State of Louisiana v. Melvin E. Johnson

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-860

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MELVIN E. JOHNSON

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF VERNON, 71830 and 71839
HONORABLE JOHN C. FORD, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Billy Howard Ezell, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Mark Kramar, Assistant District Attorney
Thirtieth Judicial District
P.O. Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71496
(337) 239-2008
Counsel for State of Louisiana

Edward K. Bauman, Attorney at Law
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 491-0570
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant:
Melvin E. Johnson

PAINTER, Judge.

Defendant, Melvin E. Johnson, pled guilty to the charge of possession of

cocaine, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, and expressly reserved his right to seek

review of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress under State v. Crosby, 338

So.2d 584 (La.1976). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of

Defendant’s motion to suppress and affirm his conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2007, the State charged Defendant with four offenses via two

separate bills of information: possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent

to distribute, resisting arrest, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On

May 30, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from the

search of Defendant as well as all statements made by Defendant. Defendant’s

motion further alleged that the entry into his home had been unlawful and without

permission. The motion further asserted the subsequent search warrant contained

false and misleading information.

The trial court conducted a suppression hearing, and, on September 24, 2007,

it denied Defendant’s motion and stated: “Considering arguments of counsel and the

law and evidence, the Court concludes that the officer’s conduct in entering the

mobile home was reasonable where he had determined, by questioning a witness at

the scene, that gunshots had occurred in the mobile home.”

Thereafter, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State wherein he

pled guilty to possession of cocaine, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, and expressly

reserved his right to seek review of the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress

pursuant to Crosby. In exchange for the plea, the State dismissed the remaining

charges against Defendant.

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After reviewing the pre-sentence investigation report, the trial court ordered

Defendant to serve five years at hard labor, suspended, with five years of supervised

probation and credit for time served. The trial court also fined Defendant $2,500 plus

court costs.

Defendant now appeals the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. For

the following reasons, we uphold the trial court’s ruling and affirm Defendant’s

conviction.

DISCUSSION

Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that there

is one error patent. However, we find that the issue is waived.

In this case, there was a misjoinder of offenses in the bill of information filed

in district court docket number 71839. In a single bill of information, the State

charged Defendant with a felony, possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S.

40:967, and a misdemeanor, resisting arrest, a violation of La. R.S. 40:108. Louisiana

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 493 provides for the joinder of offenses in a

single bill of information under limited circumstances, if the offenses joined are

triable by the same mode of trial. The offense of resisting arrest is triable by a judge

only, whereas the offense of possession of cocaine is triable by a jury. La.R.S. 40:967

and 14:108, and La.Code Crim.P. arts. 779 and 782. Because Defendant was entitled

to a jury trial for the felony charge but was not entitled to a jury trial on the

misdemeanor charge, the offenses were not triable by the same mode of trial and

should not have been charged in the same bill of information. La.Code Crim.P. art.

493. However, because Defendant failed to file a motion to quash the bill of

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information based on the misjoinder, he waived any objection to the error. La.Code

Crim.P. art. 495 and State v. Mallett, 357 So.2d 1105 (La.1978), cert. denied, 439

U.S. 1074, 99 S.Ct. 848 (1979).

Motion to Suppress

In his only assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court erred in

failing to grant his motion to suppress. Defendant urges that the facts of his case

show that law enforcement personnel had neither probable cause nor exigent

circumstances to validate their entry into his home. The State responds that, after

learning that there had been an argument and that gunshots had recently been fired

inside the trailer, law enforcement had the exigent circumstances necessary to enter

the home in order to protect the life and well-being of potential victims.

This court has determined that the proper standard for reviewing motions to

suppress is abuse of discretion:

When a trial court rules on a defendant’s motion to suppress, the
appellate court must look at the totality of the evidence presented t the
hearing on the motion to suppress. The appellate court should not
overturn a trial court’s ruling, unless the trial court’s conclusions are not
supported by the evidence, or there exists an internal inconsistency in
the testimony of the witnesses, or there was a palpable or obvious abuse
of discretion.

