State of Louisiana v. Jeffery Neal Deville

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 11-88

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JEFFERY NEAL DEVILLE

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 300,242
HONORABLE THOMAS MARTIN YEAGER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLY HOWARD EZELL
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED FOR PARTIAL
RESENTENCING AND AMENDMENT TO CORRECT MINUTES.

Willard Trichel Armitage, Jr.
P. O. Box 342
Alexandria, LA 71309-0342
(318) 445-3127
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

James C. Downs
District Attorney – Ninth Judicial District Court
701 Murray Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 473-6650
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Michael Anderson Brewer
1330 Jackson St.
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 443-4006
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Jeffery Neal Deville

EZELL, Judge.

On January 28, 2010, the Defendant, Jeffery Neal DeVille, was charged by bill of

information with two counts of vehicular homicide, violations of La.R.S. 14:32.1. The

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charges on July 20, 2010, and was sentenced to

thirty years at hard labor on each count, the sentences to run concurrently to each other

and consecutively to the sentence he was already serving. The first five years of the

sentences were ordered to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension

of sentence. The Defendant‟s motion to reconsider sentence was denied after a hearing

on October 25, 2010.

The Defendant is now before this court on appeal, asserting that his sentences are

excessive. For the following reasons, we remand this matter back to the trial court for

resentencing of Defendant on each conviction of vehicular homicide due to the illegally

lenient sentences given on those convictions.

FACTS

The facts as established in a written stipulation between the parties reflect that on

September 30, 2009, the Defendant was driving his vehicle southbound on US 167 when

he hit the guardrail and then crossed the median and struck a vehicle head on, killing the

driver, a sixty-year-old woman, and her passenger, a sixty-four-year-old man.

Toxicology reports indicate that at the time of the accident, the Defendant was driving

under the influence of carisoprodol, meprobamate, alprazolam, clonazepam, and cocaine

benzoylecgonine

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In his sole assignment of error, the Defendant argues that his thirty-year

concurrent sentences, ordered to run consecutively to any other sentences, are excessive.

In State v. Brandenburg, 06-1158, p. 28 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07), 949 So.2d 625,

644, writ denied, 07-538, 07-614 (La. 10/26/07), 966 So.2d 571, 573, this court stated:

The trial court has wide discretion in imposing a
sentence, and a sentence imposed within the statutory limits
will not be deemed constitutionally excessive absent a

manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Evans, 97-504 (La.App.
3 Cir. 10/29/97); 702 So.2d 1148, writ denied, 97-2979
(La.4/3/98); 717 So.2d 231. This court, in State v. Dubroc,
99-730, p. 22 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/15/99); 755 So.2d 297, 311,
noted:

The relevant question on review of a
sentence is whether the trial court abused its
broad sentencing discretion and not whether the
sentence imposed may appear harsh or whether
another sentence might be more appropriate.
State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d
957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615,
136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996). To constitute an
excessive sentence, this court must find the
penalty imposed is so grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable penal goals; and,
therefore, it is nothing more than needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial
court is given wide discretion in imposing a
sentence, and a sentence imposed within
statutory limits will not be deemed excessive in
the absence of manifest abuse of discretion.
State v. Pyke, 95-919 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96);
670 So.2d 713.

State v. Boudreaux, 00-1467, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/01), 782 So.2d 1194,
1201, writ denied, 01-1369 (La.3/28/02), 812 So.2d 645 (quoting State v.
Dubroc, 99-730, p. 22 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/15/99), 755 So.2d 297, 311). “As
a general rule, maximum sentences are appropriate in cases involving the
most serious violation of the offense and the worst type of offender.” State
v. Hall, 35,151, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/01), 796 So.2d 164, 169.

Pursuant to La.R.S. 14:32.1(B), the sentencing range for vehicular homicide is five

to thirty years, with or without hard labor, and with at least five years to be served

without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence if previously convicted of

driving while intoxicated. As such, the Defendant received the maximum possible prison

term on each count, but the minimum number of years without benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court, however, did not impose the mandated

fine of $2,000.00 to $15,000.00. Additionally, the Defendant received concurrent

sentences, significantly reducing his total sentence.

