State of Louisiana v. Nicholas Courville

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-1134

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

NICHOLAS COURVILLE

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 04K5594D
HONORABLE DONALD WAYNE HEBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Earl B. Taylor
27th JDC District Attorney
Jennifer Ardoin
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Drawer 1968
Opelousas, LA 70571-1149
(337) 948-3041
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Peggy J. Sullivan
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 2806
Monroe, LA 71207
(318) 388-4205
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Nicholas Courville

Nicholas Courville
In Proper Person
Winn CC Dogwood Unite C-2
P. O. Box 1260
Winnfield, LA 71483-1260

PICKETT, Judge.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the early morning hours of December 26, 2004, two intruders entered the

home of Kenneth Neely in Krotz Springs. One of the intruders fought with

Mr. Neely, and one took approximately $600 from the home. Following an

investigation by the St. Landry Sheriff’s Office, Nicholas Courville was charged with

one count of armed robbery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:65, and one count of

aggravated burglary, in violation of La.R.S. 14:60. He was tried by a jury on

December 17, 2008.

Lindsey Landry was the first witness to testify for the state at trial. Before

testifying, she acknowledged she had been granted immunity from prosecution and

acknowledged that if she lied, she could be prosecuted for perjury. Ms. Landry

testified that she moved in with her mother a month or two before Christmas 2004.

Prior to that, she had lived with Kenneth Neely in Krotz Springs for two or three

years where she and Mr. Neely shared his mobile home, which was situated on its

own lot. Mr. Neely visited Ms. Landry at her mother’s home on Christmas Day.

After the celebration, Ms. Landry returned with Mr. Neely to his home.

Ms. Landry explained she and Mr. Neely had been separated for a month or

two, but they attempted to reestablish her living arrangements with him that

Christmas evening. After they prepared for bed, their dog needed to go outside.

Ms. Landry testified that after letting the dog outside, she locked the door and waited

inside for the dog to return. The dog barked as usual when it was ready to come

inside. As Ms. Landry let the dog inside, two men rushed into the home. Ms. Landry

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testified she primarily saw one man in a ski mask because the second man wore a

hoodie and she could not see his face.

At some point, Ms. Landry noticed that the man in the ski mask wore braces

and had long dirty blonde hair that curled out and realized the ski-masked man was

Derek Evans. He wore gloves and had a knife in his hand; he held the knife to her

throat. He took her first to the couch, then to the bedroom, and, lastly, to the kitchen.

At the couch, he sat next to her and continued to hold the knife to her throat; the man

in the hoodie was fighting with Mr. Neely.

Ms. Landry testified she later learned that the man wearing the hoodie was the

defendant Nicholas Courville. She related that the defendant also entered

Mr. Neely’s home with a knife. According to Ms. Landry, the defendant struggled

with Mr. Neely, and during the struggle, he ended up on top of Mr. Neely and began

choking him.

Ms. Landry stated Mr. Evans demanded, “Give me the money. Where is the

money at?” She testified she did not know whether there was money in the home

because she had not been living there. Ms. Landry stated that, once in the bedroom,

Mr. Evans searched the dresser drawers and found money in the bottom drawer. She

did not know the amount of the money he found. She further stated she did not see

any drugs in the home that evening and did not witness a fight or disagreement over

drugs, the price of drugs, or the amount of drugs.

Ms. Landry said the struggle between the defendant and Mr. Neely resulted in

a cut on the back of Mr. Neely’s head. The cut was deep, and she could see the bone

when she examined it. Ms. Landry related that, during the altercation, the defendant

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threw a chair at Mr. Neely. The men fell onto the chair during the struggle, and it

broke. The fight also resulted in broken glass. When the two men fled, the defendant

left his knife on the floor.

Ms. Landry explained that the defendant took her into the bathroom where he

looked in the mirror and adjusted his hood. A cross pendant fell onto the floor as he

did so. The cross, found on the bathroom floor by investigating officers, belonged

to neither Ms. Landry nor Mr. Neely. Ms. Landry was certain the man she saw in the

bathroom mirror was the defendant. She was also certain the person in the ski mask

was Mr. Evans. Ms. Landry said the two men called each other by name during the

offense. While she was in the bedroom with Mr. Evans, the defendant shouted,

“Hurry up, Derek. Let’s go.” Mr. Evans responded, “Hold on, Nick.” At that

moment, Ms. Landry realized who both men were.

According to Ms. Landry, Mr. Evans had previously been to the home one time

while she was present, and the defendant had been at the home approximately two

times when she was present. One of the defendant’s visits occurred when Mr. Evans

had also been there. Ms. Landry testified there was no possibility that the defendant

left the knife on a previous visit. She testified it was not on the floor when she let the

dog outside.

Ms. Landry recalled that, after taking the money from the dresser, Mr. Evans

brought her back into the kitchen. The defendant said, “Let’s switch,” and they

switched up. Mr. Evans restrained Mr. Neely while the defendant told Ms. Landry,

“Let’s go into the bathroom.” The defendant no longer had his knife at that point.

Ms. Landry was frightened. Once in the bathroom, the defendant told her to get into

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the shower. There was a mirror over the vanity in the bathroom. She saw the

defendant’s face in a set of mirrors in the bathroom, which were set at angles that

reflected the defendant’s image in the vanity mirror when he adjusted his hoodie.

Ms. Landry testified she was positive that the person in the mirror was the defendant;

she repeated that there were no drugs in the home that evening.

