State of Louisiana v. Regal Minor

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-981

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

REGAL MINOR

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 05-K-5819-C
HONORABLE ALONZO HARRIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Oswald A. Decuir and
Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Earl B. Taylor
District Attorney
P. O. Drawer 1968
Opelousas, LA 70571
(337) 948-0551
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Jennifer Ardoin
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Drawer 1968
Opelousas, LA 70571
(337) 948-0551
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Annette Roach
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1747
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747
(337) 436-2900
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Regal Minor

DECUIR, Judge.

Defendant, Regal Minor, was charged with second degree battery, a violation

of La.R.S. 14:34.1. Defendant elected to have a bench trial, and the court found

Defendant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two and one-half years in parish

jail.

Defendant now appeals his conviction, assigning a single error.

FACTS

On December 2, 2005, the Defendant and another individual drove up, exited

their vehicle and attacked Mark Gillis in the front yard of his home beating him to the

ground. After the beating ceased, Gillis called 911. The responding officer advised

that he seek medical attention. Gillis presented to the ER with multiple contusions,

numbness in his head, headache, and pain in his ribs. Gillis also had to have blood

drained from a hematoma on his ear to avoid a potential deformity. Gillis testified

that he was in extreme pain and could not get out of bed for a week following the

attack.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues the evidence adduced at trial

does not support his conviction for second degree battery. The analysis for this type

of argument is well-established:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195,
62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559
(La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody,
393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the
respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court
should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of
fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of

review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v.
Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to
affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has
satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Second degree battery is defined by La.R.S. 14:34.1, which states, in pertinent

part:

Second degree battery is a battery committed without the consent
of the victim when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily
injury.

For purposes of this article, serious bodily injury means bodily
injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or
protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a
substantial risk of death.

Defendant argues the State did not prove he had the specific intent to inflict

“serious bodily injury” upon the victim. He also appears to question whether the

victim actually suffered serious bodily injury. Regarding intent, we note that

Defendant and an accomplice knocked the victim to the ground and then continued

punching and kicking him. Such action has been recognized as indicative of a

specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury. See, e.g., State v. Robertson, 98-883

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/98), 723 So.2d 500, writ denied, 99-658 (La. 6/25/99), 745

So.2d 1187; State v. Daigle, 439 So.2d 595 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1983). Also, Louisiana

courts have found specific intent in cases where larger men hit smaller men. See, e.g.,

State v. Accardo, 466 So.2d 549 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1204

(La.1985). An attack in concert with other assailants is at least as dangerous as an

attack by a single large, strong man. Thus, the fact that Defendant acted in concert

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with an accomplice should be viewed as indicative of a specific intent to inflict

serious bodily injury.

Regarding the degree of actual injury to the victim, Defendant correctly

observes he did not break any of Gillis’s bones, or cause permanent physical

disfigurement. He also argues that the victim’s claim to have suffered “extreme

physical pain” is not consistent with other evidence.

Photos of the victim show extensive bruising to the left side of his face, and to

his right ear. Dr. Mark Francis Olivier, the emergency room physician who treated

the victim, described the injuries as follows:

A. He has some injuries to his face and head.

Q. Okay. And did you examine him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did he have any complaints of pain at that time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Doctor, how did he describe the level of pain he was in?

A. Moderate.

Q. At that time it was moderate?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What were the - how would you classify - what did you do to treat
him?

A. Well, he had bruising and swelling in the left cheek area. He had
a small laceration over the eye on the left which required some steri-strip
placement. He had bruising and swelling in the back of the head. He
had tenderness in the right side of the jaw. And he had a um - swelling
of the right ear which was a hematoma which is a collection of blood
under the skin of the ear above the cartilage. And the way that is treated
is you have to drain the blood away to prevent destroying the cartilage
in the future.

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Q. So, Doctor, would you say if Mr. Gillis had not received the
medical treatment that you provided to him as it pertains to his ear, what
would have happened in your professional opinion?

A. If the hematoma is not drained then there is potential for
deformity of the ear, the cartilage could die and you would end up with
a deformed ear.

His testimony of cross-examination was similar. During redirect, the following

colloquy occurred:

Q. Doctor, before you treated Mr. Gillis for the hematoma, would
you consider the hematoma a disfigurement of his ear? Did he have a
disfigurement on his ear before you treated him?

A. He had a swelling [of] the ear above the cartilage which I would
consider a disfigurement.

Q. And when you treated him for the hematoma that prevented the
ear from being permanently disfigured. Would you say that that was to
the highest degree of medical certainty that you know, that prevented a
permanent disfigurement from staying there.

A. Right. The ear is different as far as hematomas in that area
because they have the potential of destroying cartilage underneath them
and causing permanent disfigurement if you don’t evacuate them.

On appeal, Defendant argues the potential for disfigurement was “speculative

at best.” However, the doctor’s testimony showed the victim was treated specifically

to prevent such disfigurement. The fact that Gillis received timely and effective

medical help does not negate Defendant’s criminal culpability. The record is clear

that Defendant and his accomplice inflicted an injury sufficient to disfigure the

victim’s ear. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that

Defendant’s conduct constituted second degree battery.

Defendant cites three cases in which Louisiana courts have reduced second

degree battery convictions to simple battery. The victim in the present case received

a more serious injury than those suffered in the cases Defendant cites. In State v.

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Helou, 02-2302 (La. 10/23/03), 857 So.2d 1024, the victim had a bloody nose, in

State v. Vidaurri, 05-742 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 919 So.2d 803, writ denied, 06-

573 (La. 10/27/06), 939 So.2d 1270, the victim sustained scratches and a black eye;

in State v. Touchet, 04-1027 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/05), 897 So.2d 900, the injuries at

issue were bruises. However, the present case is distinguishable from those three

cases because of the damage to Gillis’s ear. While bruises and scratches will heal and

fade naturally, the victim’s ear required medical intervention to avoid permanent

damage.

For the reasons discussed, this assignment lacks merit.

DECREE

The Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules,
Courts of Appeal.

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