At sentencing, the Defendant stated that he was forty-nine years old, divorced with

two girls, ages eighteen and twenty-one, and completed twelfth grade. His mother lived
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next door to him. The Defendant, a contract welder, was between jobs at the time of his

arrest.

Next, the trial court confirmed that the Defendant was previously convicted of

driving while intoxicated in 1988. The Defendant also had prior convictions for

possession of controlled dangerous substances, schedules II, III, and IV, on June 22, 2007,

and he was on probation at the time of the instant offense. The trial court also considered

the stipulation between the parties regarding the facts of the case, specifically the

pharmacology report of Dr. William J. George. In mitigation, the Defendant

stressed he did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious

harm and his criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to reoccur. The

Defendant also asserted that he was likely to respond affirmatively to probationary

treatment and imprisonment would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents.

The Defendant‟s brother, Jerry Deville, testified that they helped out their eighty-

one-year-old mother who depends on them for physical assistance and some financial

assistance. Jerry added that from the time the Defendant was eighteen years old, he had

broken a number of bones, including a leg, both arms, and he sustained a crushed pelvis.

According to Jerry, the Defendant had been on pain medication all of his life. Lastly,

Jerry stated that the Defendant was not on disability, however, and worked to support

himself.

The trial court found that there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

In its reasons for ruling, the trial court stated:

Mr. Deville, when this incident happened, this was not an accident,
you were under the influence when this incident occurred of four different
drugs. One of them, you were twice the therapeutic dose of Carisoprodol
C-a-r-I-s-o-p-r-o-d-o-l. You were twice the therapeutic dose. You weren‟t
under the influence of four, you were under the influence of five at the time
this occurred. That‟s not an accident, sir. When people do that, things
happen. We know when people are drunk and driving down the road and
they run into someone, that‟s not an accident, we know that that‟s going to
happen, sir. So, your -- I hope that you‟ve learned something about what
you‟ve caused -- you caused the death of Ms. Fry, Mr. Tyner, you‟ve heard
from Trevor Fry about his mother, raising him and those three children, so
that they could be better people, and you have taken from her, the joy of
what we would call her golden years. She worked hard to get to where she
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was at sixty, to be able to enjoy the rest of her life. You‟ve taken that from
her because of operating while under the influence of a controlled
dangerous substance, five of them, while you were impaired.

So, based upon the statements -- well, the information that we‟ve
received about your, your biographical information, the factual basis, the
sentencing guidelines, that we‟ve gone over, the fact that you were on
probation for Possession of CDS II, III and IV, and that you have a previous
conviction in 1988 from the Ninth JDC for DWI, and the fact that you were
under the influence of those five drugs at the time of the incident, the
sentence of the Court on each of these counts is that you‟re to serve 30
years at hard labor, with the Louisiana Department of Corrections.

In his motion to reconsider sentence, the Defendant stressed that he voluntarily

entered guilty pleas to the charges, fully accepting responsibility for his conduct.

Considering the facts, circumstances, and mitigating factors, as well as the nature of the

crime, his nature and background, and sentences imposed for similar crimes by the same

court and other courts, the Defendant maintained that his sentences were excessive. The

Defendant then provided a list of seven cases since 1999 involving vehicular homicide in

the Ninth Judicial District Court which he believed demonstrated that his sentences were

more than twice the highest sentence previously imposed during the last ten years.

At the hearing on the Defendant‟s motion to reconsider sentence, the Defendant

introduced certified copies of the minutes from the cases cited in his motion. In response,

the trial court declared that the Defendant‟s list of cases was not exclusive and that there

had been twenty-five cases since 2000. Also, with regard to the cases cited by the

Defendant, the trial court stated that it had no knowledge of the specific facts of the cases

upon which it could refer and compare the instant case. The trial court opined, however,

that the facts in State v. LeBlanc, 09-1355 (La. 7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1168, were similar to

those in the instant case and supported the sentences imposed in the instant case. In

LeBlanc, the supreme court reinstated the defendant‟s thirty-year sentence for vehicular

homicide which was found to be excessive and vacated by this court on appeal in State v.

