State of Louisiana v. Ricky J. Charpentier

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-953

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RICKY J. CHARPENTIER

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, DOCKET NO. 10-263
HONORABLE LORI ANN LANDRY, PRESIDING
**********

SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE
**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Harry A. Daniels, III
Daniels & Washington
830 Main Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70808
(225) 346-6280
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Ricky J. Charpentier

J. Phil Haney, District Attorney
Angela B. Odinet, Assistant District Attorney
St. Martin Parish Courthouse
307 Church Street
St. Martinville, LA 70582
(337) 394-2220
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

COOKS, Judge.

Defendant appeals the trial court‟s denial of his motion to suppress illegally

seized evidence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 4, 2009, deputies with the Iberia Parish Sheriff‟s Office

received a tip from an anonymous caller that a person was in possession of a

firearm. After several attempts to locate the “suspicious person with a firearm,”

the deputies eventually saw a vehicle fitting the description given by the

complainant. While driving toward the vehicle, the deputies observed a person

remove a rifle from the vehicle he had been driving and place it in the trunk of

another vehicle. Upon seeing this, the deputies called for backup, and when

backup arrived, the deputies approached the vehicles. All the persons at the scene

were detained, handcuffed, and searched for officers‟ safety. Deputies were told

the weapon, which was an assault rifle, belonged to Defendant, Ricky Charpentier,

the driver of the vehicle fitting the description given by the complainant.

Defendant, who had prior felony convictions, was arrested and charged with

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1.

Defendant filed a “Motion to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence.” A hearing was

held on the motion, following which the motion was denied. Defendant then pled

guilty to the charge but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to

suppress the evidence. He was sentenced that same date to ten years at hard labor,

to run concurrently with any other sentence he may have been serving at the time.

Defendant has perfected a timely appeal, asserting that the trial court erred

when it denied the “Motion to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence.” For the

following reasons, we find merit to Defendant‟s claim and reverse the trial court‟s

ruling and remand the matter for further proceedings.

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues he was arrested without probable cause when the police

surrounded his vehicle, ordered him to the ground, and handcuffed him. He

contends neither the anonymous caller‟s tip nor the deputy‟s observation of him

putting a rifle into the trunk of a vehicle established probable cause sufficient to

support an arrest. Therefore, Defendant argues, the evidence should be suppressed.

The State cites Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) and argues

there was reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed, was committing, or

was about to commit a crime. The State asserts that Defendant was not arrested

until after the deputy determined he was a felon and had a firearm in his

possession. Accordingly, the investigatory stop was a legal detention, and the trial

court did not err when it denied the motion to suppress the evidence.

At the suppression hearing, Deputy Gaylord Boyd, a patrol officer with the

Iberia Parish Sheriff‟s Office, stated while on patrol, on November 4, 2009, he and

his partner, Deputy Sonnier, were “dispatched to a complaint involving a

suspicious person with a firearm.” He explained that based on the “unknown

complainant‟s” instructions, he went to an area of town where the suspect was

supposed to be located in a vehicle. The described vehicle was not at that location.

However, when he told the dispatcher he could not locate the vehicle, the

dispatcher informed him that the complainant was still on the line and indicated a

different location. The vehicle was also not at the second location. The deputies

decided to drive around and shortly thereafter spotted a vehicle similar to the

vehicle described by the complainant parked alongside the roadway. The vehicle

was parked directly behind another vehicle. As the deputies drove towards the

vehicle, they observed a person remove a rifle from the vehicle he had been driving

and place it in the trunk of the other vehicle. Deputy Boyd described the rifle as a

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7.62x39 SKS assault rifle. The record does not state whether the deputy

recognized the rifle as an assault rifle prior to or after obtaining custody of the gun.

There were two other men on the scene, Dwayne Laviolette, who owned the

second vehicle, and his passenger, Mr. Delahoussaye. There was also an

unidentified female in the Defendant‟s vehicle. The deputy testified that he called

for backup and waited until Defendant placed the rifle in the trunk of the second

vehicle. Once backup arrived, he and his partner approached. He stated that “[a]t

that point everybody was detained.” Each person was handcuffed and searched for

officers‟ safety. Deputy Sonnier advised Laviolette and Delahoussaye of their

rights and questioned them. When asked if anyone made any statements, Deputy

Boyd stated that “Mr. Laviolette made the statement that it was not his rifle and for

Mr. Charpentier; the suspect could tell us the truth about the weapon.” Laviolette

voluntarily opened the trunk of his vehicle, and Deputy Boyd took custody of the

rifle.

