State of Louisiana v. K.W. T.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-839
consolidated with 11-1374

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

K.W.T.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 34729-09
HONORABLE ROBERT L. WYATT, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of J. David Painter, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John F. DeRosier
District Attorney
Carla S. Sigler
Karen C. McLellan
Assistant District Attorneys
1020 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 437-3400
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Peggy J. Sullivan
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 2806
Monroe, Louisiana 71207
(318) 387-6124
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
K.W.T.

K.W.T.
In Proper Person
Raven 1- Right- Camp- D
Louisiana State Prison
Angola, Louisiana 70712
Defendant

KEATY, Judge.

Defendant, K.W.T.,1 was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated

incest and one count of forcible rape. The State then filed a habitual offender bill,

and after a hearing, Defendant was adjudicated a third felony offender. He was

sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension

of sentence for each of his three convictions. Defendant now appeals his

convictions and his sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 12, 2009, the Calcasieu Parish Grand Jury indicted Defendant,

K.W.T., with two counts of aggravated incest and with one count of forcible rape

under docket number 34729-09. Defendant pled not guilty at his December 7,

2009 arraignment.

Defendant filed a motion to cross-examine L.J., the victim in the instant case,

about prior accusations she had made of sexual misconduct. Following a hearing,

the trial court granted the State’s counter-motion to preclude the defense from

using L.J.’s prior accusations at trial. Defendant later filed a motion seeking to bar

his sister, R.T., from testifying at trial and to gain permission to ask L.J. about her

prior sexual history. After a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion.

A three-day jury trial began on October 14, 2010, after which Defendant was

found guilty as charged. Polling of the jury revealed a unanimous verdict. The

State then filed a habitual offender bill under a separate docket number, 34489-10,

asserting that Defendant was a third felony offender. At the conclusion of the

habitual offender hearing, the trial court adjudicated Defendant a third felony

offender. Defendant was sentenced to serve life imprisonment without benefit of

1
In accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844(W), we use the initials of the parties, where
necessary, to protect the identity of the victim.

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for each of his three convictions. In

appellate docket number 11-839, Defendant asserts the following errors: 1) the

trial court violated his constitutional due process and confrontation rights by

prohibiting him from introducing (a) evidence of prior accusations of sexual

misconduct made by the victim in this matter and (b) evidence the victim was not a

virgin prior to the alleged events; 2) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient

to support the convictions of two counts of aggravated incest and one count of

forcible rape; 3) the trial court erred in denying eight challenges for cause during

voir dire; 4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial made after the

State elicited testimony which had been excluded by the trial court’s ruling on a

motion in limine; 5) his sentences of life without benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence were excessive under the circumstances. In appellate

docket number 11-1374, Defendant asserts that his sentences of life without benefit

of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence were excessive under the

circumstances. Upon motion of counsel, this court consolidated Defendant’s

appeals for disposition purposes.

DISCUSSION

I. Trial Testimony

The victim, L.J., testified that she grew up living with her mother, A.J. She

did not see her father, Defendant, much during that time as he only visited about

once every two years. When she was sixteen, L.J. saw her father while she was

working at a fast food restaurant. She was glad to see Defendant, and, thereafter,

Defendant visited her at home a few times and took her out to eat. L.J. believed

Defendant when he told her that he had changed, and she wanted to experience a

father-daughter relationship with him like her friends had with their fathers.

2

L.J. recalled that in 2008, when she was still sixteen years old, she stayed

with Defendant during her Christmas break. Defendant lived in a two-bedroom

house with his mother and L.J.’s two half-brothers, A.T. and D.T.2 During their

December 2008 visit, Defendant told her that he wanted to be her best friend and

lover. He complimented her often, telling her that she was fine, that she looked

good, and that he had a sexy daughter. Defendant also told her details about his

sex life. L.J. informed Defendant that she did not find him attractive because she

saw him as her father. Although those conversations made her uncomfortable

around Defendant, she initially did not tell anyone about them.

L.J. stated that Defendant also touched her many times in ways that made

her uncomfortable. The first time happened when she was sleeping. When she

awoke, Defendant told her he needed to tell her something, and he made her agree

to keep what he was going to say between them. Defendant then told her he had

been inside of her the night before. She had not felt anything and thought

Defendant might have been joking because he had been drinking beer.

L.J. related that the next incident occurred late one night while she was in

Defendant’s room watching television with her half-brother, D.T. She was lying

on the bed on her stomach when Defendant entered the room. Defendant got on

her back and forced himself into her, stating, ―It’s just gonna be for a little while.‖

L.J. was wearing a long shirt and some shorts, and Defendant pulled her shorts to

the side before inserting his penis into her. L.J. knew it was his penis because he

had his hands next to hers. L.J. tried to push Defendant away, but she was

unsuccessful. D.T. tried to see what was going on, but Defendant made him turn

his head. After Defendant ejaculated inside of her, he left the room. When she
2
Both A.T. and D.T. were deceased at the time of trial. A.T. died on December 23, 2008,
after having been severely burned in a kitchen fire at Defendant’s house; he was eighteen at the
time. D.T. died at the age of four at some point after the events at issue, but L.J. could not recall
precisely when his death had occurred.
3

heard Defendant leave the house, she then went to the bathroom and cried like she

had done every time he sexually abused her. L.J. testified that it hurt, and she felt

disgusted. L.J. reported that the next incident happened in nearly the same manner

as the second. She was lying down with D.T. and trying to put him to sleep when

Defendant crawled on top of her, removed her shorts, and pushed his penis inside

of her.

L.J. stated that on several other occasions, Defendant touched her private

parts with his hands and his mouth. The incidents of sexual contact always

occurred in Defendant’s bedroom, and he always threatened that ―something‖

would happen to her if she ever told anyone. L.J. maintained that Defendant never

used a condom during his sexual activities with her. She stated that she asked

Defendant if he wanted her to be pregnant, and he responded in the affirmative,

saying that he wanted to create a bond with her that would not be broken even if

they fought and never saw one another again.

At the end of December 2008 or in January 2009, L.J.’s uncle, T.W., asked

her if Defendant had ever touched her. Because of Defendant’s threats, she

initially denied that her father had been abusing her, but, after some prodding, she

told T.W. that Defendant had been raping her since she began staying with him

that Christmas. L.J. did not want T.W. to tell anyone because she feared what

would happen if Defendant found out.