LeBlanc, 08-1533 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/10/09), 12 So.3d 1125.

In its reasons for sentencing in LeBlanc, the trial court acknowledged that the

defendant was a first-time offender without any prior record, and she was the mother of

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two adolescent boys who depended upon her for guidance and support. The trial court

also found, however, that because of her addiction to drugs, the defendant posed an

undue risk of committing other crimes if given a suspended sentence and placed on

probation. Additionally, the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily

harm to more than one person; killing one person and injuring three other members of the

deceased victim‟s family when she got in a car with a cocktail of drugs in her system,

including, but not limited to, methadone, Xanax, Lortab and was ultimately chased down

by the police. She had also been using cocaine heavily for a few days prior to the

accident, and cocaine and marijuana were found in her car. As such, the trial court

concluded that the defendant‟s actions showed a reckless disregard for her own life and

of the lives of others. The trial court limited the defendant‟s parole eligibility for three

years, the mandatory minimum term.

In vacating the defendant‟s penalty, this court opined that the defendant was not

one of the worst offenders because her involvement in drugs had begun only in the early

2000s after she suffered her own injuries in either a fall from steps or in a car accident.

This court also found that “the trial court did not appear to consider Defendant‟s health

problems and continuing substance abuse as mitigating factors but rather ignored the

cause of her substance abuse and her attempts to get help for the problem.” LeBlanc, 12

So.3d at 1134. This court then concluded that “[i]n cases where the offenders were guilty

of driving intoxicated and causing accidents in which deaths resulted, and who were

either first-time felony offenders or whose criminal history was minor, the sentences

tended to be only one-half to three-quarters of the maximum sentences.” Id.

On writs, the supreme court referred to Judge Amy‟s dissenting opinion on appeal

wherein he noted that the defendant was under the influence of illegal controlled

substances as well as prescription drugs at the time of the offense, leading him to

“„differentiate the criminal aspect of the defendant‟s behavior from cases wherein the

maximum sentence was found inappropriate for vehicular homicide defendants with

elevated blood alcohol levels.‟” LeBlanc, 41 So.3d at 1172 (quoting LeBlanc, 12 So.3d
5

at 1135). In light of the trial court‟s consideration of the defendant‟s flight from the

scene and subsequent police pursuit, demonstrating a reckless disregard for life, Judge

Amy found no abuse of discretion in the trial court‟s imposition of the maximum, hard

labor sentence.

The supreme court then addressed the legislature‟s continuing reassessment of

vehicular homicide and its reasons for upholding the maximum sentence:

When the legislature first enacted the crime of vehicular homicide, 1983 La.
Acts 635, the penalty it provided, a maximum of five years imprisonment,
with or without hard labor, made the offense the equivalent of negligent
homicide, a crime long punished by the same maximum sentence. La. R.S.
14:32. Within that range, maximum sentences of five years imprisonment
were not uncommon for vehicular homicide, whether charged under La. R.S.
14:32 or La. R.S. 14:32.1. See, e.g., State v. Pelt, 448 So.2d 1294 (La.1984);
State v. Daranda, 398 So.2d 1053 (La.1981); State v. Wilcoxon, 26,126
(La.App. 2nd Cir.6/22/94), 639 So.2d 385, writ denied, 94-1961
(La.12/16/94), 648 So.2d 386; State v. Wry, 591 So.2d 774 (La.App. 2nd
Cir.1991); State v. Yates, 574 So.2d 566 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1991), writ
denied, 578 So.2d 131 (La.1991); State v. Rock, 571 So.2d 908 (La.App. 5th
Cir.1990), writ denied, 577 So.2d 49 (La.1991); State v. Williams, 546
So.2d 494 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), writ denied, 553 So.2d 470 (La.1989).

