State of Louisiana v. Marcus Allen Maze

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-1298

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MARCUS ALLEN MAZE

****************

APPEAL FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 64386
HONORABLE STEPHEN B. BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

****************

JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

****************

Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, James T. Genovese, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Don M. Burkett
District Attorney – Eleventh Judicial District
Ronald D. Brandon, Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 1557
Many, LA 71449
(318) 256-6246
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

James E. Beal
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 307
Jonesboro, LA 71251-0307
(318) 259-2391
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Marcus Allen Maze

GENOVESE, Judge.

In this criminal case, the Defendant, Marcus Allen Maze, appeals his sentence

pursuant to conviction for attempted manslaughter. On April 24, 2008, the Defendant

was charged by an amended bill of information with one count of attempted second

degree murder, violations of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:30.1, one count of

attempted second degree murder under the domestic violence act, violations of

La.R.S. 14:27, La.R.S. 14:30.1, and La.R.S. 46:2131 through La.R.S. 46:2151, and

one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La.R.S.

14:95.1. The Defendant pled guilty on June 22, 2009, to one count of attempted

manslaughter, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:31, and to one count of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1.

The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report. On August 31, 2009,

the Defendant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor on his

conviction for attempted manslaughter and ten years imprisonment at hard labor

without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on his conviction

of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. His sentences were ordered to run

concurrently. The Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence which was

denied without a hearing on September 4, 2009.

The Defendant perfected a timely appeal wherein he asserts that the maximum

sentence of twenty years for attempted manslaughter is excessive under the

circumstances of his case. He does not appeal his sentence for his conviction of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. For the following reasons, we find that

the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to a

total of twenty years imprisonment for his conviction of attempted manslaughter.

FACTS

The facts which supported the Defendant’s guilty plea were as follows:

[O]n or about January 17, 2008, Marcus Maze did commit the offense
of attempted manslaughter by shooting the victim Lavan Carter[,] and
also with a firearm, Mr. Maze was found convicted [sic] in this court on
September 15, 2003, of distribution of schedule two.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Defendant argues that his maximum sentence of twenty years is

constitutionally excessive. The Defendant pled guilty to attempted manslaughter.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31(B) provides for a range of punishment for the

offense of manslaughter of not more than forty years at hard labor. The Louisiana

attempt statute, in pertinent part, provides that the offender “shall be fined or

imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or

imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest

term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.”

La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Accordingly, the maximum sentence of incarceration the

Defendant could have received in this case was twenty years for the crime of

attempted manslaughter, which was the sentence imposed upon him.

The Defendant was also convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon which provides for a range of punishment of not less than ten years nor more

than fifteen years at hard labor. See La.R.S. 14:95.1(B). The Defendant received a

ten-year sentence; however, he does not contest his sentence for his conviction for

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on appeal.

In discussing maximum sentences, this court stated in State v. Bailey, 07-130,

p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 968 So.2d 247, 250:

A sentence which falls within the statutory limits

2

may be excessive under certain circumstances. To
constitute an excessive sentence, this Court must find that
the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the
sentence makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable
penal goals and[,] therefore, is nothing more than the
needless imposition of pain and suffering. The trial judge
has broad discretion, and a reviewing court may not set
sentences aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion.

State v. Guzman, 99-1753, 99-1528, p. 15 (La.5/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158,
1167 (citations omitted).

In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d
786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061 (citations
omitted), this court discussed the factors it would consider in order to
determine whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no
meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals:

In deciding whether a sentence is shocking or makes
no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, an
appellate court may consider several factors including the
nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the
legislative purpose behind the punishment and a
comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular offender
and to the particular offense committed.” Additionally, it
is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the
sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.”

“Generally, maximum sentences are reserved for those cases that
involve the most serious violations of the offense charged and the worst
type of offender.” State v. Jones, 05-735, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06),
924 So.2d 1113, 1116.

The Defendant, in brief, argues that he is not one of the most serious offenders

warranting a maximum sentence and that the sentence “is grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the crime, and serves no useful purpose.” He lists several mitigating

factors wherein he asserts the trial court should have considered pursuant to

3

La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(B)(22) through La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(B)(32), as

follows:

(22) The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor
threatened serious harm.

