State of Louisiana v. Joshua Derrick Davis

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-909

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JOSHUA DERRICK DAVIS

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 299327
HONORABLE JOHN C. DAVIDSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

James C. Downs
District Attorney - 9th Judicial District Court
Brian Davis Mosley
Assistant District Attorney - 9th Judicial District Court
P. O. Drawer 1472
Alexandria, LA 71309-1472
Telephone: (318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

Paula Corley Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 80006
Lafayette, LA 70598-0006
Telephone: (337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Joshua Derrick Davis

William Jarred Franklin
Louisiana Appellate Project
3001 Old Minden Road
Bossier City, LA 71112
Telephone: (318) 746-7467
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Joshua Derrick Davis

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

The State of Louisiana (State) charged the defendant, Joshua Derrick

Davis, with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, a Schedule II,

controlled dangerous substance (CDS). The jury found Mr. Davis guilty of the

responsive offense of possession of methamphetamine, and Mr. Davis received a

sentence of five years. The State filed a habitual offender bill seeking the imposition

of an enhanced sentence against Mr. Davis as a third offender. The trial court

adjudicated Mr. Davis a third felony offender, vacated its previously imposed five-

year sentence, and imposed a sentence of seven years at hard labor. Mr. Davis

brought this appeal. For the reasons more fully set forth below, we affirm the

defendant’s conviction and sentence.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the State produced sufficient evidence
against the defendant to support the jury’s verdict of
possession of methamphetamine; and,

(2) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was
excessive for this offense and this offender.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Deputy Kyle Sellers, a patrol officer with the Rapides Parish Sheriff’s

Department, saw Mr. Davis exit a gas station in a blue truck with an expired

inspection sticker. The officer turned around to follow, and Mr. Davis sped up and

turned into a driveway. Deputy Sellers activated his lights, pulled in behind Mr.

Davis, and told him to step to the rear of the truck. Mr. Davis complied but refused

to make eye contact. He exhibited nervous behavior with shaky hands, attempted but

could not produce a driver’s license, and could not provide the name of the person he

allegedly was in route to visit. Deputy Sellers discovered that Mr. Davis had three

outstanding warrants, advised him of the warrants, and placed him under arrest.

Deputy Sellers then asked Mr. Davis if anything illegal was in the

vehicle. Still without making eye contact, Mr. Davis put his head down and moved

it back and forth, indicating that there was not anything illegal in the vehicle.

Suspecting that something was being hidden, Deputy Sellers presented Mr. Davis

with a consent-to-search form, which Mr. Davis signed.

Deputy Sellers then made contact with the passenger in the truck and

asked her to step out. She was crying, upset, could barely talk, and seemed nervous

and scared. She said that she was Mr. Davis’ girlfriend. When Deputy Sellers asked

her if anything illegal was in the truck, she responded that she believed there was, and

she indicated that it was in the ashtray.

Deputy Sellers then searched the truck. In the ashtray underneath the

radio was a glass pipe, wet with residue, and a folded paper towel containing five

small plastic bags of crystal methamphetamine. Mr. Davis admitted the bags were

his. The passenger denied that it was hers. Mr. Davis told Deputy Sellers that times

were bad, that he was unemployed, that he planned to sell the methamphetamine to

someone he knew, and that he had tested it to make sure that it was good before he

sold it. At trial, Mr. Davis denied saying that he intended to sell the drugs.

Deputy Sellers had the passenger picked up and the truck towed. Mr.

Davis’ truck could not be driven on the road. It was uninsured, and the plates were

invalid, having been switched out for those of a tan truck of a different vintage.

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III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mr. Davis contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence

that would support a finding of constructive possession of the methamphetamine

found in his truck. In support of his argument, Mr. Davis asserts that when Deputy

Sellers stopped him in his vehicle and asked him if there were any drugs in the

vehicle, he did not answer. Mr. Davis then asserts that it was the passenger who told

the officer that there was something in the ashtray, resulting in the discovery of five

bags of methamphetamine and a glass pipe. He contends that, because it was the

occupant who provided the information to the officer regarding the location of the

drugs, and because Mr. Davis was not in physical possession of the drugs, the

evidence was insufficient to convict him. Thus, he contends on appeal that the State

did not prove its case against him.

Standard of Review

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised
on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State ex rel.
Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v.
Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393
So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the
credibility determinations of the trier of fact beyond the
sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review. See Graffagnino, 436 So.2d at 563, citing State v.
Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983).

