State of Louisiana v. Jonah Valrie

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-737

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JONAH VALRIE

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 116327
HONORABLE GLENNON P. EVERETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy and Michael G. Sullivan, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Michael Harson
District Attorney
Post Office Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502-3306
(337) 232-5170
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Carey J. Ellis, III
Louisiana Appellate Project
707 Julia Street
Rayville, LA 71269
(318) 728-2043
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Jonah Valrie

AMY, Judge.

The defendant pled no contest to attempted manslaughter and was sentenced to

twelve years imprisonment at hard labor. The defendant now appeals, asserting that

his plea is deficient for lack of a sufficient factual basis and that his sentence is

excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Jonah Valrie, was initially charged with attempted second

degree murder and resisting an officer. According to the State’s brief and the

presentence investigative report, the charges were a result of the defendant shooting

the victim multiple times, hitting him in the abdomen. Pursuant to a plea agreement

with the State, the defendant pled no contest to the lesser charge of attempted

manslaughter. The trial court, in reliance on the presentence investigation report,

sentenced the defendant to twelve years imprisonment at hard labor.

The defendant now appeals, asserting that his no contest plea is deficient for

lack of a sufficient factual basis and that his sentence is excessive.1

Discussion

No Contest Plea

The defendant argues that although he “did not protest his innocence while

pleading no contest, the Trial Court should have required the State to establish a

factual basis for the plea, as is called for in order to accept an Alford plea” as required

by North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970).

The Supreme Court held in Alford that a defendant may enter a guilty plea while

still maintaining his innocence of the charge. This plea, known as an Alford plea, puts

1
This court granted the defendant’s motion allowing him an extension of time to file a pro
se brief; however, the defendant’s brief was untimely and, therefore, was not considered by this
court. In addition, the defendant’s request to terminate his court-appointed counsel and appoint new
counsel was denied.

the trial court on notice that it needs to make a judicial finding of a significant factual

basis for the plea. State v. Sutton, 04-88 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/7/04), 879 So.2d 419, writ

denied, 04-2617 (La. 6/24/05), 904 So.2d 730.

A no contest plea, however, does not require the same judicial finding of a

significant factual basis for the plea. State v. Johnson, 04-1266 (La.App. 3 Cir.

2/2/05), 893 So.2d 945. Thus, where a defendant does not assert his innocence in a

“no contest” plea or indicate he misunderstood the nature and consequences of that

plea, the trial court does not err by failing to include a factual basis of the offense in

the record. Id.; State v. Francis, 02-862 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/02), 832 So.2d 1225,

writ denied, 03-149 (La. 5/2/03), 842 So.2d 1099.

The record does not appear to indicate that the defendant in the present case

entered an Alford plea. The defendant signed a plea agreement which was notated as

a “no contest plea.” In addition, the defendant admitted to the trial court that it was

his signature on the plea agreement and that he understood the nature and

consequences of entering into that agreement. At his plea hearing, the defendant said

he feared he would be convicted at trial, and that was one reason he was entering the

“no contest plea.” At that point, the trial court found the defendant had made a

knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights, and that the plea was freely and

voluntarily given without threats or inducements. The trial court then accepted the

defendant’s plea. The record does not indicate that the defendant made an objection

or asserted his innocence at the plea hearing.

In light of the no contest plea and the trial court’s questioning of the defendant

at the time of the plea, it was proper for the trial court to accept his plea without

requiring a factual basis on which to find his plea sufficient.

2

This assignment lacks merit.

Excessiveness of Sentence

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that his twelve-year

sentence is excessive. This court has set out a standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne,
99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165
(La.6/30/00), 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial
court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784
(La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615,
(1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p.12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

To decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[A]n appellate court may consider several factors including the nature of
the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose
behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for
similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-606 (La.7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501. While
a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some
insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the
particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v.
Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the
purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial
judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook,
95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

3

State v. Smith, 02-719, p.4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

The defendant’s agreement to plead “no contest” to the lesser charge of

attempted manslaughter gave him a possible sentence of not more than twenty years

at hard labor. See La.R.S. 14:27; La.R.S. 14:31. The agreement also resulted in the

dismissal of the resisting an officer charge. His twelve-year sentence is slightly more

than half the penalty he could have possibly received for attempted manslaughter. In

addition, the defendant received a substantial benefit from his plea bargain, which

decreased his possible sentence from fifty years to twenty years at hard labor. See

La.R.S. 14:27; La.R.S. 14:30.1.

The record reveals that the trial court judge did consider aggravating and

mitigating factors. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court judge stated:

Mr. Valrie, I have reviewed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in the applicable Articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I have
considered the factors associated with your crime in question. I have
looked at your record. I have considered in particular the victim’s impact
as well as the State of Louisiana’s recommendation of sentence. After all
the above has been considered, I hereby sentence you to serve twelve
years at hard labor.

A review of the presentence report and consideration of the facts that the

defendant received a benefit from the plea agreement and his sentence for the crime

he was convicted of is a mid-level sentence, it is clear that the trial court’s imposition

of sentence is not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the defendant’s sentence is not

excessive.

This assignment lacks merit.

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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