T.W. was Defendant’s half-brother. He testified that A.J. asked him to allow

L.J. to spend time with his family since it included a mother and a father. L.J.

spent time at both T.W.’s house and Defendant’s house in December 2008. From

what T.W. initially observed, the relationship between L.J. and Defendant seemed

fine. Defendant appeared to be acting as a father figure to his children. T.W.

recalled that when he picked up L.J. from Defendant’s house around 1:30 or 2:00
4

a.m. on January 23, 2009, ―she smelled like she was having sex.‖ Because

Defendant was the only person she had been around, T.W. asked L.J. if her father

had touched her. He asked her three times before she responded that her father had

not been touching her, but she asked T.W. to check on Defendant because he had

been cutting himself. T.W. visited Defendant and saw that he had self-inflicted cut

marks on his arm. After questioning L.J. again the next night and receiving no

response, T.W. apologized and told L.J. that he would not ask her anymore

questions. At that point, L.J. told him that Defendant had been having sex with her.

L.J. made him promise not to tell anyone, but T.W. told his wife because they had

a teenage daughter. Two days later, T.W. told A.J. that L.J. had confided that

Defendant was having a sexual relationship with her. T.W. denied that he and L.J.

made up the allegations against Defendant. He further denied that the accusations

were motivated by a desire to ―get at‖ Defendant.3

A.J., L.J.’s mother, testified that L.J. was distraught when she found out that

A.J. had been told what Defendant had done to her. She explained that L.J. was

scared and crying and that she refused to leave her room. A.J. contacted her

minister, Corporal Louis Guy, who also worked in law enforcement. Corporal Guy

referred her to Detective Mike Primeaux. A.J. denied colluding with T.W. to bring

false charges against Defendant.

Corporal Guy, a school resource officer with the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s

Office, testified that he knew A.J. and L.J. because they all attended the same

church.4 When A.J. first mentioned the allegations against Defendant, Corporal

3
Although not addressed in detail, the testimony revealed that Defendant and T.W.’s wife
had engaged in a sexual relationship in the past.
4
Corporal Guy stated that he was also a minister, but he was not employed as such at the
time of trial.
5

Guy informed her that he had to report it. Corporal Guy then reported the matter to

Lieutenant Elizabeth Zaunbrecher, who ran the Sex Crimes Unit.

Detective Mike Primeaux was assigned to the Sex Crimes Unit of the

Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office. He testified that after being notified of the

matter, he and his trainee, Detective Allison Rosteet, met Corporal Guy at L.J.’s

home. When he attempted to speak with L.J., she was very emotional, so

Detective Primeaux asked if she would be more comfortable discussing the matter

with a female officer. Detective Rosteet then interviewed L.J. in private.

Detective Primeaux arranged for L.J. to be interviewed by the Child Advocacy

Center and examined by a doctor. He stated that he had reviewed the various

statements given by L.J. in this matter and found that ―she was very consistent in

her story.‖

Dr. Scott Bergstedt was accepted as an expert in the field of forensic

examination of child sexual abuse victims. When Dr. Bergstedt examined her on

April 24, 2009, L.J. related that Defendant, her biological father, had sexual

relations with her when she was sixteen in 2008 until the early part of January

2009. L.J. reported that, about once a week, Defendant performed oral sex on her

and touched her vaginal area with his hand and penis. She recalled that, on one

occasion, her father used a vibrator on her. L.J. said that it hurt, that Defendant

never used lubricant, and that Defendant ejaculated. L.J. stated that Defendant told

her something would happen to her if she reported the abuse.

Dr. Bergstedt’s physical examination of L.J. revealed that she had ―hymenal

remnants,‖ which was evidence of vaginal penetration. Dr. Bergstedt did not

collect DNA evidence from L.J. because his exam was done beyond seventy-two

hours from the alleged abuse.

6

Defendant took the stand to testify in support of his defense. He denied ever

touching T.L. inappropriately or ever having sexual feelings or thoughts about her.

He said he loved L.J. and had never touched her inappropriately. He regretted not

acting like a father to L.J. and not being involved in her life as she grew up.

Defendant confirmed that L.J. stayed with him from December 19 to

December 21, 2008. Defendant said that the funeral for his son, A.T., was on

January 3, 2009, and he felt hurt because he was accused of having sex with his

daughter during the time he was grieving for A.T. Defendant testified that when

L.J. next spent the night at his house on January 9, 2009, he promised her that he

was not going away again because he did not want to lose their father-daughter

relationship.

Defendant next saw L.J. on January 23, 2009. L.J. was at T.W.’s house and

Defendant spoke to T.W.’s wife on the phone and asked her to have L.J. call him.

When L.J. did not return his call, he became angry and thought his family was

playing games with him. Defendant called T.W.’s house again, and when T.W.’s

wife hung up on him, Defendant called back and left nasty messages on the

answering machine about his prior sexual relationship with T.W.’s wife. Later that

night, Defendant heard a loud bang on his door. When he answered, L.J. charged

into the house, upset about the voice messages, and they argued. Defendant stated

that he was angry with L.J. because she was taking T.W.’s side, so he put her out

of his house and told her not to return. He admitted that later that night, he cut his

wrist with a razor because he missed A.T. and was upset about his argument with

L.J.

7

II. Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by

this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After a thorough review, we

have found no errors patent.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence5

―The testimony of a sexual assault victim alone is sufficient to convict the

defendant. Such testimony alone is sufficient even where the state does not

introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the

offense by the defendant.‖ State v. H.L.J., 08-1070, p. 18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/09),

6 So.3d 997, 1008 (quoting State v. Richard, 39,705, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 2 Cir.

5/11/05), 902 So.2d 1271, 1274, writ denied, 05-1713 (La. 2/10/06), 924 So.2d 161

(citations omitted)).

[The supreme court has] repeatedly cautioned that due process,
rational fact finder test of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), does not permit a reviewing court to
substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact
finder or to second guess the credibility determinations of the fact
finder necessary to render an honest verdict. A reviewing court may
intrude on the plenary discretion of the fact finder ―only to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of
law.‖ State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La.1988)(footnote and
citation omitted).

State v. Calloway, 07-2306, p. 10 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 422 (citation omitted).

