State of Louisiana v. Travis Dewayne Megason
State of Louisiana v. Travis Dewayne Megason, No. KA-0010-0112 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Oct. 6, 2010).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Leger 936 So. 2d 108
- State v. Captville 448 So. 2d 676
- State v. Allen 742 So. 2d 949
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
10-112
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
TRAVIS DEWAYNE MEGASON
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 64797
HONORABLE STEPHEN BRUCE BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Oswald A. Decuir, and
James T. Genovese, Judges.
CONVICTION REVERSED. JUDGMENT OF
ACQUITTAL ENTERED.
Don M. Burkett
District Attorney - Eleventh Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 1557
Many, LA 71449
Telephone: (318) 256-6246
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana
Paula Corley Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 80006
Lafayette, LA 70598-0006
Telephone: (337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Travis Dewayne Megason
Ronald D. Brandon
Assistant District Attorney - Eleventh Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 216
Many, LA 71449
Telephone: (318) 256-5910
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana
THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.
After a bench trial, Defendant, Travis Dewayne Megason, was convicted
of attempted unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling, in violation of La.R.S.
14:27 and La.R.S. 14:62.3. The trial court sentenced Megason to one year at hard
labor.
Megason appeals. He argues that the State failed to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends the State failed to prove his specific intent,
and the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Because we find that the State
failed to prove Megason’s specific intent to enter an inhabited dwelling, we reverse
his conviction and sentence and order the entry of an acquittal.
I.
ISSUE
We shall consider whether the State failed to prove Defendant’s specific
intent to enter an inhabited dwelling where Defendant, a plumber who was under the
impression he forgot a tool at the victim’s house, raised the window of the victim’s
house to get her attention when he was sure someone was at the house and where the
victim initially had no intention of filing charges and inaccurately described
Defendant as well as the details of conversations she had on the day of the incident.
II.
FACTS
Megason, a plumber employed by Robert Byles Plumbing, did some
plumbing work at the home of Mary Christine Bryant in January of 2008. Megason
was under the impression that he left his drill at Bryant’s house at that time. Shortly
thereafter, he was fired from Byles Plumbing for buying a drill on Byles’ account
without permission. He went to work in New Orleans for several months. When he
returned, Byles rehired him.
On May 8, 2008, Megason was working on a job for Byles with Jonathan
Hansen. Megason left to get some supplies and decided to stop by Bryant’s house to
inquire, according to Megason, about his drill. Megason and Hansen drove by
Bryant’s home on a previous occasion, but, because there were no vehicles in the
driveway, they did not stop.
On the day of the incident, Megason was “pretty sure” someone was in
the house because the van was parked outside. That day, Bryant was at her home
talking on the telephone. She became aware that someone was knocking on the door
and ringing the doorbell. She then saw her bathroom window being pulled open.
Bryant grabbed the blinds and saw Megason.
According to Bryant, Megason said he was supposed to fix some
plumbing, but must have been at the wrong house. Megason asked Bryant if she
remembered him, as he had done some work at her house in January. Bryant recalled
him from January, but she had not called for a plumber on May 8. When, according
to Bryant, Megason again said he must be at the wrong address, Bryant said he was
trying to come in her window and told him to leave. Then, she slammed the window
and locked it.
Bryant immediately called Megason’s employer and told him his
employee tried to break into her house. Bryant did not want to report the matter, but
her husband, an employee of the Sheriff’s Department, felt she should. Bryant then
called the police.
When a Sabine Parish Sheriff’s Deputy arrived at Bryant’s home, she
was visibly shaken. The deputy found no evidence of forced entry on any doors or
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windows. Megason gave the deputy a statement saying he stopped by Bryant’s home
to see if he had left a tool there. He stated that after knocking at both the front and
the back doors and the window, he noticed that the window was slightly opened. He
then raised it to “just yell Hello” to get someone’s attention and, instead, scared
Bryant.
According to Megason, after Bryant pulled up the blind, he told her he
was not sure he was at the right place, but he thought he left his drill the last time he
worked there. Bryant was very upset, so Megason told her who he was and who
employed him. He apologized, and Bryant told him to leave. Megason then called
Robert Byles, the owner of Megason’s employer, and asked to come by his house to
tell him about the incident.
After speaking with Byles and learning that Bryant was thinking about
filing charges, Megason called Bryant. He apologized again and tried to explain that
he had no intention to enter her house and was simply trying to get her attention.
