State of Louisiana v. Ronald G. Grudewicz AKA Ronald G. Grideiocz AKA Ronald G. Grudewcz AKA Ronald Grudewzcz

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-958

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RONALD G. GRUDEWICZ, AKA RONALD G. GRIDEIOCZ, ET AL.

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, DOCKET NO. CR-84990
HONORABLE PATRICK L. MICHOT, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********

SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Carey J. Ellis, III
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 719
Rayville, LA 71269-0719
(318) 728-2043
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Ronald G. Grudewicz

Michael Harson, District Attorney
Mark Garber, Assistant District Attorney
Courthouse Building
P.O. Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 232-5170
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

COOKS, Judge.

Defendant, Ronald G. Grudewicz, was charged by bill of information with

pornography involving juveniles, in violation of La.R.S. 14:81.1. Defendant was

arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. After several continuances requested by

Defendant, he changed his plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity and

requested a sanity commission be appointed.

A hearing was held after which the trial court found Defendant competent to

proceed to trial. Immediately following, Defendant filed a motion to quash the bill

of information on the ground that the time to commence trial had prescribed pursuant

to La.Code Crim.P. art. 578. The matter was heard by the trial court and denied.

Defendant then entered a plea of no contest to the charge reserving his right to appeal

the denial of the motion to quash. Additionally, as part of the plea agreement,

Defendant was sentenced to two years at hard labor without the benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence.

On appeal, Defendant asserts as his sole assignment of error the trial court

erred in denying his motion to quash.

ANALYSIS

During the hearing on the motion to quash, Defendant asserted in pertinent

part:

[W]e would acknowledge that this matter was left open on April
8, 2002, passed for the purpose of the sanity commission. . . [D]r. Gad’s
evaluation was filed into the record on September 9, 2002, while the
other doctor’s report was filed in the record on December 19, 2003.
What we are suggesting is at that point the court and the state had notice
that my client was competent to stand trial, as both reports so indicate.
We would also point out that from the point from December 9, 2003 to
present, nothing has happened and on that basis and based on the Article
578, we are arguing that the time to proceed to trial has passed, and,
therefore, ask the matter be quashed.

....

-1-

I would just point out that upon the filings of those reports, that there is
now notice, and our point is once notice is presented, it is the State’s
duty . . . to proceed to trial. . . and that was not done.

The State, in pertinent part, gave the following response at the hearing on the

motion to quash:

[W]e do recognize that 578 is controlling, but point out to the court that
Article 578 is modified by Article 580, and also in turn by Article 642
which dictates specifically that there can be no further proceedings of
any kind once the issue of sanity has been raised, until that issue. . . has
been ruled on by a court. . . [T]here has been no argument or authority
set before this court that would indicate that it was the State’s
responsibility to bring to fruition what was originally a defense motion
for a sanity commission.

At the conclusion of argument from both parties, the trial court ruled as

follows:

The Court is cognizant of the case law and the statutory law
particularly in reference to time limitations upon the institution of trial
and the concept of lenity, however, the court looks at the strong wording
of the statute in effect here as argued by the State here. When the
question of the defendant’s mental incapacity is raised, and I am quoting
from Article 642 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there shall be no
further steps in the criminal prosecution except in the institution of
prosecution until the defendant is found to have the mental capacity to
proceed. The defendant is not-- and now I am getting away from the
statute and using my words -- the defendant is not found competent until
a court finds him competent. So the fact that experts say they would
recommend that he is competent is the Court’s and only the Court’s
function to make that determination, and in this case that was not done.

The defense effectively argues that, okay, it’s the prosecution’s
responsibility to move the case, but the way that statute is written, no
further steps until the defendant is found to have the mental capacity to
proceed seems to indicate that it’s the court, not the state or the
defendant’s responsibility, because if the State makes a motion to have
the defendant found competent and to proceed, that could be construed
as violating the statute as a step in the criminal prosecution, the fact that
he even files that motion to make the determination, so he could be
found to be violating the statute and not be allowed to make the motion
because of the way the statute is worded, making the motion would be
a further step. So it could be argued and it is argued by the State that it’s
the Court’s responsibility to make that determination before the case can
proceed. So the State is not at fault. It was the Court’s responsibility to
bring the case forward, according to that strict reading of that statute
which was carefully worded in that sentence. So it seems to me to

-2-

overcome the considerations of lenity and the time considerations, the
case on the limitations of time, and there is no case law that states
otherwise than the way the state just argued.

