KA-0010-0112 Nonprecedential Processed

State of Louisiana v. Travis Dewayne Megason

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed October 6, 2010

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-112

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TRAVIS DEWAYNE MEGASON

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APPEAL FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 64797
HONORABLE STEPHEN BRUCE BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Oswald A. Decuir, and
James T. Genovese, Judges.

CONVICTION REVERSED. JUDGMENT OF
ACQUITTAL ENTERED.

Don M. Burkett
District Attorney - Eleventh Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 1557
Many, LA 71449
Telephone: (318) 256-6246
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

Paula Corley Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 80006
Lafayette, LA 70598-0006
Telephone: (337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Travis Dewayne Megason

Ronald D. Brandon
Assistant District Attorney - Eleventh Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 216
Many, LA 71449
Telephone: (318) 256-5910
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

After a bench trial, Defendant, Travis Dewayne Megason, was convicted

of attempted unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, in violation of La.R.S.

14:27 and La.R.S. 14:62.3. The trial court sentenced Megason to one year at hard

labor.

Megason appeals. He argues that the State failed to prove his guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends the State failed to prove his specific intent,

and the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Because we find that the State

failed to prove Megason’s specific intent to enter an inhabited dwelling, we reverse

his conviction and sentence and order the entry of an acquittal.

I.

ISSUE

We shall consider whether the State failed to prove Defendant’s specific

intent to enter an inhabited dwelling where Defendant, a plumber who was under the

impression he forgot a tool at the victim’s house, raised the window of the victim’s

house to get her attention when he was sure someone was at the house and where the

victim initially had no intention of filing charges and inaccurately described

Defendant as well as the details of conversations she had on the day of the incident.

II.

FACTS

Megason, a plumber employed by Robert Byles Plumbing, did some

plumbing work at the home of Mary Christine Bryant in January of 2008. Megason

was under the impression that he left his drill at Bryant’s house at that time. Shortly

thereafter, he was fired from Byles Plumbing for buying a drill on Byles’ account

without permission. He went to work in New Orleans for several months. When he

returned, Byles rehired him.

On May 8, 2008, Megason was working on a job for Byles with Jonathan

Hansen. Megason left to get some supplies and decided to stop by Bryant’s house to

inquire, according to Megason, about his drill. Megason and Hansen drove by

Bryant’s home on a previous occasion, but, because there were no vehicles in the

driveway, they did not stop.

On the day of the incident, Megason was “pretty sure” someone was in

the house because the van was parked outside. That day, Bryant was at her home

talking on the telephone. She became aware that someone was knocking on the door

and ringing the doorbell. She then saw her bathroom window being pulled open.

Bryant grabbed the blinds and saw Megason.

According to Bryant, Megason said he was supposed to fix some

plumbing, but must have been at the wrong house. Megason asked Bryant if she

remembered him, as he had done some work at her house in January. Bryant recalled

him from January, but she had not called for a plumber on May 8. When, according

to Bryant, Megason again said he must be at the wrong address, Bryant said he was

trying to come in her window and told him to leave. Then, she slammed the window

and locked it.

Bryant immediately called Megason’s employer and told him his

employee tried to break into her house. Bryant did not want to report the matter, but

her husband, an employee of the Sheriff’s Department, felt she should. Bryant then

called the police.

When a Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Deputy arrived at Bryant’s home, she

was visibly shaken. The deputy found no evidence of forced entry on any doors or

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windows. Megason gave the deputy a statement saying he stopped by Bryant’s home

to see if he had left a tool there. He stated that after knocking at both the front and

the back doors and the window, he noticed that the window was slightly opened. He

then raised it to “just yell Hello” to get someone’s attention and, instead, scared

Bryant.

According to Megason, after Bryant pulled up the blind, he told her he

was not sure he was at the right place, but he thought he left his drill the last time he

worked there. Bryant was very upset, so Megason told her who he was and who

employed him. He apologized, and Bryant told him to leave. Megason then called

Robert Byles, the owner of Megason’s employer, and asked to come by his house to

tell him about the incident.

After speaking with Byles and learning that Bryant was thinking about

filing charges, Megason called Bryant. He apologized again and tried to explain that

he had no intention to enter her house and was simply trying to get her attention.

