State of Louisiana v. Crayton Jones, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 09-751

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CRAYTON JONES, JR.

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APPEAL FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 60,490
HONORABLE STEPHEN BRUCE BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billy Howard Ezell, J. David Painter, and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Don M. Burkett
District Attorney
Anna Louise Garcie
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 1557
Many, LA 71449
(318) 256-6246
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Annette Fuller Roach
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1747
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747
(337) 436-2900
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Crayton Jones, Jr.

Crayton Jones, Jr.
Sabine Parish Detention Center
384 Detention Center Road
Many, LA 71449

EZELL, JUDGE.

Defendant, Crayton Jones, Jr., was charged by bill of indictment with second

degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, on August 24, 2005 for the shooting

death of Alice Staton. He pled guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter, in

violation of La.R.S. 14:31 on July 10, 2006. He was sentenced to twenty years at

hard labor on December 14, 2006.

At that hearing, Defendant verbally indicated his desire to appeal his sentence.

Defendant’s attorney, Joseph David Toups, Jr., told the court, “I’d like to give notice

to the Court of my intention to appeal and I will provide the Court with a written

motion for appeal as well as a written motion to reconsider the sentence.” The trial

court instructed Mr. Toups to file a written motion for appeal prior to the end of the

2007 year. Mr. Toups died on September 17, 2008; at the time of his death, no

written motion had been filed.

In the meantime, Defendant timely filed a pro se application for post-

conviction relief on July 8, 2008, in which he alleged he pled guilty because he was

scared and forced into making the plea. Defendant claimed his guilty plea was made

without understanding the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.

Where the application asked if Defendant had appealed from the judgment of

conviction, Defendant checked “Yes.” The trial court denied the application for post-

conviction relief on July 11, 2008. Defendant did not seek review of the denial.

The record on appeal contains the trial court’s order dated October 27, 2008

that states, “[t]he Court has received written correspondence from the defendant in

which he requests that new counsel be appointed due to the demise of Mr. Toups.”

The next entry in the record is a handwritten letter from Defendant dated “12-20-08,”

addressed to the District Attorney’s office in Many, Louisiana, which reads:

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I, Crayton Jones Jr., was sentence[d] Dec. 14-06 as the charged of
manslaughter, in the 11th Judicial Court. My appointed counsel Mr.
Joseph Toups (IDB) represented me and after a guilty plea, Mr. Joseph
Toups asked for an appeal in which records shows.

Mr. Joseph Toups deceased [sic], in protractive [sic] to assist in the legal
matters pertaining to this matter. After inquiring I was told the appeal
was placed with the IDB for a new appointed attorney. My prayers is
that your office would investigate my allegations, and re-appoint me the
attorney as soon as possible. I thank you very much.

Look to hear from you soon.

Sincerely,
Mr. Crayton Jones

The letter bears no indication of the date of filing into the record.

This Court made a request to the office of the Clerk of Court for Sabine Parish

for a copy of the letter to which the October 27, 2008 order refers. In response, the

clerk’s office supplemented the record on appeal with an affidavit stating the letter

from Defendant dated “12-20-08” was attached to the October 27, 2008 order and

filed with it on that same date. Thus, the only logical explanation is that Defendant

placed an incorrect date on the letter, and his request for a new attorney was actually

made prior to October 27, 2008.

On March 3, 2009, the trial court signed an order to appoint new counsel for

Defendant for the purpose of preparing and filing an out-of-time appeal. Newly-

appointed counsel filed an out-of-time motion to reconsider Defendant’s sentence on

March 9, 2009.1 The motion alleged the trial court failed to articulate sufficient

reasons to justify Defendant’s sentence and the sentence was harsh and excessive

because Defendant’s conduct did not justify a twenty-year sentence. At a hearing on

March 24, 2009, the parties submitted the matter but made no oral argument. The

trial court denied the motion on March 25, 2009. Defendant then filed a motion for

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The record contains no timely filed motion to reconsider.

