State of Louisiana v. Verna Mae St. Julien

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-1109

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

VERNA MAE ST. JULIEN

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 05-230145
HONORABLE PAUL J. deMAHY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Jimmie C. Peters and Marc T. Amy, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Alfred F. Boustany, II
Post Office Box 4626
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 261-0225
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Verna Mae St. Julien

J. Phillip Haney
District Attorney
300 Iberia Street, Suite 200
New Iberia, LA 70560
(337) 369-4420
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Jeffrey J. Trosclair
Assistant District Attorney
500 Main Street, 5th Floor
Franklin, LA 70538
(337) 828-4100
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

AMY, Judge.

The defendant pled guilty to an amended charge of negligent homicide, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:32. The trial court sentenced her to three years at hard labor.

The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to suspend her hard

labor sentence and place her on supervised probation with mental health treatment.

Further, the defendant contends that the trial court failed to grant a hearing on her

motion to reconsider sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Verna Mae St. Julien, was charged by bill of indictment with

second degree murder in connection with a house fire that caused the death of her

son, Felix St. Julien, III. According to the record, the defendant’s husband, Felix St.

Julien, Jr., returned home from work around 9:30 p.m. on October 27, 2004, and

found his children unsupervised. The defendant, whose testimony reveals that she

had been visiting with a friend who recently lost her father, returned home between

10:00 and 10:30 that evening. The testimonies of the defendant and her husband

indicate that a heated argument ensued between them concerning her whereabouts.

The State alleged that the defendant went into her bedroom, lit a candle, and set her

bed on fire. She locked the bedroom door, “hollering” at the children to exit the

house. The record shows that the couples’ three vehicles were then moved. The

defendant stated that once she was outside, she realized that Felix St. Julien, III was

still inside. The boy, who would have turned ten years old three days after the

incident, perished in the fire.

The initial second degree murder charge was amended to negligent homicide,

and the defendant entered a guilty plea to the amended charge. The trial court

sentenced the defendant to three years at hard labor. The defendant filed a Motion

to Reconsider Sentence, which was denied without a hearing. The defendant appeals,

assigning the following errors:

1. The lower court erred in failing to suspend Appellant’s hard labor
sentence and in failing to place her on supervised probation with mental
health treatment; and

2. The lower court erred in failing to grant a hearing on the Appellant’s
motion to reconsider her sentence.

Discussion

Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no errors

patent.

Assignment of Error No. 1

The defendant’s first assignment of error concerns the trial court’s failure to

suspend the sentence and its failure to place her on supervised probation to allow

mental health treatment.

An argument that a trial court should have suspended an imposed sentence is

reviewed under an excessive sentence standard. See State v. Wagley, 36,277 (La.App.

2d Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So.2d 116. In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02),

808 So.2d 331, this court set forth the standard for reviewing excessive sentence

claims:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person
to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence,
the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the
sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals
and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and
suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court

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has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory
limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir.
10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d
1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been
more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957,
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

The penalty for negligent homicide is imprisonment with or without hard labor

for not more than five years and/or a fine of not more than $5,000.00. La.R.S.

14:32(C).

At her sentencing hearing, the defendant testified that she was enrolled in

special education throughout high school. She stated that she was raped at the age

of eighteen and subsequently began abusing alcohol. She was treated for alcoholism

and depression at several mental health centers.

On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that on the night of the fire, she

drank six to eight beers at her friend’s house. She stated that she left her children

alone while she was gone. Further, she denied setting the fire and, instead, alleged

that the police “bribed” her into saying that she intentionally set the bed on fire

because she was mad at her husband. She acknowledged, however, that she did not

escort her children out of the burning house.

Several witnesses testified that the defendant was a caring, loving, and

involved mother. Her mental health records were introduced into evidence, as well

as letters from her doctor, deacon, and treating physician at a mental health center,

wherein they spoke positively of the defendant.

After considering the testimony and evidence presented, the trial court stated:

All right. In determining the appropriate sentence in this case, I
take into consideration the evidence presented here today, as well as,
which includes the pre-sentence investigative report, and the testimony

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and documents presented, as well as the sentencing guidelines provided
by the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1. Considering the
aggravating circumstances, the defendant knew that she knowingly
created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person.
There [was] a house full of children that she set afire. The offense
resulted in a significant—resulted in the death of the victim. Of course,
that’s the nature of the crime. The one aggravating circumstance that I
mentioned is the only one that— which is listed that seems to fit in this
case.

