State of Louisiana v. Scott Lee

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-0456

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

SCOTT LEE

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 06-K-6343-B
HONORABLE ELLIS J. DAIGLE., DISTRICT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Earl B. Taylor
District Attorney
Twenty-Seventh Judicial District
P.O. Drawer 1968
Opelousas, LA 70571
(337)948-3041
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Scott Lee

PETERS, J.

The State of Louisiana charged the defendant, Scott Lee, with the offense of

aggravated second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:34.7. After a jury found

him guilty of the offense, the trial court sentenced him to serve six years at hard labor

and ordered that he make restitution to the victim of the offense in the amount of

$9,387.79. After the trial court rejected his oral motion for reconsideration of his

sentence, the defendant perfected this appeal, asserting three assignments of error.

For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence in all

respects.

Assignment of Error Number One

The charge against the defendant arises from a December 12, 2006 incident

wherein he physically attacked his girlfriend, Gwendolyn Gautreaux. The attack

resulted in Ms. Guatreaux’s hospitalization for a period of two weeks, and the state

asserts that he committed it with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a heavy-duty flashlight.

In his first assignment of error, the defendant asserts that the evidence was not

sufficient to convict him of the offence charged.

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436
So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982);
State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact
finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witness. Therefore, the
appellate court should not second-guess the credibility determination of
the trier of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson
standard of review. See King, 436 So.2d 559, citing State v.
Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983).

State v. Lambert, 97-64, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/30/98), 720 So.2d 724, 726-27.

As applied to the litigation now before us, La.R.S. 14:33 defines battery, as

“the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another.” Louisiana

Revised Statutes 14:34.7(A)(1) defines aggravated second degree battery as “a battery

committed with a dangerous weapon when the offender intentionally inflicts serious

bodily injury.” Additionally, La.R.S. 14:34.7(A)(2) provides that “serious bodily

injury” is defined as any “bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme

physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss of

impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a

substantial risk of death.”

In asserting this assignment of error, the defendant argues that there exists

reasonable doubt as to whether he even struck Ms. Gautreaux. Furthermore, he

argues that even assuming the evidence establishes that he struck Ms. Gautreaux, at

best he is guilty of the offense of simple battery. He bases the first argument on Ms.

Gautreaux’s credibility and his second on the fact that no weapon was introduced at

trial.

Ms. Gautreaux testified that she had been living with the defendant at Melville,

Louisiana, for approximately three months before December 12, 2006. She

acknowledged that on the evening of December 12, she and the defendant had been

ingesting Xanax and smoking crack cocaine. According to Ms. Gautreaux, when they

ran out of cocaine, the defendant gave her $40.00 and sent her to a local dealer to

purchase more. Ms. Gautreaux testified that she was delayed at the dealer’s home

and, when she did not return home as expected, the defendant went to the dealer’s

home, stood outside, and yelled for her to come out. According to Ms. Gautreaux,

she left the dealer’s house, and as she and the defendant walked toward to his house,

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he began punching her in the stomach. She testified that the punches were landed

with such force that she began to vomit and passed out. The next thing she

remembered was waking up in the hospital a few days later. She remained in the

hospital intensive care unit for two weeks. While she could not testify that the

defendant struck her with anything other than his fists, Ms. Gautreaux did testify that

the defendant had a “police-type, ” heavy-duty flashlight at his home. She described

it as being camouflage in color and eighteen to twenty-four inches long.

Dr. Gregory Allain treated Ms. Gautreaux for her injuries at the Opelousas

General Hospital. According to Dr. Allain, Ms. Gautreaux’s injuries were life

threatening, primarily because she suffered renal failure from the trauma and had to

be placed on dialysis. He testified that although he could not state with any medical

certainty that the bruises on the patient’s body were consistent with being beaten with

a metal flashlight, they did appear to have been inflicted by a long object.

Furthermore, he did testify with medical certainty that her injuries had been inflicted

by something greater than a fist.

Ms. Gautreaux did not receive medical attention until the afternoon of

December 13, when her aunt, Debra Ann Sanders, came to the defendant’s home and

discovered Ms. Gautreaux on the bedroom floor, severely beaten and in a semi-

conscious state. According to Ms. Saunders, the defendant telephoned her that

morning and informed her that Ms. Gautreaux had not come home the night before.

When she left work at approximately 1:30 that afternoon, she stopped by the

defendant’s house and found her niece. Ms. Saunders testified that she asked her

niece who inflicted her injuries, and Ms. Gautreaux replied that the defendant “beat

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me.” Ms. Saunders then ran down the street to the home of her sister, Janice Savant,

to seek help.

After being informed of Ms. Gautreaux’s condition, Ms. Savant ran to the

defendant’s house and found Ms. Gautreaux on the bedroom floor, naked and beaten.

When questioned by Ms. Savant, Ms. Gautreaux also informed her that the defendant

had attacked her. According to Ms. Savant, clumps of Ms. Gautreaux’s hair were

strung from the front room of the defendant’s home in a trail to the bedroom. While

looking around the front room for Ms. Gautreaux’s driver’s license, she observed a

camouflage colored flashlight on the floor next to a bloody sock.