State v. Bargeman, 98-617, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/28/98), 721 So.2d 964, 967, writ

denied, 99-33 (La. 5/28/99), 743 So.2d 658. The State bears the burden of proving

the admissibility of evidence seized without a warrant. La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(D).

The supreme court has recently discussed the warrant requirement in the

context of exigent circumstances:

Police generally need a warrant to enter a home, but “warrantless
searches will be allowed when police have a reasonable belief that
exigent circumstances require immediate action and there is no time to
secure a warrant.” One such circumstance is when the police
“reasonably fear[ ] for the safety of someone inside the premises.” The
safety of others is a particular concern when police respond to a report

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of a crime in progress, and, in such a situation, police judgments
regarding warrantless entries “should be afforded an extra degree of
deference.” To justify a warrantless entry, the exigent circumstances
must be known to the officers “at the time of the warrantless entry” and
cannot be based on evidence discovered during the search.

In order to justify a warrantless entry based on exigent
circumstances, there must also be probable cause to enter the residence.
Probable cause is defined as “reasonable grounds for belief, supported
by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” This
determination must be made from the totality of the circumstances,
based on the objective facts known to the officer at the time. In
determining whether sufficient exigent circumstances exist to justify the
warrantless entry and search or seizure, the court must “consider the
totality of the circumstances and the ‘inherent necessities of the situation
at the time.’ ” Further, the scope of the intrusion must be circumscribed
by the exigencies that justified the warrantless search.

. . . [T]he Federal United States Appellate Court noted examples
of exigent circumstances that included, but were not limited to hot
pursuit of a suspected felon, the possibility that evidence may be
removed or destroyed, and danger to the lives of officers or others. In
these limited situations, the need for effective law enforcement trumps
the right of privacy and the requirement of a search warrant, thereby
excusing an otherwise unconstitutional intrusion. Exigent
circumstances, however, do not meet Fourth Amendment standards if
the government deliberately creates them.

The “ ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,’ ” and accordingly,
warrantless entries are considered presumptively unreasonable. The
relevant focus is whether the facts, as they appeared at the moment of
entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced agent to believe that
evidence might be destroyed or removed before a warrant could be
secured.

Exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry, search, or
seizure when “police officers, acting on probable cause and in good
faith, reasonably believe from the totality of the circumstances that (a)
evidence or contraband will imminently be destroyed or (b) the nature
of the crime or character of the suspect(s) pose a risk of danger to the
arresting officers or third persons.” The government bears the burden
of showing specific and articulable facts to justify the finding of exigent
circumstances.

With the exception of a few well-delineated situations, officers
must obtain a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate prior to
conducting either an arrest or a search. The warrant requirement limits

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police discretion in determining which persons to search or seize.[1]
Absent one of the foregoing exceptions, a warrant is required because
it places the crucial task of making delicate judgments and inferences
from facts and circumstances in the hands of a detached and neutral
magistrate judge, instead of police officers, who are engaged in the
zealous pursuit of ferreting out crime.

A search and seizure conducted without a warrant issued on
probable cause is per se unreasonable unless the warrantless search and
seizure can be justified by one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the
warrant requirement. When the constitutionality of a warrantless search
or seizure is placed at issue by a motion to suppress the evidence, the
State bears the burden of proving the admissibility of any evidence
seized without a warrant. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 703(D).

State v. Warren, 05-2248, pp. 9-13 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1224-26 (first

alteration in original; footnotes, case citations, and parentheticals omitted).

One witness, Officer Ethan Crockett, testified at the suppression hearing. In

the course of his duties on the morning of December 17, 2006, Officer Crockett, who

was a patrol shift supervisor for the Vernon Parish Sheriff’s Office, arrested four

people at a specific address in Jean Chapel Trailer Park, namely Defendant, Jeremy

Buckner, Reggie Buckner, and Gregory Gray.

