KA-0007-1036 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Alvernon Sloan, Jr.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed January 30, 2008

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Opinion text

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-1036

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ALVERNON SLOAN, JR.

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APPEAL FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 62,512
HONORABLE STEPHEN BRUCE BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********

GLENN B. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Glenn B. Gremillion, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Hon. Don M. Burkett
District Attorney
P. O. Box 1557
Many, LA 71449
(318) 256-6246
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

William Jarred Franklin
LA Appellate Project
3001 Old Minden Road
Bossier City, LA 71112
(318) 746-7467
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Alvernon Sloan, Jr.

GREMILLION, Judge.

In this case, the defendant, Alvernon Sloan, Sr., was initially charged

by bill of information with forcible rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14:42.1, but

eventually pled guilty to the lesser and included offense of simple rape, a violation

of La.R.S. 14:43. He was sentenced to serve ten years at hard labor, without benefit

of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Although he did not file a motion to

reconsider his sentence in the trial court, he now appeals asserting that his sentence

is excessive. For the following reasons, his sentence is affirmed.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues that the sentence

imposed is excessive. More specifically, he contends that the trial court failed to list

the aggravating and mitigating circumstances it found applicable to his case. As we

have noted, Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider his sentence, and therefore,

his excessiveness claim is barred by La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1. However, in the

interest of justice, we shall review this assignment of error as a bare claim of

excessiveness. State v. Hargrave, 05-1027 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06), 926 So.2d 41,

writ denied, 06-1233 (La. 11/22/06), 942 So.2d 552.

We have set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of

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sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 01-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1042-43, writ denied, 01-0838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

To decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, we have held:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose
behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for
similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00); 766 So.2d 501.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize
the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-0562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

The penalty for simple rape is imprisonment for not more than

twenty-five years, with or without hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:43(B). Thus, Defendant’s ten year sentence is

significantly less than the maximum possible sentence. Additionally, he received a

significant benefit from his plea bargain, as he faced a maximum possible sentence

of forty years at hard labor for the charge of forcible rape.

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At sentencing, the trial court noted Defendant’s age of sixty-two years,

considered the pre-sentence investigation report, and commented that Defendant was

a fourth felony offender. The trial court did not specify for the record the aggravating

and mitigating circumstances it found applicable to the instant case; however, as

Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider sentence, he is only entitled to review

of the bare claim of excessiveness. When considering that Defendant is a fourth

felony offender, received a sentence in the lower range, and benefitted from a plea

bargain, we cannot say that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit and Defendant’s sentence is

affirmed.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s sentence of ten years at hard labor without the benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED
FOR PUBLICATION, Uniform
Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-
16.3.

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