On cross-examination, Ms. Landry stated that Mr. Evans’ previous visit was

for the purpose of purchasing cocaine; however, on the night of the incident, he was

not there to purchase cocaine. She maintained that there were no drugs in the home

on the night of the offense. Ms. Landry further stated that Mr. Neely’s cellular

telephone was on the counter when she let the dog out and that it never rang.

Ms. Landry said the defendant did not take anything from Mr. Neely. She testified

the defendant dropped his knife when he struggled with Mr. Neely.

On redirect examination, Ms. Landry stated the defendant told Mr. Evans to get

the money. It was then that Mr. Evans demanded money from her. Ms. Landry

recalled responding that she did not know where there was any money. When

Mr. Evans took Ms. Landry into the bedroom, he first looked under the bed and under

the dresser before he began rifling through the dresser drawers. Ms. Landry did not

remember Mr. Neely taking any telephone calls about drug transactions that evening.

Mr. Neely also testified at trial. He acknowledged that pursuant to a Motion

to Compel filed by the state, he had no right to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination, but any incriminating information derived from his

testimony would not be used against him. At the time of trial, Mr. Neely was thirty-

one years old. He stated he had been working since he was seventeen. In 2004, he

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worked as a combination welder, and he was so employed at the time of trial. Mr.

Neely asserted he had never been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a crime.

Mr. Neely said he did not know the defendant before 2004. He had seen him

approximately four or five times prior to the early morning hours of December 26,

2004. According to Mr. Neely, the defendant had been to his home two or three

times, and they had gone deer hunting together. Mr. Neely stated the defendant did

not leave a knife at his home during one of those visits.

Mr. Neely explained he was related to Mr. Evans. He testified Mr. Evans had

visited his home on one prior occasion when he accompanied a couple of his friends

there. Mr. Neely stated the only time Mr. Evans had been to his home with the

defendant was the night of the incident.

Mr. Neely testified he spent Christmas Day visiting family and friends then

went to Ms. Landry’s parents’ home. Ms. Landry agreed to try and work things out

between them and accompanied him back to his home. Mr. Neely recalled he and

Ms. Landry arrived at his home around eleven o’clock that evening, and they

prepared for bed. Ms. Landry had brought her dog with her, and she let the dog

outside. Mr. Neely was in the kitchen at the time. After letting the dog out,

Ms. Landry closed and locked the door as was her custom. The dog barked to be let

back inside about fifteen minutes later. When Ms. Landry opened the door, two

people were there. One was wearing a ski mask and the other was wearing a hoodie.

Mr. Neely said he was not sure what the person in the ski mask did when he entered

because the person wearing the hoodie had a knife and charged him. Mr. Neely was

surprised and tried to defend himself.

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Mr. Neely maintained he had consumed neither alcohol nor drugs that day.

Although he admitted he had sold drugs from his home in the past, he stated he did

not have any drugs in his home that evening. He did not realize where the person in

the mask was or what he was doing because he was fighting with the person in the

hoodie. Mr. Neely said he was cut on the back of his head, but the fight remained

basically fistic. He testified he was not aware of what happened to the knife; he was

trying not to get cut or killed. The defendant threw a chair at him; it broke. A glass

dish on the table was also broken during the struggle.

Mr. Neely testified the person in the hoodie eventually subdued him, then knelt

on his arms and choked him with a hand around his throat. Mr. Neely could not

breathe. Mr. Neely recalled that the person in the hoodie told the ski-masked person

to “Go get the money.” According to Mr. Neely, the person in the hoodie told the ski-

masked person, “Hurry up, Derek,” and the ski-masked person replied, “Hold up,

Nick.” When he heard the person in the hoodie’s voice, he recognized him as the

defendant. Mr. Neely further testified that at some point, the defendant called

Mr. Evans over and instructed, “Hold him down.” At that time, Mr. Evans held

Mr. Neely at knife point while the defendant took Ms. Landry into the back of the

home.

Mr. Neely explained he had approximately $600.00 in his drawer from cashing

a per diem check. He denied conducting any drug transactions that evening and

stated he had not promised the defendant he would sell him drugs.

On cross-examination, Mr. Neely said his last drug transaction before that

evening had occurred a week or so before. He did not recall exactly because the

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offense had occurred three or four years before trial. Mr. Neely said he did not

recognize Mr. Evans as one of the perpetrators until the defendant called his name.

He also stated that he did not give the men anything and that they took money from

Ms. Landry. He explained, however, that he did not see the money change hands

because he was pinned down being choked by the defendant at the time.

Mr. Neely testified that he no longer sold drugs and that he did not have any

drugs in his home at the time of the offense. He stated he did not speak to the

defendant on the telephone Christmas Day but explained they had gone hunting

together either one or two days earlier. He also stated he had not spoken to Mr. Evans

either in person or over the telephone that day.

Mr. Neely said that he told the police he had a cut on his head. After reviewing

his statement, he acknowledged he must have forgotten to include that information

in his statement. Mr. Neely also acknowledged that he did not specifically mention

a “fight” but explained he considered being hit over the head with a chair a fight.

Deputy Jerry Guillot had been working for the St. Landry Sheriff’s Office

approximately three months when he was called to respond to the incident at

1:29 a.m. on December 26, 2004. He testified that when he entered the home, he

noticed blood on the floor, a broken chair, broken glass, a knife, and the wound on

Mr. Neely’s head. He also saw an item in the bathroom. Deputy Guillot testified that

while Mr. Neely and Ms. Landry were upset, neither appeared to be intoxicated. He

took statements from both Ms. Landry and Mr. Neely. Deputy Guillot related that

Mr. Evans went to the police department before his shift ended at 6:00 a.m.