Officer Crockett explained that, around 6:00 a.m., the dispatcher sent him and

Deputy Owens to the trailer park to investigate a call involving discharge of firearms

in the vicinity of Lot Number 91.2 When Officer Crockett arrived at the trailer park,

he drove to the address. He was familiar with the area because Jean Chapel Trailer

Park is a high crime area. He testified that there are daily calls from that area

1
The supreme court listed the exceptions to the warrant requirement parenthetically here:
investigatory stops justified by objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be,
engaged in criminal activity; vehicle search supported by probable cause; standard inventory
searches; searches incident to a lawful arrest; consensual searches; and searches under exigent
circumstances.
2
See La.R.S. 14:94(A): “Illegal use of weapons . . . is the intentional or criminally negligent
discharging of any firearm . . . where it is foreseeable that it may result in death or great bodily harm
to a human being.”

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reporting break-ins, domestic disturbances, gunshots, and drugs and that the calls

from that location usually involve violence.

Officer Crockett averred that he was concerned and proceeded in a cautious

manner due to the nature of the call. He testified that he made a loop around the

trailer park and did not see anyone outside or hear any loud noises. Officer Crockett

testified, however, that Deputy Owens discovered a man, Gregory Gray, Jr., walking

toward the trailer park’s office. When Officer Crockett arrived at that location,

Officer Owens had already checked Mr. Gray for weapons.

Officer Crockett testified that, during his interview with Mr. Gray, another

man, Kyle Thornton, approached them from the opposite direction. During their

conversation, Mr. Thornton told Officer Crockett that he had just left a party and

wanted to call a taxi. Mr. Thornton told the officers that he had not heard gunshots.

Officer Crockett said that Mr. Gray declared he had been at the same party as Mr.

Thornton, and Mr. Gray had just left the location where the gunshots were fired.

Officer Crockett revealed that he had contacted dispatch to determine whether

there were warrants on either of the men and that he had also had the sheriff’s office

contact the military police to get Mr. Thornton, who was active duty military, a ride.

Upon discovering an active warrant for Mr. Gray, Officer Crockett arrested him.

After his arrest, Mr. Gray agreed to show the officers the trailer he had just left.

Officer Crockett informed the military police that Mr. Thornton would be free to go

if nothing was found in the trailer to implicate him.

Officer Crockett testified that the military police then accompanied the sheriff’s

officers to the trailer on Lot Number 91, as directed by Mr. Gray. Deputy Owens and

the military police went to the front door while Officer Crockett went to the back.

The lights were out in the trailer and one of the windows was broken, but when the

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officers knocked, Officer Crockett heard numerous footsteps running through the

trailer. The officers continued knocking, identifying themselves as law enforcement,

and telling the occupants they needed to open the door.

Officer Crockett testified that Jeremy Buckner finally answered the door.

During the field interview, Officer Crockett asked about the call that a gunshot had

been heard coming from the trailer. Mr. Buckner replied that no one had fired a gun,

that there were no firearms in the trailer, and that he had not heard any gunshots.

When Mr. Buckner told the officers that he was alone in the trailer, Officer Crockett

did not believe him because Officer Crockett thought he had heard more than one

person moving around inside.

Officer Crockett testified that, based on the gunshot and Mr. Thornton’s and

Mr. Buckner’s lying, he wanted to enter the trailer to determine whether someone had

been injured from the gunshots. When Officer Crockett asked for Mr. Buckner’s

permission to enter the trailer, Mr. Buckner responded that he could not give

permission because it was not his trailer. Officer Crockett explained to Mr. Buckner

that he needed to enter the trailer to determine if anyone had been injured in the

gunfire, so Mr. Buckner needed to get his dog under control because Officer Crockett

was going to enter the trailer to perform a persons sweep.

