KA-0010-0019 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Walter James Hicks, Jr.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed June 2, 2010

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-19

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

WALTER JAMES HICKS, JR.

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. CR-853-08
HONORABLE STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Marc T. Amy, and James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Michael C. Cassidy
District Attorney
Bennett R. LaPoint
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 1388
Jennings, LA 70546
(337) 824-1893
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Carey J. Ellis, III
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 719
Rayville, LA 71269
(318) 728-2043
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Walter James Hicks, Jr.

Walter James Hicks, Jr.
Pine Prairie Correctional Center
1133 Hampton Dupre Road
Pine Prairie, LA 70576

AMY, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of second degree battery and sentenced to five

years imprisonment at hard labor. He appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Walter James Hicks, Jr., was charged by bill of information

with second degree battery, after he was involved in a physical altercation with

another man, John Eckel. At the time of the altercation, both men were inmates at the

Jefferson Davis Parish Jail. As a result of the fight, Mr. Eckel was taken by

ambulance to a local hospital where he was treated for injuries to his head.

On May 4, 2009, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted as charged.

The defendant filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, arguing that “[t]he evidence

contained in the record is insufficient as a matter of law to support the verdict of the

jury finding the defendant guilty” of second degree battery. Following a hearing, the

motion was denied. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to serve

five years imprisonment at hard labor.

The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his

conviction for second degree battery.

Discussion

Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no errors

patent.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant contends that the evidence is

insufficient to convict him of second degree battery. Specifically, the defendant

asserts that Mr. Eckels was not rendered unconscious nor suffered an injury which

would support his conviction.

Second degree battery is defined in La.R.S. 14:34.1 as “a battery committed

without the consent of the victim when the offender intentionally inflicts serious

bodily injury.” Serious bodily injury is defined in the same statute as “bodily injury

which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or protracted and obvious

disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member,

organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death.” La.R.S. 14:34.1.

The analysis for a claim of insufficient evidence is, as follows:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195,
62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559
(La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody,
393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the
respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court
should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of
fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v.
Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to
affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has
satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

At trial, several persons testified about Mr. Eckel’s injuries and level of

consciousness following the altercation. Officer Ryan Gary, a correctional officer for

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Jefferson Davis Parish, testified that he was working at the jail on the night of the

incident. When asked about Mr. Eckel’s condition following the altercation, Officer

Gary replied that “he was beaten pretty bad. I had an ambulance en route right away.”

He testified that Mr. Eckel was disoriented and unable to state his date of birth or his

location. When asked to describe what Mr. Eckel looked like after he returned from

the hospital, Officer Gary stated that “[b]oth eyes was [sic] black and still swollen,

and he had a - - his jaw was still swollen up pretty bad, and his ears were bruised up.”

Mr. Eckel testified that the defendant hit him on the right side of his head with

his fist. He recalled that after he was hit, he “fell to the side, and [he] felt the left side

of [his] head strike something, and then [he] woke up, and [he] was in the hospital.”

As to his injuries, he testified that he “had some stitches on [his] ear, and swelling of

the jaw” in addition to black eyes. When asked to describe his pain, Mr. Eckel

testified as follows:

Every time my heart beats [sic], my head pulsated with excruciating
agony. It felt as though if I would stand up, which I could, but it would
take me awhile to get up, that once I was up, I would fall short from lack
of blood pumping to my brain and feel like I’m about to blackout and
fall down. I had migraine headaches that lasted for weeks afterwards.
The pain in my jaw from the swelling was like a steady constant mild
pain.

Several other persons who were inmates at the time of the incident testified.

Two of the inmates, Philip Thibeaux and Elijah Miller, responded that they never

observed Mr. Eckel unconscious after the fight. Mr. Miller testified about Mr.

Eckel’s injuries, stating that Mr. Eckel’s “face was swollen, and one of his eyes were

[sic] closed. I think his lip was busted.” Daven Fontenot testified that after the

incident, Mr. Eckel did not move until he was picked up by another inmate. In their

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testimony, Mr. Thibeaux and Mr. Miller denied that Mr. Eckel ever needed assistance

walking after the altercation.

The defendant asserts that there is no evidence to prove that Mr. Eckel

sustained serious bodily injury to support a conviction under La.R.S. 14:34.1. The

defendant points to the conflicting testimony as to whether Mr. Eckel was rendered

unconscious, arguing that there was no evidence, other than Mr. Eckel’s testimony,

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Eckel was rendered unconscious.

Further, the defendant argues the State failed to offer any evidence that Mr. Eckel was

in extreme physical pain.

After a review of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we

find that the record supports a determination that the State proved beyond a

reasonable doubt the defendant committed second degree battery. We note that there

is conflicting testimony as to whether Mr. Eckel was rendered unconscious and what

injuries Mr. Eckel received; however, “[t]he testimony of a victim may present

sufficient evidence to establish that the victim sustained serious bodily injury[.]”

State v. Gunnells, 619 So.2d 192, 201 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 625 So.2d 1061

(La.1993). Here, the victim, Mr. Eckel, testified that he was rendered unconscious

after receiving a blow to the head delivered by the defendant. He further testified that

he endured excruciating pain as a result of his injuries. It is the function of the fact

finder to weigh the credibilities of witnesses, and therefore, a reviewing court should

not second guess the credibility determinations of the trier of fact beyond the

sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. State v. R.W.W., 06-

1253 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/07), 953 So.2d 131 (citing State v. Freeman, 01-997

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(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/12/01), 801 So.2d 578.) Accordingly, we find that the record

contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction of this defendant.

The defendant also argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury.

Specific intent is defined in La.R.S. 14:10 as the “state of mind which exists when the

circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal

consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” Specific intent can be inferred from

the circumstances of the incident and the defendant’s actions. See State v. Wommack,

00-137 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01),

797 So.2d 62.

Based upon the circumstances of this case, we find sufficient evidence to

support a finding of the specific intent. The defendant testified that he was separated

from fighting by another inmate, stating “that’s when Thibeaux pulled - - Thibeaux

was like, man, come on. You got the best of him. Let it go, you know, and that’s

when I walked away.” Mr. Thibeaux testified that when he grabbed the defendant,

the defendant was prepared to hit Mr. Eckel again, and he prevented the defendant

from doing so by explaining that the victim was “finished.” Another inmate, Daven

Fontenot, testified that after the defendant hit Mr. Eckel and he fell to the ground, the

defendant continued to beat the victim for about a minute, resulting in blackened eyes

and injuries to the head. Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to support that

this defendant had the specific intent to commit a second degree battery.

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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