State of Louisiana v. Terrance A. Martin

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 10-588

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TERRANCE A. MARTIN

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 33804-09
HONORABLE DAVID ALEXANDER RITCHIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and
Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

Amy, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

REVERSED.

John Foster DeRosier
District Attorney Fourteenth Judicial District Court
David Palay
Carla Sue Sigler
Assistant District Attorneys
P. O. Box 3206
Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206
(337) 437-3400
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Paula Corley Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 80006
Lafayette, LA 70598-0006
(337) 991-9757
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Terrance A. Martin

William Jarred Franklin
Louisiana Appellate Project
3001 Old Minden Road
Bossier City, LA 71112
(318) 746-7467
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Terrance A. Martin

EZELL, JUDGE.

On October 21, 2009, the Defendant, Terrance A. Martin, was charged by bill

of information with possession of Carisoprodol (Soma), a schedule IV controlled

dangerous substance (CDS), a violation of La.R.S. 40:969(C). On February 10, 2010,

several matters were taken up. First, the Defendant’s probation for prior convictions

and sentences was revoked, and the trial court imposed the previously suspended

sentences. Next, the Defendant’s motion to suppress, filed in the instant case, was

heard and subsequently denied.

Immediately following the probation revocation and suppression hearings, the

Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge herein, pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338

So.2d 584 (La.1976). As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed charges

pending in an unrelated docket number and agreed not to file a habitual offender bill

against the Defendant. He was then sentenced to serve five years at hard labor, to run

concurrently with the sentences imposed following the revocation of his probation.

A motion to reconsider sentence was not filed.

The Defendant is now before this court on appeal, asserting that the trial court

erred in denying his motion to suppress and that his sentence is excessive.

FACTS

The following facts were set forth at hearing on the Defendant’s motion to

suppress. On August 16, 2009, the Defendant was walking out of a convenience store

when he was approached by Corporal Matthew Thomas Gibbs of the Calcasieu Parish

Sheriff’s Office. Corporal Gibbs asked the Defendant for his identification so that

he could check for outstanding warrants. At that time, Corporal Gibbs noticed that

the Defendant was nervous and was sweating profusely. He then asked the Defendant

if he had anything illegal on his person. The Defendant responded, “Yes, sir, I got

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four Somas in my pocket.” Corporal Gibbs then patted down the Defendant,

recovered the pills, and arrested him for possession of same.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

By this assignment of error, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress. The Defendant sought to suppress evidence seized

in the instant matter as well as in the unrelated docket number that was dismissed as

part of his plea agreement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred

in denying both motions to suppress, including the dismissed matter. The trial court’s

denial of the Defendant’s motion to suppress filed in the unrelated matter is moot,

however, and is not addressed herein.

The Defendant contends that Corporal Gibbs did not have reasonable suspicion

that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. Because Corporal

Gibbs had no reason to detain the Defendant or to question him regarding possible

criminal conduct, the Defendant maintains that any evidence seized as a result of the

illegal detention should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, pursuant

to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963).

As noted by this court in State v. Bargeman, 98-617, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10/28/98), 721 So.2d 964, 967, writ denied, 99-33 (La. 5/28/99), 743 So.2d 658:

When a trial court rules on a defendant’s motion to suppress, the
appellate court must look at the totality of the evidence presented at the
hearing on the motion to suppress. The appellate court should not
overturn a trial court’s ruling, unless the trial court’s conclusions are not
supported by the evidence, or there exists an internal inconsistency in
the testimony of the witnesses, or there was a palpable or obvious abuse
of discretion. State v. Burkhalter, 428 So.2d 449 (La.1983), and State
v. Gaspard, 96-1279 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/11/98); 709 So.2d 213. The
admissibility of evidence seized without a warrant is a question for the
trial court. Its conclusions on credibility and the weight of testimony
regarding the voluntariness of a consent for admissibility purposes will
not be overturned on appeal, unless the conclusions are unsupported by
the evidence. State v. Gachot, 609 So.2d 269 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1992),

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writ denied, 617 So.2d 1180 (La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 980, 114
S.Ct. 478, 126 L.Ed.2d 429 (1993).

Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 215.1(A), “A law enforcement officer may

stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has

committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name,

address, and an explanation of his actions.” In State v. Perrot, 600 So.2d 805, 807,

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1992), this court explained:

The right of law enforcement officers to stop and interrogate one
reasonably suspected of criminal conduct is recognized by La.C.Cr.P.
art. 215.1 as well as both state and federal jurisprudence. An officer
may stop a person with less than probable cause for arrest if he has
specific and articulable facts to suspect possible criminal activity. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The validity
of the investigatory stop depends on whether the officer has adequate
articulable knowledge of particular facts, enough to warrant
infringement on the person’s constitutional right to be left alone. State
v. Shy, 373 So.2d 145 (La.1979).

However, in the case of State v. Neyrey, 383 So.2d 1222
(La.1979) the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the suspicion
requirements of La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, Article I, Section 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution are necessary only when the stop is forcible. “Police
officers do not need probable cause to arrest, or reasonable cause to
detain, in order to converse with its citizens.” State v. Shy, [373 So.2d
at 147]. In Neyrey, the officer approached a parked car that was
blocking a driveway to an apartment. The officers testified no
reasonable suspicion concerning commission of a crime existed. The
defendant was inside the car passed out. Officers awakened him and
asked him to leave at which time he passed out again. The officers then
asked him to exit the car and, in complying, a bag of cocaine fell from
defendant’s lap. The court held there was no forcible detention as
defendant was free to leave at any time. Therefore, the reasonable
suspicion standard did not apply.

Furthermore, as long as the person to whom questions are put
remains free to disregard questions and walk away, there has been no
intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would require some
particularized and objective justification under the fourth amendment.
See State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195 (La.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
953, 104 S.Ct. 2158, 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984); State v. Lanter, 391 So.2d
1152 (La.1980); State v. Duplessis, 391 So.2d 1116 (La.1980).

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Also, in State v. Bargeman, 721 So.2d at 967-68, this court noted:

A “hunch” or generalized suspicion is not sufficient. However, if the
police officer has a specific suspicion of criminal activity, he may
further detain the individual or the property while he diligently pursues
a means of investigation likely to quickly confirm or dispel the
particular suspicion. U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84
L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

Additionally, in State v. Hall, 581 So.2d 337, 338-39 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991), this court

found:

[W]hen the officer decided to pat down the defendant, the “questioning
phase” ended and the incident became a stop. It is axiomatic that
reasonable cause for an investigatory stop is something less than
probable cause. The totality of the circumstances, “the whole picture,”
must be considered in determining whether reasonable cause exists.
Although flight, nervousness, or a startled look at the sight of a police
officer is, by itself, insufficient to justify an investigatory stop, this type
of conduct may be highly suspicious and, therefore, may be one of the
factors leading to a finding of reasonable cause. State v. Belton, 441
So.2d 1195 (La.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2158, 80
L.Ed.2d 543 (1984).

At the hearing, Corporal Gibbs testified that as he was walking into a

convenience store in Moss Bluff, Louisiana, he saw the Defendant walking out.

Corporal Gibbs stated that he knew the Defendant when they both lived in Westlake,

Louisiana, and that he used to see the Defendant at football games and about town.

According to Corporal Gibbs, he asked the Defendant how he was doing.

Corporal Gibbs knew the Defendant had been in trouble in Lake Charles,

Louisiana, so he proceeded to ask the Defendant for his identification to check for

outstanding warrants. After the Defendant gave Corporal Gibbs his identification,

they continued to talk a bit. At this time, Corporal Gibbs noticed that the Defendant

was nervous and that he was sweating profusely. According to Corporal Gibbs, he

then asked the Defendant if he had anything illegal on his person. The Defendant

responded that he had four Somas in his pocket.