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On cross-examination, Deputy Guillot explained that Mr. Neely told him his

head injury occurred when he was struck with the wooden chair, not that he had been

cut with the knife. On redirect examination, Deputy Guillot related that Ms. Landry’s

statement included the information that there were two men and that one of the men

held her on the couch with a knife while the other fought with Mr. Neely. He further

explained Ms. Landry told him that one of the men made her give him the money

while the other man held Mr. Neely down and that the one who had been holding

down Mr. Neely subsequently took her into the bathroom.

Randy Lorah also testified for the state. He testified that he worked as a

detective in criminal investigations from 2002 until 2006 and that he had about fifteen

years of experience. He responded to the dispatch reporting the offense at

Mr. Neely’s home. He took the pictures of the scene and Mr. Neely and interviewed

the defendant. According to Mr. Lorah, he informed the defendant of his Miranda

rights, and the defendant indicated he understood his rights but refused to sign the

rights form.

During the interview, Mr. Lorah informed the defendant that they had retrieved

a knife and that he was going to send it off for DNA and fingerprint analysis. The

defendant then admitted that the knife was his but explained he had left it at

Mr. Neely’s home when they went hunting a couple of days earlier. Mr. Lorah stated

he did not send the knife for analysis because the defendant’s identification of the

weapon obviated the need for analysis. Mr. Lorah acknowledged that his statement

differed from the testimony of both Mr. Neely and Ms. Landry and stated it was a

mistake on his part. He also acknowledged his statement differed from that written

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by Deputy Guillot. Mr. Lorah stated he based his report on the report issued by the

officer in charge’s statement which was erroneous.

On cross-examination, Mr. Lorah explained he did not issue a supplemental

report with corrections because he did not notice the error until the date of trial. He

reported the defendant had alleged drugs were involved and being sold out of

Mr. Neely’s home. Mr. Lorah also reported Mr. Evans stated in his statement that the

defendant made him give the defendant all the money except five dollars and the

drugs. According to Mr. Lorah, Mr. Evans was initially uncooperative and denied

involvement, but he later gave a written statement. Mr. Evans stated that Ms. Landry

gave him $550 in cash and that once he returned from the bedroom, the defendant

instructed him to hold down Mr. Neely. Mr. Evans did not admit using or purchasing

cocaine, and he did not specify where he had obtained the drugs.

On redirect examination, Mr. Lorah explained that Mr. Evans admitted

breaking into Mr. Neely’s home at the defendant’s instigation but claimed the

defendant coerced him then took all of the money from the offense. Mr. Lorah also

related that Mr. Evans informed him that he and the defendant had donned gloves and

masks in preparation for the offense.

Jessica Courville testified for the defendant. She stated that late on December

24 and early on the morning of December 25, 2004, she was home with her father,

her grandmother, and her brother, the defendant. According to Ms. Courville, she and

the defendant were watching television around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m. when he received

a call from Mr. Evans; Mr. Evans then arrived at their home in his mother’s Blazer.

She stated they all went into her father’s room and talked about getting some cocaine.

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Mr. Evans placed a telephone call, then he and the defendant left. When they

returned, they had a bag of cocaine which they weighed on a digital scale.

Ms. Courville testified the cocaine was three grams less than the amount the

defendant and Mr. Evans said they paid for. The defendant made a phone call and

told her and Mr. Evans, “Kenny said he’s going to make it right.” The defendant and

Mr. Evans left. Ms. Courville did not know when they returned because she went to

sleep. She recalled seeing the defendant and Mr. Neely together on several

occasions; they had gone hunting together several times. That night was the first time

she had seen Mr. Evans at their home.

Cecil Brent Courville, the defendant’s father, testified for the defendant. He

stated that on Christmas Day 2004, his daughter Jessica, and his youngest son, Colin,

spent the day at his home and that at around 10:00 p.m., the defendant and Mr. Evans

were also at his home. They were all hanging out and watching television.

Mr. Courville testified that the defendant and Mr. Evans made a few telephone calls

then left. They returned and made more telephone calls then left again. They

returned a second time and brought cocaine with them from Mr. Neely’s. According

to Mr. Courville, the defendant and Mr. Evans left again. Mr. Courville received a

call from the defendant around 1:00 a.m. The call originated from a telephone

belonging to Mr. Evans’ mother. Mr. Courville said the defendant asked him for

money and said he needed an extra one hundred dollars to finish the deal.

Mr. Courville said he did not give the defendant any money, and the defendant

returned.

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On cross-examination, Mr. Courville said that “they” were not present when

the defendant made his telephone calls. He assumed the defendant spoke to

Mr. Neely because they had been trying to contact him for an hour or more. The last

time the defendant returned, he had drugs. Mr. Courville said he did not see the

defendant with drugs when he returned any other time. He said the defendant stated

that he had been shorted by Mr. Neely. Mr. Courville stated he did not own a digital

scale, but there may have been one in the home.

The defendant then testified in his defense. He related that when he spoke to

Mr. Evans on December 25, 2004, it was late and about the time people would be

going to bed. He said he was watching television with his brother and sister when

Mr. Evans called to see if he could get him some cocaine. The defendant responded

that he had been trying to contact Mr. Neely all day, but he had not been successful.

Mr. Evans then came to visit him.

The defendant said Mr. Neely eventually answered his telephone and

confirmed that he was in possession of cocaine powder. The defendant said he and

Mr. Evans went to Mr. Neely’s, got the cocaine, and went home. The defendant said

he trusted Mr. Neely because he was ordinarily trustworthy about giving him the

quality and quantity of cocaine for which he paid, so he did not bring his scale with

him. The defendant said he weighed the cocaine when he returned to his father’s

home because he was going to divide it with Mr. Evans and realized he was shorted.

