State of Louisiana v. Oterrel Joseph Boutte

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 09-583

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

OTERREL JOSEPH BOUTTE

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. CR98989
HONORABLE GLENNON P. EVERETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John D. Saunders, and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Michael Harson
District Attorney, 15th JDC
P.O. Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502-3306
(337) 232-5170
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

William Jarred Franklin
Louisiana Appellate Project
3001 Old Minden Road
Bossier City, LA 71112
(318) 746-7467
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Oterrel J. Boutte

GREMILLION, Judge.

The Defendant, Oterrel Joseph Boutte, was convicted of monetary instrument

abuse, in violation of La.R.S. 14:72.2 and was ordered to serve ten years at hard

labor. Defendant is now before this court asserting three assignments of error.

Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to prove the offense of monetary

instrument abuse beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in denying his

motion for mistrial, and the sentence imposed is excessive for this offender and this

offense. We affirm.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends there was insufficient

evidence to prove his guilt for the offense of monetary instrument abuse beyond a

reasonable doubt.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction . .
. , an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard of review
adjudged by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979),

“[T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was
sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the
elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984).

State v. Desoto, 07-1804, p. 7 (La. 3/17/09), 6 So.3d 141, 146.

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:72.2(B) provides, in pertinent part:

Whoever makes, issues, possesses, sells, or otherwise transfers an
implement designed for or particularly suited for making a counterfeit
or forged monetary instrument with the intent to deceive a person shall
be fined not more than one million dollars but not less than five
thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more
than ten years but not less than six months, or both.

Captain Ted Vincent testified that he received a tip from Crime Stoppers on

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March 25, 2003. The tip consisted of information regarding someone at a local motel

making counterfeit checks. It included the motel room number and information that

the person was wanted by the sheriff’s office.

Captain Vincent went to the Super 8 Motel in Lafayette, Louisiana. He

knocked on the door of room 311. There was no response, but Captain Vincent heard

someone inside the room. Captain Vincent entered the adjacent room and “could see

someone from 311 had jumped out the window.” Captain Vincent did not see the

person. He then entered the room.

Once inside the room, Captain Vincent found a Louisiana identification card

belonging to Defendant and clothes with a dry cleaning ticket in the name of

Defendant. It appeared that more than one person had been occupying the room, and

it was registered to someone other than Defendant.

Sergeant Keith Gremillion testified that when he entered room 311, he observed

a computer with the image of a check on the screen. The evidence taken from the

scene also includes check-writing software entitled “VersaCheck.” There were several

printers in the room and “check stocks” from a business named P.B.W.

Sergeant Gremillion also found a Social Security Administration identification

card issued to Edith M. Johnson, an envelope addressed to Joe Lewis, and a flyer from

Bank One addressed to Edith Johnson. Sergeant Gremillion testified that Edith

Johnson is Defendant’s mother and Joe Lewis is his step-father. Sergeant Gremillion

further confirmed that dry cleaning tags and receipts and a Louisiana identification

card, all bearing Defendant’s name, were found inside the motel room.

Sergeant Gremillion interviewed Defendant in April 2003. During that

interview, Defendant denied he was the person who jumped out the window of room

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311. Defendant stated the stolen computer in the room “was for” a guy named Jazzy.

Jazzy’s computer was in the room because he pawned it to Defendant for crack.

Defendant told Sergeant Gremillion that faked checks were being made on the

computer, and that he had even seen Jazzy make them.

Defendant denied that he created any of the checks found in the room and stated

that Jazzy created them. When asked how the check made out to Joe Lewis got into

the room, Defendant responded as follows:

Uh, like I told you, the other dude Jazzy would give me the money
he made while I stayed to get an account. Maybe we should have taken
him yesterday, but, you know, he gave me money to give him the
account. I got him an account. You know, he did his thing and I was
supposed to bring a check back. I just never had a chance to. And
basically that’s what it was about.

Defendant further stated that Jazzy wanted a copy of the check to put in the computer.

Defendant indicated that was the only check he gave to Jazzy.

Sergeant Gremillion testified that he never found Jazzy. Sergeant Gremillion

further testified that persons other than Defendant negotiated checks. However, he

agreed that “most roads lead to” Defendant. He stated there was no way to tell who

had been using the computer and creating the checks.

