State of Louisiana v. Tiffinie Samoine Caraway
State of Louisiana v. Tiffinie Samoine Caraway, No. KA-0009-0113 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Oct. 7, 2009).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Campbell 404 So. 2d 1205
- State v. Etienne 746 So. 2d 124
- State ex rel. Marshall v. State 765 So. 2d 1067
- State v. Cook 674 So. 2d 957
- State v. Barling 779 So. 2d 1035
- Butler v. Allen 808 So. 2d 331
- State v. Smith 433 So. 2d 688
Opinion text
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
09-113
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
TIFFINIE SAMOINE CARAWAY
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 72446-A
HONORABLE VERNON BRUCE CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Michael G. Sullivan, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Billy Howard
Ezell, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
William E. Tilley
District Attorney - Thirtieth Judicial District
Terry W. Lambright
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71496-1188
(337) 239-2008
Counsel for State-Appellee:
State of Louisiana
William Jarred Franklin
Louisiana Appellate Project
3001 Old Minden Road
Bossier City, LA 71112
(318) 746-7467
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant:
Tiffinie Samoine Caraway
PICKETT, Judge.
FACTS
On July 24, 2006, the defendant cashed a check at McKee’s Grocery in Vernon
Parish in the amount of $2,996.80, drawn on an account that she knew did not exist.
On June 18, 2007, the defendant, Tiffinie Samoine Caraway, was charged by
bill of information with theft by fraud valued at $2,996.80, a violation of La.R.S.
14:67. The defendant was subsequently charged on February 19, 2008, with two
counts of jumping bail, and on May 20, 2000, with four more counts of jumping bail,
violations of La.R.S. 14:110.1. On September 5, 2008, the defendant entered a plea
of guilty to theft by fraud in exchange for the dismissal of all the charges of bail
jumping.
The defendant was sentenced on November 25, 2008, to serve five years at
hard labor, all but eighteen months suspended and with credit for time served, and
ordered to pay a fine of $750.00, plus court costs. Three years of supervised
probation were ordered upon her release, along with restitution in the amount of
$2,996.80, to be paid within twelve months of being placed on probation and with
minimum monthly payments of $250.00. She was also ordered to pay the fine and
court costs upon her release at a minimum monthly payment of $25.00 and to pay a
supervision fee of $55.00 per month. A Motion to Reconsider Sentence was filed and
denied, without reasons, on December 2, 2008.
The defendant is now before this court on appeal, asserting that her sentence
is excessive.
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ERRORS PATENT
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this
court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find
there are no errors patent.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In her sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the sentence imposed
is excessive. This court has set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing
excessive sentence claims:
La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).
State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,
1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331 (alteration in original).
“While the trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating
circumstance outlined in art. 894.1, the record must reflect that he adequately
considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the defendant.” State
v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983) (citations omitted).
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:67(B)(1) provides, “Whoever commits the crime
of theft when the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value of five hundred
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dollars or more shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten
years, or may be fined not more than three thousand dollars, or both.” As such, the
defendant’s five-year sentence is only one-half of the maximum possible sentence.
Further, all but eighteen months of that sentence was suspended, and thus, the
defendant will serve only a fraction of the maximum possible sentence. Additionally,
the defendant’s fine of $750.00 is less than one-third of the maximum possible fine.
The defendant also received a significant benefit from her plea agreement.
Prior to her plea, she faced six counts of jumping bail, which each carry a sentence
of not more than two years at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:110.1. As such, the defendant
faced a total possible sentence of twelve years on these charges.
On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court failed to adequately
consider the factors of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. More specifically, the defendant
stresses that she had no prior felony convictions and her only misdemeanor
conviction was for possession of marijuana. The defendant also contends that the
trial court incorrectly considered the economic harm to the victim because the statute
recognizes economic harm as an element of the charge itself. Lastly, the defendant
states that she is currently employed and capable of making restitution. She
maintains, however, that she will be unable to make restitution while incarcerated,
thereby exacerbating the economic harm to the store.
In her motion to reconsider sentence, the defendant argued that the trial court
failed to give due consideration to her lack of criminal history, her status as a first
felony offender and to the fact that she is presumed to be entitled to a suspended
sentence. The defendant, however, did not address any other issues raised now on
appeal. Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1, the defendant’s failure to include a
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specific ground in her motion to reconsider sentence precludes her from raising the
ground for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, the defendant’s argument with
regard to the trial court’s consideration of economic harm caused by the defendant or
her ability or inability to pay restitution is not properly before this court and will not
be considered herein.
At sentencing, the trial court noted that after her guilty plea, the defendant did
not report to the probation office for a presentence interview. As such, the trial court
had no information other than the defendant’s criminal record and the facts of the
case upon which to base her sentence. Defense counsel then informed the trial court
that at the time of the defendant’s plea, she was unable to bond out of jail because the
company that previously furnished her bond was no longer recognized by the sheriff’s
office. As a result, the defendant remained incarcerated the remainder of the day.
The defendant maintained that upon her release that evening, she was not told that she
needed to go to the probation office and had no information instructing her to do so.
The trial court proceeded with sentencing and stated its reasons for sentencing
as follows:
I considered the factors of Article 894.1 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and found that the following were applicable. There was
economic harm caused to the victim in this case. There are no
substantial grounds which would tend to excuse or justify her criminal
conduct nor did she act under strong provocation by anyone. She’s
twenty-seven years of age. She does have a prior criminal record in that
on January the 6th, 2006 in the 30th Judicial District, she was convicted
of possession of marijuana first offense and given six months probation.
Her ----- [sic] - probation was terminated unsatisfactorily on November
the 30th, 2006. I also noted earlier that she has failed to appear for court
several times and bench warrants had to be issued so her record of
compliance for anything is poor at best.
Considering the trial court’s reasons for sentencing, we find that the trial court
adequately considered the factors of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 and addressed the
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applicable mitigating and aggravating factors of the defendant’s case. The trial court
clearly noted that the defendant’s criminal history had only one misdemeanor
conviction for possession of marijuana. The trial court also observed the defendant’s
young age. The trial court was particularly influenced by the defendant’s prior
unsatisfactory termination of probation and her lack of compliance with court
appearances. These facts, in addition to the benefit received from her plea agreement,
unequivocally support the minimal sentence imposed in this matter. Accordingly, the
defendant’s sentence is affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The defendant’s sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.
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