―The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the bounds of

rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness[.]‖ State v. Higgins, 03-

1980, p. 17 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1232, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126

S.Ct. 182 (2005). ―Credibility determinations are within the sound discretion of

the trier of fact and will not be disturbed unless clearly contrary to the evidence.‖

5
―When issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to
one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the
evidence.‖ State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La.1992).
8

State v. Marshall, 04-3139, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 362, 369, cert. denied,

552 U.S. 905, 128 S.Ct. 239 (2007).

Defendant argues that ―[t]he evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to

support the convictions of two counts of aggravated incest and one count of

forcible rape.‖ He complains that, other than L.J.’s testimony, the State introduced

no direct evidence that inappropriate contact occurred. Defendant protests that

T.W.’s testimony showed that he did not witness any such contact and that T.W.

had a motive to lie because Defendant once had sex with T.W.’s wife. Defendant

adds that L.J.’s mother, A.J., did not present direct evidence of inappropriate

conduct and, in fact, did not suspect anything until T.W. ―put the idea into her

head.‖ Defendant also protests that the remaining witnesses, two law enforcement

officers and Dr. Bergstedt, only testified about what they had been told. Defendant

asks this court to believe his account of events, which included a clear timeline of

events, over the less specific and allegedly less credible testimony of the victim,

L.J.

The State counters ―that the defendant’s convictions are fully supported by

the record evidence, and the factfinder’s determinations were inherently rational.

Moreover, the State met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ The State

asserts that the victim’s ―testimony was compelling, and established the offenses in

question.‖ The State submits that the victim’s inability to recall a more precise

time frame for the offenses and surrounding events does not mean that the victim

was not credible. Finally, it submits that the testimony of one witness is sufficient

to establish the elements of a sexual offense.

Examination of Defendant’s arguments reveals that he does not assert that

L.J.’s testimony did not satisfy the elements of the charged offenses. Instead, he

argues that the State’s evidence was not believable because L.J. was not credible.
9

The record shows that the jury was allowed to hear and consider the evidence

presented by the defense, including Defendant’s allegations that T.W. and L.J. had

motives to bring false accusations against him. The jury had the information it

needed to compare Defendant’s detailed timeline to L.J.’s temporally vague

account of events. The jurors were also able to consider and weigh the importance

of L.J.’s failure to immediately report the inappropriate conduct against her desire

to maintain a relationship with Defendant. Furthermore, the defense had the

opportunity at trial to point out any major inconsistencies between the various

statements given by L.J. to law enforcement, the examining doctor, and the

advocacy center; however, no major inconsistencies were revealed to the jury. In

fact, Detective Primeaux specifically testified that although L.J. might have added

or left out details from one statement to another, her statements were consistent

overall.

After considering the evidence and argument presented, the jury

unanimously chose to convict Defendant of all three charges. A review of the

record does not reveal that the jury’s credibility determinations were contrary to

the evidence. The State presented evidence that was more than sufficient to

support all of Defendant’s convictions. This assignment of error lacks merit.

IV. Defendant’s Constitutional Rights of Due Process and Confrontation

Defendant asserts that the trial court violated his constitutional due process

and confrontation rights by prohibiting him from introducing evidence that: 1) L.J.

was not a virgin prior to the alleged events; and 2) that L.J. had made prior

accusations of sexual misconduct. Defendant advances that being barred from

introducing this evidence at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

10

Defendant alleges that the trial court misapplied the ―rape shield‖ statute and

that he should have been allowed to ask the victim if she had sex with anyone other

than Defendant. He complains that, without evidence to the contrary, the jury

could have thought that L.J. was a virgin prior to the alleged intercourse she had

with Defendant. Defendant posits that Dr. Bergstedt’s testimony that L.J. was not

a virgin was irrelevant and prejudicial because he was not allowed to question L.J.

about her sexual history.

Defendant claims that he also should have been allowed to question L.J.

about accusations of sexual misconduct she previously made against other

individuals. He contends that the questions would have been asked for the purpose

of impeaching L.J.’s credibility and not for the purpose of showing that she acted

in accordance with any particular character trait. Defendant posits that none of

L.J.’s prior accusations of sexual misconduct (two allegations of forcible rape and

one allegation of inappropriate touching) resulted in the prosecution of the person

accused; neither L.J. nor her family pursued prosecution of those accused or

followed up with the police after making the initial reports. Defendant insists,

therefore, that reasonable jurors could have found that L.J.’s prior complaints were

false.

The State responds that salacious and insulting questions regarding the

victim’s sexual history are precisely what the rape shield law was designed to

prevent. It provides that a defendant is only allowed to ask about the victim’s

sexual history during the seventy-two-hour time period surrounding the offense,

and the questions must be limited to proving a defense that the defendant was not

the source of the victim’s injuries. See La.Code Evid. art. 412(B)(1). Finally, the

State submits that defendants are prohibited from asking victims about their

chastity. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 05-1560 (La. 4/24/06), 927 So.2d 266.
11

In this case, Defendant failed to file a rape shield motion within the delays

set forth by La.Code Evid. art. 412. The State submits that even though defense

counsel enrolled after the La.Code Crim.P. art. 521 time limits had lapsed, he had

no credible reason for waiting until the eve of trial to file his motion.

A. L.J.’s Prior Sexual History

On October 8, 2010, Defendant filed a motion seeking permission to cross-

examine L.J. about her prior sexual conduct. In the motion, the defense gave

notice that it intended to ask L.J. whether she had ever had sex prior to the dates of

the charged offenses. Defendant maintained that the question would not be

presented to impugn the victim’s chastity but to counter the misleading testimony

of Dr. Bergstedt.

On October 12, 2010, the State filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion,

arguing that inquiry into L.J.’s sexual history was prohibited by the rape shield law

and that the status of L.J.’s virginity at the time of the offense was irrelevant. The

record shows that the trial court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of L.J.’s

sexual history prior to voir dire on October 13, 2010. After considering the

argument presented by counsel, the trial court denied the motion.

The admissibility of the evidence concerning L.J.’s sexual history is

governed by La.Code Evid. art. 412, which provided, in pertinent part:

A. Opinion and reputation evidence. When an accused is
charged with a crime involving sexually assaultive behavior,
reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of the
victim is not admissible.

B. Other evidence; exceptions. When an accused is charged
with a crime involving sexually assaultive behavior, evidence of
specific instances of the victim’s past sexual behavior is also not
admissible except for:

(1) Evidence of past sexual behavior with persons other than
the accused, upon the issue of whether or not the accused was the
source of semen or injury; provided that such evidence is limited to a
12

period not to exceed seventy-two hours prior to the time of the
offense, and further provided that the jury be instructed at the time
and in its final charge regarding the limited purpose for which the
evidence is admitted; or

(2) Evidence of past sexual behavior with the accused offered
by the accused upon the issue of whether or not the victim consented
to the sexually assaultive behavior.