And then, of course, 580 says the time limitation shall be
suspended until the ruling of the Court. So the Court never ruled until
just now when I ruled that he was competent, so the Court will then
deny the motion to quash.

Defendant contends in brief that this case involves a matter of prescription,

citing La.Code Crim.P. art. 578. Defendant argues the trial court erred in finding

La.Code Crim.P. art. 642 prevented the State from bringing the matter to trial. The

Defendant asserts, in pertinent part:

C.Cr.P. art. 579 states unambiguously that the period of limitation
is interrupted if the defendant cannot be “tried because of insanity . . .”
C.Cr.P. art. 642 reads that proceedings are halted until a ruling on
competency. Article 642 is ambiguous in the sense that there is no
direction as to whether the Court or the State has the duty to bring forth
the proceeding.

....

The State should not be allowed to circumvent the clear language
of C.Cr.P. art. 578 by claiming that it was prevented from having the
Trial Court determine competency by the language of C.Cr.P. art. 642.

In State v. Sorden, 09-1416 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/4/10), 45 So.3d 181, the court

addressed the difference in the statutory right to a speedy trial versus the

constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court explained, in pertinent part:

A state’s ability to institute prosecutions or commence trials is subject
to the protections of the Sixth Amendment, but a defendant’s ability to
invoke statutory limitations on institution of prosecution or, as here,
commencement of trial is not conditioned or dependent upon
establishing a separate Sixth Amendment violation. See State v. Powers,
[344 So.2d 1049 (La.1977)] infra. The United States Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo approvingly cited the right of legislatures to define
more narrowly the speedy trial right by enacting laws that set forth
specific time limitations. Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33
L.Ed.2d 101 (the Court stated that, in recognizing the virtue of clarifying
when the speedy trial right is infringed and simplifying courts’
application of it, “some legislatures have enacted laws and some courts
have adopted procedural rules which more narrowly define the right.”).
The provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 578 may in this instance provide a

-3-

more rather than less restrictive time limitation for commencement of
trial than would be required under a Barker v. Wingo analysis.

Thus, statutory and constitutional rights are distinct bases for
asserting the right to speedy trial. State v. Powers, 344 So.2d 1049, 1051
(La.1977). The Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Powers, supra,
344 So.2d at 1051, n. 5, discussed the distinction between constitutional
and statutory speedy trial guarantees:

Interestingly, the statutory provision is narrower than
the constitutional right to a speedy trial (because, for
example, the acceptable time period may be longer than
that approved under the constitutional guarantee) and it is
at the same time broader than the constitutional right
(because, for example, there is no need to assess prejudice
to the accused nor to require that an accused make known
his desire for an early trial).... The state’s reason for delay
is of no moment in questions of the running of statutory
time periods, See State v. Martens, 338 So.2d 95
(La.1976), but may well be relevant in a determination as
to whether defendant’s right to speedy trial has been
violated. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct.
2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (other citations omitted).

Accordingly, the question of whether a speedy trial violation is
statutory or constitutional involves wholly separate inquiries.
Regardless of whether Ms. Sorden can establish a showing of an
infringement of her constitutional right to speedy trial, the success of her
statutory claim is not dependent upon the success or failure of a
constitutional claim.

Id. at 185-86.

The record reflects the following timeline which is pertinent in deciding this

issue:

Bill of Information filed December 7, 1999

Defendant arraigned January 4, 2000

Continuances requested by April 3, 2000
the Defendant and granted August 7, 2000
November 6, 2000
January 1, 2001
March 12, 2001
May 14, 2001
August 13, 2001
November 12, 2001
January 14, 2002

-4-

Defendant filed motion seeking February 19, 2002
appointment of sanity commission

Trial court grants appointment of February 21, 2002
sanity commission (Dr. Gad and
Dr. de Mahy)

Changed Plea to Not Guilty/Not February 25, 2002
Guilty by Reason of Insanity

Order granting appointment February 25, 2002
filed into the record

Dr. Gad’s report is filed September 9, 2002

Dr. de Mahy’s report is filed December 19, 2003

Defendant fails to appear in court July 23, 2009

Defendant served in open court August 7, 2009
with trial date of October 26, 2009

Defendant requests and is granted October 26, 2009
continuance of trial

Defendant requests and is granted November 30, 2009
continuance of trial

Trial court finds Defendant May 18, 2010
competent to proceed to trial

Defendant files motion to quash May 18, 2010
and motion is denied

Defendant enters plea of May 18, 2010
no contest

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 578 provides for the State, in

this case, to commence trial within two years of filing of the bill of information. The

bill of information was filed on December 7, 1999, and the Defendant pled guilty on

May 18, 2010. Thus, on its face, more than two years elapsed from the time the bill

was filed until the plea was entered.

