State of Louisiana v. Wayne Patterson

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-199

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

WAYNE PATTERSON

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF AVOYELLES, NO. 140119
HONORABLE WILLIAM BENNETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

James Edward Beal
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 307
Jonesboro, LA 71251-0307
(318) 259-2391
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant:
Wayne Patterson

Charles A. Riddle III
District Attorney, 12th Judicial District Court
Miche Moreau
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 1200
Marksville, LA 71351
(318) 253-6587
Counsel for State-Appellee:
State of Louisiana

PICKETT, Judge.

FACTS

On March 17, 2007, the twelve-year-old victim in this matter was at church to

help his Sunday school teacher move the class materials to a larger classroom in

another building. The defendant, Wayne Patterson, was passing by the church when

he was stopped by the Sunday school teacher and asked to help move a broken bench

out of the building. After moving the bench, the defendant’s assistance was no longer

needed and the Sunday school teacher thought he left the premises.

Later, the victim went to get cleaning supplies located in the back of the church

near the men’s restroom when he was approached by the defendant, a stranger to the

victim, who pulled down his pants, exposed his penis and instructed the victim to

suck it. When the victim attempted to get away, the defendant grabbed the victim on

the hip and tried to pull him back. The victim was able to escape the defendant’s grip

and he ran to his Sunday school teacher and reported the incident.

On July 16, 2007, the defendant was charged by bill of information with

molestation of a juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:81.2. Following a bench trial

held on November 27, 2007, the defendant was found guilty of indecent behavior

with a juvenile.

On January 2, 2008, the state filed a habitual offender bill of information under

a new docket number. The defendant was subsequently adjudicated a second felony

offender following a hearing held on March 25, 2008. The defendant filed a motion

for a new trial that same day which was heard prior to sentencing on May 12, 2008.

The defendant’s motion was denied, and he was sentenced to serve twenty years at

hard labor with credit for time served. The defendant objected to the sentence, but

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did not orally move or file a motion to reconsider sentence.

The defendant is now before this court on appeal, asserting that his sentence

is illegally excessive. Separate appeals were filed for the two proceedings: docket

number 09-199 is the underlying conviction, and docket number 09-201 is the

habitual offender proceedings and sentencing. Subsequently, the defendant filed a

Motion to Consolidate Appeals for Briefing Purposes. The motion was granted, and

the appeals were consolidated for briefing purposes.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this

court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the records in docket

numbers 09-199 and 09-201, we find there are no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court’s

imposition of a twenty-year sentence is an illegally excessive sentence. The

defendant refers to La.R.S. 14:81(H)(1), which allows a maximum sentence of seven

years. As such, the defendant contends that the maximum sentence pursuant to

La.R.S. 15:529.1 for a second felony offender is fourteen years, not more than twice

the maximum term.

The appropriate penalty, however, for which the defendant was convicted is

found in La.R.S. 14:81(H)(2) which provides, “Whoever commits the crime of

indecent behavior with juveniles on a victim under the age of thirteen when the

offender is seventeen years of age or older, shall be punished by imprisonment at hard

labor for not less than two nor more than twenty-five years.” (Emphasis added). The

relevant portion of the habitual offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a), provides:

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If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender
would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural
life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term
not less than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the
longest term prescribed for a first conviction[.]

The sentencing range for the instant offense is twelve and one-half years to fifty

years. As such, the defendant’s twenty-year sentence is not illegally excessive.

The defendant also argues on appeal that his sentence is grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime and serves no useful purpose. The

defendant asserts that the reviewing court should look to the particulars of the crime

and the individual defendant in determining whether a particular sentence is

excessive. The defendant did not orally move or file a motion to reconsider sentence,

and thus, is precluded from objecting to the sentence on appeal. La.Code Crim.P. art.

881.1(E). However, in the interest of justice, this court has chosen to review such an

assignment as a bare claim of excessiveness. State v. Hargrave, 05-1027 (La.App.

