State of Louisiana v. Cederic D. Sereal

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-1397

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CEDRIC D. SEREAL

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 07-1898
HONORABLE GERARD B. WATTIGNY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

J. Phil Haney
District Attorney
Walter J. Senette, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney
St. Mary Parish Courthouse
Franklin, LA 70538
(337) 828-4100
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Peggy J. Sullivan
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 2806
Monroe, LA 71207-2806
(318) 387-6124
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Cedric D. Sereal

PETERS, J.

The State of Louisiana charged the defendant, Cederic D. Sereal, with

possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1).

After a bench trial, the trial court found him guilty of the charged offense. Thereafter,

the trial court sentenced him to serve two years at hard labor without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He now appeals his conviction,

asserting in his one assignment of error that the evidence was insufficient to support

his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction in all

respects.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

The underlying facts giving rise to this prosecution are not in dispute. On June

25, 2007, Officer Fernest Martin of the Jeanerette Police Department observed the

defendant back his vehicle into a ditch and then remove his vehicle from the ditch.

Officer Martin stopped the defendant to determine if the defendant was impaired. As

he approached the defendant’s vehicle, Officer Martin observed the defendant place

something in his crotch area. Officer Martin patted down the defendant for safety and

located a plastic bag containing six irregular-shaped rocks of cocaine having a total

weight of less than one gram.

After the State of Louisiana (state) filed its bill of information on September

6, 2007, the defendant invoked a sanity commission, asserting that he was not

mentally capable of proceeding to trial. Following a December 17, 2008 hearing, the

defendant was found capable of proceeding to trial. Thereafter, on March 26, 2010,

the defendant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The

trial court rejected this defense at the April 5, 2010 bench trial and found the

defendant guilty of the charged offense.

OPINION

In asserting the insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant primarily argues

the insufficiency of only one element of the state’s burden of proof—that the state

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to distribute

cocaine. He asserts that due to his insanity at the time of the offense, he lacked the

requisite mental capacity to form the intent to distribute, and, in the alternative, the

record contains no evidence to establish his intent to distribute the cocaine regardless

of his mental state.

In considering an insanity defense, we must start with the legal presumption

that a “defendant is sane and responsible for his actions.” La.R.S. 15:432.

Additionally, “[t]he defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of insanity

at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” La.Code Crim.P. art.

652. Basically, in order to be exempt from criminal responsibility for his actions, a

defendant must prove that “the circumstances indicate that because of a mental

disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right

and wrong with reference to the conduct in question.” La.R.S. 14:14. Furthermore,

“[t]he determination of sanity is a factual matter.” State v. Silman, 95-154, p. 7 (La.

11/27/95), 663 So.2d 27, 32.

In reviewing a claim for insufficiency of evidence in an action
where an affirmative defense of insanity is raised, this court, applying
the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), must determine whether under the facts
and circumstances of the case, any rational fact finder, viewing the
evidence most favorable to the prosecution, could conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense. State v.
Peters, 94-0283 (La. 10/17/94); 643 So.2d 1222; State v. Nealy, 450
So.2d 634 (La.1984); State v. Price, 403 So.2d 660 (La.1981); State v.
Claibon, [395 So.2d 770 (La.1981)]; State v. Roy, 395 So.2d 664
(La.1981).

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Id. at 32.

The only evidence provided by the defendant in attempting to carry his burden

on the sanity issue was his own testimony. According to the defendant, his mental

state could be traced to his 2005 service in Iraq as a member of the United States

Marine Corps. The defendant testified that he joined the Marines in November of

2002 and was deployed to Iraq in 2005. During his seven to eight month deployment,

he was exposed to combat duty and suffered all the experiences associated therewith.

Although he claims to have shot at least one combatant and witnessed numerous IED

explosions, he returned from his deployment without having been wounded himself.

According to the defendant, he was discharged from the Marines in December

of 2005 and began having flashbacks of his Iraq experiences on June 25, 2007 (the

day of his encounter with Officer Martin). He claims to recall nothing from that day

and that he only knows what his mother told him as to what happened. In November

of 2007 he sought treatment for the first time and claims to have been diagnosed with

post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). At the time of trial, he was under medication

for his condition and was still receiving treatment from the Veterans Administration

Hospital in New Orleans, Louisiana.