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As stated in Perrot, 600 So.2d 805, Corporal Gibbs did not need probable

cause to arrest, or reasonable cause to detain the Defendant for the purpose of

conversing with him. However, Corporal Gibbs went a step further and detained the

Defendant to check for outstanding arrest warrants. At that point, the casual

conversation allowed under Perrot ended because the Defendant was no longer free

to disregard Corporal Gibbs’ questions and walk away. The stop became forcible, an

intrusion upon the Defendant’s liberty and/or privacy, when Corporal Gibbs asked the

Defendant for his identification to check for outstanding warrants. Thus, the inquiry

at that point is whether Corporal Gibbs had reasonable suspicion that the Defendant

was committing, had committed, or was about to commit an offense to justify

detaining him. At the hearing, Corporal Gibbs testified:

I was walking into the Five Star in Moss Bluff. I saw Terrence
[sic]. He was walking out. I knew Terrence [sic] from when he lived in
Westlake. I lived in Westlake. I used to see him at football games, out
and about town. I asked him how he was doing. I knew he had been in
some trouble in Lake Charles, so I asked him for his ID, to check him
for warrants. He said – he gave me his ID. We talked a little bit. He
was nervous, sweating profusely. So I asked him, I said, you know,
“Terrence [sic], you got anything illegal on you?” He said, “Yes, sir, I
got four Somas in my pocket.” And from there, I had to pat him down,
recover the Somas, arrested him and booked him in for possession.

A few more details were revealed on cross-examination:

Q So it’s your testimony that you asked him if he was carrying
anything, --

A Illegal.

Q – and he – and he just said he had four Somas?

A Yes, sir. I wish he wouldn’t have. I was hungry; I was ready to
eat.

Q So, you’re saying – you didn’t just search him –

A No, sir.

Q – because he’s Terrence [sic]?

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A No, sir. I checked him for warrants because he’s Terrence [sic],
but I didn’t search him, I asked him.

Q Did he have any warrants?

A No, sir, he didn’t have warrants.

Q How many times do you know of that Terrence [sic] has been
arrested?

A I couldn’t even guess.

Q You were dressed similar to how you are today, more or less?

A Exactly how I’m dressed today.

Q Wouldn’t that explain somebody, with that history, being
nervous?

A I encountered Terrence [sic] before dressed like this at football
games and other civic functions in the city of Westlake and he
hadn’t appeared that way.

Corporal Gibbs also indicated that there were no bystanders or witnesses to his

conversation with the Defendant. He also denied asking the Defendant, first, if he

was carrying any drugs, and upon his denial of same, proceeding to ask for the

Defendant’s identification and searching him regardless of his response. Corporal

Gibbs maintained that the only reason he searched the Defendant was because he

admitted to carrying drugs. Corporal Gibbs then clarified that he never searched the

Defendant, just recovered the Soma pills after the Defendant reported they were in

his pocket.

On redirect examination, the State revisited its questioning regarding Corporal

Gibbs’ past experiences with the Defendant. According to Corporal Gibbs, the

Defendant acted differently during the various social functions than he did the day of

the instant offense. Corporal Gibbs testified that the Defendant is usually very

sociable and does not mind speaking to officers. They usually laugh, joke, and cut

up, yet on the day of the offense, Corporal Gibbs stated that the Defendant was trying

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to avoid him. He did not elaborate, however, on the Defendant’s behavior. The

difference in the Defendant’s behavior prompted Corporal Gibbs to ask the Defendant

if he had anything illegal.

The trial court concluded that Corporal Gibbs had probable cause to search the

Defendant because he voluntarily acknowledged, in response to a question, that he

was in possession of the Soma pills. The trial court did not address the Defendant’s

initial detention and whether or not Corporal Gibbs had reasonable suspicion to

detain the Defendant.

