State of Louisiana v. Gary Wayne Woods

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-799

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

GARY WAYNE WOODS

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 300,156
HONORABLE THOMAS YEAGER, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Billy Howard Ezell, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

Genovese, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

CONVICTION REVERSED AND SENTENCE VACATED.

James C. Downs
District Attorney
John T. Giordano
Assistant District Attorney
Ninth Judicial District Court
P.O. Drawer 1472
Alexandria, LA 71309
(318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Gary Wayne Woods

Gary Wayne Woods
IN PROPER PERSON
Rapides Parish Detention Center-1
P.O. Box 1551
Alexandria, LA 71309

DECUIR, Judge.

Defendant, Gary Wayne Woods, was charged by bill of information with

possession of stolen goods having a value greater than $500.00. Defendant was

found guilty as charged and was sentenced to serve five years at hard labor. He is

now before this court asserting three assignments of error. He contends the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court erred in allowing

the State to refresh a witness’s memory with evidence not provided to defense

counsel during discovery, and his sentence is excessive.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
& PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends there was insufficient

evidence to find him guilty of possession of stolen goods valued at over $500.00.

In order to sustain the Defendant’s conviction, the State had to prove: “(1) the

defendant had the intent to possess, procure, receive, or conceal; (2) a thing of

value; (3) which has been the subject of a robbery or theft; and, (4) under

circumstances which indicate the offender knew or had good reason to believe that

the thing was stolen.” State v. Gordy, 07-1032, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/12/08), 981

So.2d 45, 47.

Jimmy Deramus, the owner of Silver Dollar Pawn Shop and Jimmy

Deramus Properties, testified that he was contacted by police in August 2009 and

was told they were investigating an employee of his, Daniel Gonzales, who had

possibly been stealing from him. Gonzales worked for Deramus in 2009 at both

businesses and at Deramus’s home. Deramus subsequently identified two

computers that were stolen from his home and two camcorders which had been

taken from the pawn shop.

Investigating officers testified that Daniel Gonzales admitted stealing from

Deramus. Gonzales was arrested, and he implicated Defendant as one of the

persons in possession of the stolen items. Defendant was located and gave a

statement to police, freely admitting he had the items at issue herein. Defendant’s

home was searched and a Dell computer, a Hewlett Packard computer, a

Panaramic digital camcorder, and a Mitsubishi camcorder were found under the

Defendant’s bed. He stated to police that he purchased all four items on the street

for $35.00, but he thought the items were worth over $4,000.00. When asked

whether he thought the items had been stolen, Defendant replied: “That’s the first

thing crossed my mind you know, I – I live on that street. I knew anytime

somebody come to me like that with something for a little price like it’s a

possibility they are stolen. . . . But it could - could have been out of his house you

know.”

The two computers and camcorders were returned to Deramus by police.

Deramus testified that he still owned the Dell laptop, which he identified in court

and which he had purchased for $365.00. It was not for sale in the pawn shop but

was being used by a family member. The serial number on the HP computer had

been scratched out, so it was sold for parts. He testified that it originally cost

$195.00. Deramus further testified that police returned a Mitsubishi camcorder

that cost $80.00 and a Panaramic digital camcorder that also cost $80.00 but had

been sold for $399.00 and was on layaway at the time of the theft. The other had a

retail price of $360.00. Deramus’s testimony was corroborated by his daughter,

Tammy Deramus Credeur, who managed the pawn shop.

In this appeal, Defendant asks this court to consider the conflicting

testimony regarding the working condition of the computers, the fact that the HP

computer and the camcorders were not presented at trial, and the inconsistent

testimony regarding the physical characteristics of the computers. While there

may have been some variation in the witnesses’ descriptions of the stolen items,

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these discrepancies are irrelevant. Defendant admitted his purchase and possession

of the items, they were recovered in his home, and they were directly linked to the

victim’s business records. Our review of the record shows the State proved the

items at issue were possessed by the Defendant, they had a value greater than

$500.00, and they were stolen from Deramus’s home and pawn shop. The only

issue in this case is whether the Defendant knew or had good reason to believe the

items were stolen.

Defendant argues on appeal that although he got a great deal when he

purchased the items at issue, there is no indication that he knew the items were

stolen. Defendant states that he did not know Gonzales, who was unavailable at

trial, and had no way of knowing why he chose to sell the computers and

camcorders. While it is true that the items were found by police under Defendant’s

bed, there is no evidence that Defendant actively tried to hide the items. In fact, he

willingly allowed the investigating officers into his home where he told them the

items were stored. Defendant contends the State failed to prove he knew or should

have known the items were stolen.

In support of his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction, appellate counsel cites the following from State v. Chester, 97-1001,

pp. 2-3 (La. 12/19/97), 707 So.2d 973, 974:

In Louisiana, the “mere possession of stolen property does not
create a presumption that the person in possession of the property
received it with knowledge that it was stolen by someone else.” State
v. Ennis, 414 So.2d 661, 662 (La.1982); State v. Nguyen, 367 So.2d
342, 344 (La.1979); State v. Walker, 350 So.2d 176, 178 (La.1977).
The state must therefore prove the defendant’s guilty knowledge as it
must every other essential element of the offense. Ennis, 414 So.2d at
662. Nevertheless, jurors may infer the defendant’s guilty knowledge
from the circumstances of the offense. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 2362, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973.)