The article specifies that an accused who wants to offer evidence of the victim’s

past sexual behavior must file a motion to offer such evidence within the time

allowed for filing pretrial motions. La.Code Evid. art. 412(D). Under La.Code

Crim.P. art. 521, pretrial motions should be filed within fifteen days of arraignment,

―unless a different time is provided by law or fixed by the court at arraignment

upon a showing of good cause why fifteen days is inadequate. Upon written

motion at any time and a showing of good cause, the court shall allow additional

time to file pretrial motions.‖

This court has previously discussed the implications of La.Code Evid. art.

412 as it applies to the time for filing and as it applies to a victim’s sexual history:

In the present case, the defendant waited until after jury selection and
before opening statements to file a motion concerning the victim’s
prior sexual activities. This motion was untimely and even though the
court and the prosecution allowed the defendant to present evidence
and argument on his motion, the issue of untimeliness was not
waived. In the recent United States Supreme Court case of Michigan
v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991), the
United States Supreme Court upheld the notice and hearing
requirement of the Michigan rape shield statute. In upholding the
requirement that a defendant must give notice and submit to a hearing
if he wished to introduce evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual
relationships, the United States Supreme Court noted that to the extent
that a rape shield statute operates to prevent a criminal defendant from
presenting relevant evidence, the defendant’s ability to confront
adverse witnesses and present a defense is diminished, but this does
not necessarily render the statute unconstitutional. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 148, 111 S.Ct. at 1746. . . .

In State v. Lanerie, 527 So.2d 1146 (La.App. 3d Cir.1988), a
case decided under former La.R.S. 15:498, the defendant attempted to
introduce evidence that another person had engaged in sexual
relations with the rape victim in order to raise the defense that the
13

defendant was introduced by this other person to the victim for the
purpose of ―further sexual adventure.‖ In upholding the trial court’s
decision to exclude this evidence, this court noticed that only when
the evidence shielded by this statute is particularly relevant to a
defendant’s guilt or innocence may the defendant’s right to set forth a
defense override the prohibition in the rape shield statute. In Lanerie,
this court determined that there was little relevancy between the
evidence which the defendant was attempting to introduce and the
issue of whether or not the defendant had engaged in unconsented
sexual intercourse with the victim.

In State v. Blue, 591 So.2d 1173 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1991), it was
alleged by the defendant that the young victim of the defendant’s
crime had previously been molested by another man. During cross-
examination of the victim’s mother, defense counsel tried to ask if the
victim had ever told her mother she had been molested by another
man. The prosecution objected and, relying upon Article 412, the trial
court ruled that this evidence was inadmissible. Even though the
defendant specifically noted that he was not introducing the evidence
to impeach the victim’s general reputation for chastity, but only to
explain that someone other than the defendant had molested her in the
past and therefore the young victim was able to describe the act of
molestation from the previous act of molestation, the first circuit ruled
that it was correct that the alleged prior acts of molestation of the
victim were irrelevant and inadmissible in the present case. State v.
Blue, 591 So.2d at 1177.

....

In the present case, the defendant attempted to argue that the
medical records from Briarwood Hospital establish that the young
victim already had inappropriate knowledge of certain sexual
activities in March of 1988, and that this knowledge and the alleged
sexual abuse was possibly a result of the victim’s biological father or
uncle molesting her, and not the defendant.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, citing a problem
with relevancy. . . . Even if the defendant had timely filed his motion
pursuant to article 412 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, the trial
court could have denied this motion on the merits finding that the
timing of the victim’s hospitalization and the timing of the defendant
becoming a member of her family raised the probability that it was the
defendant who committed these crimes upon the victim, and further
that the victim had not been associated with her biological father or
any other male members of her family since she was approximately
two years of age.

State v. Billings, 93-1542, pp. 2-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94), 640 So.2d 500, 501-02,

writ denied, 94-1437 (La. 10/7/94), 644 So.2d 631.

14

Defendant was arraigned on December 7, 2009, and Defendant did not file a

motion to question L.J. about her sexual history until October 2010. Therefore,

Defendant’s motion was untimely. In addition, Defendant’s motion did not contain

an explanation for the delay in filing, an allegation that the delay was through no

fault of Defendant, or a statement that the defense was unaware of the other sexual

history. Moreover, under the plain language of La.Code Evid. art. 412, the

evidence Defendant sought to introduce regarding L.J.’s sexual history is

inadmissible as the evidence does not fit within either of the exceptions set forth in

La.Code Evid. art. 412. Accordingly, Defendant’s argument that he should have

been allowed to ask L.J. about her sexual history is without merit.

B. L.J.’s Prior Allegations of Sexual Misconduct

Examination of the record shows that Defendant filed his motion to question

L.J. about her prior accusations of sexual misconduct on March 3, 2010.

Defendant alleged that L.J. had previously accused her cousin, B.T.,6 and another

man of raping her in December 2008. Defendant argued that the evidence was

relevant to prove the source of any sexual abuse revealed by the evidence and

because L.J.’s ―prior accusations of rape go directly to the defense theory that the

victim makes up rape allegations as part of a modus operandi to hurt men.‖

Defendant’s motion did not allege that the prior allegations were false.

On March 18, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on Defendant’s

motion to cross-examine L.J. regarding her prior allegations of sexual misconduct.

The State presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: R.T., the sister of

Defendant and L.J.’s aunt; Detective Justin Abshire; Detective Kathy LeBlanc;

Detective David Burnett; A.J., L.J.’s mother; B.A., L.J.’s stepbrother; and L.J.

Detective Primeaux, Detective Rosteet, and T.W. were also called to testify. While

6
B.T. is the son of R.T.
15

they had no information about L.J.’s prior allegations of sexual misconduct, they

did testify about the facts of the instant matter.7

After considering the evidence and argument presented, the trial court

granted the State’s motion in limine to prohibit the defense from inquiring into the

victim’s prior accusations of sexual misconduct.

The supreme court has held that La.Code Evid. art. 412 does not apply to

cases wherein the defense seeks to introduce prior false allegations of sexual

misconduct for purposes of discrediting the victim. See State v. Smith, 98-2045,

(La. 9/8/99), 743 So.2d 199 (where the defendant presented evidence sufficient to

allow reasonable jurors to conclude that the victim made false allegations of sexual

molestation in the past, that evidence directly addressed the victim’s credibility and

could have been admitted once the trial court made a determination that the

evidence met all other standards for admissibility).