Megason called her telephone number a second time. He explained the
incident to the man who answered the telephone. He then went to the Sheriff’s
Department to give a written statement. There, he was arrested. Even though Bryant
had described the man at her house as stocky and bald, and Megason is “small and
lanky,” Megason never denied he was the person involved.
Megason apologized again at trial and acknowledged he “handled the
situation the wrong way.” A plumber for twenty years, he said he has previously
stuck his “head in doors and hollered plumber.” He maintained that he was simply
trying to get Bryant’s attention, that he was “truly sorry,” and that he had no intention
of breaking into the house.
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Megason was candid about a prior burglary conviction. He said he went
into a friend’s unlocked home, took a gun, and pawned it. He planned to get the gun
back before the friend returned from work offshore, but the friend returned early and
reported the gun stolen. Megason also had “some history with drugs,” including an
arrest in September of 2007.
According to Byles, Megason contacted him on the day of the incident
and repeated his account of the events. Byles testified that Bryant’s house was not
on the route to where Megason would have gone for supplies and that he knew
nothing about Megason’s loss of his drill.
Jill Speight, Byles’ secretary, spoke to Megason and to Bryant twice on
the date of the incident. Megason told Speight there had been a call for a plumber in
the area, but Speight was not aware of it. Megason then repeated the incident to
Speight. Nevertheless, he mentioned the lost drill only the second time Speight spoke
with him.
When Speight spoke with Bryant, she told Bryant where the nearest
company truck was in the area. That location was different from what Bryant testified
Speight told her. Bryant also told Speight that “her guard was definitely up” on the
day of the incident because a black man was standing at the end of her driveway a
couple of days earlier. Bryant told Speight “it really freaked her out.”
Lance Spears, Megason’s employer at the time of trial, never had any
problems with Megason. Spears kept money and checks at his business; there were
cars and four wheelers in the parking lot all the time, along with easy access to
“knives, stuff like that.” Nothing was ever missing while Megason was employed by
Spears, and Spears never had any customer complaints about Megason.
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III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is
“whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the
essential elements of the crime charged.” State v. Leger, 05-11, p. 91 (La. 7/10/06),
936 So.2d 108, 170, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279 (2007) (citing
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d
676 (La.1984)).
IV.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Megason was convicted of an attempted unauthorized entry of an
inhabited dwelling. Louisiana law defines one who attempts a crime as: “[a]ny
person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the
purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object . . . .” La.R.S.
14:27(A). Thus, an attempted offense requires a showing of specific intent. Id.
Specific intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances
indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to
follow his act or failure to act.” La.R.S. 14:10(1). Because specific intent is a state
of mind, it does not need to be proven by fact; it may be inferred from the
circumstances and the actions of the defendant. State v. Allen, 99-320 (La.App. 5 Cir.
7/27/99), 742 So.2d 949. The existence of specific intent is for the trier of fact to
determine, and review of this determination is correctly made under the Jackson
standard. Id.
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Louisiana law defines unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling as
“the intentional entry by a person without authorization into any inhabited dwelling
or other structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a home or
place of abode by a person.” La.R.S. 14:62.3(A).
Certainly, Megason used poor judgment, and he readily admitted that.
Bryant was undoubtedly startled and frightened when she encountered Megason
raising her bathroom window. Nevertheless, she had no thought of filing charges
until her husband, a Sheriff Department’s employee, urged her to do so. She could
not accurately describe the man she saw in her window. Similarly, according to
Speight, Bryant did not accurately relate the conversation in which Speight told
Bryant about the location of one of their employees. These circumstances suggest
that she may not have been accurate about other pertinent details.
Megason expressed regret for his actions immediately after the incident.
He made no attempt to hide what he had done and voluntarily called Byles to report
the incident and apologized to Bryant. He voluntarily contacted the Sheriff’s
Department and gave a written statement that was consistent with his trial testimony.
This court concludes that the evidence does not establish Megason’s
specific intent to commit the crime of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling.
While Bryant’s testimony may support some other criminal charge (criminal trespass,
for example), Megason’s testimony shows his lack of specific intent to commit the
crime of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. The State did not present
evidence sufficient to overcome Megason’s testimony and show that he had the
specific intent to commit the crime. Thus, the trial court erred in finding Megason
guilty as charged.
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V.
CONCLUSION
Megason’s conviction is reversed. His sentence is vacated and set aside,
and a judgment of acquittal is entered.
CONVICTION REVERSED. JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
ENTERED.
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