Deputy Boyd stated that Defendant told him “he used it [the rifle] and was

going to use it to help some of his homeboys out that was [sic] having problems at

the St. Edwards housing apartment over on Mississippi Street.” Deputy Boyd

agreed that although he recorded Laviolette‟s statement in his police report, he did

not note Defendant‟s statement. During this time, dispatch advised him that

Defendant had prior felony convictions. Defendant was then placed under arrest.

Deputy Boyd stated he never spoke with the person who called regarding

someone with a firearm. He had no idea who the caller was, and the caller never

gave a name. He stated he was not even sure if the caller knew the occupant of the

vehicle.

Deputy Boyd further described the scene upon initial contact with the three

men. Three or four other patrol cars arrived within fifteen to thirty seconds of his

call for a backup with lights and sirens activated. Defendant‟s vehicle and the

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second vehicle were surrounded. All the officers had their weapons pulled and

pointed at the men. They were ordered to their knees and handcuffed prior to

being searched for weapons.

Following this testimony, the trial court denied the motion to suppress,

stating that “[r]easonable suspicion did exist at that time for them to detain and ask

questions pursuant to the Constitution and the clarification thereof.”

Defendant argues in brief that even though Deputy Boyd testified he did not

formally arrest Defendant until after he learned that Defendant was a convicted

felon, the actions of the police constituted an effective arrest of the three men. He

contends that he “was arrested when the officers pointed their handguns at him,

ordered him to get down on his knees and not move until he was forcibly restrained

by the officers placing handcuffs on him.” Defendant argues, however, there was

no probable cause to arrest him.

In brief, the State does not address whether the police action constituted an

arrest with or without probable cause. The State argues there was reasonable

suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based on the anonymous call and the

deputies‟ observations pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 215.1.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 215.1(A) provides:

A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place
whom he suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to
commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an
explanation of his actions.

The State agrees it is not a crime for a citizen to possess a gun. However,

“[a]s Officer Boyd clarifies it is suspicious for an individual to transport a semi-

automatic rifle and to change its location in the middle of the street.”

While discussing investigatory stops, the fifth circuit noted:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures. But the right of law enforcement

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officers to stop and interrogate those reasonably suspected of criminal
conduct is recognized by LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 215.1 and by state and
federal jurisprudence. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195 (La.1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2158, 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984).

Although Article 215.1 permits an officer to stop a citizen in a
public place and question him, such an investigatory stop must be
based upon reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, or
is about to commit, a criminal offense. State v. Temple, 02-1895, p. 4
(La.9/9/03), 854 So.2d 856, 860; State v. Collins, 04-751, p. 3
(La.App. 5 Cir. 11/30/04), 890 So.2d 616, 618. The detaining officer
“„must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity. . . .‟” State v. Collins,
supra, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101
S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Moreover, the officer must be
able to articulate specific facts upon which his suspicion is based.
State v. Becnel, 04-1266 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 838,
852.

In determining whether an investigatory stop was justified by
reasonable suspicion, a reviewing court must consider the totality of
the circumstances, “giving deference to the inferences and deductions
of a trained police officer „that might well elude an untrained
person.‟” State v. Huntley, 97-0965 (La.3/13/98), 708 So.2d 1048,
1049 (per curiam), quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695.
Factors that may support reasonable suspicion for an investigatory
stop include an officer‟s experience, his or her knowledge of recent
criminal patterns, and his or her knowledge of an area‟s frequent
incidence of crime. State v. Mitchell, 04-136 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/29/04),
877 So.2d 1151, 1155.

The State bears the burden of proof in establishing the
admissibility of evidence seized without a warrant. LSA- C.Cr.P. art.
701D. The trial court‟s decision to deny a motion to suppress is
afforded great weight and will not be set aside unless the
preponderance of the evidence clearly favors suppression. State v.
Cooley, 03-418 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 857 So.2d 1209, 1216, writ
denied, 03-3107 (La.3/12/04), 869 So.2d 818. If evidence is derived
from an unreasonable search or seizure, the proper remedy is to
exclude the evidence from trial. State v. Becnel, supra.