In [State v. ]Wallace, [00-1745, (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/16/01), 788
So.2d 578, writ denied, 01-1849 (La. 5/24/02), 816 So.2d 297,]
however, this Court rejected the defendants prior false allegation
argument because [t]he defendants mere assertion that the alleged
statement was made and that it was false does not satisfy the Smith
test. Consequently, it is no abuse of discretion for a court to exclude
evidence of prior false allegations of sexual misconduct when that
evidence is based on the mere assertion of the defendant.

State v. Dixon, 07-915, pp. 14-15 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/08), 982 So.2d 146, 155-56,

writ denied, 08-987 (La. 1/30/09), 999 So.2d 745 (footnotes omitted).

Testimony at the March 18, 2010 hearing on Defendant’s motion indicated

that in 2005, when L.J. was thirteen years old, A.J. contacted the Calcasieu Parish

Sheriff’s Office with a complaint J.S., the twenty-five year old uncle of one of

L.J.’s half-siblings, had inappropriately touched L.J. Testimony also revealed that

7
Detective Rosteet was questioned regarding a police report from a 2008 complaint of
rape made by L.J. regarding a D.L. She initially had no recall of that incident, but after being
shown the report, she recalled taking information from L.J. and her mother at a hospital. She
was not the investigative officer on that incident.
16

L.J. accused a juvenile named D.L. of raping her in the fall of 2008. Defendant

presented no evidence at the hearing that the allegations against J.S. and D.L. were

false. Thus, reasonable jurors could not find, based on the evidence presented by

Defendant, that the victim made prior false accusations toward J.S. and D.L.

In reference to B.T., the only evidence presented at the hearing to support a

finding that L.J.’s accusation against him was false was testimony by third parties

that B.T. passed a polygraph during the investigation of the offense. However,

B.T.’s alleged polygraph results were counterbalanced by the fact that no one

could testify as to what questions were asked during the test, by the fact that L.J.

was not subjected to a polygraph in reference to that allegation, by the

investigating officer’s belief that L.J. was telling the truth, and by the fact that a

biological sample was taken from L.J.’s thigh during the SANE exam. Notably,

the swab was not analyzed to either include or exclude B.T. as a contributor,

Defendant did not call B.T. to testify at the hearing, and the defense failed to call

an expert to testify concerning the implications of the polygraph results.

Considering the forgoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that a reasonable jury could not have found that the

allegations against B.T. were false.

V. Defendant’s Challenges for Cause

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying eight of its

challenges for cause. The defense used all twelve of its peremptory challenges

during voir dire. The trial court denied the defense’s challenges for cause

regarding jurors Mike Callahan, Carla Hymel, Jeanette Moss, Kenneth Prejean,

Albert Hooper, Stacy Wheat, Stacie Ardoin, and Michael Heath. The State

contends that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s challenges for cause.

17

The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on
the ground that:

(1) The juror lacks a qualification required by law;

(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his
partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a
juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an
impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence;

(3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment,
friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person
injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such
that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in
arriving at a verdict;

(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the
court; or

(5) The juror served on the grand jury that found the
indictment, or on a petit jury that once tried the defendant for the same
or any other offense.

La.Code Crim.P. art. 797.

The second circuit has discussed the standard for reviewing a trial court’s

ruling on a challenge for cause:

The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on a challenge
for cause and his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
showing of abuse of discretion or a clear showing of error. State v.
Sugar, 408 So.2d 1329 (La.1982). If a prospective juror is able, after
examination by defense counsel, to declare to the court’s reasonable
satisfaction that they are able to render an impartial verdict according
to the law and the evidence, it would be the trial court’s duty to deny a
challenge for cause. State v. Claiborne, 397 So.2d 486 (La.1981).
The law is clear that a relationship between the prospective juror and
the participants is not necessarily a disqualifying fact. The existence
of a relationship, even one of blood or marriage, is not sufficient to
disqualify a juror unless it is shown that the relationship is sufficient
to preclude the juror from arriving at a fair verdict. State v. Peterson,
446 So.2d 815 (La.App.2d Cir.1984).

State v. Fairley, 25,951, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/4/94), 645 So.2d 213, 216 (on

reh’g), writ denied, 94-1940 (La. 11/11/94), 645 So.2d 1152, and writ denied, 94-

2909 (La. 3/24/95), 651 So.2d 287.

18

The Louisiana Supreme Court has discussed the ramifications of an

erroneous denial of a challenge for cause during voir dire when a defendant, as in

the instant case, has utilized all of his peremptory challenges:

Louisiana Constitution article I, § 17 guarantees to a defendant
the right to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and to
challenge jurors peremptorily. . . . When a defendant uses all twelve
of his peremptory challenges, an erroneous ruling of a trial court on a
challenge for cause that results in depriving him of one of his
peremptory challenges constitutes a substantial violation of his
constitutional and statutory rights, requiring reversal of the conviction
and sentence. Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is
erroneously denied by a trial court and a defendant has exhausted his
peremptory challenges. Therefore, to establish reversible error
warranting reversal of a conviction and sentence, defendant need only
demonstrate (1) the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2)
the use of all his peremptory challenges.

State v. Juniors, 03-2425, pp. 7-8 (La. 6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, 304-05, cert.

denied, 547 U.S. 1115, 126 S.Ct. 1940 (2006) (citations omitted). However, a

defendant is not allowed to appeal the ruling on a challenge for cause unless he

objected at the time of the ruling and set forth specific grounds for his objection:

―A defendant may not assign as error a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for

cause made by him, unless an objection thereto is made at the time of the ruling.

The nature of the objection and grounds therefor shall be stated at the time of

objection.‖ La.Code Crim.P. art. 800(A). Even if a defendant has used all of his

peremptory challenges, he must still comply with La.Code Crim.P. art. 800, which

requires the defendant to object to the trial court’s ruling. Fairley, 645 So.2d 213.8

8
In Fairley, the second circuit discussed whether there had been an objection sufficient to
satisfy La.Code Crim.P. art. 800. Fairley, 645 So.2d at 219. Citing State v. Vanderpool, 493
So.2d 574 (La.1986), the Fairley court determined the record showed an objection sufficient to
allow a merit review of the defendant’s challenge for cause. Fairley, 645 So.2d at 219.

In Vanderpool, the supreme court held that there had been a sufficient objection because
the defense challenged a juror for cause a second time on the same basis as it had originally
urged after the district court denied the first challenge for cause. Fairley, 645 So.2d at 219. In
Fairley, the attorney challenged a potential juror for cause a second time on a different basis
after the trial court denied the original challenge for cause. Id.