Officer Crockett explained that the persons sweep involved entering the trailer

for the purpose of identifying everyone therein. Officer Crockett testified that he did

not go inside to search for physical evidence. When Mr. Buckner yelled for the dog

to come, it did not, so Officer Crockett believed that something or someone was

keeping the dog from going to its owner. Officer Crockett and Deputy Owens then

followed Mr. Buckner into the trailer.

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Officer Crockett recalled that the dog entered the kitchen area shortly

thereafter, and Mr. Buckner picked it up. Officer Crockett explained to Mr. Buckner

that he was not under arrest; however, the officers were going to detain him while

they were in the trailer, and Mr. Buckner agreed. Officer Crockett removed the couch

cushions and checked the area for weapons before allowing Mr. Buckner to sit on the

couch. While he was in the living room, Officer Crockett noticed an open box on the

floor; it held a small clear plastic bag containing two pills. Officer Crockett testified

that he picked up the box and set it on the television. Deputy Owens waited with Mr.

Buckner, who had been instructed to not move from the couch.

Officer Crockett averred that he made a sweep of the front bedroom and

determined that it was empty of people but obviously being used. Mr. Buckner told

the officers that he was staying in that room. Officer Crockett testified that he had

noticed wads of cash and rolling papers on the dresser of that room and that, since he

was looking for people, he checked under the bed and in the closet, but he did not

search the drawers or between the mattress and box springs. Officer Crockett

thought that the pills he spotted earlier were contraband, so he confiscated them when

he exited Mr. Buckner’s bedroom.

Officer Crockett testified that Deputy Owens told him he thought he heard

somebody in the remaining bedroom. Backup deputies arrived and stayed with Mr.

Buckner, so Officer Crockett and Deputy Owens continued to sweep the trailer.

Officer Crockett further testified that, as he entered the kitchen, he saw what he

suspected to be crack rocks in plain view on the counter top. Officer Crockett picked

up a clear plastic bag lying nearby, slipped two of the rocks into it, and put the

suspected contraband in his pocket. Officer Crockett stated that Deputy Owens then

pointed out an empty shell casing underneath the kitchen table.

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Officer Crockett testified that he and Deputy Owens next continued on to the

back bedroom. On the way, the officers cleared a small laundry or bathroom area.

At the closed bedroom door, Officer Crockett and Deputy Owens pulled their

firearms before entering. They saw Defendant and Reggie Buckner lying on the bed

and began giving loud verbal commands for the men to get on the floor and show

their hands. The volume of the commands escalated as the two men did not respond

or cooperate.

Officer Crockett testified that the two military police entered the trailer when

they heard the loud voices. By the time the military officers arrived, Defendant had

slid onto the floor. Officer Crockett holstered his firearm, and he, along with one of

the military police officers, handcuffed Defendant, who was struggling: “fighting,

kicking, yelling, cursing, [and] want[ing] to know why he was being arrested.” To

which Officer Crockett responded that Defendant was being arrested for possession

of crack cocaine. Meanwhile, Deputy Owens got Reggie Buckner off the bed and

handcuffed, and the officers in the living room handcuffed Jeremy Buckner.

Officer Crockett testified that he remembered that Defendant continued to

struggle, balk, and even attempt a getaway after he was handcuffed. Once Defendant

was outside, Officer Crockett returned to assist in handling Reggie Buckner, who was

also resisting. Officer Crockett testified that he believed that Reggie Buckner did not

know why the officers were present. When Officer Crockett exited the trailer,

Defendant was still resisting. The military police officers were attempting to control

Defendant, but Defendant was struggling with such force that they were having

trouble. Officer Crockett could not assist because he and Deputy Owens were trying

to control Reggie Buckner, who was also still resisting.

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Officer Crockett testified that he called for reinforcements and that two city

police units and two state trooper units arrived on the scene in response. Officer

Crockett and Deputy Owens had managed to get Reggie Buckner into a car, but he

kept banging his head against the car’s door frame. About the time the backup

arrived, Reggie Buckner broke the back window of Deputy Strother’s unit with his

head.

