State of Louisiana v. Tasha Jane Darce

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-837

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TASHA JANE DARCE

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 70687-688
HONORABLE VERNON BRUCE CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Michael G. Sullivan, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

William E. Tilley
District Attorney
Terry W. Lambright
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71446
(337) 239-2008
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Carey J. Ellis III
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 719
Rayville, LA 71269
(318) 728-2043
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Tasha Jane Darce

DECUIR, Judge.

On September 19, 2006, the Defendant, Tasha Jane Darce, was charged in

separate bills of information with possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone,

in violation of La.R.S. 40:968(A), and possession with intent to distribute morphine,

in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A) and (B)(1). The Defendant pled guilty to

possession with the intent to distribute hydrocodone and to the lesser charge of

possession of morphine. On April 24, 2007, the Defendant was sentenced for

possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone to five years at hard labor, three

years suspended, and ordered to pay a fine of $1,200.00, plus court costs. For

possession of morphine, the Defendant was sentenced to three years at hard labor, all

three years suspended, and ordered to pay a fine of $1,000.00, plus court costs. The

sentences were ordered to run concurrently, and once released, thirty months of

supervised probation with special conditions was ordered for each offense to run

concurrently.

The Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence on April 27, 2007, which

was subsequently denied without a hearing on May 10, 2007. The Defendant is now

before this court on appeal, asserting that her sentences are excessive.

FACTS:

On May 20, 2006, the Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle which was

stopped for speeding by an officer of the Rosepine Police Department. The officer

was suspicious and asked for consent to search the vehicle. A large black purse

belonging to the Defendant was found, and following a consensual search of same,

the officer found a prescription bottle with no label containing sixty-seven pills. The

Defendant admitted that the pills belonged to her and that she was going to the

Skipper Motel to sell some of the pills. The pills tested positive for hydrocodone and

morphine.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

In her sole assignment of error, the Defendant argues that the sentences

imposed are excessive given the particular facts of this case. This court has set forth

the following standard to be used in reviewing excessive sentence claims:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43,

writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

To decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose
behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for
similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00); 766 So.2d 501.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize
the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

2

The Defendant argues in this appeal that the trial court failed to adequately

articulate for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis for

the sentences imposed. Additionally, the Defendant maintains that the trial court

failed to adequately consider mitigating circumstances and considered improper and

inapplicable aggravating circumstances in determining the appropriate sentences to

be imposed.

The record reveals that the Defendant has no prior criminal history, was

twenty-four years old at the time of sentencing, is a single mother of one child, and

has maintained gainful employment. The Defendant asserts that she is a person who

can contribute and be a productive member of society given the opportunity. The

Defendant focuses on her health problems, which include a history of six surgeries

involving the prescription of pain medication. She points out that she readily

admitted to her guilt and expressed remorse for her behavior at the time of her arrest

and by her guilty plea.

With regard to aggravating circumstances, the Defendant contends that the trial

court placed too much emphasis on the fact that this case involves drugs. Although

the trial court opined that there is a significant economic harm or impact on society

in general when one distributes illegal drugs, the Defendant maintains that there

would be no harmful economic impact to society were she to receive a fully

suspended sentence with rehabilitation and treatment.

The Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone

which carries a sentence of not more than ten years at hard labor and a possible fine

of not more than $15,000.00. La.R.S. 40:968(B). Thus, the Defendant’s sentence of

five years at hard labor, three years suspended, was half of the possible sentence she

could have received. Further, the $1,200.00 fine imposed was significantly less than

the possible maximum fine. The Defendant also pled guilty to possession of

morphine which carries a sentence of not more than five years, with or without hard

3

labor, and a possible fine of not more than $5,000.00. La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2). Thus,

the Defendant’s three year suspended sentence was not the maximum sentence she

could have received.

At sentencing, the trial court stated:

All right. I considered the factors of Article 894.1 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and found the following were applicable. This is a
drug case and there is significant economic harm or impact on society
in general when one is dealing in the use or distribution of illegal drugs.
There are no substantial grounds to excuse or justify her conduct. She
was apparently seeking to obtain some monetary benefit from this. She
did not act under strong provocation by anyone. She is twenty-four
years of age. She’s single and has one child. Her health is such, as Ms.
Nelson noted, she has had six surgeries and she is on medication for
pain. She does have employment history in that she’s worked as a cook
and is - at the time of the report was making $6.15 an hour. She has a
high school education. She does not have any prior criminal record at
all according to the PSI.

Considering the aggravating and mitigating factors noted by the trial court, the

Defendant’s sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.

Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its wide discretion in sentencing

this Defendant. The Defendant has not shown that the trial court failed to adequately

articulate for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis for

her sentences. The Defendant has not specified any mitigating circumstances that the

trial court did not consider, nor did she identify any improper and inapplicable

aggravating circumstances the trial court allegedly considered in fashioning her

sentences.

Finding no error in the ruling of the trial court and no error patent on the face

of the record, we hereby affirm the convictions and sentences imposed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules,
Courts of Appeal.

4