State of Louisiana v. Steven Reinholt

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-1315

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

STEVEN REINHOLT

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 5318-07
HONORABLE D. KENT SAVOIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, James T. Genovese, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

James E. Beal
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 307
Jonesboro, LA 71251-0307
(318) 259-2391
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Steven Reinholt

John F. DeRosier
District Attorney
Cynthia Killingsworth
First Assistant District Attorney
1020 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-3400
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Carla S. Sigler
Assistant District Attorney
1020 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-3400
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

DECUIR, Judge.

Defendant, Steven Reinholt, was convicted on three counts of aggravated rape,

in violation of La.R.S. 14:42. The trial court sentenced him to three concurrent life

terms to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant now appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions.

FACTS

Defendant was a friend of the twelve-year-old victim’s mother, all of whom

were residents of Vinton, Louisiana. One day during the summer of 2005, the victim,

C.P., was at Defendant’s residence because the boy’s mother was at work.1 C.P. was

lying on the couch watching television, and Defendant approached him and began

rubbing his penis. Defendant then disrobed himself and the boy and sat on the

victim’s penis and began moving up and down. A similar incident occurred on a

different date. On a third occasion that summer, Defendant put the boy’s penis in his

mouth.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant claims the evidence adduced at trial

was insufficient to support his convictions for two of the counts against him, i.e., the

ones that alleged anal rape. His assignment does not discuss the act of oral sex that

he performed. He argues the rape statute does not proscribe his behavior regarding

anal sex, as he is the person who was penetrated.

When trial evidence is alleged to be insufficient, the analysis is well-settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical
inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

1
Initials are being used to protect the victim’s identity, pursuant to La.R.S. 46:1844(W).

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d
126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983);
State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d
1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective
credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not
second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond
the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See
State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson,
425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a
conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied
its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Defendant does not contest the facts of the case, thus his argument relies purely upon

legal interpretation.

Defendant received three convictions for aggravated rape, which is defined by

La.R.S. 14:42. As it did in 2005, the statute states, in pertinent part:

A. Aggravated rape is a rape committed upon a person sixty-five
years of age or older or where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual
intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim because
it is committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:

....

(4) When the victim is under the age of thirteen years. Lack of
knowledge of the victim’s age shall not be a defense.

The record shows that the victim was born on March 5, 1993. Therefore, when

the offense occurred during the summer of 2005 he was twelve years old.

Rape is defined by La.R.S. 14:41, which had the same form in 2005:

A. Rape is the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse with
a male or female person committed without the person’s lawful consent.

B. Emission is not necessary, and any sexual penetration, when
the rape involves vaginal or anal intercourse, however slight, is
sufficient to complete the crime.

2

After citing the text of the two foregoing statutes, Defendant argues their

language shows that the proscribed act of penetration must be performed by an

offender on a victim. In this case, as already noted, the victim penetrated Defendant.

He contends that reading the statutes to include an offender who is the person

penetrated would be illogical. Specifically, he posits that such a reading would make

“it illegal for anyone over the age of sixty-five to have sex, because that person [could

not] give lawful consent to penetrate or be penetrated by anyone.” This argument is

incorrect. Pursuant to La.R.S. 14:41(A), rape is a non-consensual sex act. In La.R.S.

14:42(A), aggravated rape is non-consensual sex with a person aged sixty-five or

older. If the person consents, it is not rape at all, regardless of who performs

penetration.

We have no case addressing Defendant’s penetration argument, but a logical

argument can be made from the text of the relevant statutes. Reading La.R.S. 14:41

and La.R.S. 14:42 together in regard to anal sex reveals that the core proscription is

against non-consensual intercourse.2 The term “intercourse” in this context clearly

means “sexual relations,” which would encompass the actions of both parties. This

point is illustrated by the Criminal Code’s treatment of consensual anal intercourse.

In 2005, consensual anal intercourse was prohibited by La.R.S. 14:89(A)(1)

(emphasis added), which stated:

A. Crime against nature is:

(1) The unnatural carnal copulation by a human being with
another of the same sex or opposite sex or with an animal, except that
anal sexual intercourse between two human beings shall not be deemed
as a crime against nature when done under any of the circumstances

2
In the context of La.R.S. 14:42, consent may be vitiated due to violence by an offender or
a victim’s lack of mental capacity to consent. The present case falls into the latter category, pursuant
to La.R.S. 14:42(A)(4).

3

described in R.S. 14:41, 14:42, 14:42.1 or 14:43. Emission is not
necessary; and, when committed by a human being with another, the use
of the genital organ of one of the offenders of whatever sex is sufficient
to constitute the crime.

Thus, in consensual situations, both the person penetrating and the person

being penetrated were statutorily subject to punishment. When one party does not

consent, or consent is vitiated, the act is anal rape. Reading La.R.S. 14:41 and

La.R.S. 14:42 in conjunction with La.R.S. 14:89, we conclude that non-consensual

anal intercourse is anal rape, regardless of whether the offender penetrates the victim

or manipulates the victim into penetrating the offender. Defendant’s sole assignment

of error lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s convictions are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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