19

A. Mr. Callahan, Ms. Hymel, Ms. Moss, Mr. Prejean, Mr. Hooper, and Ms. Wheat

Defendant argues that Mr. Callahan should have been dismissed for cause

because he had a personal relationship with Detective Mike Primeaux and because

his two nieces had been molested five years before Defendant’s trial. Although he

believed he could be fair and impartial, Mr. Callahan admitted that the incident

with his nieces would be problematic for him. Defendant contends that, despite Mr.

Callahan’s assurances otherwise, Mr. Callahan’s disgust and revulsion over the

molestation of his nieces prevented him from being fair and impartial.

In challenging Mr. Callahan for cause, defense counsel argued that his body

language and his answers to questions during voir dire indicated ―that he may be

looking for someone to take out his own frustrations on.‖ While the trial court

noted Defendant’s concerns, it denied the challenge for cause.

Defendant challenged Ms. Hymel, Ms. Moss, and Mr. Prejean for cause on

the ground that they had all been victims of burglary. Defendant urged that this

would be a conflict if the State cross-examined Defendant about his prior

convictions. Defense counsel did not want to question the potential jurors about

any prejudice arising from their respective burglaries because it would ―ring the

bell.‖ When the trial court informed him that it would not strike them on the

grounds urged, defense counsel said, ―Okay,‖ and did not object.

During voir dire, the defense challenged Mr. Hooper for cause on the basis

that Defendant claimed to know Mr. Hooper. According to Defendant, he and

Mr. Hooper had adversarial interactions in junior high school, so there was a

chance that Mr. Hooper was being less than candid. Defense counsel admitted that

Both Fairley and Vanderpool are distinguishable from the instant situation. In the current
case, the defense neither objected to nor challenged any of the jurors for cause a second time
after the trial court denied the initial challenges for cause. Therefore, except for the issues
presented herein involving Ms. Ardoin and Mr. Heath, the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art.
800 bar review of the claims made in this assignment of error.

20

Mr. Hooper did not seem to be disingenuous. When the trial court denied the

challenge for cause, defense counsel, once again, responded, ―Okay,‖ and did not

object on the record.

Defendant challenged Ms. Wheat for cause on the basis of her friendship

with a Ms. DeRosier who worked in the district attorney’s office. Upon finding

that the women were not close enough to impair Ms. Wheat’s impartiality, the trial

court denied the challenge for cause.

Defendant’s assignment of error does not reference a page number in the

record addressing a relationship between the potential juror, Mr. Callahan, and

Detective Primeaux. Accordingly, Defendant’s claim that Mr. Callahan had a

personal relationship with Detective Primeaux will not be considered.9

When the trial court denied his challenges for cause with regard to potential

jurors Mr. Callahan, Ms. Hymel, Ms. Moss, Mr. Prejean, Mr. Hooper, and Ms.

Wheat, Defendant did not object to the trial court’s ruling at the time of the

decision. In addition, Defendant’s appellate brief does not list a record page

reference number to any such objection made at a later time. Pursuant to La.Code

Crim.P. art. 800(A), we will not consider the portions of Defendant’s assignment

of error related to the aforementioned jurors.

B. Ms. Ardoin

Defendant argues that Ms. Ardoin also should have been dismissed for cause

because she had known Detective Primeaux since she was sixteen and because her

husband worked with Detective Primeaux at the sheriff’s office and thought he was

9
Uniform Rules―Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–12.4 provides, in pertinent part:

The argument on a specification or assignment of error in a brief
shall include a suitable reference by volume and page to the place in the
record which contains the basis for the alleged error. The court may
disregard the argument on that error in the event suitable reference to the
record is not made.
21

a good cop. Defendant also challenged Ms. Ardoin for cause because she was

familiar with Dr. Bergstedt as she and her daughter saw him as their obstetrician-

gynecologist. In addition, Dr. Bergstedt had delivered Ms. Ardoin’s son and had

performed surgical procedures on her.

Although conceding that, individually, these facts would not be sufficient to

support a dismissal for cause, Defendant maintains that, when all of these factors

are considered together, Ms. Ardoin should have been disqualified for cause from

serving as a juror in this case.10 The State counters that Ms. Ardoin’s responses

―clearly reveal her ability to remain fair and impartial.‖

When the trial court asked whether Ms. Ardoin would be more inclined to

believe something that Detective Primeaux testified to in court, she replied that she

would listen and make her own judgment. When the trial court asked if she could

do the same with Dr. Bergstedt, Ms. Ardoin answered, ―Absolutely.‖ The trial

court denied the challenge of Ms. Ardoin for cause, but stated that the decision had

been a close one. Afterward, although no objection by defense counsel appears in

the transcript, the trial court said, ―The objection is noted.‖

Under the plain language of La.Code Crim.P. art. 797(3), a potential juror’s

relationship is basis for a cause challenge only when the relationship is with the

defendant, the victim, the prosecuting attorney, or defense counsel. Defendant did

not allege that Ms. Ardoin had a relationship with any of those people. However,

this court has expanded the ―influence‖ analysis, as opposed to the bias analysis set

forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 797(2), to a prospective juror’s relationship with any

of the witnesses testifying at trial. See State v. Fussell, 06-324 (La.App. 3 Cir.

10
In his brief to this court, Defendant also argued that Ms. Ardoin should have been
dismissed for cause because her daughter was the same age as the victim in the instant case;
therefore, Ms. Ardoin’s maternal instinct would have prevented her from being a fair and
impartial juror. However, as this was not a reason urged for the challenge made during voir dire,
it cannot now be considered on appeal. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 841.
22

9/27/06), 941 So.2d 109, reversed, in part, on other grounds, 06-2595 (La.

1/16/08), 974 So.2d 1223 (discussing whether the evidence showed that the

prospective jurors’ relationships with witnesses would have influenced the

prospective jurors).

There is no evidence on the record showing that Ms. Ardoin was influenced

by her relationships with Detective Primeaux and Dr. Bergstedt. Ms. Ardoin did

not have a close friendship with either witness; neither witness shared information

about the case with Ms. Ardoin, and she specifically stated that she could reserve

judgment as to the witnesses’ veracity. Further, Ms. Ardoin acknowledged that

law enforcement officers, including Detective Primeaux, are capable of lying, and

the defense acknowledged that Dr. Bergstedt’s testimony would not be refuted at

trial.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Defendant’s challenge for cause in reference to Ms. Ardoin.