According to the defendant, he contacted Mr. Neely. Mr. Neely told him to return to

his home, and he would make up the difference. The defendant said he announced

this information while both his sister and father were in the room.

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The defendant stated he and Mr. Evans returned to Mr. Neely’s home and

parked at a vacant lot next door. They walked over, and the dog was outside barking.

When Ms. Landry opened the door, he was in front of her. Ms. Landry let him inside,

and Mr. Neely was sitting in a chair in the kitchen. When he asked Mr. Neely about

the shortage, Mr. Neely asked to see the bag. After examining the bag, Mr. Neely

said he was not going to give him any more cocaine because the bag showed evidence

of tampering. The defendant said he attempted to talk Mr. Neely into correcting the

shortage, but Mr. Neely told him to leave. He refused to leave and, instead, became

insistent; Mr. Neely shoved him. They then fought and fell onto the chair.

The defendant related that said he was wearing a hood because it was cold

outside and that Mr. Neely pulled on his hood. He testified he did not take anything

from Mr. Neely and denied knowing anything about Mr. Evans taking any money.

He maintained that, to his knowledge, Mr. Evans stayed by the door throughout the

visit to Mr. Neely’s home. He said he had obtained the money for the drugs through

work and through Christmas money given to him by his father.

On cross-examination, the defendant said he had been convicted of both

aggravated battery and attempted possession of a firearm by a felon. He stated the

extra cash he asked his father to provide was for him and Mr. Evans to go to a bar.

He denied that the knife belonged to him and denied telling Mr. Lorah that it was his.

He accused Mr. Lorah of putting a mark over his eye that was depicted in a

photograph and noted in his report. The defendant also accused Mr. Lorah of

including things in his statement that he did not say. The defendant said the fight

with Mr. Neely ended when he got up and ran out of the home. He said Mr. Evans

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ran out at the same time. The defendant theorized that Mr. Evans said he, the

defendant, coerced him into robbing Mr. Neely because he was afraid of going to jail.

He claimed Mr. Evans was not telling the truth.

On rebuttal, Mr. Lorah denied being present when the injury shown by the

defendant’s mug shot was inflicted and denied inflicting the injury. Mr. Lorah stated

that after he took the defendant to the booking area, he went into his office to type the

paperwork. While there, he was informed the defendant had become “very

combative” and had to be subdued. When Mr. Lorah went back to see the defendant,

he had the mark or bruise. He explained he had examined the defendant’s arms,

body, and head to make sure he did not have any cuts or lacerations, and there were

no marks or bruises on his chest or arms. On cross-examination, Mr. Lorah said he

had been fired by the new sheriff for dereliction of duty.

The state next called Mr. Evans to testify as a rebuttal witness. Mr. Evans

acknowledged he was charged with burglary and theft in relation to the invasion of

Mr. Neely’s home. He testified those charges were dismissed in exchange for his

testimony against the defendant and that he had been granted immunity and could not

be prosecuted for anything he testified about as long as he told the truth.

Mr. Evans stated he had been arrested the night of the incident after he went

to the police station in his own vehicle. He was seventeen years of age at that time

and was twenty-one years of age at the time of trial. When he was arrested,

Mr. Evans denied having invaded Mr. Neely’s home but then gave a statement and

admitted having done so. He said he was not threatened into giving the statement

although the detective taking his statement promised him a lesser charge.

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Mr. Evans testified that he used drugs at the time of the offense, but he did not

think he had a drug problem. He explained that although he had not undergone

rehabilitation, he no longer used drugs. At the time of the offense, Mr. Evans said he

had known the defendant for a couple of months. Mr. Evans said he had been to

Mr. Neely’s home a few times before that night and had purchased cocaine from him.

He denied contacting the defendant for the purpose of obtaining drugs.

Mr. Evans said that, after speaking to the defendant on the telephone, he drove

to the defendant’s home; the defendant’s sister was present. They tried to contact

Mr. Neely but were not successful. He said they never got in touch with Mr. Neely

and he and the defendant discussed robbing Mr. Neely. Mr. Evans testified he did not

have any money to go halves on a quarter ounce of cocaine. He stated that he usually

purchased a gram, just enough to get high, for fifty dollars.

Mr. Evans did not remember why he initially contacted the defendant that

evening but thought it may have been about drugs. He related that he and the

defendant took turns calling Mr. Neely and that the defendant had a plan to lure

Mr. Neely away from his home so they could “go inside and take drugs or whatever”

while he was not home. According to Mr. Evans, he and the defendant were at the

Courville home when the conversation took place, but neither the defendant’s father

nor his sister was present for the conversation. Mr. Evans was aware that Mr. Neely

had a longtime girlfriend who was sometimes at his home, but they did not plan on

her being present and did not discuss the possibility that she would be present.

Mr. Evans explained that, because they were unable to contact Mr. Neely, they

decided to just go to the home and take what was there by force. He parked at a boat

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ramp near Mr. Neely’s home. After looking around for a little while, they went to the

front of the home when Mr. Neely let the dog outside. The dog started barking at

them. Mr. Evans reported that the defendant supplied him with a ski mask and gloves

while the defendant wore a hood and gloves. He did not know what happened to the

disguise. He denied having a knife and stated he did not see a knife that evening or

know the origin of the knife recovered from the scene.

Mr. Evans said he held Mr. Neely down after the defendant finished fighting

with him and he did not threaten Ms. Landry. He did not clearly recall the events

because they happened too quickly. He believed the chair was broken in the fight

when the defendant and Mr. Neely fell over it. The defendant went into the bedroom

to find the money while Mr. Evans restrained Mr. Neely, who seemed dazed.