In rejecting the defendant’s assertions that a mental condition precluded him

from remembering anything on the day of the offense, the trial court noted the

complete lack of medical evidence supporting the defendant’s argument that he

suffered from a mental disease or defect on the day of the offense and concluded that

the defendant’s reliance on flashbacks which first manifested themselves one and

one-half years after his return from Iraq was something that he “could have made up.”

Specifically, the trial court concluded that the defendant failed in his burden of

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establishing that he could not tell right from wrong on June 25, 2007. We find no

error in the trial court’s factual findings on this issue.

As an alternate defense, the defendant asserts that, regardless of his mental

condition, the state failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the “intent” element

required for conviction of possession with intent to distribute. We also find no merit

in this defense.

Intent to distribute can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the

arrest. In State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 735 (La.1992), the Louisiana Supreme

Court explained,

Intent is a condition of mind which is usually proved by evidence
of circumstances from which intent may be inferred. State v. Fuller, 414
So.2d 306 (La.1982); State v. Phillips, 412 So.2d 1061 (La.1982);
La.Rev.Stat. 15:445. In State v. House, 325 So.2d 222 (La.1975), this
court discussed certain factors which are useful in determining whether
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the intent to distribute a
controlled dangerous substance. These factors include (1) whether the
defendant ever distributed or attempted to distribute the drug;
(2) whether the drug was in a form usually associated with possession
for distribution to others; (3) whether the amount of drug created an
inference of an intent to distribute; (4) whether expert or other testimony
established that the amount of drug found in the defendant’s possession
is inconsistent with personal use only; and (5) whether there was any
paraphernalia, such as baggies or scales, evidencing an intent to
distribute.

The defendant argues that none of the factors listed in Hearold were established by

the state in his case.

The record contains no evidence that the defendant distributed or attempted to

distribute the cocaine, or that Officer Martin recovered any paraphernalia which

indicated an intent on the part of the defendant to distribute the cocaine.

Additionally, no expert testified that the seized cocaine was in a form usually

associated with possession with intent to distribute or that the amount was

inconsistent with personal use. In fact, the only evidence at trial concerning the
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seized cocaine and the circumstances surrounding the seizure was that of Officer

Martin.

According to Officer Martin, after he seized the cocaine, he provided the

defendant with his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.

1602 (1966). The defendant did not appear impaired and seemed to understand what

was happening and what was being said. When questioned by Officer Martin the

defendant gave appropriate responses, and at no time did he become combative. In

fact, the only thing the officer found unusual was the defendant’s initial action in

placing something in his crotch as the officer approached the vehicle. Officer Martin

testified that after he had provided the defendant with his Miranda rights, and after

the defendant responded that he understood the rights, the defendant advised him that

the cocaine was his and that his two passengers had nothing to do with it.

The defendant testified at trial that he did not use any illegal narcotics,

including specifically cocaine, and that he was not an addict. In rejecting the defense

that there was no intent to distribute, the trial court stressed this last point—that

because the defendant does not use cocaine, and did not say that he was holding the

cocaine for someone else, one is left only with the conclusion that he intended to

distribute it to others.

Thus, while there is no evidence establishing the presence of the Hearold

factors, the defendant admitted to Officer Martin that the cocaine was his, and he

testified in court that he does not use cocaine himself. In finding no error in the trial

court’s determination that the state established the “intent” element beyond a

reasonable doubt, we are mindful that our jurisprudence has held that the list of

factors in Hearold is not exclusive. Rather, they are useful to the trier of fact and the

supreme court did not suggest that the evidence establishing intent must fall squarely
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within those factors. See State v. Mosley, 08-1318 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/12/09), 13 So.3d

705, writ denied, 09-1316 (La. 3/5/10), 28 So.3d 1002; State v. Cushenberry, 94-1206

(La.App. 4 Cir. 1/31/95), 650 So.2d 783.

ERRORS PATENT

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 920(2) requires that we review

all appeals for errors that are “discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and

proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” After reviewing the record, we

find no such errors.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-
16.3, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.

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