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an out-of-time appeal on April 2, 2009, and the trial court granted the motion on April

3, 2009.

Mr. Toups’ oral indication of the intent to appeal Defendant’s sentence served

as a timely motion for appeal, even though Mr. Toups told the trial court he would

“provide the Court with a written motion for appeal as well as a written motion to

reconsider the sentence” and never did so. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held

an “oral motion made by counsel in open court following sentencing constituted an

oral motion for an appeal as authorized by La.C.Cr.P. art. 914(A) . . . .” State v.

Murphy, 07-2032 (La. 2/22/08), 974 So.2d 1290. Murphy reversed this court’s

decision dismissing an appeal based on a similar oral motion. See State v. Murphy,

an unpublished opinion bearing docket number 07-555 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/12/07).

Here, the motion for reconsideration was filed on March 9, 2009, and the

motion for an out-of-time appeal was filed on April 2, 2009, both more than two years

from the date Defendant was sentenced. Thus, the time had lapsed for Defendant to

file an application for post-conviction relief for the purpose of requesting an out-of-

time appeal. See State v. Counterman, 475 So.2d 336 (La.1985). Based on Murphy,

this appeal was timely requested by Mr. Toups’ oral motion.

Defendant appeals his sentence as excessive. He also argues the trial court’s

reasons for imposing the sentence are unsupported by the record and do not satisfy

the mandates of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. His pro se brief suggests his guilty plea

was not knowingly and voluntarily made. For the reasons set forth below, the

sentence imposed by the trial court is affirmed.

FACTS

According to the pre-sentence investigation report, Defendant told Sabine

Parish Sheriff’s Detective Steven Marr on July 21, 2005, the day of the incident, that

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he and Alice Staton had an argument, struggled over a handgun, and it fired. In

Defendant’s application for post-conviction relief, he alleged that, although he had

told the detective he and Staton were “tusseling [sic] over the firearm,” in reality, he

cocked the gun to see if it needed cleaning, and it accidentally fired. The application

for post-conviction relief states Defendant “was scared and shock [sic] up, wehn the

accident occurred.” What he had said in his initial statement to Detective Marr was

“not the way it happen [sic].” Defendant filed correspondence with the trial court on

July 8, 2008, in which he stated, “I’m very sorry i [sic] didn’t tell how the accident

happen [sic] from the beginning, i [sic] am very sorry please forgive me.”

According to Defendant’s handwritten statement attached to the pre-sentence

investigation report, Defendant checked the gun to see if it needed oiling. As he “was

fixing to set down,” it accidentally went off, and he saw Staton “laying there.”

Defendant threw the gun in a chair, got a towel to wipe Staton’s face, went to a

neighboring apartment, and asked its resident to call 911. When the resident asked

what happened, Defendant told her the gun accidentally fired. Defendant ran back

to the apartment, then returned to the neighboring apartment, and was stopped as he

tried again to return to his apartment. Defendant was too nervous, scared and hurt “to

tell what happen [sic] at the time of the accident.”

A witness reported she had been at the couple’s residence on the date of the

shooting, and Defendant and Staton had argued periodically, from 11:00 p.m. until

she left their home at 2:08 a.m. At one point, Defendant retrieved a handgun from his

vehicle, brought it into the residence, and placed it on the couch. As the witness left

the residence, Staton got into her vehicle and said she wanted to go home with the

witness, but the witness did not let her go.

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At the guilty plea hearing, Defendant indicated he understood the nature of his

plea, his possible sentence, and the waiver of his constitutional rights. The trial court

found Defendant was capable of making the plea and had “done so knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily, fully understanding the rights [he had] given up by

pleading guilty and the consequences thereof.”