Mr. Evans did not remember seeing blood. Mr. Evans related that was his only visit

to Mr. Neely’s home that evening. He was not familiar with the account of facts

given by the defendant and his family.

Mr. Evans said the defendant emerged from Mr. Neely’s bedroom with

approximately $600. They also took two packages of cocaine, each one-eighth ounce,

plus one open bag of cocaine from the kitchen table. After examining his statement,

Mr. Evans agreed that, in his statement, he wrote that the defendant instructed him

to take Mr. Neely’s wife and go get the money. Mr. Evans also wrote that he

complied with the defendant’s order and came back with the money. Mr. Evans

additionally penned that, after the incident, he gave the defendant all of the drugs and

the money except five dollars. Mr. Evans averred that the information on the sworn

statement was the correct account. He explained that he had become confused during

15

his testimony because he was really nervous. He said that although he was nervous

the night of the offense, he would have remembered having a knife and maintained

that he did not have a knife on the night in question. Mr. Evans restated that he did

not see the defendant with a knife, but he agreed they stole approximately $600 and

some drugs.

Mr. Evans asserted he participated in the offense because the defendant

threatened his life. Mr. Evans owed the defendant $50 and testified the defendant

told him that he knew where he lived and “would get the money back somehow, some

way.” Mr. Evans said the other information in his statement was exaggerated, but,

at the time, he believed the defendant was going to kill his family, too. Since then,

the defendant contacted Mr. Evans and asked him to change his story to say that they

went to Mr. Neely’s for a drug deal instead of a robbery. Mr. Evans said he let the

defendant know he would be telling the truth at trial, which is that they did not go to

Mr. Neely’s for a drug deal or to get drugs to make up for a shortage in their

purchase.

On cross-examination, Mr. Evans said he excluded a lot of information from

his first statement to the police. The detective tore up Mr. Evans’ initial statement;

Mr. Evans said he supposed this was because the detective wanted the truth and felt

Mr. Evans was lying. Mr. Evans’ statement that said the defendant told him he would

kill Mr. Evans’ parents was true. Mr. Evans acknowledged he was immune from

prosecution. He said he located the money underneath the dresser in the bedroom,

stating Ms. Landry reached under the dresser and pulled out wads of money when he

asked her to identify the location of the money.

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On redirect examination, Mr. Evans said Ms. Landry appeared to be “very”

frightened at the time she gave him the money. Mr. Evans denied “making her” give

him the money. Mr. Evans asked, “Where’s the money? Where’s the money.” He

did not recall going through the dresser drawers, but it was possible he did so. He

was still wearing the ski mask and gloves at the time. When they went back into the

living room, the defendant was still holding down Mr. Neely. The defendant told him

to swap places, and he complied. The defendant went looking “for more because he

didn’t think that that [sic] was all.” Mr. Evans said he did not remember a lot of

things about the event; his adrenaline was rushing because he was scared.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged.

The defense filed a motion seeking a post-verdict judgment of acquittal. After a

hearing, the trial court denied the motion and imposed the following sentence: five

years at hard labor for the simple robbery conviction and twenty-five years at hard

labor for the aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court designated that the

sentences were to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to any other

sentences the defendant was serving at the time or would serve in the future. The

defendant then filed a motion to reconsider sentence seeking concurrent sentences

and any other relief, which the trial court denied. He now appeals his convictions and

sentences.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support
convictions of aggravated burglary and simple robbery.
2. The sentences imposed are excessive under the facts and
circumstances of this case.

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PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

3. The jury erred in finding the defendant guilty when the
evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions [and]
where the evidence presented by the state at trial did not
satisfy the elements of the crimes as required by law.

4. The court erred in allowing the use of perjured testimony.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defense counsel and the defendant, pro se, assert the evidence presented at trial

was insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated burglary and simple robbery

and urge that the jury should have believed the defense witnesses because they were

more credible than the state’s witnesses. The defendant, pro se, urges the State failed

to prove that he robbed the victim named in the bill of information, Kenneth Neely.

In the alternative, the defendant asserts that his co-defendant’s decision to take

money from Ms. Landry should not be imputed to him. The defendant adds that the

State failed to prove aggravated burglary because it did not prove he entered the home

without permission with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein.

The Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the standard of review for evaluating

the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in State v. Macon, 06-481, pp. 7-8 (La.

6/1/07), 957 So.2d 1280, 1285-86 (citations omitted), stating:

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence
claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979). A determination of the weight of evidence is a question of
fact, resting solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in
whole or in part, the testimony of any witnesses. A reviewing court may
impinge on the fact finding function of the jury only to the extent
necessary to assure the Jackson standard of review. It is not the function
of an appellate court to assess credibility or re-weigh the evidence.

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The defendant primarily complains that the evidence was insufficient to convict

him because the jury should not have believed the state’s witnesses. Appellate courts

cannot, however, reassess the credibility of witnesses or re-weigh evidence:

[The supreme court has] repeatedly cautioned that [the] due process,
rational fact finder test of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), does not permit a reviewing court to
substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder
or to second guess the credibility determinations of the fact finder
necessary to render an honest verdict. A reviewing court may intrude on
the plenary discretion of the fact finder “only to the extent necessary to
guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.”

State v. Calloway, 07-2306, p. 10 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 422 (citations omitted).

“The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the bounds of

rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness[.]” State v. Higgins,

03-1980, p. 17 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1232, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126

S.Ct. 182 (2005). “Credibility determinations are within the sound discretion of the

trier of fact and will not be disturbed unless clearly contrary to the evidence.” State

v. Marshall, 04-3139, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 362, 369, cert. denied, 552 U.S.