Megason called her telephone number a second time. He explained the

incident to the man who answered the telephone. He then went to the Sheriff’s

Department to give a written statement. There, he was arrested. Even though Bryant

had described the man at her house as stocky and bald, and Megason is “small and

lanky,” Megason never denied he was the person involved.

Megason apologized again at trial and acknowledged he “handled the

situation the wrong way.” A plumber for twenty years, he said he has previously

stuck his “head in doors and hollered plumber.” He maintained that he was simply

trying to get Bryant’s attention, that he was “truly sorry,” and that he had no intention

of breaking into the house.

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Megason was candid about a prior burglary conviction. He said he went

into a friend’s unlocked home, took a gun, and pawned it. He planned to get the gun

back before the friend returned from work offshore, but the friend returned early and

reported the gun stolen. Megason also had “some history with drugs,” including an

arrest in September of 2007.

According to Byles, Megason contacted him on the day of the incident

and repeated his account of the events. Byles testified that Bryant’s house was not

on the route to where Megason would have gone for supplies and that he knew

nothing about Megason’s loss of his drill.

Jill Speight, Byles’ secretary, spoke to Megason and to Bryant twice on

the date of the incident. Megason told Speight there had been a call for a plumber in

the area, but Speight was not aware of it. Megason then repeated the incident to

Speight. Nevertheless, he mentioned the lost drill only the second time Speight spoke

with him.

When Speight spoke with Bryant, she told Bryant where the nearest

company truck was in the area. That location was different from what Bryant testified

Speight told her. Bryant also told Speight that “her guard was definitely up” on the

day of the incident because a black man was standing at the end of her driveway a

couple of days earlier. Bryant told Speight “it really freaked her out.”

Lance Spears, Megason’s employer at the time of trial, never had any

problems with Megason. Spears kept money and checks at his business; there were

cars and four wheelers in the parking lot all the time, along with easy access to

“knives, stuff like that.” Nothing was ever missing while Megason was employed by

Spears, and Spears never had any customer complaints about Megason.

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III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is

“whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the

essential elements of the crime charged.” State v. Leger, 05-11, p. 91 (La. 7/10/06),

936 So.2d 108, 170, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279 (2007) (citing

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d

676 (La.1984)).

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Megason was convicted of an attempted unauthorized entry of an

inhabited dwelling. Louisiana law defines one who attempts a crime as: “[a]ny

person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the

purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object . . . .” La.R.S.

14:27(A). Thus, an attempted offense requires a showing of specific intent. Id.

Specific intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances

indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to

follow his act or failure to act.” La.R.S. 14:10(1). Because specific intent is a state

of mind, it does not need to be proven by fact; it may be inferred from the

circumstances and the actions of the defendant. State v. Allen, 99-320 (La.App. 5 Cir.

7/27/99), 742 So.2d 949. The existence of specific intent is for the trier of fact to

determine, and review of this determination is correctly made under the Jackson

standard. Id.

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Louisiana law defines unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling as

“the intentional entry by a person without authorization into any inhabited dwelling

or other structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a home or

place of abode by a person.” La.R.S. 14:62.3(A).

Certainly, Megason used poor judgment, and he readily admitted that.

Bryant was undoubtedly startled and frightened when she encountered Megason

raising her bathroom window. Nevertheless, she had no thought of filing charges

until her husband, a Sheriff Department’s employee, urged her to do so. She could

not accurately describe the man she saw in her window. Similarly, according to

Speight, Bryant did not accurately relate the conversation in which Speight told

Bryant about the location of one of their employees. These circumstances suggest

that she may not have been accurate about other pertinent details.

Megason expressed regret for his actions immediately after the incident.

He made no attempt to hide what he had done and voluntarily called Byles to report

the incident and apologized to Bryant. He voluntarily contacted the Sheriff’s

Department and gave a written statement that was consistent with his trial testimony.

This court concludes that the evidence does not establish Megason’s

specific intent to commit the crime of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling.

While Bryant’s testimony may support some other criminal charge (criminal trespass,

for example), Megason’s testimony shows his lack of specific intent to commit the

crime of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. The State did not present

evidence sufficient to overcome Megason’s testimony and show that he had the

specific intent to commit the crime. Thus, the trial court erred in finding Megason

guilty as charged.

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V.

CONCLUSION

Megason’s conviction is reversed. His sentence is vacated and set aside,

and a judgment of acquittal is entered.

CONVICTION REVERSED. JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

ENTERED.

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