Over the years, the legislature has steadily increased punishment for
the crime, raising the maximum sentence to 15 years imprisonment in 1989
La. Acts 584, then to 20 years imprisonment, with or without hard labor, in
1999 La. Acts 1103, and thereafter, to its present maximum of 30 years
imprisonment with or without hard labor. 2004 La. Acts 750. The
legislature has since increased the mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment from two to five years and increased the minimum term of
parole disability from one to three years. 2006 La. Acts 294. The changes
reflect the growing awareness in this state and elsewhere of the carnage
caused by intoxicated drivers on the open road. Cf. Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412
(1990)(“No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving
problem or the States‟ interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-
related death and mutilation on the Nation‟s roads are legion.”).

The broader sentencing ranges provided for the offense over the
years have provided trial courts with increased opportunities to exercise
their discretion in individualizing punishment to the particular defendant
and the particular circumstances of the case, within the general parameter,
as recognized in the present case by both the trial court and court of appeal,
that sentences at or near the maximum should ordinarily apply only to the
most blameworthy offenders committing the most serious violations of the
described offense. While comparisons with other similar cases “is useful in
itself and sets the stage,” [State v.] Telsee, 425 So.2d [1251 (La.1983)] at
1254, the focus of sentence review remains on the character and
propensities of the offender and the circumstances of the offense. Id.

6

We agree with Judge Amy that because the circumstances of the
present case so clearly demonstrate why the legislature has steadily
increased punishment for the crime of vehicular homicide, the decision of
where to place defendant‟s conduct on that broad sentencing continuum fell
within the discretion of the trial court. It clearly appears from the record of
sentencing that in determining the length of sentence, the trial court took
into account the possibilities for early release on parole. The court
specifically noted that because La. R.S. 14:32.1 requires that the offender
serve at least three years imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence, defendant would not be eligible for intensive
incarceration and intensive parole supervision as a matter of R.S.
15:574.4.1. However, by imposing only the mandatory minimum three-
year term of parole disability, although La. R.S. 14:32.1 permits a court to
deny parole eligibility altogether, the court made possible for defendant to
secure release on parole after serving one-third of her term, or 10 years at
hard labor. R.S. 15:574.4(A). She also remains eligible to earn early
release (as if on parole) on good time credits after serving 15 years of her
sentence. La. R.S. 15:571.3(B)(1). The presentence report underscored
these opportunities when, after recommending a maximum sentence, it
reminded the court that “with the possibility of parole release, and
guaranteed Good Time Release, the maximum thirty (30) year sentence is
actually a fifteen (15) year sentence at best.”

The availability of early release options is generally a relevant
consideration in review of sentences for excessiveness. State v. Green, 418
So.2d 609, 616 (La.1982); cf. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct.
2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (“A variety of flexible techniques--
probation, parole, work furloughs, to name a few--and various
postconviction remedies may be available to modify an initial sentence of
confinement in noncapital cases.”). In the present case the availability of
early release appears central to a determination that defendant‟s sentence
appropriately serves the sentencing goals of deterrence, retribution and
rehabilitation. Cf. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179,
1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (“A sentence can have a variety of
justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or
rehabilitation.”) (citation omitted). Defendant‟s sentence will require her to
serve a substantial term of imprisonment at hard labor commensurate with
the seriousness of her crime which resulted in the death of another human
being. In this respect, the trial court did not err in declining to consider
defendant‟s drug addiction as a circumstance militating for a lesser term of
imprisonment because it encompassed not only the legal drugs prescribed to
her by Dr. Khorsandi, which she clearly abused, but also the illegal
controlled substances she had acquired from other sources and also abused
during her self-confessed days-long cocaine binge before she plowed into
the Hardy family vehicle. By defendant‟s own admission during the
presentence investigation, her longstanding abuse of legal and illegal drugs
had been punctuated by only a few, half-hearted attempts to receive
treatment. Nor did defendant‟s guilty pleas to vehicular homicide and
negligent vehicular injuring necessarily reflect an acknowledgment of the
direct correlation between her drug abuse and the death of Mrs. Hardy or
recognition of her own moral culpability. Defendant reaped considerable
benefit from her plea bargain with the state, which reduced her sentencing
exposure by nearly 20 years, and it was scarcely a reassuring sign of her
potential for rehabilitation that in speaking to the probation officer after she
entered her guilty pleas defendant attributed the fatal accident not to the
7

“cocktail” of drugs in her system but to a fight with her cocaine dealer who
believed defendant had stolen some of her possessions.