905, 128 S.Ct. 239 (2007).

Our extensive review of the facts and evidence presented shows that the

testimonies of Mr. Neely, Ms. Landry, and Mr. Evans support each other to a large

extent, notwithstanding that Mr. Evans denied having a knife or knowing that the

defendant had one and both Ms. Landry and Mr. Neely denied having drugs in the

home. All three testified that they received immunity from prosecution for any

charges related to the incident in exchange for their truthful testimony at the

defendant’s trial. Thus, the jury had the opportunity to evaluate the immunity deals

and any discrepancies between the testimonies of these witnesses and their prior

19

statements in determining the credibility of these witnesses. The omissions of facts

can be attributed to the self-interest of each of witness, and many of the discrepancies

between their earlier statements and their testimonies can be attributed to either the

lapse of time or nervousness. Overall, the accounts of events given by the state’s

witnesses are very similar. Therefore, the jury’s credibility determination was not

clearly contrary to the evidence.

SIMPLE ROBBERY

The defendant contends the evidence does not support his simple robbery

conviction. “Simple robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another

. . . that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, but not

armed with a dangerous weapon.” La.R.S. 14:65(A).

The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, shows

that the defendant and Mr. Evans, working in concert, struggled with Mr. Neely in his

home. They then took turns forcibly restraining Mr. Neely while they took

approximately $600 from his bedroom. The money was taken from Ms. Landry’s

immediate presence when she was forced into the bedroom by Mr. Evans, who she

testified was armed with a knife, while Mr. Neely was being restrained by the

defendant. Mr. Evans further testified that they took two bags of cocaine and an open

bag of cocaine from the kitchen table.

“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or

absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet

in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the

20

crime, are principals.” La.R.S. 14:24. Principals are considered parties to those

crimes. La.R.S. 14:23.

[A] defendant’s mere presence at the scene is not enough to “concern”
him in the crime. Only those persons who knowingly participate in the
planning or execution of a crime may be said to be “concerned” in its
commission, thus making them liable as principals. A principal may be
connected only to those crimes for which he has the requisite mental
state. State v. Neal, 00-0674 (La.6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 659, cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed.2d 231 (2002).

State ex rel. D.F., 08-182 pp. 5-6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/6/08), 991 So.2d 1082, 1085, writ

denied, 08-1540 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 138. “[T]he defendant need not actually take

anything to be found guilty of [robbery] . . . . A person who aids and abets another

in a crime, is liable just as the person who directly commits it, although he may be

convicted of a higher or lower degree of the crime. . . .” State v. Cayton, 98-100, p.

2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/28/98), 721 So.2d 542, 543 (citations omitted).

An item is within the immediate control of a person if it is in the same room

with them. In State v. Johnson, 97-317 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/19/98), 718 So.2d 553, the

defendant was convicted of simple robbery after ordering a community center worker

into a back room, taking money from a drawer in that room, and then fleeing with the

cash. The fourth circuit found sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it

shows that the defendant and Mr. Evans took something of value belonging to

another that was in the immediate control of another by use of force or intimidation.

Thus, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the simple

robbery proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the defendant’s argument

is without merit.

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AGGRAVATED BURGLARY

The defendant also urges the evidence is not sufficient to support his

aggravated burglary conviction. “Aggravated burglary is the unauthorized entering

of any inhabited dwelling . . . where a person is present, with the intent to commit a

felony or any theft therein, if the offender, (1) Is armed with a dangerous weapon; or

. . . (3) Commits a battery upon any person while in such place.” La.R.S. 14:60.

“Battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another.”

La.R.S. 14:33.

The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, shows

the defendant planned to steal money and drugs from the mobile home inhabited by

Mr. Neely. In order to facilitate the taking of those items, the defendant armed

himself with a knife and entered Mr. Neely’s home without permission while both

Mr. Neely and Ms. Landry were present. The defendant then immediately attacked

Mr. Neely and struggled with him, causing injuries to Mr. Neely’s face and head.

Thus, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it

was sufficient to support the defendant’s aggravated burglary conviction. This

assignment of error is without merit.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the sentences imposed

are excessive under the facts of this case. He contends the trial court set forth no

aggravating or mitigating factors other than his criminal history and complains his

sentences were not tailored to him as the offender or the offenses because the trial

court failed to both discuss and address his family life, his work history, and his drug

22

addiction. He concludes that the penalties imposed do not serve the ends of justice

and should be set aside as excessive.

At the defendant’s sentencing, the state introduced the presentence

investigation report into evidence, and the trial court took judicial notice of the entire

record. The trial court then imposed the defendant’s sentences and stated oral reasons

therefor:

THE COURT: Alright. Court is going to consider the sentencing
statutes of both statutes, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
of Article 894.1 and in particular . . . this case, Article 894.1 (A)
(1)[undue risk that the defendant will commit another crime], (2)[need
of correctional treatment or a custodial environment], and (3)[a lesser
sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the crime]. I’m going to
consider the sentencing objectives of public protection, rehabilitation[,]
and deterrence. I’m going to further consider the record of this
individual, which indicates that these two offenses result in him
becoming a third time felon. Court notes for the record that the
gentleman entered a plea of guilty to an original charge of attempted
second degree murder on May 24, 2000[,] and pled guilty to aggravated
battery on January 17, 2001, was sentenced to four years hard labor. In
addition, on 10/10/04[,] he was charged with possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, entered a plea of guilty to attempted possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, sentenced to three years at hard labor.
Two arrests in between those two time periods and then since that time
period, which the Court is allowed to take into consideration, the arrests
that have occurred since the time of these instant offenses. I’ll note in
2005, February, he was arrested for armed robbery and false
impersonation. That was dismissed. On July 6, 2005[,] he was arrested
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. That was dismissed.
October 2005 arrested for aggravated second degree battery. That was
dismissed. August 28, 2006, charged with second degree battery, simple
criminal damage to property. Due to the lack of bill of information
being filed[,] a 701 Motion was granted. December 14, 2006, charged
with introducing contraband into a penal facility, dismissed. July 30,
2007, charged with distribution of CDS II, cocaine, he’s been arraigned,
no bill of information [has] been filed at this point in time. November
5, 2007, charged with resisting an officer, battery of an officer, criminal
damage to property, pled guilty to resisting an officer and battery of a
police officer. On November 7, 2007, charged with unauthorized entry
of an inhabited dwelling, entering on and remaining on places after
being forbidden, pled guilty to entering or remaining. January 11, 2008,

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unauthorized entry of a critical infrastructure and felony theft. Matter
has been set for arraignment; no bill of information has been filed to
date. April 23, 2008, charged with possession of cocaine, drug
paraphernalia. Arraigned on both of those, no specific court date has
been set . . . yet. April 28, 2008, charged with attempted first degree
murder, aggravated second degree battery, aggravated burglary. A bill
of information was filed charging attempted first degree murder, armed
robbery, aggravated burglary of a dwelling, possession of cocaine,
aggravated second degree battery with a dangerous weapon. Matters are
set, or were set for June of ‘09, jury selection as well. I don’t have a
result as yet. And then in September of ‘08 charged with aggravated
arson and has been arraigned. To say that this gentleman has a storied
history would be to me to be putting it lightly. I find him to be a menace
to society in general, this community in particular. As a result, after
careful consideration of the crimes charged, his long and storied career,
I sentence him to serve twenty-five years at hard labor --

....

THE COURT: On the aggravated burglary.

....

THE COURT: I further sentence him to serve five years on the
simple robbery, same to run concurrent[ly] with one another, but with
no other crime. So[,] on any other time that he gets, it’s my intent that
these two sentences are to run consecutive[ly] to any other time he may
be serving or to be served in the future. I find that these are crimes of
violence, that the penalties have not been enhanced.

On August 24, 2009, the defendant filed a “Motion to Amend, Modify and/or

Reconsider Sentence.” The motion did not allege any error in the trial court’s

sentences; it simply requested that the trial court consider imposing concurrent

sentences and any other relief the trial court was inclined to grant.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the defendant’s motion on May 27,

2010. At the hearing, the defense asserted that the sentence should be reconsidered

because of inconsistencies between the accounts given at trial by the state’s

witnesses. The defendant denied having a weapon or taking anything during the

24

incident and alleged he was not the primary perpetrator in the case, pointing out that

Mr. Evans was not charged for his part in the incident. The defense asked the trial

court to consider the defendant’s relative youthfulness at the time of the offense,

twenty-four years old, and his consistent drug use as mitigating factors. The

defendant stated he thought he could be a good person when sober and clean.

The trial court refused to reconsider the defendant’s sentences and gave reasons

for its decision:

When I do initial sentencing, I take a great deal of time and effort. It’s
much more arduous tha[n] one might think. I am very aware of the
situation involved here as in every situation. It’s never easy under any
circumstance. Despite what people may think, it’s easy to sit here when
you’re running for office and when you -- I’m a law and order judge –
that’s not necessarily the case. When you begin to consider that you are
housing people, removing them from society, I’m telling you that I take
that as a very serious responsibility. I do so with the utmost reluctance.
I understand that he believes that there are flaws in the transcript. I’m
well aware that this was a jury trial. The flaws that he makes reference
to in the transcript – the transcript is absolutely accurate, one hundred
percent. Now the flaw he makes reference to is what he perceived the
jury should or should not have seen. They jury found him guilty.
Subsequent to finding him guilty, I looked at his record. It was
deplorable. Youth aside, this gentleman treated society with absolute
disdain. I believe I said at the time of sentencing with the time that I
gave him, that he was a menace to society. I meant that. I mean it
today. I looked at the transcript. I looked at the argument. I’ve had a
lot of time to look at this. This matter has been continued several times.
I’m going to tell you each time one of these is given I do go back and I
read it. I carefully consider it, which is why I decline to wait. The
original sentence given was done after a great deal of thought, after
considering, as indicated, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
of Article 894.1, the crime itself, the record of this individual. And as
a result, I see no reason to change the sentence that was originally
rendered, and so I deny – I’ve allowed you[,] and I’ve reconsidered the
sentence[,] but I decline to change my original sentence.

The defense did not contest the sufficiency of the trial court’s reasons for

imposing the defendant’s sentence in its motion to reconsider sentence or at the

25

motion to reconsider sentence hearing. Therefore, those arguments are precluded

from review on appeal, La.Code Crim.P. arts. 841 and 881.1(E), and our review of the

defendant’s sentences is limited to bare excessiveness. See State v. Granger, 08-1477

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09), 11 So.3d 649.

This court has previously discussed the standard for reviewing excessive

sentence claims:

[Louisiana Constitution Article] I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute
an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our
sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. The trial court has wide discretion in
the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence
shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been
more appropriate.

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331 (citations omitted).

“Whoever commits the crime of simple robbery shall be fined not more than

three thousand dollars, imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than seven

years, or both.” La.R.S. 14:65(B). Therefore, the defendant’s five-year penalty for

simple robbery fits within the sentencing parameters set forth by statute. It

constitutes an upper mid-range penalty.