John Allen Brown testified that the defendant telephoned him at approximately

9:30 on the morning of December 13, 2006, and asked for a ride to the defendant’s

mother’s house in Krotz Springs, Louisiana. He picked the defendant up at his house

and drove him to Krotz Springs as requested. During the trip, the defendant informed

him that he had beaten Ms. Gautreaux with a flashlight and that she was still in his

home. He testified that when he returned to Melville that afternoon, he stopped by

the defendant’s house to check on Ms. Gautreaux. By the time he arrived there, the

Melville police were already on the scene. After Melville Chief of Police John

McKeel told him of the severe beating Ms. Gautreaux had endured, he told Chief

McKeel what he had been told by the defendant. Mr. Brown also testified that in the

past, he had seen a “police flashlight” at the defendant’s home.

Chief McKeel testified that after he arrived at the defendant’s house, Ms.

Gautreaux identified the defendant as her assailant. He testified that he did not

initially look for a flashlight at the scene of the crime because, at that time, he was not

aware that a weapon had been used on Ms. Gautreaux.

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In arguing that there exists reasonable doubt as to whether he ever struck Ms.

Gautreaux, the defendant challenges Ms. Gautreaux’s credibility based on her

criminal record and the illegal activity she was involved in at the time of the offense.

He points out that Ms. Gautreaux testified that she could not remember anything after

he punched her on the way home, but had initially told Chief McKeel that the last

thing she remembered was being at the dealer’s house.

In rejecting this argument, we note that while Ms. Gautreaux testified at trial

to a loss of memory beyond anything that happened after the walk home, three other

witnesses testified that on the day after the offense, she identified the defendant as her

assailant. Furthermore, the defendant left his home with Mr. Brown on the morning

of December 13, and that same afternoon Ms. Gautreaux was found in that home,

naked, semi-conscious, and severely beaten. These facts, together with the trail of

hair starting in the living room and leading into the bedroom, and Ms. Savant’s

observance of the flashlight and bloody sock in the living room, could lead a rational

trier of fact to conclude that the defendant beat Ms. Gautreaux with that flashlight.

In arguing that, at best, he should have been convicted of nothing more than

simple battery, the defendant does not assert that a heavy-duty flashlight could not be

considered a dangerous weapon. Instead, he asserts that the state failed in its burden

of proof on this issue because no flashlight was introduced into evidence. This

argument falls because, as noted by the state in its response to the defendant’s

argument, “it is well settled in Louisiana jurisprudence that no weapon need be seen

by the victim, witnesses nor detective in order to convict a defendant of a crime

involving a weapon.” See State v. Page, 02-689 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d

165, writ denied, 03-951 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 517; State v. Harrell, 98-671

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(La.App. 5 Cir. 1/26/99), 727 So.2d 1231; and State v. Elam, 312 So.2d 318

(La.1975).

Applying the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979), standard to our review of the evidence, we find that a

rational trier of fact could have found that the elements of aggravated second degree

battery were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we find no merit in this

assignment of error.

Assignment Of Error Number Two

After the trial court pronounced sentence, the defendant moved for

reconsideration of the sentence imposed. He did so based on the testimony of Dr.

Allain who had explained that redness on a person’s body could be caused by cocaine

abuse, as well as notations in the medical records that suggested Ms. Gautreaux’s

unconsciousness was induced by cocaine toxemia. On appeal, the defendant asserts

that his six-year, hard labor sentence is constitutionally excessive because the trial

court did not particularize his sentence as required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:34.7(B) provides that “[w]hoever commits the

crime of aggravated second degree battery shall be fined not more than ten thousand

dollars or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than fifteen years, or

both.” Thus, the defendant received a sentence that is less than one-half of what he

could have received. Still, a sentence which falls within the statutory limits may be

excessive under the particular circumstances of a given case. State v. Sepulvado, 367

So.2d 762 (La.1979). To constitute an excessive sentence, the penalty must be

grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or be nothing more than needless

imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Howard, 414 So.2d 1210 (La.1982).

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Additionally, the trial court is given wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and a

sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be deemed excessive in the absence

of manifest abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, the question before this court is not

whether imposition of another sentence would be more appropriate, but whether the

trial court abused its discretion. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957,

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996).

With regard to the trial court’s obligation in sentencing a defendant, La.Code

Crim.P. art. 894.1(A) provides:

When a defendant has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor,
the court should impose a sentence of imprisonment if any of the
following occurs:

(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended
sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime.

(2) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment or a
custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his
commitment to an institution.

(3) A lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness of the
defendant’s crime.

Additionally, the trial court must “state for the record the considerations taken into

account and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence.” La.Code Crim.P. art.

894.1(C). However, in complying with Article. 894.1(C), the trial court “need not

articulate every circumstance or read through a checklist of items.” State v.

Anderson, 95-1688, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96), 677 So.2d 480, 483.