Considering La.Code Crim.P. art. 215.1 and the jurisprudence cited herein,

Corporal Gibbs’ testimony did not include any articulable facts or particularized

suspicions about the Defendant’s involvement in criminal conduct prior to detaining

him. Corporal Gibbs opted to detain the Defendant based on the sole fact that he

knew the Defendant had previously been in trouble. This knowledge was nothing

more than a generalized suspicion or hunch and is not a sufficient basis for detaining

an individual. State v. Bargeman, 721 So.2d 964. Other than this fact, Corporal

Gibbs did not give any legal justification for detaining the Defendant, nor was there

any evidence of suspicious activity prior to stopping the Defendant. The Defendant

was simply walking out of the store. According to Corporal Gibbs, the Defendant

appeared nervous and was sweating profusely after he was detained.

Accordingly, viewing the picture as a whole, the State did not show that

Corporal Gibbs had articulable knowledge of particular facts upon which reasonable

inferences could be drawn to provide reasonable grounds of past, present, or future

criminal activity. As such, we find that the trial court erred in denying the

Defendant’s motion to suppress, and thus, the Defendant’s conviction and sentence

should be reversed and set aside.

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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

By this assignment of error, the Defendant argues that his sentence is

excessive. In light of our decision to reverse and set aside the Defendant’s conviction

and sentence, this alleged error is now moot.

CONCLUSION

The Defendant’s conviction and sentence are reversed and set aside.

REVERSED.

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NUMBER 10-588

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TERRANCE A. MARTIN

AMY, J., dissenting.

The majority finds that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion

to suppress, thus reversing the defendant’s conviction and sentence. I respectfully

dissent, as I find an affirmation is appropriate.

In State v. Herrera, 09-1783, p. 1 (La. 12/18/09), 23 So.3d 896, 897, our

supreme court stated:

A law enforcement officer may approach any person and ask simple
questions without a requirement of reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. State v. Sherman, 05-0779, p. 7 (La.04/04/06), 931 So.2d 286,
291. Mere communications between officers and citizens implicate no
Fourth Amendment concerns where there is no coercion or detention. Id.
An officer’s request for identification does not turn the encounter into
a forcible detention unless the request is accompanied by an
unmistakable show of official authority indicating to the person that he
or she is not free to leave. I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104
S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Sherman, 05-0779 at 7, 931
So.2d at 291.

The distinction between a permissible encounter and a seizure was
set forth in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324,
75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The Court held that “law enforcement officers
do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an
individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he
is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the
person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal
prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions....” Id.

The majority reverses, finding the officer did not give legal justification for

detaining the defendant and that there is no evidence of suspicious activity prior to

the officer stopping the defendant. However, I do not find that the encounter

between the officer and the defendant rose to the level necessitating a finding of

reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.

In this case, the officer approached the defendant and began conversing with

him, asking him “how he was doing.” The record reveals that the officer then asked

the defendant for his identification, which the defendant handed over, and the two

continued to “talk[] a little bit.” The officer then asked the defendant if he had

anything illegal on his person, to which the defendant responded affirmatively.

Relying on the above jurisprudence, I conclude that the officer in this case had

the right, without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, to approach the

defendant and ask for his identification and ask questions. Further, I find that there

is no evidence that the officer’s request was followed by an “unmistakable show of

official authority indicating to the [defendant]” that he was not free to leave. See

Herrera, 23 So.3d at 897 (citing I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S.Ct. 1758

(1984)). The defendant voluntarily complied with the officer’s request for

identification. Further, he voluntarily offered a response to the officer’s potentially

incriminating question. There is no evidence that the defendant’s response to the

officer was coerced. I note that the officer testified that he was familiar with the

defendant from previous encounters around town such as football games and other

civic functions The officer related that the defendant had previously been sociable

and willing to speak to officers.

In light of the above, it is my view that the officer acted permissibly. For these

reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress.

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