I take into account the fact that she has no criminal record, which
is a mitigating circumstance. I take into account that she voluntarily
participated in substance abuse treatment; that imposition of a
penitentiary sentence would be a hardship on her other children. But
one of the important factors is that the sentence, I feel that a suspended
sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime.

Considering all of these things, based [sic] the plea of guilty, I
sentence Verna Mae St. Julien to serve three (3) years at hard labor with
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections. I give her credit for
all time served since her arrest.

In her Motion to Reconsider Sentence, the defendant asserted that she “is the

mother of four children who live with her and her husband, Felix St. Julien. Her

children are 15 years old, 14 years old, 6 years old and 2 years old. She and Felix St.

Julien provide the only source of care and support for the children.” She continued,

explaining that at her sentencing hearing her husband’s health deteriorated and he

was taken to the hospital via an ambulance. The defendant claimed that she

subsequently learned that he most likely suffered a stroke, and she contended that his

disability and her incarceration would leave no one to care for the children. In the

motion, she also urged the court to consider the following mitigating factors:

[She] did not contemplate that her criminal conduct would cause or
threaten serious harm to her child; she has no prior history of prior
delinquency or criminal activity and has led a law abiding life for a
substantial period of time before the commission of the instant crime;
her criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;
her character and attitudes indicate that she is unlikely to commit
another crime; she is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to

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probationary treatment; and her imprisonment would entail excessive
hardship to her, her children, and her husband.

The defendant, on appeal, argues that the trial court erred by not suspending

her sentence and imposing either court-approved community service or home

incarceration. In support of this contention, she states that she pleaded guilty to a

non-intentional crime, that no risk of committing another crime exists as evidenced

by her character and good criminal record, that she needs mental treatment not

incarceration, and that “she will suffer the rest of her life with the burden of what she

did to herself and her family.” For statutory support, the defendant relies on La.Code

Crim.P. art. 893.5, which provides in pertinent part:

A. Except as otherwise prohibited by law, the court may suspend,
in whole or in part, the imposition or execution of sentence if:

(1) The defendant has not previously been convicted of a felony.

(2) The maximum term of imprisonment for the offense is thirty
years or less.

(3) The court imposes a period of court-approved community
service of not less than two nor more than five years.

(4) The court specifies in written form in the court record the
reason for the imposition of community service in lieu of imprisonment.

Insofar as satisfaction of this article’s requirements does not grant automatic

suspension of sentence, we note La.Code Crim.P. art. 893.5 permits the trial court to

use its discretion in determining whether to suspend the imposition or execution of

sentence. Accordingly, our review entails an evaluation of whether the trial court

abused its discretion.

By the defendant’s own admission, she drank six to eight beers before

returning home on the night of the fire. She acknowledged that she could not recall

some of the events that evening and conceded that she moved her vehicles instead of

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escorting her children out of the house. She stated, “when you’re drinking, your mind

doesn’t work right.” The St. Martin Parish Sheriff’s Office investigative report which

was made part of the pre-sentence investigation report, indicated that the defendant

admitted to lighting the mattress on fire in her bedroom because she was mad at her

husband for hitting her in the face.

The trial court considered the mitigating factors, namely her lack of a criminal

record, her voluntary participation in substance abuse treatment, and the hardship on

the children. While the defendant argues that her husband’s sudden illness was a

mitigating factor that the trial court did not consider at the time of her sentencing

hearing, we find that the trial court sufficiently evaluated the effect her incarceration

would have on her family. Further, the defendant pled guilty to an amended charge

that resulted in significantly less onerous consequences. Accordingly, the trial court

did not err in sentencing the defendant to three years at hard labor, and this

assignment of error is without merit.

Assignment of Error No. 2

In her second assignment of error, the defendant alleges that the trial court

erred in failing to grant a hearing on her Motion to Reconsider Sentence. Louisiana

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1(D) states:

The trial court may deny a motion to reconsider sentence without
a hearing, but may not grant a motion to reconsider without a
contradictory hearing. If the court denies the motion without a hearing,
the party who made or filed the motion may proffer the evidence it
would have offered in support of the motion.

Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of a hearing was discretionary, and we find no

abuse of discretion in this case. See State v. Hughes, 03-420 (La.App. 3 Cir.

12/31/03), 865 So.2d 853, writ denied, 04-663 (La. 9/24/04), 882 So.2d 1165.

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s sentence for negligent homicide is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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