At the same time, defendant‟s sentence also affords her incentives for
rehabilitation within the prison system to take advantage of early release on
parole. Even then, she will remain subject to continuing state supervision
for the unexpired term of her sentence, La. R.S. 15:574.6, as a means of
minimizing the risk that she may resume her abuse of legal and illegal drugs
and once more pose a serious threat to social order. Given the existence of
ameliorative alternatives and the extreme circumstances surrounding
commission of the crime, we cannot agree with the court of appeal majority
that the sentence imposed by the trial court, although the maximum penalty
for the offense, “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and
suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”
State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La.1993) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).

Id. at 1173-75.

In the instant case, the Defendant correctly asserts that he will be required to serve

at least half of his thirty-year sentence due to his prior felony conviction, five more years

than the defendant in LeBlanc. La.R.S. 15:574.4(A)(1). However, as in LeBlanc, the

trial court imposed only the mandatory minimum five-year term of parole disability,

allowing for the possibility of release on parole after serving one-half of his term or

fifteen years. La.R.S. 15:574.4(A). As such, in light of LeBlanc, we find that the trial

court did not err in refusing to consider in mitigation the Defendant‟s substance abuse.

The Defendant will be required to serve a substantial prison term commensurate with the

seriousness of the offense, which resulted in the death of two people. Also considering

the reduction in total sentencing exposure as the result of concurrent sentences and the

Defendant‟s prior criminal history of illegal drug possession, we find that the

Defendant‟s sentences are not excessive.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors

patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there is an error

patent concerning the Defendant‟s sentences.

The Defendant‟s sentences for vehicular homicide are illegally lenient. This court

may recognize an illegally lenient sentence on its own. La.Code Crim.P. Art. 882
8

First, the trial court failed to impose a mandatory fine. The sentencing provision

for vehicular homicide, La.R.S. 14:32.1(B), that was in effect when the offense was

committed requires the imposition of a fine of not less than $2,000.00 nor more than

$15,000.00, which was not imposed in this case. This court has recognized the trial

court‟s failure to impose a mandatory fine as an error patent and has remanded the cases

for rehearing. State v. Major, 03-249 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 898 So.2d 548, writ denied,

05-1716 (La. 2/10/06), 924 So.2d 161; State v. Davis, 05-1629 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/06),

929 So.2d 841.

Additionally, the sentencing provision also requires the court to order participation

in a court-approved substance abuse program, which was not imposed in this case. This

court has also recognized that the trial court‟s failure to order a defendant to participate in

a court-approved substance abuse program rendered the sentence illegally lenient. State

v. Kotrla, 08-364 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 1224.

Since the trial court is given discretion in assessing the amount of the fine imposed

under La.R.S. 14:32.1, we remand this case for resentencing and the ordering of the

Defendant to participate in a court-approved substance abuse program as outlined in this

opinion. See State v. Norris, 36,614 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/29/03), 837 So.2d 723, writ denied,

03-982 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 518.

Next, the minutes of sentencing are in need of correction. The sentencing

transcript indicates the court imposed a sentence of thirty years at hard labor with the first

five years to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on

each count to run concurrently with each other and consecutive to any other sentence the

Defendant is presently serving. The sentencing minutes do not accurately reflect the

sentence imposed by the trial court:

Court sentenced accused for HOMICIDE, VEHICULAR. HOMICIDE,
VEHICULAR. Court sentenced accused to be committed to the Louisiana
Department of Corrections. Accused to serve 030 Year(s). Sentence is to
be served at Hard Labor. Sentence is to run concurrent. . . . The first five
years are to be without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of
sentence. . . . Sentence is to run consecutively with any other sentence
presently serving.
9

“[I]t is well settled that when the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript

prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369,

writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Thus, the trial court is instructed to

amend the minutes of sentencing to correctly reflect the sentences imposed by the trial

court.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED FOR PARTIAL
RESENTENCING AND AMENDMENT TO CORRECT MINUTES.

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