Defendant’s pro se brief, however, states he was “scared and nervous” and did

not know what he was doing when he pled guilty. Defendant alleges the guilty plea

“was a big misunderstanding,” and he would have never pled guilty had he

understood the questions better.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE AND TWO

Defendant claims his twenty-year sentence is cruel, unusual, and excessive and

thus violates both the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, §20

of the Louisiana Constitution. Further, he argues the reasons given by the trial court

in support of the imposition of the twenty-year sentence are not supported by the

record and are insufficient to satisfy the mandates of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1.

At the sentencing hearing on December 14, 2006, the trial court noted

Defendant was convicted of simple burglary in 1982. He also served time on a theft

charge and was released on good time parole that expired in 1990. The court

discussed the benefit Defendant gained by his guilty plea and noted Defendant’s

crime was one of violence. The trial court then particularly noted its review of the

La.Code Crim.P. art 894.1 factors. While it did not comment on each of the thirty-

three factors, it specifically mentioned two of them as aggravating and one as

mitigating. He noted that Defendant used a dangerous weapon in the commission of

the crime and that Defendant foreseeably endangered human life by discharging a

firearm, even though that discharge may have been accidental. The trial court also

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noted in mitigation that the circumstances were unlikely to reoccur.

The trial court should indicate in the record that it considered both the

aggravating and mitigating factors of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 in particularizing

a sentence to a defendant. State v. Morain, 07-1207 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/08), 981

So.2d 66. The court need not “go through all of the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances” so long as the record reflects that he adequately considered the

article’s guidelines.” Id. at 68 (quoting State v. Thomas, 434 So.2d 530, 536 (La.App.

2 Cir. 1983)). The trial judge’s specific reference to the factors he considered

applicable in this case shows he adequately considered Article 894.1.

Defendant further argues his sentence is excessive considering the

circumstances of the case and his background. This court has set out a standard to be

used in reviewing excessive sentence claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331(alteration in original).

To decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

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[An] appellate court may consider several factors including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose
behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for
similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00); 766 So.2d 501.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize
the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784, [p.2] (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

Defendant’s crime of manslaughter is a violent offense that resulted in Staton’s

death. The penalty for manslaughter is up to forty years at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:31.

Defendant’s twenty-year sentence is in the middle of the sentencing range. At the

time of his guilty plea, Defendant was forty-five years old. He has a seventh grade

education and two prior felony convictions for simple burglary and theft. Defendant

now claims the shooting occurred accidentally while he was cleaning or oiling his

gun. However, just hours after the shooting and at the hearing of his guilty plea, he

said the gun discharged as he and Staton argued. Nothing in the record indicates

Defendant’s story changed until after he was sentenced. Defendant now wants this

court to believe that he was unable to truthfully report how the shooting actually

occurred because of his shock and fear in the immediate aftermath of the shooting,

and again a year later at the guilty plea, but is now, after sentencing, able to tell how

the accident really happened.

Defendant alleges the trial court doubted whether the State could have proven

second degree murder, and thus, he really received no benefit from the plea bargain

to the lesser offense of manslaughter. The trial court commented, “even though there

are some indications that it was accidental in regard to not an intentional [sic], it was

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certainly as a result of elements that make it manslaughter.” The trial court did not

see the evidence or hear the witnesses’ testimony because of the plea bargain, and

therefore, could not (and did not) say whether the State could have proven its case.

Had Defendant gone to trial for second degree murder, a jury might have found him

guilty, and he would have faced a mandatory life sentence without benefit of parole,

probation or suspension of sentence. His agreement to plead to manslaughter reduced

his possible sentence to no more than forty years at hard labor. Defendant will serve

only half of that possible sentence. Clearly, Defendant received considerable benefit

from the plea agreement.

The manslaughter conviction is Defendant’s third felony. He had a 1982

conviction for simple burglary and a theft conviction for which his parole expired in

1990. The trial court did not use these convictions to enhance Defendant’s sentence,

but properly considered them as part of Defendant’s criminal history.

Similar cases show Defendant’s mid-range sentence was not an abuse of the

trial court’s discretion. The defendant in State v. Williams, 03-1537 (La.App. 3 Cir.