Officer Crockett averred that Deputy Strother, one of the deputies who had

been watching Jeremy Buckner, also faced difficulties when Jeremy Buckner refused

to get into Officer Crockett’s unit. After being contained in the vehicle, Jeremy

Buckner also attempted to get out of the unit in which he was placed. By this time,

Defendant had made it to the roadway where the military police continued the

struggle to subdue him. Officer Crockett retrieved some flex-cuffs from his car,

brought them to the military officers, and instructed them to bind Defendant’s feet so

he would cease kicking. After trussing Defendant’s ankles, the military police were

able to get Defendant into a police vehicle.

Officer Crockett testified that they did not find anyone inside the trailer who

had been either injured or shot. Law enforcement did not search the premises at that

time. Officer Crockett observed a plastic shopping bag at the foot of steps at the

trailer’s entrance, and the bag held fifty or sixty of what he believed to be crack rocks.

Officer Crockett testified that he wondered where they had come from and noticed

that there were a number of small pieces on the stairway where he had struggled with

Defendant when he was trying to remove Defendant from the trailer. Officer Crockett

testified that he then called the narcotics division.

Officer Crockett remained at the site and awaited the arrival of the narcotics

officers while the other law enforcement personnel transported the suspects to the

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Sheriff’s Office. Officer Crockett testified that he did not re-enter the trailer after

finding the shopping bag; instead, he took pictures of the exterior of the trailer while

he waited for the narcotics officers. When they arrived, the narcotics officers

informed Officer Crockett that they would wait for a search warrant. Officer Crockett

further testified that before leaving, however, Deputy Owens, acting on Officer

Crockett’s instruction, collected the spent bullet casing in the kitchen as well as one

found in the roadway near the officers’ vehicles.

Officer Crockett testified that he returned to the Sheriff’s Office where he met

with Ray Ortiz from the narcotics office. After discussing the facts of the case and

Officer Crockett’s reason for his actions, Mr. Ortiz typed some search warrants and

field tested the samples taken by Officer Crockett. The samples tested positive for

cocaine. After reviewing the search warrant affidavit, Officer Crockett found one

error in that the warrant said he had thought the two pills from the box on the floor

were crack cocaine. However, Officer Crockett testified that he never believed them

to be crack cocaine because they were pills. Officer Crockett denied both

participating in the search performed pursuant to the search warrant and to returning

to the scene.

Before being dismissed from the witness stand, Officer Crockett reiterated that

he went into the trailer because he felt that time was of the essence if there was

someone injured in the home who needed assistance. Officer Crockett testified that

he thought that he could have gotten a warrant to enter the trailer on those grounds.

The evidence submitted at the suppression hearing shows that Officer Crockett

entered Defendant’s domicile without permission. Defendant’s home was located in

an area to where Officer Crockett was frequently called out on complaints of break-

ins, domestic disturbances, gunshots, and drugs. On this occasion, Officer Crockett

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was dispatched to investigate a complaint that there had been at least one gunshot

from Defendant’s trailer. When he began his investigation, he interviewed a witness

who confirmed that the shot came from Defendant’s home.

Officer Crockett heard foot traffic within the domicile of what he believed to

be more than one person, so he became more suspicious when the person who

answered the door stated he was home alone. Officer Crockett attempted to obtain

permission to enter the trailer, but the man, who was a resident of the home, denied

permission. Officer Crockett entered the domicile anyway to conduct a persons

sweep on the belief that he needed to make sure none of the other occupants were

injured. In the course of conducting the persons sweep, Officer Crockett observed

what he believed to be illicit narcotics and confiscated samples thereof.

In the course of arresting Defendant for the drugs in the trailer, more narcotics

fell out of Defendant’s clothing. Based on Officer Crockett’s observations and a field

test of the sample contraband he seized, a narcotics officer applied for and received

a warrant to search Defendant’s residence.