State v. Freeman, 01-997, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/12/01), 801 So.2d 578, 580.

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Possession of methamphetamine, a Schedule II CDS, is prohibited by

La.R.S. 40:967. The evidence presented at Mr. Davis’ trial clearly establishes the

essential elements of this offense.

Deputy Sellers testified that on July 24, 2009, he stopped Mr. Davis after

noticing that the inspection sticker on his truck was expired. Mr. Davis could not

produce a driver’s license, and he was found to have three active warrants. As a

result of the active warrants, Deputy Sellers arrested Mr. Davis. When asked if there

was anything illegal in the vehicle, Mr. Davis responded that there was not, and he

consented to a search of his vehicle.

When Deputy Sellers made contact with the passenger of the vehicle, she

indicated that she believed there was something illegal in the vehicle. A subsequent

search of the vehicle revealed a glass pipe and what appeared to be crystal

methamphetamine in the ashtray. Upon being questioned, Mr. Davis told Deputy

Sellers that the drugs were his and that he was going to sell them to make a profit; the

occupant confirmed to the deputy that the drugs did not belong to her.

As alleged by Mr. Davis, Deputy Sellers did testify that his family knew

the passenger’s mother. However, when asked why he did not charge the passenger

with an offense, he explained that Mr. Davis asked him not to do that because the

drugs were not hers. It was stipulated at trial that the substance submitted for testing

was indeed methamphetamine.

Mr. Davis testified at trial that prior to being stopped by Deputy Sellers,

he had obtained about five grams of methamphetamine from a guy who owed him

$400.00 for four tire rims. Mr. Davis accepted the methamphetamine in lieu of

money because the guy said he would not have the money for a few more weeks. Mr.

Davis testified that he was already in possession of the pipe. He admitted that he and

his girlfriend, the passenger in the truck, smoked a little of the methamphetamine
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before they were stopped by Deputy Sellers. Mr. Davis denied telling Deputy Sellers

that he planned to sell the drugs and testified that he planned to smoke all of it

himself.

Hence, the State clearly proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.

Davis possessed methamphetamine. Accordingly, there is no merit to this assignment

of error.

Sentence Imposed

In Mr. Davis’ original brief, he argued that a five-year sentence for the

offense of possession is excessive. Since this sentence was vacated when Mr. Davis’s

habitual offender sentence of seven years was imposed, any claims concerning that

first sentence are rendered moot. However, Mr. Davis submitted a supplemental brief

contending that his seven-year sentence as a habitual offender is excessive. Mr.

Davis argues that he is a young man with a serious drug problem and has the potential

for rehabilitation.

Likewise, this argument has no merit. As a third habitual offender, Mr.

Davis faced a minimum sentence of 3.33 years and a maximum sentence of ten years

at hard labor. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(I-little I) and La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2). The

seven-year sentence that Mr. Davis received is not excessive as it is supported by the

record and by the jurisprudence.

Standard of Review

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall
subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To
constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must
find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the
sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404
So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion
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in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and
such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192
(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant
question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Salameh, 09-1422, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 38 So.3d 568, 570 (quoting

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331).

In determining whether a sentence imposed by the trial court would

shock the sense of justice or fail to make a meaningful contribution to our acceptable

penal goals, we have held that:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors including
the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender,
the legislative purpose behind the punishment and a
comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes.
State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501. While
a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must
be individualized to the particular offender and to the
particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d
1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). Additionally, it is within the
purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence
because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Salameh, 38 So.3d at 570-71 (quoting State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App.

3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d

1061).

In the present case, where the jury found Mr. Davis guilty of possession

of methamphetamine, La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2) imposes a sentence of imprisonment with

or without hard labor for up to five years and allows a fine of up to $5,000.00. At Mr.

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Davis’s original sentencing for possession, the trial court considered Mr. Davis’

record of arrests and convictions, along with the sentencing guidelines and factors of

Article 894.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, and the court sentenced

Mr. Davis to five years. The court gave the following reasons in support of the

original five-year sentence:

Well, by my count it’s a, a third felony conviction, based
upon the information I have in front of me. And, ah, I
certainly find that there is a risk during a period of
suspended sentence or probation that you would commit
another crime. You certainly do appear to be in need of
correctional treatment. I think a lesser sentence would
depreciate the seriousness of the crime based upon the
continued criminal conduct. And based upon a further
consideration of the others (sic) fac, the other factors set
forth under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1 and
the sentencing guidelines generally, and from what I can
tell I, I can’t . . . I haven’t been presented with any
mitigating factors, so, ah, I’mma sentence you to five years
with the Department of Corrections.