Police also arrested Tyrus Breaux, whose name the motel room was in, because

checks were being made out to him. Breaux told Sergeant Gremillion that he left the

motel room at 6:30 a.m. on the date in question and Defendant and two other people

were still there. Sergeant Gremillion admitted that he never asked Defendant the last

day he stayed at the motel.

John Lowrance, the owner of Wetco formerly known as P.B.W., testified that

Joe Lewis worked for him in March of 2003. Lowrance testified that State’s Exhibit

4 was a payroll check he made out to Lewis. The check to Lewis was reissued because

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Lewis told Lowrance he had never received the check.

Lowrance did not recognize a company check made out to Celest Meche, as he

had never employed anyone by that name. Lowrance testified the check was not

produced by him and he had never produced checks like the Celest Meche check.

Lowrance further testified that Defendant did not have permission to write checks for

the company.

Defendant contends the only evidence of a connection between himself and the

computer was his statement that Jazzy pawned it to him in exchange for drugs.

Further, he argues the State failed to prove he possessed the computer and printers or

that the used them for counterfeiting purposes.

Defendant further contends the State failed to prove the implement was

designed for, or particularly suited for, making a counterfeit or a forged monetary

instrument. Defendant asserts the alleged implement was a computer and the

legislature never intended to prohibit the possession of computers as a counterfeiting

tool. Defendant further argues that the State failed to prove the computer and printers

were designed or particularly suited for counterfeiting activities. Defendant asserts

the State attempted to proceed on the theory that “the manner in which it was used”

rendered its possession illegal. However, the legislature did not include the “manner

used” language in the statute. Lastly, Defendant asserts the State failed to show he

possessed the implements with intent to deceive. The State never showed Defendant

possessed the computer for any other reason than he had taken the computer from

Jazzy as payment for drugs.

Defendant asserts the State relied on the use of the computer as an implement

designed for, or particularly suited for. making a counterfeit or forged monetary

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instrument. The State asserted, in its closing argument:

Without a check, a template, could this have happened? Well, I don’t
believe so, at least as it involves PBW because without the real check and
the account, how is he going to make the other checks? How is he going
to make a check made out to Celeste Meche without Joe Lewis’ check?

The evidence is there. It’s right in front of you. The defendant
admitted everything himself. He is the person that made this possible.
It was his computer by his own admission that is making checks. Jazzy
is making checks. He admitted, “My computer was making checks.” And
on top of that, he was helping make checks because he was giving him
the check that was being used to make checks.

No Louisiana case has addressed the meaning of the term “implement,” but

federal jurisprudence has addressed the issue. In U.S. v. Holloman, 981 F.2d 690 (3d

Cir.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 907, 113 S.Ct. 3002 (1993), the defendant argued

that cancelled checks in his possession were not implements falling within the

statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 513(b), which states:

Whoever makes, receives, possesses, sells or otherwise transfers an
implement designed for or particularly suited for making a counterfeit or
forged security with the intent that it be so used shall be punished by a
fine under this title or by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or
both.

The court noted there was nothing to suggest that a cancelled check bearing

particularly useful information may not be an implement of counterfeiting or forgery.

The court noted the statute included language covering an implement designed for and

an implement particularly suited for making a counterfeit or forgery. The court went

on to find that the cancelled check was particularly suited for making a counterfeit or

forgery in the hands of someone like the defendant. In U.S. v. Wade, 266 F.3d 574

(6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 964, 122 S.Ct. 1381 (2002), the court found that

checks without signatures were implements under 18 U.S.C. § 513(b). Clearly then,

the State proved Defendant committed monetary instrument abuse by providing Jazzy

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with, or possessing checks to use as, a template to create counterfeit checks.

Defendant challenges the notion that a computer may also be considered an

implement under the language of the statute. After all, as Defendant notes in brief, “to

prohibit the possession of computers. . . would criminalize the behavior of most

citizens in today’s technological world.” Defendant misses the point by discussing a

computers in general as opposed to discussing this one in particular. The computer

at issue had with it software that was designed for, and particularly suited for,

producing checks. Furthermore, Defendant, himself, admitted that counterfeit checks

had been produced from that computer. He had seen it himself. So, was this

computer, with accompanying printers and software, “particularly suited” to produce

the counterfeit instruments found with it? Certainly. Otherwise, “Jazzy” would have

been unable to produce them while Defendant looked on. For theses reasons, this

assignment of error lacks merit.

MISTRIAL

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court erred in

denying his motion for mistrial.