State v. Clay, 06-37, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/25/06), 930 So.2d 1028, 1031-32

(alteration in original).

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In Clay, where the fifth circuit did not find “reasonable suspicion,” two

deputies received an anonymous tip that gunfire was heard on a particular street.

Upon arriving at the street, the deputies saw two men walking from the direction of

the reported gunfire. One deputy conducted a field interview while the second

deputy frisked one of the defendants. Crack cocaine was found in one of his

pockets. The defendant argued that an anonymous report of gunfire and his

presence in a high crime area was not enough to support reasonable suspicion for

an investigatory stop. The fifth circuit agreed, noting:

Under certain circumstances, an informant‟s tip can provide
reasonable suspicion to detain and question a person. Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); State
v. Smith, 00-1838 (La.5/25/01), 785 So.2d 815, 816 (per curiam).
Whether an informant‟s tip creates reasonable suspicion necessary to
justify an investigatory stop is determined by considering the totality
of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214, 103 S.Ct.
2317, 2320, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Boss, 04-457, p. 6
(La.App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 887 So.2d 581, 586. The anonymous
caller‟s ability to predict the suspect‟s future behavior goes toward
proving reliability, as it demonstrates inside information and a special
familiarity with the suspect‟s affairs. See, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
at 332, 110 S.Ct. at 2417; State v. Boss, supra. Independent
corroboration of the details of an informant‟s tip by police
investigation is valuable to the totality of the circumstances analysis.
State v. Boss, supra. A non-predictive anonymous tip paired with
either police corroboration or independent police observation of
unusually suspicious conduct can provide police with the reasonable
suspicion needed to temporarily detain the suspect. Id. “[I]f a tip has
a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be
required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be
required if the tip were more reliable.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at
330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416. See also, State v. Boss, supra.

The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing shows that the
officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. First, the
anonymous tip had a low degree of reliability. Deputy Franklin
testified that the caller did not report having seen someone firing a
gun; rather, this person had only heard gunshots. Further, there was
no description given of a perpetrator. Deputy Franklin could not say
how long it took her to get to Pailet Street after she was dispatched.
The greater the time span, the less likely it was that the perpetrator

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would still be at or near the scene. While the officer had reason to
believe a crime (illegal discharge of a firearm) had been committed,
she did not have reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a
crime. Deputy Franklin testified that neither defendant nor his
companion exhibited behavior that indicated they were carrying
weapons. She stopped them because they happened to be in the area
where the gunfire was reported.

The officer stated she knew the street where she saw defendant
as a high crime area with a great deal of drug activity. However, a
person‟s mere presence in a high crime area, without more, does not
provide police with reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts
to make an investigatory stop. See, State v. Washington, 03-1134
(La.App. 5 Cir. 2/10/04), 866 So.2d 1058, 1062. See also, State v.
Blasio, 98-0077 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/21/98), 720 So.2d 749, 750 (“A
stop in which a defendant is merely walking in a high crime area is
unjustified”).

Id. at 1032 (alteration in original).

In the current case, Deputy Boyd testified he had no clue as to who the

anonymous caller was. He did not speak to the caller directly but was advised

through the dispatcher. Deputy Boyd was told only that someone had a firearm in

his vehicle. There was only a description of the vehicle. He was not told who the

person allegedly possessing the firearm was nor was he given a description of the

person. He was not told whether the caller saw the person fire the rifle, point the

rifle at anyone, or heard threats to do so. Further, the vehicle was not in the two

locations the caller said it could be found. The deputies only located Defendant

because he was driving around the area and spotted a vehicle similar to the one

described by the caller.

Finally, as noted above, a non-predictive anonymous tip together with

independent police observation of unusually suspicious conduct can provide police

with the reasonable suspicion needed to temporarily detain the suspect. In the

current case, the deputy, when asked, “How often do you see people transporting

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semiautomatic assault rifles from one trunk to another in the middle of the street?”

he replied, “Not often,” and then agreed it was suspicious.

However, the tip which was relied on in this case was of a very low degree

of reliability with no identification of the alleged offender and that, despite the

deputy‟s agreement otherwise, transferring a weapon from the trunk of one vehicle

to another vehicle‟s trunk is not a suspicious activity—such as observing one

person slipping money into the hands of another who surreptitiously slips a small

quantity of something into the purchaser‟s hand while standing on a street corner,

which in an experienced officer‟s opinion could very well be an illegal drug

transaction.