6/9/04), 875 So.2d 1043, writ denied, 04-1951 (La. 12/17/04), 888 So.2d 864, was

sentenced to the maximum forty years at hard labor, without benefits, after a

confrontation that resulted in the defendant shooting the victim at point-blank range

and killing him.

The victim died of injuries from a fist fight in State v. Levy, 08-1467 (La.App.

3 Cir. 6/10/09), 12 So.3d 1135. The Levy defendant was charged with second degree

murder. He pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty-five years at

hard labor. In State v. Lanieu, 98-1260 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/1/99), 734 So.2d 89, writ

denied, 99-1259 (La. 10/8/99), 750 So.2d 962, the defendant shot his victim after an

argument, paused, and shot him again. He drove away with the victim’s body in the

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car and dumped it in a field. The first circuit affirmed the maximum forty-year

sentence.

Defendant argues the aggravating factor of endangering human life should not

have been considered in imposing his sentence because that characteristic is inherent

to a manslaughter conviction. By nature, manslaughter endangers human life, and so,

that factor is already considered in the sentencing range for the crime. Thus,

Defendant argues that factor should not be considered to lengthen his sentence in any

way.

This argument was not made in the trial court, and thus, may not be considered

here. La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1. “Where the record clearly shows an adequate

factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has

not been full compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.” State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d

475, (La.1982). The record shows an adequate factual basis for Defendant’s twenty-

year sentence.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Defendant’s pro se brief does not formally allege any assignments of error.

However, it argues Defendant’s guilty plea was made because he misunderstood what

he was doing, implying the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made.

This argument was not made in Defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence.

It was first raised in Defendant’s application for post-conviction relief; that

application was denied. The proper mode of review of a judgment denying an

application for post-conviction relief is by application for supervisory writs. La.Code

Crim.P. art. 930.6. Defendant did not file a supervisory writ application seeking

review of the trial court’s denial of his application for post-conviction relief.

However, in the interest of judicial economy, we will consider Defendant’s pro se

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assignment of error and review the trial court’s denial of his application for post-

conviction relief.

From the time of the shooting, Defendant maintained it occurred during an

argument with Staton that involved the gun. Defendant continued with that version

of the facts at the hearing of his guilty plea. Only after he received a twenty-year

sentence of imprisonment at hard labor did his story change. Only at that point did

he contend the gun accidentally fired while he was cleaning or oiling it.

Defendant’s pro se brief alleges he waived his rights because he misunderstood

the question asked of him, and his guilty plea to manslaughter was a big

misunderstanding. He would have never taken the plea if he had understood the

question; he was scared and nervous and did not know what he was doing.

Defendant, however, never identifies the particular question he allegedly

misunderstood. The transcript of the plea hearing shows Defendant said no one had

threatened him or made any promises or guarantees to try to make him plead against

his will. He understood the possible penalty for manslaughter was forty years at hard

labor. He said he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol and that nothing

was going on in his life that would prevent him from understanding what he was

doing or the consequences of his action. Defendant said he understood he gave up

his Boykin rights of trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, and privilege against

self-incrimination.

After the State presented the factual basis for the plea, including that Defendant

told law enforcement officers that he and Staton had a verbal argument and that the

gun fired while they struggled over it, Defendant indicated he still wanted to enter his

guilty plea. The judge found Defendant fully understood the rights he relinquished

and entered the plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The record supports

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a finding that the trial judge was correct. See State v. Jones, 08-1158 (La.App. 5 Cir.

2/25/09), 9 So.3d 893.

Nothing in the record supports Defendant’s claim that he misunderstood any

part of the hearing. Defendant’s contention that he was too scared and nervous to tell

the truth does not provide an adequate basis to withdraw his guilty plea.

CONCLUSION

The twenty-year sentence imposed by the trial court is affirmed, and the trial

court did not err in denying Defendant’s application for post-conviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

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