In State v. Morris, 99-3235, p. 1 (La. 2/18/00), 755 So.2d 205, the court

explained, in pertinent part:

-5-

Once the accused shows that the state has failed to bring him to trial
within the time periods specified by La.C.Cr.P. art. 578, the state bears
a heavy burden of demonstrating that either an interruption or a
suspension of the time limit tolled prescription. State v. Joseph,
93-2734, p. 1 (La.6/3/94), 637 So.2d 1032; State v. Rome, 630 So.2d
1284, 1286 (La.1994); State v. Estill, 614 So.2d 709, 710 (La.1993).

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 579 provides, in pertinent part:

A. The period of limitation established by Article 578 shall be
interrupted if:

....

(2) The defendant cannot be tried because of insanity or because
his presence for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any
other cause beyond the control of the state; or

....

B. The periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall
commence to run anew from the date the cause of interruption no longer
exists.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 580 provides, in pertinent part:

A. When a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary
plea, the running of the periods of limitation established by Article 578
shall be suspended until the ruling of the court thereon; but in no case
shall the state have less than one year after the ruling to commence the
trial.

In State v. Lewis, 09-846, p. 40 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 33 So.3d 1046, 1073,

writ denied, 10-967 (La. 11/24/10), 50 So.3d 825, this court explained:

La.C.Cr.P. art. 580 provides that the time limitation is suspended
when a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea. A
preliminary plea is any pleading or motion filed by the defense which
has the effect of delaying trial. State v. Brooks, 02-792, p. 2
(La.2/14/03), 838 So.2d 778, 782, reh’g denied, 02-792 (La.3/21/03).
These pleadings include properly filed motions to quash, motions to
suppress, or motions for a continuance, as well as applications for
discovery and bills of particulars. Id.

In State v. Washington, 02-1346, p. 8 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 723, 727, in

footnote number ten, the supreme court noted, in pertinent part:

Washington filed an application for the appointment of a sanity

-6-

commission. According to LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 580, that preliminary
motion suspended the time limitation until a ruling was made on his
sanity. Thus, the State would have one year from the date of the trial
court’s ruling on the report of the sanity commission in which to try
Washington for aggravated rape.

In State v. Rome, 93-1221 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1284, the Louisiana

Supreme Court discussed the distinction between “interruption” and “suspension.”

The Court stated:

An interruption of prescription occurs when the state is unable,
through no fault of its own, to try a defendant within the period specified
by statute, in this case two years. . . . Once the cause of interruption
disappears, the two-year time limit begins anew. See La.Code
Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 579(B). In contrast, the prescriptive period is
merely suspended, until the trial court rules on the filing of preliminary
pleas. The relevant period is simply not counted, and the running of the
time limit resumes when the motions are ruled on. Note, however, that
“in no case shall the state have less than one year after the ruling to
commence the trial.” La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 580.

Id. at 1287 (footnote omitted).

The bill of information was filed on December 7, 1999; thus, the State had until

December 7, 2001, to bring the Defendant to trial unless the time period was

interrupted or suspended. From the filing of the bill, one year and three months

passed when the Defendant requested and was granted his first continuance of trial

on April 3, 2000. Subsequent to that date, Defendant requested and was granted

continuances on August 7, 2000; November 6, 2000; January 8, 2001; March 12,

2001; May 14, 2001; August 13, 2001; November 12, 2001; and January 14, 2002.

Each time the continuance was ruled upon, pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 580, the

State had no less than one year to commence trial. Thus, from the last continuance,

the State had until January 14, 2003, to commence trial. Defendant filed the motion

for appointment of a sanity commission on February 19, 2002, and the sanity

commission was appointed on February 21, 2002. According to the above case law,

the motion for sanity commission is a preliminary plea which interrupted the running

-7-

of the time period of La.Code Crim.P. art. 578. Therefore, the time period did not start

to run again until the trial court ruled on the motion for sanity commission on May

18, 2010. La.Code Crim.P. art. 580. Following the denial of the motion, Defendant

entered a guilty plea. Consequently, the time period of La.Code Crim.P. art. 578 had

not tolled at the time Defendant entered the guilty plea. Therefore, the trial court

properly denied the motion to quash.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

-8-