State of Louisiana v. John D. Skinner

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-704

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JOHN D. SKINNER

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 80337
HONORABLE VERNON B. CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Marc T. Amy, and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Asa A. Skinner
District Attorney
Post Office Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71496-1188
(337) 239-2008
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Terry W. Lambright
Attorney at Law
118 S. Third Street, Suite A
Leesville, LA 71446
(337) 239-6557
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
John D. Skinner

AMY, Judge.

After failing to appear for a hearing in an unrelated case, the defendant was

charged with jumping bail, a violation of La.R.S. 14:110.1. As part of a plea

agreement with the State, the defendant pled guilty to jumping bail and, in a

separate case, theft over $500.1 The trial court sentenced the defendant to two

years at hard labor, to run concurrently with the sentence for his theft over $500

charge. Additionally, the trial court imposed restitution in the amount of

$4,898.90. The defendant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

According to the record, the defendant was arrested and charged with theft

over $500. Minutes from the theft case indicate that the defendant failed to appear

at two hearings. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to one

count of jumping bail and, in a separate docket number, one count of theft over

$500, a violation of La.R.S. 14:67. As part of the plea agreement, the State

dropped several other pending charges against the defendant, including charges of

principal to theft, theft of firearms, and another count of jumping bail. The State

also agreed to recommend that the defendant’s sentence on the jumping bail charge

run concurrently with his sentence on the theft charge, and agreed not to institute

habitual offender proceedings.

For the jumping bail charge, the trial court sentenced the defendant to two

years at hard labor, to run concurrently with his sentence in the theft case. The

trial court also imposed restitution in the amount of $4,898.90. The defendant

subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied

without reasons.

1
The defendant has also appealed his sentence for the theft over $500 charge. See State
of Louisiana v. John D. Skinner, 11-703 (La.App. 3 Cir. _/_/12), __ So.3d __.

The defendant appeals, asserting as his sole assignment of error that “[t]he

Trial Court erred in that the sentences imposed [ … ] are constitutionally excessive

and imposed without sufficient consideration of Art. 894.1.”

Discussion

Errors Patent

Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors

patent. An error patent is “[a]n error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of

the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La.Code

Crim.P. art. 920(2). After reviewing the record, we find no errors patent.

Excessiveness of Sentence

The defendant contends, in his sole assignment of error, that the trial court

failed to consider the sentencing factors contained in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1

and that his sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.

First, we turn to the defendant’s contention that the trial court failed to

adequately consider the sentencing factors delineated in La.Code Crim.P. art.

894.1. The record must indicate that the trial court adequately considered the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances in particularizing a defendant’s sentence,

but there is no requirement that the trial court list all of Article 894.1’s sentencing

factors. State v. Jones, 09-751 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 29 So.3d 689, writ denied,

10-659 (La. 3/25/11), 61 So.3d 655. Further, Article 894.1(C) requires that the

trial court state on the record the factors taken into account and the factual basis for

the sentence imposed.

A review of the record indicates that the trial court was privy to a pre-

sentence report. Further, the trial court specifically noted that it considered the

factors of Article 894.1, including the defendant’s age, family history, education,

employment history, history of drug and alcohol problems, and participation in a
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drug treatment program. The trial court additionally noted that there was economic

harm to the victim2 and that the defendant had at least two prior felony convictions

and four misdemeanor convictions. As a result of his plea agreement, the

defendant’s sentencing exposure was substantially reduced, as the State dropped

three other pending cases, recommended that the defendant’s sentences run

concurrently, and agreed not to seek the defendant’s adjudication as a habitual

offender. Given these considerations and the trial court’s specific reference to the

factors it considered applicable in this case, we find the record supports a finding

that the trial court adequately considered Article 894.1.

Accordingly, we next examine the defendant’s assertion that the sentence

imposed for jumping bail is unconstitutionally excessive. The trial court imposed a

sentence of two years at hard labor, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed

in the defendant’s theft case. The trial court also imposed restitution in the amount

of $4,898.90, as ordered in the defendant’s theft case.3 See La.Code Crim.P. art.

883.2.

A panel of this court reiterated the law applicable to excessive sentence

claims in State v. Planco, 96-812, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/26/97), 692 So.2d 666,

670-71, stating:

Article 1, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, prohibits “cruel,
excessive, or unusual punishment,” and a sentence which falls within
the statutory limits may nevertheless be excessive under the
circumstances. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979); State v.
Naquin, 527 So.2d 601 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988). If a reviewing court
2
In this regard, the district attorney stated at the defendant’s plea hearing that “the State
would dismiss bill of information 79,520 and 521, however Mr. Skinner acknowledges these
charges for the purpose of restitution. It is my understanding, Your Honor, that the total
restitution amount was four thousand eight hundred ninety-eight dollars and ninety cents. Also,
my understanding that the co-defendant, who’s paid part of that, and insurance he’s paid part of
it [sic], so if there is any restitution, he’s acknowledging it for that purpose.” At the same
hearing, when questioned by the trial court, the defendant agreed that the State’s recitation of the
plea agreement was the agreement he had with the State.
3
In his theft case, in addition to restitution, the defendant was sentenced to seven years at
hard labor and a fine of $1,500.00.
3

finds that a penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is
nothing more than needless imposition of pain and suffering then that
sentence is excessive. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981);
State v. Everett, 530 So.2d 615 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988), writ denied,
536 So.2d 1233 (La.1989).

....

However, the trial court is given wide discretion in imposing a
sentence, and a sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not
be deemed excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion.
State v. Howard, 414 So.2d 1210 (La.1982).

The defendant was charged with jumping bail, a violation of La.R.S.

14:110.1. The applicable penalty for this charge is contained within La.R.S.

14:110.1(C), which states “[w]hoever commits the crime of jumping bail when the

bail is to assure the presence of the defendant for those cases defined as felonies in

this Title and in the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law shall be

imprisoned at hard labor for not more than two years.” Therefore, the defendant

received the maximum sentence.

A review of comparable cases indicates that in State v. Cruz, 438 So.2d 1251

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1983), a panel of this court upheld a one-year sentence for jumping

bail. Therein, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to attempted

aggravated battery and jumping bail. For the attempted aggravated battery charge,

the defendant was sentenced to three years, and for the jumping bail charge, the

defendant was sentenced to one year, to run consecutively with his sentence for

attempted aggravated battery. In reviewing the defendant’s sentence, the appellate

court noted that, although the defendant was married and had two young children,

he was a second felony offender, had an extensive out-of-state criminal history,

and had a history of drug use.

4

The record here indicates that, although the defendant pled guilty to only one

count of jumping bail, he failed to appear at two scheduled court appearances, one

on May 10, 2010 and one on May 18, 2010. Further, the defendant has several

misdemeanor convictions, as well as prior felony convictions for simple burglary

and two counts of theft, aggravated burglary, and attempted second degree battery.

As previously discussed, the defendant’s sentencing exposure was substantially

reduced as part of his plea agreement. Further, his sentence in this case is to run

concurrently with the sentence imposed in his theft case. Accordingly, we find that

an adequate basis for this sentence exists in the record. The defendant’s sentence

for jumping bail, a violation of La.R.S. 14:110.1, is not unconstitutionally

excessive.

The defendant’s assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

The defendant’s sentence for jumping bail, a violation of La.R.S. 14:110.1,

is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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