State of Louisiana v. Rico Matthews

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-103

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RICO MATTHEWS

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 06-K-0495-D
HONORABLE DONALD WAYNE HEBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE
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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Jimmie C. Peters, and
James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Paula C. Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 80006
Lafayette, LA 70598-0006
Telephone: (337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Rico Matthews

Earl B. Taylor
District Attorney, 27th Judicial District Court
Jennifer M. Ardoin
Assistant District Attorney, 27th Judicial District Court
P. O. Drawer 1968
Opelousas, LA 70571-1968
Telephone: (337) 948-0551
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

The Defendant, Rico Matthews, previously convicted of a felonious drug

offense, pled guilty to possession of cocaine. He was sentenced to serve two years

at hard labor and ordered to pay a fine of $1,000.00. He appeals on the basis of

excessiveness of sentence and failure of the trial court to particularize his sentence.

These claims are meritless. We, therefore, affirm.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The Defendant argues that the trial court did not particularize the

sentence and comply with the mandates of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. This court has

set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing excessive sentence claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall
subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To
constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must
find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the
sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404
So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion
in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and
such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192
(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant
question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 01-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

To decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[A]n appellate court may consider several factors including
the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender,

the legislative purpose behind the punishment and a
comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes.
State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501. While
a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must
be individualized to the particular offender and to the
particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d
1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the
purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence
because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

The Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine which, pursuant to

La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2), carries a sentence not more than five years, with or without

hard labor, and a possible fine of not more than five thousand dollars. Thus, the

Defendant’s two-year hard labor sentence and $1,000.00 fine were significantly less

than the maximum possible sentence and fine.

At sentencing, the trial court took note of a letter from the Defendant’s

employer which attested to his hard work, his efforts and capabilities on the job, and

that he worked approximately thirty-two to forty hours per week. Next, the

Defendant took the stand and asked the trial court to allow him to continue caring for

his child and mother. He also informed the trial court that he had not been in any

trouble since his conviction. Following the Defendant’s testimony, the trial court

imposed sentence, stating the following reasons:

THE COURT: Alright, the Court notes this is
conviction number two for this gentleman. He does have
a record. He was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine in 2004. The Court notes two separate
parole violations from that cocaine conviction, which he
indicates to the Court that perhaps a lesson was not
learned. In addition, considering the objectives of
deterrence, public protection and rehabilitation, and the

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aggravating and mitigating circumstances of Article 894.1
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and in particular
Article 894.1(A)(3), the Court takes particular notice of the
fact that while he was given the opportunity on the
possession with intent to distribute, he elected to basically
ignore the gift that was given to him when he was placed
on parole or probation and was violated on three separate
occasions and ultimately ended up here again charged with
possession of cocaine. The Court notes at the time the
probable cause sheet indicates he had eight rocks of
cocaine in his possession and attempted to obviously keep
that from being discovered.

At the hearing on his Motion to Reconsider Sentence, the Defendant

asserted several mitigating factors. First, he testified that he was gainfully employed

at the time of his sentencing and that his employment was still available to him at the

time of the hearing. Second, the Defendant maintained that since his incarceration,

he had not received any type of disciplinary write-ups. Third, the Defendant testified

that he had no previous convictions prior to his guilty plea and that he was caring for

his nine-year-old daughter and forty-nine-year-old mother before he was incarcerated.

Following the Defendant’s testimony regarding his assertion of

mitigating factors, the trial court denied the motion, stating:

THE COURT: Alright, the Court notes, as each
time, I looked at the sentencing in this thing the first time
I did it. He was convicted in 2004 for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine. He was released and was
violating three different times, which indicates to me that
there’s a relative indifference to the rehabilitation process.
Then at the time of this arrest he had eight rocks of crack
cocaine on him and he’s lucky he got the charge he got. As
a result, I find the sentence was appropriate at the time and
I so find today. Motion to Reconsider is denied. I still
think the two years was probably a gift.

On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court failed to give a

sufficient factual basis for sentencing because it articulated only the facts of the

present offense and the Defendant’s 2004 conviction and parole violations. Further,

the Defendant complains that the trial court made no mention of his personal history,

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and thus, the record fails to affirmatively reflect that adequate consideration was

given to the guidelines in Article 894.1. The Defendant also reiterated the mitigating

factors he stated at the hearing with regard to employment and the need to care for his

daughter and mother. Lastly, the Defendant asserted that he accepted responsibility

for the offense and pled guilty, that he was remorseful, and that he had taken steps

toward rehabilitation prior to his incarceration.

Considering the testimony and evidence adduced at sentencing and at the

hearing on the Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Sentence, in addition to the reasons

articulated by the trial court in fashioning the Defendant’s sentence, we conclude that

the Defendant’s sentence is not excessive. The Defendant did not raise any

mitigating factors in his Motion to Reconsider Sentence that were not considered at

sentencing. The fact that the Defendant took steps toward rehabilitation prior to his

incarceration was not raised at sentencing, in his motion, or at the hearing to

reconsider sentence. Thus, the issue is not properly before this court for the first time

on appeal. Lastly, the Defendant received less than half of the maximum possible

sentence for possession of cocaine. Accordingly, the Defendant’s sentence is not

excessive.

CONCLUSION

The Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule
2-16.3, Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal.

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