State of Louisiana v. Robert Elijah Lamar Mincey AKA Robert Bryant

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-1315

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ROBERT ELIJAH LAMAR MINCEY, A/K/A ROBERT BRYANT

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 18494-06
HONORABLE ROBERT LANE WYATT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and
Jimmie C. Peters, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John Foster DeRosier
District Attorney - 14th Judicial District Court
Carla S. Sigler
Assistant District Attorney - 14th Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 3206
Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206
Telephone: (337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

Mary E. Roper
Louisiana Appellate Project
830 Main Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70802-5597
Telephone: (225) 387-6600
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Robert Elijah Lamar Mincey, a/k/a Robert
Bryant

Robert Elijah Lamar Mincey
CBC - U-R-9
Louisiana State Prison
Angola, LA 70712

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

The Defendant, Robert Elijah Lamar Mincey, a/k/a Robert Bryant,

appeals his jury conviction for manslaughter on the basis that the evidence was

insufficient to disprove his claim of self-defense. We affirm.

FACTS

In September of 2006, the victim, Jerome Dejean, was at a nightclub

called “Club 69” on Highway 90 in Calcasieu Parish. His girlfriend, Ashley Garcia,

and two male friends, Kevin “Sandez” Doucet and Phillip “Smurf” Jones were also

there. Defendant was at the same nightclub with his sister, Nashayla Norman, and his

mother, Tracey Bryant. The Defendant apparently bumped into Dejean on his way

to and from the bathroom. Words were exchanged, and the Defendant ultimately

walked out of the club followed by his mother, Doucet, and Jones.

Doucet and Jones confronted the Defendant about the bumping incident.

An argument ensued, and the Defendant advised them that he was in possession of

a gun. According to the Defendant’s mother, Jones told Defendant, “N....r, show us

what you got. We don’t care about what you got, we got heat.”

Dejean then came out of the club and also confronted the Defendant.

The Defendant’s mother intervened and attempted to mediate the escalating dispute

by standing between the Defendant and Dejean. She placed her hand on Dejean’s

chest. He pushed her hand aside and attempted to punch the Defendant. The

Defendant shot him in the chest and fled. According to the Defendant’s mother,

Dejean was in “mid-swing whenever he got shot.”

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.

The analysis for such claims is well-established:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised
on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444
U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex
rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State
v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393
So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the
credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the
sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559
(citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)).
In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the
record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of
proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Defendant does not deny that he shot and killed the victim, nor did he

deny it at trial. Rather, he argues that the State failed to disprove that he acted in self-

defense. Killing in self-defense is governed by La.R.S. 14:20(A), which states, in

pertinent part, “[a] homicide is justifiable: (1) When committed in self-defense by

one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or

receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that

danger.” (Emphasis added).

Defendant contends that the killing was justifiable because he had his

back against the wall, and was surrounded by the victim and the victim’s two friends,

Doucet and Jones. Further, he contends that shooting the victim was the only way he

could escape.

The Defendant’s claim that Jones had a firearm was disputed by both

Doucet and Jones at trial. The evidence given by his own mother defeats his claim

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of justifiable self-defense. The essence of his defense is that he was justified in

responding to an attempted punch by shooting his opponent in the chest at close

range. We recognize that Dejean had two friends with him. Thus, Defendant may

have genuinely felt endangered; further, some level of fear was objectively

reasonable. However, the level of force he used to defend himself was far beyond

what was necessary under the circumstances.

In the context of self-defense in a manslaughter prosecution, our court

has observed in State v. Griffin, 06-543, pp. 12, 14 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 940

So.2d 845, 851, 854, writ denied, 07-2 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.2d 995, the following:

The State had the burden of proving the Defendant
did not stab Marcus Conway in self-defense; therefore, we
must determine whether the Defendant reasonably believed
that he was in imminent danger of losing his life or
receiving great bodily harm and that killing Marcus was
necessary to save himself from that danger. The standard
in La.R.S. 14:20 is whether the Defendant’s subjective
belief that he was in danger was reasonable. State v.
Brown, 93-1471 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94), 640 So.2d 488.

Factors to consider in determining
whether a defendant had a reasonable belief
that the killing was necessary are the
excitement and confusion of the situation, the
possibility of using force or violence short of
killing, and the defendant’s knowledge of the
assailant’s bad character. State v. Hardeman,
467 So.2d 1163 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1985).
Although there is no unqualified duty to
retreat, the possibility of escape is a factor to
consider in determining whether a defendant
had a reasonable belief that the use of deadly
force was necessary to avoid the danger.
State v. Brown, 414 So.2d 726 (La.1982).

State v. Spivey, 38,243, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir.
5/12/04), 874 So.2d 352, 357.

In cases where the defendant claims
self-defense as a justification, the absence of
a weapon from the victim’s person or
immediate reach is often a critical element of

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the state’s proof. See State v. Davis, 28,662
(La.App. 2d Cir. 9/25/96), 680 So.2d 1296....
The absence of weapon on the victim,
however, is not dispositive of the issue. . . .

State in Interest of D.S., 29,554, p. 3 (La.App.
2 Cir. 5/7/97), 694 So.2d 565, 567.

....

By returning the guilty verdict, the jury obviously
did not believe the Defendant acted in self-defense. We
find that a rational fact finder, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State proved the
homicide was not committed in self-defense. Accordingly,
this assignment of error lacks merit.

Defendants in this case and in Griffin used deadly force against what

were unarmed attacks. Thus, as in Griffin, the jury in the present case could rationally

have concluded that Defendant did not act in self-defense.

This analysis applies even if the jury believed the testimony of

Defendant’s most favorable witness, Ms. Bryant, the Defendant’s mother. Of course,

the State presented evidence that was less favorable to Defendant. Jones testified that

Defendant walked to the bar’s bathroom, and bumped into the victim, then bumped

into the victim again on his way back. The victim then told him to watch where he

was going, “[a]nd the dude got crazy.” According to Jones, Defendant indicated that

he wanted to resolve the issue outside, so Jones and Doucet followed him out of the

bar. When they arrived outside, Defendant got near a wall and put his hand under his

shirt. Jones testified that he saw Defendant had a gun, so then he and Doucet began

backing up. The victim then came out and got in front of Defendant. When the

victim touched his hat, Defendant shot him. Jones opined that the victim did not see

the gun in Defendant’s waistband. Doucet’s testimony was similar, although he

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acknowledged that he did not see the initial jostling that apparently triggered the

incident.

Defendant did not deny shooting and killing the victim. His defense was

justification. However, as mentioned earlier, responding to an oncoming punch by

shooting the other person in the chest is an excessive response. Thus, the jury’s

determinations in the present case were not unreasonable. Therefore, the Defendant’s

reliance on self-defense is meritless.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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