(23) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct
would cause or threaten serious harm.

(24) The defendant acted under strong provocation.

(25) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify
the defendant’s criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense.

(26) The victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct induced or
facilitated its commission.

(27) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the
victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained.

(28) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal
activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time
before the commission of the instant crime.

(29) The defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur.

(30) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively
to probationary treatment.

(31) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive
hardship to himself or his dependents.

(32) The defendant has voluntarily participated in a pretrial drug
testing program.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:

Mr. Maze, you appeared in this court and pled to attempted
manslaughter and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. I note
that you are in fact a fourth felon[y] offender. I had ordered a pre-
sentence investigation. It’s been returned to me. I’ve made it available
to your attorney[,] Mr. Kendrick[,] to review. I’ve noted the sentencing
guidelines. I’ve noted the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Only a few of the above mitigating factors may fit the circumstances of the

4

instant case. According to the pre-sentence investigation report, the facts of which

were not disputed, the Defendant, armed with a shotgun, broke out the window of the

motel room of his former wife and her current boyfriend and fired twice, hitting the

boyfriend in the chest. The second shot went through the motel room wall, seriously

injuring a man in the adjacent room. As noted by the trial court, the Defendant had

three prior felony convictions. His arrest record started in 1989 and is lengthy. He

had three prior felony convictions wherein he received prison time, and, in each case,

either his parole or his probation was revoked for violations of the conditions thereof.

The Defendant argues that the trial court failed to take into consideration that

he was suffering from depression and was on medication for his depression at the

time of the incident. However, we note that the trial court was fully aware of the

Defendant’s mental health issues. The trial court had ordered a sanity commission

report and had held an evidentiary hearing concerning the results of the commission’s

findings.

Finally, the offenses to which the Defendant pled guilty did not adequately

describe the entire course of his conduct, and the plea bargain resulted in a significant

reduction in his potential exposure to imprisonment. The Defendant received a

considerable benefit when he was allowed to plead to a lesser offense which may be

considered when determining whether the sentence is excessive. See State v. Hicks,

07-726 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/5/07), 977 So.2d 1008.

We note that in the instant case, the trial court took cognizance of the

requirements of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not required to list

every aggravating or mitigating circumstance as long as the record reflects adequate

compliance. See State v. Hutcherson, 34,540 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/4/01), 785 So.2d 140.

5

In comparing the Defendant to other similarly situated defendants, the

following cases are pertinent. In State v. Holmes, 99-631 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00),

754 So.2d 1132, writ denied, 00-1020 (La. 3/30/01), 788 So.2d 440, in a similar

factual scenario, the first circuit did not find the maximum sentence imposed on a

conviction for attempted manslaughter to be excessive. The defendant in that case,

charged with second degree murder and attempted second degree murder, was found

guilty of manslaughter and attempted manslaughter. He was sentenced to forty years

and twenty years, respectively, to be served concurrently. The defendant had crawled

into his former wife’s bedroom window, shot and killed her lover, then wounded her

in the face. Likewise, in State v. Stanton, 05-812 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/8/06), 929 So.2d

137, writ denied, 06-1381 (La. 1/26/07), 948 So.2d 161, the defendant, charged with

attempted second degree murder, was convicted of attempted manslaughter and

sentenced to the maximum sentence of twenty years imprisonment. During an armed

robbery attempt, the defendant aimed the gun at the victim and fired twice, but the

gun misfired both times. The fourth circuit did not find the sentence excessive,

noting that the defendant had an extensive criminal record and that he had

“committed very serious crimes without regard for human life[.]” Id. at 141.

Considering the above jurisprudence and the facts of the current case, we

cannot say that the maximum sentence of twenty years is so shocking that it disturbs

this court’s sense of justice. The Defendant has three prior felony convictions with

revocations in each case. This was a serious offense committed without regard for

human life, which resulted in serious injury to the victims. Accordingly, the trial

court did not abuse its vast discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to the

maximum sentence of twenty years for the offense of attempted manslaughter.

6

DISPOSITION

We affirm the Defendant’s twenty-year sentence pursuant to his conviction for

attempted manslaughter.

AFFIRMED.

7