and understand their loss. I have also
received letters from friends of the defendant who ask for

3

mercy. I’ve read those statements and understand those
feelings. These statements are part of the record and will
be filed.

Criminal activity in which there is loss of life
demonstrates to this Court that this community must be
protected from you. You are certainly in need of
correctional treatment in a custodial environment for a
significant period of time. Anything less would deprecate
from the seriousness of the offense, would not promote
respect for the law, and would not provide a just
punishment for the crime of which you stand convicted.
The Court has an obligation to protect the public from you
and will do so by removing you from society.

Considering the mitigating and aggravating factors considered by the

trial court, in addition to the benefit received from the dismissal of the charge illegal

use of a weapon, the Defendant’s sentence of twenty years at hard labor is not grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Accordingly, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule
2-16.3, Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal.

4