The first circuit has found that an officer’s warrantless and nonconsensual entry

into someone’s home to retrieve a loaded handgun qualified under the exigent

circumstances exception. State v. Brumfield, 05-2500(La.App. 1 Cir. 9/20/06), 944

So.2d 588, writ denied, 07-213 (La. 9/28/07), 964 So.2d 353. In that case, the

defendant used the firearm in a crime and stashed it in a residence wherein children

resided. Id. After arresting the defendant, the officer justified his subsequent entry

into the home and search by stating his concern for the safety and welfare of the

children living therein. Id.

In State v. Ledford, 40,318, p. 1 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/28/05), 914 So.2d 1168,

1170, deputies responded to a report that a man and a woman were fighting in the

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yard in front of a residence. When the officers arrived, the woman, who had a small

amount of blood on her face, was still in the yard, but the defendant was gone. Id.

The woman informed the deputies the defendant had fled into the woods when he saw

that law enforcement was approaching. Id. The officers asked for permission to enter

the residence, but the woman, who was a resident, denied permission. Id. The

deputies entered the residence anyway and discovered a small amount of marijuana

on a bedroom table. Id. The officers cited their concern for the woman’s safety and

belief she might be lying about the defendant not being in the trailer as their basis for

the warrantless and nonconsensual entry. Id. The first circuit determined that; based

on the location of the altercation, the woman’s assurances the defendant was not in

the residence, and the lack of any report that the defendant was armed; the officers

did not have the necessary probable cause to enter the residence. Id. at 1173.

In State v. Divers, 38,524 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/23/04), 889 So.2d 335, writ

denied, 04-3186 (La. 4/8/05), 899 So.2d 2, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 939, 126 S.Ct. 431

(2005), the defendant, who was living in Texas, was suspected of murdering two men

in Louisiana; he had been living with his girlfriend in an apartment leased by a

second woman, Sharon Felder. After the date of the murders, the defendant began

driving a small white car, and he initially told Ms. Felder his uncle had given him the

car, but he later changed the story to say he had gotten it from two men. Id. When

Ms. Felder learned the police had towed the car, she became frightened and did not

return to her apartment. Id. In looking for the defendant, the police went the

apartment complex where the officer manager, who was concerned because she had

not seen Ms. Felder that day, gave them permission to enter Ms. Felder’s apartment.

Id. The officers found the defendant’s girlfriend asleep in one bedroom, and she told

them there was no one else in the apartment. Id. Law enforcement continued to

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search, found the defendant hiding in a closet, and arrested him. Id. The second

circuit found this satisfied the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant

requirement: “Given the grave and immediate concerns that Ms. Felder was in

imminent peril, the police had exigent circumstances to enter her apartment, at the

request of her apartment manager, and to search for her without a warrant.” Id. at

356.

Thus, we find that the trial court properly denied suppression of the evidence

seized immediately after the officers’ warrantless entry because the officers had

probable cause to fear for the safety of the trailer’s occupants. We note that

Defendant does not contest the validity of the search warrant or assert that the officers

executing the warrant, who were different from those initially involved, did not have

a good faith belief in its validity. See State v. Long, 03-2592 (La. 9/9/04), 884 So.2d

1176, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 977, 125 S.Ct. 1860 (2005) (discussing the good faith

except to the exclusionary rule in cases where the search warrant is invalid).

It appears that, other than the drug samples taken by Officer Crockett and the

bullet casings seized by Deputy Owens, the bulk of the evidence; i.e., crack cocaine,

firearms, and drug paraphernalia; was seized pursuant the subsequently issued search

warrant. This court finds that the arguments regarding the evidence seized pursuant

to the search warrant have been abandoned. Therefore, even if the evidence seized

by Officers Crockett and Owens was suppressed, there is sufficient evidence before

the court to support the conviction. Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4.

For the reasons asserted herein, we find that Defendant’s assignment of error

lacks merit.

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DECREE

For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts
of Appeal. Rule 2-16.3.

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