In this case, the trial court stated the following in sentencing the defendant:

Considering the input from the defendant and the state, together
with the victim impact statement, the pre-sentence investigation and
guidelines set forth in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article
894.1 and other applicable sentencing statutes, including R.S. 14:34.7,
the crime upon which the defendant was convicted, the Court notes the
following factors pertinent to this sentencing: The defendant is thirty-

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nine years of age and is classified as a first felony offender; The
defendant viciously beat the victim with a blunt object, for a long period
of time, all over the victim’s body, and he left her and notified a relative
of the victim that the victim was missing. The relative found the victim
at the home of the defendant. The defendant continued to deny that he
had anything to do with the crime; however, upon being interviewed by
the probation officer, the defendant said, “I am sorry for what happened.
If drugs would not have been involved, I would not have done what I
did.” Saying sorry now does not express remorse to this Court. In fact,
this Court specifically finds that the defendant has shown no remorse
whatsoever in this matter. Additionally, there’s an undue risk that during
the period of a suspended sentence or a probation, the defendant will
commit another crime. The defendant is in need of correctional
treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most
effectively by his commitment to an institution. A lesser sentence will
deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime, and there are no
mitigating circumstances in this matter.

Regardless of Ms. Gautreaux’s cocaine use and the effects thereof, the record

establishes that she was beaten so severely that she spent two weeks in the intensive

care unit at the hospital. The trauma to her body was such that her kidneys failed, and

she had to undergo dialysis. Additionally, there is no question but that her injuries

were life-threatening. Finally, the defendant has not directed this court to any

mitigating circumstances that should have been considered by the trial court. We do

not find that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant. See

State v. P.M. 00-1613 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/01), 786 So.2d 857; State v. Shorts, 42,854

(La.App. 2 Cir. 12/19/07), 973 So.2d 894. We find no merit in this assignment of

error.

Assignment Of Error Number Three

In this assignment of error, the defendant asserts that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to subpoena the drug dealer

to testify at trial.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more properly
raised in an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court

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because it provides the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing under
La. C. Cr. P. art. 930. State v. Lane, 40,816 (La.App.2d Cir.04/12/06),
927 So.2d 659, 669, writ denied, 2006-1453 (La.12/15/06), 944 So.2d
1283. When the record is sufficient, however, allegations of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel may be resolved on direct appeal in the
interest of judicial economy. State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528 (La.1982);
State v. Lane, supra. . . .

....

The right of a defendant in a criminal proceeding to the effective
assistance of counsel is mandated by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. See State v. Wry, 591 So.2d 774, 778 (La.App. 2d
Cir.1991). A claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is analyzed under the
two-prong test developed by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). To establish that his counsel was ineffective, Eiskina first must
show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires a showing
that counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. The
relevant inquiry is whether counsel’s representation fell below the
standard of reasonableness and competency as required by prevailing
professional standards demanded for attorneys in criminal cases. See
Strickland, supra. The assessment of an attorney’s performance requires
his conduct to be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the
occurrence. A reviewing court must give great deference to trial
counsel’s judgment, tactical decisions, and trial strategy, strongly
presuming he has exercised reasonable professional judgment. See State
v. Moore, 575 So.2d 928, 931 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991).

State v. Eiskina, 42,492, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/19/07), 965 So.2d 1010, 1013.

To be successful in this argument, the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice.

That is to say, he must show error so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial before

relief may be granted. It is not enough to show an error that could have had a

conceivable effect on the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104

S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

The record reflects that the state actually tried to subpoena the drug dealer

approximately six months after the offense, but this effort was unsuccessful because

the dealer could not be located. The defendant requested a continuance of the trial

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to locate and subpoena the dealer, but the trial court rejected the request. The

defendant’s argument is that the dealer’s testimony was necessary to impeach the

victim’s testimony. In making this argument, he suggests that the dealer might well

have been the one who committed the offense.

Despite these assertions, nothing before us suggests that the defendant

successfully showed that the drug dealer was a material witness whose testimony

would most likely have changed the result of the trial. At trial, Ms. Gautreaux

testified that the dealer had flirted with her, and, therefore, she was at his house

longer then necessary to purchase cocaine. She admitted that she had initially lied to

Chief McKeel, but explained that she did so because she still loved the defendant, and

she did not want to get him into trouble. We note that in her statement to Chief

McKeel, Ms. Gautreaux actually told the Chief that she had left the dealer’s house

and, the last thing she remembered was walking home along the levee. Moreover,

when Ms. Gautreaux was at her most vulnerable, she told three different people that

it was “Scott Lee” who hurt her. There was no indication in the record that the drug

dealer was involved in her injuries.

This lack of evidence, coupled with Mr. Brown’s testimony concerning the

defendant’s admission to him that he beat Ms. Gautreaux with a flashlight and Ms.

Gautreaux’s testimony that the defendant was her assailant, leaves us with the

conclusion that, at best, the drug dealer would have testified that Ms. Gautreaux was

at his home and purchased cocaine, and, at the worst, he would have denied she had

been there. His testimony would not have changed the verdict. Therefore, there is

no merit in this assignment of error

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DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed

in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

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