“Whoever commits the crime of aggravated burglary shall be imprisoned at

hard labor for not less than one nor more than thirty years.” La.R.S. 14:60. Thus, the

defendant’s twenty-five year sentence for aggravated burglary also fits within the

26

parameters set forth by statute. It is a high-range sentence, as it is five-sixths the

maximum possible penalty.

Even though a penalty falls within the statutory sentencing range, it may still

be unconstitutionally excessive:

In deciding whether a sentence is shocking or makes no
meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, an appellate court
may consider several factors including the nature of the offense, the
circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose behind the
punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes
may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to
particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
presented by each case.”

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061 (citations omitted). “[T]he trial judge need not

articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance outlined in art. 894.1[;] the

record must reflect that he adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing

the sentence to the defendant.” State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983).

In State v. Johnson, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985), the defendant, as

in the instant case, was originally charged with armed robbery but convicted of

simple robbery. The defendant appealed his seven-year sentence as constitutionally

excessive. Noting the district court’s reasons for ruling, the first circuit found no

abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion:

In imposing sentence, the trial judge noted that the defendant had
an extensive previous criminal record, and that the defendant was in
need of correctional treatment in a custodial environment. The trial
judge stated that the defendant previously had the benefit of supervised
parole which had been revoked for parole violation. Thus, it was the

27

opinion of the trial judge that there was an undue risk that during any
period of suspended sentence or probation, the defendant would commit
another crime.

Id. at 1042 (footnote omitted).

In State v. Williams, 452 So.2d 234 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1984), the defendant also

received a seven-year sentence after being convicted of simple robbery. The

defendant, two women, and another man approached the victim. One of the women

struck the victim on the head and knocked him to the ground. Then, the defendant

and the two women held the victim down while the second man removed the victim’s

wallet and keys. All four perpetrators left the scene in the victim’s automobile. On

appeal, the defendant asserted his sentence was excessive. In reaching its decision,

the first circuit noted the violent manner of the robbery, the defendant’s three prior

misdemeanors and two prior felony convictions, and the sentencing range that would

have been applicable if the defendant had been charged as a multiple felony offender.

Based upon those considerations, the first circuit found no abuse of the trial court’s

sentencing discretion.

Based upon (1) the facts of this case; (2) the defendant’s extensive criminal

history; and (3) the trial court’s findings that the defendant constitutes a threat to the

community, that there is an undue threat of a repeat offense, that the defendant was

in need of correctional treatment, and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the

seriousness of the offenses, we find the defendant’s five-year sentence for simple

robbery does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

In State v. Coleman, 450 So.2d 1063 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 456 So.2d

172 (La.1984), the defendant was also found guilty of aggravated burglary and

28

sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor. In Coleman, two sisters were home

watching television when they heard a noise. They called a nearby male friend who

came over and checked the home. While he was there, the friend walked one of the

sisters through the home. As they passed a bedroom, they saw the defendant standing

with a knife in a lit bedroom. The defendant fled through the bedroom window,

which had been pried open and broken. On appeal, the defendant argued his sentence

was excessive. The district court had noted that this was the defendant’s second

conviction as the defendant had previously pled guilty to receiving stolen things;

however, the defendant was classified as a first offender for the purposes of the

aggravated burglary because the other offense occurred after the burglary. The

sentencing court further noted the defendant’s juvenile and adult record included

numerous charges for dangerous and violent crimes. Based on the district court’s

reasons for sentencing and the defendant’s lengthy criminal history, the first circuit

found no abused of discretion.

In the instant case, this was the defendant’s third felony conviction, and his two

prior convictions were crimes of violence. The defendant has also been charged with

many other crimes even after the commission of the instant aggravated burglary.

Therefore, based upon (1) the facts of the case; (2) the defendant’s extensive criminal

history; and (3) the sentencing court’s findings that the defendant constitutes a threat

to the community, that there is an undue threat of a repeat offense, that the defendant

was in need of correctional treatment, and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the

seriousness of the offenses, we find the defendant’s sentence of twenty-five years at

29

hard labor for aggravated burglary does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

PERJURED TESTIMONY

The defendant, pro se, urges, “The court erred in allowing the use of perjured

testimony.” He asserts the testimonies of Mr. Evans and Ms. Landry are not credible

because they were given in exchange for immunity. He also urges there is evidence

in the record that Mr. Neely committed perjury. The defendant points out that

Mr. Neely attributed discrepancies in his testimony to the lapse of time between the

offense and the trial. The defendant also contends the prosecution elicited perjured

testimony in reference to Mr. Evans’ statements that he went along with the

defendant’s plan because he was afraid of the defendant. The defendant alleges the

prosecution manufactured Mr. Evans’ testimony. He further alleges that there were

significant differences between Ms. Landry’s trial testimony and her pretrial

statements. He complains the defense was not allowed to fully explore the

contradictory pretrial statements given by the state’s witnesses.

The defendant’s attack on the credibility of the state’s witnesses has already

been addressed. As to his allegations that these witnesses committed perjury, the

defendant points out inconsistencies and contradictions within and between various

witnesses’ testimonies, but he does not present any evidence that any witness

intentionally lied under oath. The jury had the opportunity to view the witnesses and

assess their credibility. It was aware the fact witnesses were granted immunity in

exchange for their testimony and was in the best position to weigh the credibility of

30

that testimony. There is no evidence to support the defendant’s claim that the

witnesses committed purjury. This assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

We find the defendant’s assignments of error lack merit. Both the convictions

and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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