3 Cir. 3/1/06), 926 So.2d 41, writ denied, 06-1233 (La. 11/22/06), 942 So.2d 552.

In State v. Semien, 06-841 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/07), 948 So.2d 1189, 1197, writ

denied, 07-448 (La. 10/12/07), 965 So.2d 397, this court stated:

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La.
Const. art. I, § 20 prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive
punishment. “ ‘[T]he excessiveness of a sentence becomes a question
of law reviewable under the appellate jurisdiction of this court.’ ” State
v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La.1993) (quoting State v.
Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 764 (La.1979)). Still, the trial court is given
wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and, absent a manifest abuse of
that discretion, we will not deem as excessive a sentence imposed within
statutory limits. State v. Pyke, 95-919 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670
So.2d 713. However, “[m]aximum sentences are reserved for the most
serious violations and the worst offenders.” State v. Farhood, 02-490,
p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/03), 844 So.2d 217, 225. The only relevant
question for us to consider on review is not whether another sentence
would be more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its broad
discretion in sentencing a defendant. State v. Cook, 95-2784
La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615,

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136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

In State vs. Telsee, 425 So. 2d 1251 (La. 1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court

named three factors that a reviewing court should consider in determining whether

a sentence is constitutionally disproportionate:

1. The nature of the crime,

2. The nature and background of the offender, and

3. The sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and

other courts.

The nature of the offense in the instant case is particularly heinous, involving

the purposeful exposure of the defendant’s genitals to a twelve-year-old boy in a

church setting. Even more atrocious was the defendant’s demand that the victim

participate in oral sex and the defendant’s attempt to keep the victim from escaping.

Additionally, the trial court noted that the defendant knew or should have known that

the victim was particularly vulnerable due to his extreme youth and that the defendant

used his position or status and relationship with the victim to facilitate the

commission of the crime.

The trial court also addressed the nature and background of the defendant, the

second Telsee factor. The trial court observed that the defendant’s criminal history

included a prior conviction in 1991 for indecent behavior with a juvenile. The trial

court stressed the importance of his prior conviction in determining the sentence for

the instant offense. The trial court believed that there was an undue risk that the

defendant would commit another crime, that he was in need of correctional treatment

and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the crime.

Additionally, at the habitual offender hearing, Milton Alexander with the

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Probation and Parole office testified that he was supervising the defendant following

his release from prison in January of 2007 on a conviction for aggravated battery.

The defendant’s supervision ended shortly thereafter upon his arrest for the instant

offense on March 17, 2007.

We have reviewed recent jurisprudence for sentences involving similar crimes,

the third and last factor to consider under Telsee. A 2006 amendment to La.R.S.

14:81 added an enhancement to the sentence for offenses committed on juvenile

victims under the age of thirteen when the offender is seventeen years of age or older

and was in effect at the time of the instant offense. This was enacted as La.R.S. 14:81

(H)(2). Prior to the amendment, only one penalty was in effect, a maximum sentence

of seven years, and thus, the maximum possible sentence for a second felony

offender, regardless of the juvenile victim’s age, was fourteen years. As such, there

are only a few reported cases involving the enhanced penalty for the offense

committed on a juvenile victim under the age of thirteen.

Further, there are no cases after the 2006 amendment wherein the victim was

under the age of thirteen and the defendant was sentenced as a second felony

offender. In a decision prior to the 2006 amendment, State v. Wallace, 41,720

(La.App. 2 Cir. 1/24/07), 949 So.2d 556, the defendant was convicted of indecent

behavior with an eight-year-old juvenile and then adjudicated a second felony

offender. He was sentenced to the maximum fourteen years at hard labor. The

defendant did not challenge his sentence on appeal.

In the instant case, the defendant’s twenty-year sentence was less than one-half

of the maximum possible sentence of fifty years. Considering the heinous nature of

the offense and the defendant’s past criminal history which included a prior

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conviction for indecent behavior with a juvenile, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its broad discretion in sentencing the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant’s

sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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