In the present case, the State presented no evidence of the circumstances

under which Defendant came into possession of the stolen goods. The State
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proved only that Defendant purchased the goods “on the street.” The State also

presented no direct or circumstantial evidence associating Defendant with

Gonzales or with the theft admittedly committed by Gonzales.

In State v. Ennis, 414 So.2d 661 (La.1982), the supreme court held that an

unusually low price may give a person reason to suspect that items were the

subject of a theft, but mere suspicion, not rising to the level of certainty required to

form a belief is not enough to prove a defendant knew or had reason to know the

property had been stolen. The court stated:

In State v. Walker, 350 So.2d 176 (La.1977), this court held that
“* * * R.S. 14:69 does not create any presumptions and the State must
prove that the accused actually knew or had good reason to believe
that the property had been stolen before a conviction under La., R.S.
14:69 can be obtained.” We have also held that mere possession of
stolen property does not create a presumption that the person in
possession of the property received it with knowledge that it was
stolen by someone else. State v. Nguyen, 367 So.2d 342 (La.1979);
State v. Walker, supra, at 178.

....

However, in order to obtain a conviction of receiving stolen things,
the state must prove that the defendant knew or had good reason to
believe the thing to be stolen. Mere suspicion, not rising to the level
of certainty required to form a belief, is not enough. See, W. LaFave
and A. Scott, Criminal Law, § 93, at 685, 686 (1972).

Id. at 662-63.

By contrast, in State v. St. Romain, 505 So.2d 223 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ

denied, 508 So.2d 86 (La.1987), this court had evidence of the circumstances

under which the defendant came into possession of the stolen goods. We discussed

the pivotal question of whether the defendant knew or had reason to believe a

motor had been stolen:

In the present case, the defendant was a commercial fisherman
and had been a fisherman, by his own testimony, for 41 years. The
defendant had a boat and trailer which he knew had only minimal
value. In fact, he testified that he had paid Mr. Weil $200.00 for the
boat and trailer earlier, but that the bill of sale stated the price as being
$50.00. Defendant also testified that he knew that Mr. Weil, his co-
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defendant, had an old green 40 horsepower motor. Yet the defendant
asked no questions of Mr. Weil when the latter came over with the
relatively new blue Mariner motor. Weil and the defendant then
drove from Marksville to Lafayette where they sold this motor, along
with the defendant’s relatively valueless boat and trailer, for
$1,000.00, of which defendant received one-half. As in [State v.]
Honeycutt, [438 So.2d 1303 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 434 So.2d
585 (La.1983),] facts known to the defendant at the time of the
transaction are such that he had good reason to believe that the motor
had been stolen. There is no reasonable hypothesis of the defendant’s
innocence which negates a finding that the defendant had good reason
to believe that the motor had been stolen.

Id. at 226.

The evidence presented by the State did not link Defendant to the theft of the

items at issue. There was no evidence regarding the circumstances of how

Defendant came into possession of the items other than his statement that he

purchased them for $35.00. The evidence presented to the jury consisted of the

following details: Defendant bought the items on the street, Defendant’s statement

that it crossed his mind that the items may have been stolen, a disproportionately

small sale price, and the fact that the items were found under Defendant’s bed.

Based on the evidence presented to the jury, we find the evidence is

insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS TWO AND THREE:

Defendant’s assignments of error concerning evidentiary matters and an

allegedly excessive sentence are rendered moot by our decision on the issue of

insufficiency of the evidence.

DECREE

The Defendant’s conviction and sentence are hereby reversed, vacated, and

set aside.

CONVICTION REVERSED AND SENTENCE VACATED.

5

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-799

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

GARY WAYNE WOODS

GENOVESE, J., dissents and assigns the following reasons.

In this case, the majority reverses a jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of

possession of stolen goods valued at over $500.00. In reversing the jury verdict,

the majority opines that “the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s

conviction.” I disagree.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, a reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each
of the essential elements of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v.
Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984). Additionally, where
circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, the
evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence,
“assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove.”
La. R.S. 15:438; see State v. Neal, [00-674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01)], 796
So.2d 649, 657, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152
L.Ed.2d 231 (2002). The statutory requirement of La.R.S. 15:438
“works with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency test to evaluate
whether all evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury.” Neal, [796 So.2d
at 657].

State v. Draughn, 05-1825, p. 7 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 592, cert. denied,

552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537 (2007).

In accordance with the Jackson standard of review, we are bound to consider

the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. By his own statement

and admission, when questioned by police, Defendant stated: “That’s the first

thing crossed my mind . . . I live on that street. I knew anytime somebody come to

me like that with something for a little price like it’s a possibility they are

stolen. . . .” In his statement to the police, Defendant admitted that he had

possession of the items at issue, that he purchased all four items on the street for

$35.00, and that he knew the items were worth over $4,000.00. In a light most

favorable to the prosecution, there was more than ample evidence presented to the

jury showing that Defendant knew or had good reason to believe that these items

were stolen.

Consequently, I would affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence in all

respects.