State of Louisiana v. R.L.J.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-500

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

R.L.J.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 112,880
HONORABLE MARILYN C. CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Oswald A. Decuir and
Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Michael Harson
District Attorney
Mark T. Garber
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502-3306
(337) 232-5170
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
(337) 491-0570
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
R.L.J.

DECUIR, Judge.

After a jury trial, Defendant, R.L.J., was convicted of one count of forcible

rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14:42.1. Defendant was sentenced to ten years at hard

labor, with five years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension

of sentence. Defendant’s oral motion to reconsider the sentence based on a claim of

excessiveness was denied.

Defendant has perfected a timely appeal, raising two assignments of error: He

contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict of forcible rape and the

sentence imposed is excessive under the circumstances of the case. For the following

reasons, we find there is no merit to either assignment of error and affirm Defendant’s

conviction and sentence.

The evidence in the record shows that Defendant and the Victim, T.M., lived

together on and off for several years. After some problems, however, the Victim

obtained an eviction judgment and evicted Defendant from her residence. In the early

morning hours of August 2, 2006, Defendant wired the Victim’s front door shut, cut

the phone lines from the outside the house, and broke into the house through the

bedroom window. Threatening that he would kill her while holding a sharp object

to her throat, he forced the Victim to have sexual intercourse with him.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:

Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict of

forcible rape. He argues that the Victim’s testimony was false and made in retaliation

because he had not moved out of the residence and that there was insufficient

evidence that she resisted the sexual intercourse or was prevented from doing so by

force or threats of physical violence.

The analysis for a claim of insufficient evidence is well-settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical
inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d
126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983);
State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d
1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective
credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not
second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond
the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See
State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson,
425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a
conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied
its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

The crime of forcible rape is described in La.R.S. 14:42.1(A):

Forcible rape is rape committed when the anal, oral, or vaginal
sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of the
victim because it is committed under any one or more of the following
circumstances:

(1) When the victim is prevented from resisting the
act by force or threats of physical violence under
circumstances where the victim reasonably believes that
such resistance would not prevent the rape.

At trial, the Victim testified that she and Defendant had an on and off

relationship since 1986. While Defendant had lived with her at the current residence,

she had recently obtained an eviction judgment ordering him out of the house. About

2:00 a.m., on the morning of August 2, 2006, shortly after T.M. came home from

work, she heard a voice outside the house saying, “I’m going to kill you, bitch.” She

said she recognized the voice as Defendant’s. She testified she tried to call 911, but

the phone would not work. She tried to get out of the house by the front door, but she

could not get the door open. The Victim testified that when she called out to him that

she was going to call the cops, he said “you can’t call–you weren’t able to call no cop,

2

because you ain’t got no phone.” She tried pounding on the front window and yelling

to attract attention, but to no avail.

The Victim further stated she could not go out the back door. She had

barricaded the door days earlier because Defendant had been coming into the house

while she was at work. She testified that she heard the window in a back bedroom

break, and Defendant “rushed” her from behind and held something black, pointed,

and sharp to her throat. Defendant told her he wanted to get back together. When he

ordered her to undress and go into the bedroom, she told him no. The Victim testified

that Defendant then told her that “if I would not go in the room, he will kill me, just

like my sister got killed,” explaining that her sister had been murdered by her

husband. She testified that she was forced to submit to his demand: “To save my life,

I had to do what he said.” After sexual intercourse, Defendant fell asleep, and T.M.

managed to get out the front door and across the street to a neighbor’s house from

where she called the police.

T.M. testified that prior to this night, her brother had nailed the windows in the

house closed and barricaded the back door because Defendant had been going into

the house. She stated that there was no reason for him to be in the house; all his

personal things had been removed.

Robert White, a police officer with Lafayette Police Department, was the first

to respond to the 911 call from the Victim. Prior to the Victim going to the hospital,

he interviewed her as to what had happened. The sequence of events related to him

was essentially the same as what the Victim testified to at trial. The officer looked

around the house and saw that the back bedroom window was broken, that there was

a clothes hanger wire attached to the front screen door which had been used to fasten

3

the front door shut, and that the phone line was disconnected on the outside of the

house. Moreover, the back door had been barricaded.

Brad Robin, a detective with the Lafayette Police Department, also interviewed

the Victim on the morning of the incident. He reviewed the crime scene, noting that

the windows had been nailed shut. He stated that the Victim told him she had the

lock changed on the front door of the house a month prior to the incident. The

detective testified that he located Defendant the same morning at “The Well,” which

he described as “a place where people go to sleep and also obtain food.” He testified

that he interviewed Defendant, and Defendant admitted that he broke into the house

through the window and that he and the Victim had sexual intercourse, though he

claimed she consented to the sexual act.

Defendant argues there was no evidence submitted to establish that he was

aware of the eviction proceeding. The record discloses, however, that the eviction

notice was posted. The front door lock was changed, the windows were nailed shut,

and the back door was boarded up. Nevertheless, the question of whether Defendant

knew of the eviction was not an issue in the case. In order to convict for forcible

rape, the State had to prove only that there was an act of vaginal intercourse, without

the lawful consent of the victim, and the victim was prevented from resisting by acts

of force or threats of physical violence under circumstances where the victim

reasonably believed that such resistance would not prevent the rape. State v. Clark,

04-901 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/04), 889 So.2d 471.