C. Mr. Heath

Defendant contends that Mr. Heath should have been dismissed for cause

because he said he would give more credence to the testimony of a police officer

than that of a lay person. Defendant claimed that although Mr. Heath later stated

that he could ―probably‖ be fair and impartial, his body language indicated there

was a problem. The State counters that Mr. Heath’s initial statements were

rehabilitated and that Mr. Heath’s responses at voir dire reveal that he was able to

be fair and impartial. The trial court denied the challenge for cause and noted

Defendant’s objection, stating, ―I believe Mr. Heath was candid and indicated that

he had a sense of respect for law enforcement from his upbringing.‖

Generally, an individual who will unquestionably credit the
testimony of law enforcement officers over that of defense witnesses
is not competent to serve as a juror. However, a mere relationship
23

between a prospective juror and a law enforcement officer is not of
itself grounds to strike the juror for cause. Additionally, a prospective
juror’s seemingly prejudicial response is not grounds for an automatic
challenge for cause, and a trial judge’s refusal to excuse him on the
grounds of impartiality is not an abuse of discretion, if after further
questioning the potential juror demonstrates a willingness and ability
to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. But,
a challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective
juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror’s responses
as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to
render a judgement according to law may be reasonably implied.

State v. Kang, 02-2812, pp. 4-5 (La. 10/21/03), 859 So.2d 649, 652-53 (citations

omitted).

A review of the voir dire transcript showed that Mr. Heath’s initial response

was based on a ―feeling‖ rooted in his upbringing. However, he clarified that he

realized that police officers were human and, as such, capable of lying and making

mistakes. Mr. Heath first stated then maintained that he would be willing to put

aside his feelings and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses on what they said

rather than whether they were employed by law enforcement. Finally, Mr. Heath

said that he would have no problem concluding that a police officer lied because he

knew that they did lie. The record shows that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Defendant’s challenge for cause in reference to Mr. Heath.

VI. Defendant’s Motion for Mistrial

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial

made after the State elicited testimony regarding hearsay statements of what R.T.,

Defendant’s sister, said about Defendant’s sleeping arrangements. The subject

matter was excluded by a prior ruling on a motion in limine. Defendant contends

that, under La.Code Crim.P. art. 775, the trial court should have declared a mistrial

because introduction of hearsay statements constituted a legal defect that would

make the verdict reversible as a matter of law. Further, Defendant maintains that

prohibiting R.T. from testifying at trial did not undo the prejudice caused by the
24

State’s transgression as the jury was still made aware that Defendant’s sister had

concerns about the situation.

The State responds that it did not elicit any hearsay information about the

sleeping arrangements at Defendant’s house. In fact, A.J. was instructed to refrain

from repeating R.T.’s statements. The jury only learned that R.T. had concerns.

The State submits that because any prejudice to Defendant in this case was not so

severe as to deprive him of a fair trial, there was no abuse of the trial court’s

discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.

The record shows that, on October 8, 2010, Defendant filed a motion

seeking to bar R.T. from testifying at trial. In the motion, the defense alleged that

the State intended to introduce its substantive evidence through the process of

impeaching R.T. On October 12, 2010, the State filed an opposition to

Defendant’s motion, urging that no statute entitled a defendant to the wholesale

exclusion of testimony presented by a State’s witness. It contended that

Defendant’s argument was specious, as it relied completely on speculation since no

one could accurately predict the substance of R.T.’s testimony. The trial court

conducted a hearing on the matter prior to voir dire. After considering the

argument by counsel, Defendant’s motion was denied.

At trial, Defendant moved for a mistrial when, during the direct examination

of L.J.’s mother, A.J., she stated that R.T. had seen something that made her

concerned about L.J.’s relationship with her father. Thereafter, a bench trial

occurred wherein the trial court gave the State the option of a mistrial or being

prohibited from calling R.T. as a witness. The State chose to withdraw R.T. as a

witness. The bench conference ended with defense counsel rejecting the trial

court’s offer to admonish the jury to disregard the remark about R.T. having

concerns about the relationship between L.J. and Defendant.
25

―Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered, and in a jury case

the jury dismissed, when prejudicial conduct in or outside the courtroom makes it

impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial, or when authorized by Article

770 or 771.‖ La.Code Crim.P. art. 775

A hearsay statement by a witness at trial, even when specifically prohibited

by the trial court, is not a basis for a mandatory mistrial under La.Code Crim.P. art.

770. Instead, the grant or denial of a defendant’s motion for mistrial based upon a

witness’s remark is a matter of judicial discretion:

In the following cases, upon the request of the defendant or the
state, the court shall promptly admonish the jury to disregard a remark
or comment made during the trial, or in argument within the hearing
of the jury, when the remark is irrelevant or immaterial and of such a
nature that it might create prejudice against the defendant, or the state,
in the mind of the jury:

(1) When the remark or comment is made by the judge, the
district attorney, or a court official, and the remark is not within the
scope of Article 770; or

(2) When the remark or comment is made by a witness or
person other than the judge, district attorney, or a court official,
regardless of whether the remark or comment is within the scope of
Article 770.

In such cases, on motion of the defendant, the court may grant a
mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure
the defendant a fair trial.

La.Code Crim.P. art. 771.

The first circuit has discussed how prejudicial remarks made by witnesses

are to be examined under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure:

Article 775 provides for a mistrial if prejudicial conduct inside
or outside the courtroom makes it impossible for the defendant to
obtain a fair trial or when authorized under articles LSA-C.Cr.P. arts.
770 or 771. Article 771 is concerned with prejudicial remarks made
by persons other than the court, district attorney, or court officials, and
provides that, if the remark is not within the mandatory provisions of
article 770, the court may, in its discretion, grant a mistrial rather than
admonish the jury to disregard the prejudicial remark. Mistrial is a
drastic remedy. When the conduct does not fall within the mandatory
26

mistrial provisions, the judge has the sound discretion to determine
whether the activity or comment is so prejudicial to the defendant that
he could not receive a fair trial. State v. Narcisse, 426 So.2d 118, 133
(La.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 202, 78 L.Ed.2d 176
(1983); State v. Wright, 441 So.2d 1301, 1306 (La.App. 1 Cir.1983).

State v. Pooler, 96-1794, pp. 29-30 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/97), 696 So.2d 22, 44, writ

denied, 97-1470 (La. 11/14/97), 703 So.2d 1288.