Defendant asserts that Captain Vincent testified that the anonymous tip from

Crime Stoppers indicated that a person wanted by the Lafayette police was in room

311. Defendant asserts the testimony regarding the warrant placed the jury on notice

that someone had allegedly committed other crimes. Defendant moved for a mistrial,

but the trial court ruled it was not necessary since Sergeant Vincent had not identified

Defendant as the person who had an outstanding warrant, making the request

premature.

Defendant contends that Sergeant Gremillion later identified Defendant as the

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person with the bench warrant. Defendant asserts that this testimony removed all

doubt as to the identity of the wanted person and the only inference to be drawn was

that he had committed “prior other crimes.”

While a mistrial is mandatory when a judge, district attorney, or
court official refers to inadmissible other crimes evidence in the presence
of the jury, our jurisprudence has held that a police officer is not a “court
official.” See State v. Carter, 412 So.2d 540 (La.1982); State v. Gene,
587 So.2d 18 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied, 604 So.2d 993
(La.1992).

When a police officer makes such a reference, factors which may
be considered in determining whether a mistrial is warranted are whether
the statement was deliberately elicited by the district attorney, whether
it was responsive to the question, and whether the witness purposely
uttered it to prejudice the defendant. State v. Parker, 27,417 (La.App.2d
Cir.9/27/95), 661 So.2d 603, writ denied, 95-2576 (La.2/16/96), 667
So.2d 1049; State v. Williams, 26,655 (La.App.2d Cir.3/1/95), 651 So.2d
331, writ denied, 95-0777 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 448. Generally,
ambiguous or obscure references to other crimes made without
explanation or elaboration do not prejudice the defendant. State v.
Williams, supra; State v. Gene, supra.

State v. Brooks, 40,186, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/26/05), 914 So.2d 110, 114.

During Captain Vincent’s testimony, he stated: “That tip was consistent with

information in regards to someone making counterfeit checks at a local motel. They

gave the specific room number as well as information that he was presently wanted by

the Sheriff’s office.” At that time, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting

Captain Vincent’s response indicated there was an outstanding warrant for Defendant.

The trial court denied the motion, finding Captain Vincent had not given the name of

the person with the outstanding warrant. The trial court instructed defense counsel

that it was giving him the opportunity to later seek an admonishment if he chose to do

so. Defense counsel then indicated he did not wish for the trial court to do so.

In State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, cert. denied, 537

U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266 (2003), the supreme court found that a 911 caller’s

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statement that “two [unidentified] blacks had committed some robberies in the area,”

did not refer to any specific crime committed by the defendant but merely referenced

the caller’s personal knowledge of recent robberies committed in her neighborhood

by two unidentified African-American males. Further, this ambiguous reference did

not render it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial.

As in Bridgewater, the trial court properly denied the motion for mistrial, as

Captain Vincent did not testify that the outstanding warrant was for Defendant and his

testimony would be considered an ambiguous reference, which did not deprive

Defendant of a fair trial.

During the taking of Defendant’s statement, Sergeant Gremillion asked the

following question:

Oterrel, what I’m going to do is I’m going to talk about an incident that
happened on March 26, 2003. It occurred at Super 8 Motel in Room 311.
Myself and several officers went in reference to a complaint we had
about some counterfeit checks being produced from that room and also
that you were staying there at the time. It was determined that there were
some bench warrants issued for your arrest. The officers knocked on the
door and someone jumped out of the window. Was that you that jumped
out of the window?

At the time this testimony was given, defense counsel did not object. A

defendant cannot avail himself of an alleged error unless he made a contemporaneous

objection at the time of the error. Thus, Defendant may not now complain about this

testimony. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841(A); State v. Willis, 05-218, (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/2/05), 915 So.2d 365, writ denied, 06-186 (La. 6/23/06), 930 So.2d 973, cert.

denied, 549 U.S. 1052, 127 S.Ct. 668 (2006).

For these reasons, this assignment of error lacks merit.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In his third assignment of error, Defendant contends the sentence imposed is

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excessive for this offender and this offense. In this assignment of error, Defendant

attacks the excessiveness of the habitual offender sentence imposed for the underlying

conviction of monetary instrument abuse. This assignment is mooted by our ruling in

appellate docket number 09-404, wherein we vacated the sentence and remanded the

matter to the trial court for a new habitual offender adjudication.

DECREE

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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