Our review of the record reveals sufficient evidence of each element of forcible

rape. There was unrefuted testimony that Defendant admitted he broke a window in

order to gain entrance into the house and that he had non-consensual sexual

intercourse with the Victim by the use of force. The Victim’s testimony and

4

corroborating facts support a factual finding of sexual intercourse without lawful

consent and threats of violence such that the Victim would have reasonably believed

her life was in danger if she did not comply. The front door was wired shut, and the

phone line had been cut. Defendant harangued her from outside the house telling her

he was going to kill her. He held a sharp object to her throat. She said no when he

told her to get undressed, and he told her that he was going to kill her like her sister

was murdered unless she complied. She testified she did so out of fear for her life.

The Victim’s fear of Defendant was evidenced by her dramatic actions of changing

the front door lock, nailing her windows shut, and boarding up her back door to keep

him out.

Defendant points to Clark, 889 So.2d 471, wherein this court reversed a

conviction for forcible rape because there was no evidence the victim fought back or

was prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of physical violence. The

facts in Clark were as follows:

C.T. testified that after Shrimp left with her friend, she locked the
house and prepared for bed. She changed from a skirt, shirt, and thong
into boxer shorts and a tee shirt to sleep in. She testified that after
sleeping for a while she was awakened by the sound of the Defendant
coming into her room. He took off his clothes, got in bed with her, and
proceeded to have sex with her. She testified that she was “frozen” and
did not fight him off, scream to Cole for help, or try to get away. Rather,
she pleaded with him to stop and was overpowered by him, a two
hundred pound man. She stated that he pinned her down, but he did not
threaten her and was not violent with her. She acknowledged she had
no bruises or other physical injuries from the incident. The Defendant
agreed that he returned to the Ewing house that morning, but he testified
the sexual act was consensual and C.T. never asked him to stop. Both
agreed the Defendant then cleaned himself up with a towel lying on the
floor, kissed C.T. on the forehead, and asked her if he would see her
later at a barbecue for the Ewings. He then left.

Id. at 473.

5

In Clark, this court found the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict for

the crime of simple rape because of the victim’s intoxication. Clark is clearly

distinguishable from the instant case. In this case, T.M. attempted to escape and call

out for help but was prevented from doing so by Defendant’s deliberate act of wiring

the front door shut and cutting the phone line. In contrast to the Clark case,

Defendant herein threatened to kill her unless she complied. The intercourse was

admitted, the Victim did not consent, and she was prevented from resisting by acts

of force by threats of violence.

Considering the testimony and corroborating evidence in this case, and the

Victim’s reasonable fear for her life if she did not submit to Defendant’s demand, we

find the elements of forcible rape were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm

the conviction.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO:

Defendant argues that the sentence imposed was excessive under the

circumstances of the case. He further argues that the trial court did not comply with

the mandates of La.Code Crim.P. art 894.1.

The offense of forcible rape is punishable by no less than five years

imprisonment and no more than forty years at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:42.1. Defendant

was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ten years, one-fourth of the possible

sentence that could have been imposed.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the
imposition of excessive punishment. A sentence is constitutionally
excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment, is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and
suffering, and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.
State v. Johnson, 97-1906, pp. 6-7 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 677
(citing State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993)). A sentence is
grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are

6

considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of
justice. State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739, 751 (La.1992).

Three factors to be considered in reviewing a sentence for
excessiveness are: (1) the nature of the crime; (2) the nature and
background of the offender; and (3) the sentences imposed for similar
crimes by the same court and other courts. State v. Tracy, 02-0227, p.
21 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/29/02), 831 So.2d 503, 516, writ denied, 02-2900
(La.4/4/03), 840 So.2d 1213. The trial judge has wide discretion in
imposing sentences within the statutory limits, and a sentence will not
be set aside if it is supported by the record. State v. Taylor, 02-1063, p.
11 (La.App. 5 Cir.2/25/03), 841 So.2d 894, 900, writ denied, 03-0949
(La.11/7/03), 857 So.2d 516.

State v. Carter, 04-482, pp. 13-14 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 888 So.2d 928, 937-38.

Absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court, a reviewing court

may not set aside a sentence. State v. Guzman, 99-1528, 99-1753 (La. 5/16/00), 769

So.2d 1158.

The record of the sentencing hearing shows that Defendant was forty-seven

years old at the time of trial. He had a criminal record of thirty-four misdemeanor

convictions, eight of which involved either battery, assault, or violation of a

protective order, and a prior felony conviction for distribution of cocaine. The

present conviction, the sentencing court noted, involved acts of violence.

In State v. Collins, 04-1441 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 896 So.2d 1265, writ

denied, 05-1334 (La. 1/9/06), 918 So.2d 1040, this court affirmed a thirty-year

sentence for a conviction of forcible rape. The offender entered a neighbor’s

apartment under the pretext of borrowing her phone. He forced her into the bedroom

and, after slapping and choking her, he had sexual intercourse with her. Similarly,

the second circuit did not find a sentence of twenty years imposed on a defendant who

was convicted of forcible rape to be excessive. In State v. Simpson, 39,268 (La.App.

2 Cir. 1/26/05), 892 So.2d 694, the defendant and the victim had been married. One

7

early morning, the defendant forced his way into the victim’s home, hid her phone so

she could not call for help, threatened to kill her if she did not submit, and raped her.

In the instant case, Defendant acted deliberately and violently when he secured

the Victim’s front door and cut the phone lines so that she could not escape or call for

help. He threatened her with acts of violence, using a threat that was particularly

poignant, that of killing her like her own sister was killed. Considering the facts of

this case, the nature of the crime, and similar jurisprudence, a sentence of ten years

at hard labor does not shock this court’s sentence of justice. The sentence imposed

does not represent an abuse of discretion and is hereby affirmed.

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s conviction and sentence are both

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules,
Courts of Appeal.

8