While the record indicates that a presentence investigation report (PIR)

was not ordered, Mr. Davis’s own trial testimony reveals that his criminal history

began when he was a teenager. At the time of trial in 2009, he was twenty-seven

years old and had two felony convictions prior to the subject incident on July 24,

2009.1 There were other arrests as well. Mr. Davis admitted to having been

previously arrested for fighting and disturbing the peace; he denied that the charge

included criminal damage to property. He also admitted to having been arrested for

possession and distribution of Schedule II drugs. Mr. Davis was arrested in 2001 and

subsequently charged with aggravated battery, sexual battery, attempted forcible rape,

and simple kidnaping; he pled guilty to aggravated battery and to simple kidnaping.

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Mr. Davis admitted at trial that he had previously pled guilty to three felonies (aggravated
battery, simple kidnaping, and unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling), but he stated that “on
paper” he was a second offender. The record indicates that the aggravated battery charge and the
simple kidnaping charge were both brought on the same date and were both listed in a guilty plea
dated August 19, 2002.

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In 2005, he was arrested and subsequently pled guilty to unauthorized entry into an

inhabited dwelling. Moreover, as noted by the trial judge, Mr. Davis was twice given

a break by imposition of a probated sentence, but he managed to have his probation

revoked both times.

Pursuant to the hearing on the State’s habitual offender bill, wherein the

State sought an enhanced sentence, the trial judge heard testimony from the

fingerprint expert confirming Mr. Davis’ identity on the two prior felony convictions

(aggravated battery/simple kidnaping and unauthorized entry of inhabited dwelling)

and on the methamphetamine possession felony of July 24, 2009. In adjudicating Mr.

Davis a habitual offender, the trial court stated as follows:

And as a third felony offender, I’m gonna sentence you to
seven years at hard labor. The basis for that decision is
that, ah, you’ve previously in, ah, August of [‘02], pled
guilty to Aggravated Battery. You were placed on
probation; you ended up gettin’ revoked. In addition, ah,
you were in February of ‘07 placed on supervised
probation for Entry of an Inhabited Dwelling, and you
ended up getting revoked. And I did sit through the trial,
and I believe, based upon what I heard at trial, that would
be an appropriate sentence.

A seven-year sentence for a third felony is consistent with the habitual

offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) which provides in pertinent part as

follows:

A. (1) Any person who, after having been convicted
within this state of a felony or adjudicated a delinquent
under Title VIII of the Louisiana Children’s Code for the
commission of a felony-grade violation of either the
Louisiana Controlled Dangerous Substances Law involving
the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to
distribute a controlled dangerous substance or a crime of
violence as listed in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, or
who, after having been convicted under the laws of any
other state or of the United States, or any foreign
government of a crime which, if committed in this state
would be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent
felony within this state, upon conviction of said felony,
shall be punished as follows:
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....

(b) If the third felony is such that upon
a first conviction, the offender would be
punishable by imprisonment for any term less
than his natural life then:

(i) The person shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for a determinate term not less
than two-thirds of the longest possible
sentence for the conviction and not more than
twice the longest possible sentence prescribed
for a first conviction.

Pursuant to the above, where the longest possible sentence for

possession of methamphetamine under La.R.S. 40:967(C)(2) is five years, the third

felony offender is subject to two thirds of five years, or 3.33 years, as a minimum

sentence, and two times five years, or ten years, as a maximum sentence. Hence, the

seven-year sentence of the trial court in this case is a mid-range sentence.

In State v. Brown, 37,736 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/12/04), 868 So.2d 289, writ

denied, 04-2216 (La. 6/3/05), 903 So.2d 445, the second circuit upheld an eight-year

sentence imposed on a second felony habitual offender who had been convicted of

possession of cocaine. Brown had three prior convictions and was released from

prison one month prior to the subject offense. The court in Brown held that the eight-

year sentence did not shock one’s sense of justice, and it affirmed that sentence.

Likewise, in the present case, the trial court’s imposition of a mid-range

sentence of seven years upon Mr. Davis does not shock one’s sense of justice and is

not a needless imposition of pain and suffering. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion, and this sentence is not constitutionally excessive.

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V.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the State’s evidence in this case was sufficient

to prove Mr. Davis’ guilt of possession of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled

dangerous substance, and the sentence imposed upon Mr. Davis by the trial court is

not excessive.

AFFIRMED.

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