The supreme court has reviewed the refusal to grant a defendant’s motion

for mistrial based upon a witness’s hearsay statement under a harmless error

analysis:

Defendant’s hearsay objection to this statement was sustained,
but his mistrial motion was denied. Defendant stresses that the trial
court granted his pre-trial motion to exclude any reference to the
hearsay statement regarding the two African-American males
observed running from the van. Given defendant’s admission that he
and Jacobs abandoned the van in the Iberville Housing Development,
even assuming this statement was hearsay, admitting it was harmless
error, and the mistrial motion properly was denied. See also State v.
Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729, 741 (La.1984) (officer’s remark allegedly
casting the accused as an associate of criminals was not prejudicial
and did not impact the fairness of trial).

State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529, p. 3 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 886 n.4, cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266 (2002). The harmless error analysis

requires the examination of multiple factors:

Confrontation errors are subject to a Chapman [v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967)] harmless error analysis. Delaware
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).
The correct inquiry is whether the reviewing court, assuming that the
damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, is
nonetheless convinced that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438. Factors to be
considered by the reviewing court include ―the importance of the
witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony
was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the
overall strength of the prosecution’s case‖. Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at
1438.

State v. Wille, 559 So.2d 1321, 1332 (La.1990).

27

The record shows that A.J. did not testify concerning the details of the

offenses committed against L.J. The primary purpose of A.J.’s testimony was to

explain how the case came to the attention of law enforcement. Further, T.W.’s

testimony revealing why he became suspicious and how he later confirmed his

suspicions was much more damaging to the defense than A.J.’s remark that

Defendant’s sister saw something that raised concerns about Defendant’s

relationship with L.J. Even though the trial court attempted to correct the error by

barring R.T. from testifying for the State, it did not prohibit the defense from

calling R.T. to clarify her statement to A.J. Furthermore, the lack of admonition to

the jury that they were to disregard A.J.’s hearsay statement was directly

attributable to the defense.

Thus, in light of the overall unimportance of A.J.’s testimony, the fact that

another witness’s suspicions were much more damaging to the defense, the relative

immateriality of the statement when compared to T.W.’s testimony, the ability of

the defense to call R.T. to clarify her remark to A.J., and the fact that the bulk of

the material evidence was presented by the victim alone, we conclude that the error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the trial court did not err in

denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial.

VII. Excessiveness of Sentence

Defendant posits that his sentence of life without benefits is excessive under

the circumstances. Defendant’s prior convictions for simple robbery and

aggravated burglary occurred in 1989 and 1991. Because Defendant was released

in 2000, the ten-year cleansing period was still in effect at the time of the charged

offenses: December 2008 and/or January 2009. Because nearly twenty years had

lapsed since the commission of his prior offenses, Defendant insists there was no

showing that there was a risk he would commit another crime, that Defendant had
28

a criminal disposition, or that Defendant required institutionalization. Defendant

declares that the overcrowded prison system should be reserved for people who

constitute a danger to the public and not for wrongly-convicted productive

members of society. He asks this court to find that he qualifies for a downward-

departure from the mandatory minimum penalty based on the exceptional

circumstances of his case, the fact that he spent most of his adult life caring for his

disabled son, his ability to maintain employment, his grief over the death of his son,

and his lack of culpability. Defendant maintains that he is the true victim in the

instant case.

The State responds that, as Defendant failed to comply with La.Code Crim.P.

art. 881.1 by filing a motion to reconsider sentence, this court should limit its

review of Defendant’s sentences to bare excessiveness. Further, the State

maintains that the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion as Defendant

was a third felony offender and there is a strong presumption that the mandatory

minimum sentence is constitutional. It also contends that a lesser sentence would

deprecate the seriousness of the offenses.

Because Defendant failed to comply with La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1, we

will review Defendant’s sentence for bare excessiveness. See State v. Batiste, 09-

521 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 25 So.3d 981.

This court has previously discussed the standard for reviewing
excessive sentence claims:

[Louisiana Constitution Article] I, § 20 guarantees
that, ―[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or
unusual punishment.‖ To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to
shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is,
therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of
pain and suffering. The trial court has wide discretion in
the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and
29

such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing
discretion, not whether another sentence might have been
more appropriate.

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01),
779 So.2d 1035, 1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331
(citations omitted)(second alteration in original).

In deciding whether a sentence is shocking or
makes no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal
goals, an appellate court may consider several factors
including the nature of the offense, the circumstances of
the offender, the legislative purpose behind the
punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed
for similar crimes. While a comparison of sentences
imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, ―it
is well settled that sentences must be individualized to
the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.‖ Additionally, it is within the purview of the
trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial
judge ―remains in the best position to assess the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by
each case.‖

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786,
789,writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061 (citations
omitted). ―[T]he trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and
mitigating circumstance outlined in art. 894.1[;] the record must
reflect that he adequately considered these guidelines in
particularizing the sentence to the defendant.‖ State v. Smith, 433
So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983).

Id. at 983.

At the January 5, 2011, sentencing hearing, the trial court found that

Defendant was a third felony offender with two prior violent felonies and

sentenced him to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, and

suspension of sentence for each conviction.11 The record shows that the trial court

sentenced Defendant under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b):

11
Simple robbery, aggravated burglary, and forcible rape are all classified as crimes of
violence. La.R.S. 14:2(B). Defendant was convicted of simple robbery in 1989 and aggravated
burglary in 1991. See State’s Exhibit 5. Further, forcible rape and aggravated incest are both
classified as sex offenses. La.R.S. 15:541(23)(a).
30

(3) If the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the
offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than
his natural life then:

....

(b) If the third felony and the two prior felonies are felonies
defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), a sex offense as
defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the age of
eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violation of
the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by
imprisonment for ten years or more, or any other crimes punishable by
imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such
crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural
life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Therefore, the life sentences the trial court imposed for Defendant’s convictions

constitute the statutory minimum possible penalty.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the minimum sentences set forth

in the Habitual Offender Law are constitutional.

The Legislature has sole authority under the Louisiana Constitution to
define conduct as criminal and provide penalties for such conduct.
La. Const. art. III, § I. Acting pursuant to this authority, the
Legislature passed the Habitual Offender Law. This Court, on
numerous occasions, has held this statute to be constitutional. Since
the Habitual Offender Law in its entirety is constitutional, the
minimum sentences it imposes upon multiple offenders are also
presumed to be constitutional.

State v. Johnson, 97-1906, pp. 5-6 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 675 (citations

omitted).

Defendant’s sentences of life in prison without benefits are not excessive.

DECREE

Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

31