The State argues that Laviolette consented to the search of his vehicle and

that Defendant, after he had been Mirandized, admitted he used and planned to use

the rifle; therefore, there were “no grounds to challenge the admissibility of the

statements given.”

As for Laviolette‟s consent to search the trunk of his vehicle, under

Louisiana law, any person adversely affected by a warrantless search and seizure

may raise the violation of a third person‟s constitutional rights. State v. Jackson,

09-1983 (La. 7/6/10), 42 So.3d 368. In State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202, 1206

(La.1984) (citations omitted), the supreme court explained:

[I]f the consent was obtained after an illegal detention or entry, the
consent was valid only if it was the product of a free will and not the
result of an exploitation of the previous illegality. Among the factors
considered in determining whether the consent was sufficiently
attenuated from the unlawful conduct to be a product of a free will are
whether the police officers adequately informed the individual that he
need not comply with the request, the temporal proximity of the
illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening circumstances
and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

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See also State v. Harris, 09-62 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/09), 21 So.3d 437, wherein

this court found that the State failed to meet its burden to prove that the defendant

gave his consent and that the consent was free and voluntary.

Furthermore, “[s]tatements given during a period of illegal detention are

inadmissible, even though voluntarily given, if they are the product of illegal

detention and not the result of an independent act of free will.” State v. Fisher, 97-

1133, p. 11 (La. 9/9/98), 720 So.2d 1179, 1185. While a defendant has the burden

of proving the grounds for his motion, the State has the burden of proving the

admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant or of any

evidence seized without a warrant. La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(D).

In Fisher, following a fatal shooting, „“people in the neighborhood‟” who

did not see the shooting told the police that Fisher committed the killing. Id. at

1181. Months later, the police spotted Fisher as a passenger in a vehicle and pulled

the vehicle over. They handcuffed him and put him into the police unit to transport

him to the police station. During this time, the defendant apparently made three

incriminating statements. After being convicted of second degree murder by a

jury, he appealed the trial court‟s denial of his motion to suppress the statements.

The supreme court found that Fisher had been effectively arrested without probable

cause and that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the

statements. The supreme court stated:

The determination of whether an arrest occurred depends on the
totality of the circumstances, but several factors distinguish an arrest
from lesser infringements on personal liberty. State v. Allen, 95-1754
(La.9/5/96); 682 So.2d 713. A prime characteristic of any Fourth
Amendment seizure of a person is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person would not consider himself or
herself free to leave. Allen, 682 So.2d at 719; Moreno, 619 So.2d at
65 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct.
1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). Ultimately, whether a person has been
arrested depends on circumstances indicating an intent to impose an
extended restraint on the persons liberty. Allen, 682 So.2d at 719;
State v. Simms, 571 So.2d 145, 148 (La.1990).
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In the present case, the police forcibly restrained defendant by
handcuffing him and putting him in the back seat of the police car
bound for the station. No reasonable person in this position could
have believed he or she was “free to go,” and indeed defendant was
not. In addition, Officer Taylor testified that he intended to take
defendant to the police station, indicating an unmistakable intent to
impose a restriction on defendant‟s liberty more extensive than an
investigatory stop.

Arrests have been found in many similar situations. See, e.g.,
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218-19, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60
L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (finding that an arrest occurred when the
defendant was “picked up” and brought in for questioning about a
murder); United States v. Gentry, 839 F.2d 1065, 1070 (5th Cir.1988)
(finding an arrest when the defendants were removed from their
vehicle at gunpoint); Passman v. Blackburn, 797 F.2d 1335, 1346 (5th
Cir.1986) (finding the suspect was “unquestionably” arrested by being
handcuffed, placed in a police car and driven to the station).

Under the totality of the circumstances in the present case,
defendant was under arrest when he allegedly made his statements.

Id. at 1183-84 (emphasis in original).

In the current case, the three men were ordered out of their vehicles at

gunpoint by at least five to seven officers, ordered to their knees, and then

handcuffed. While still on their knees, the deputies began questioning the three

men. We find at this point the three men were effectively arrested at this point

without probable cause. In State v. Porche, 06-312, pp. 7-9 (La. 11/29/06), 943

So.2d 335, 339-40, the supreme court discussed what circumstances effectuated an

arrest:

Inherent in the right of the police to conduct a brief investigatory
detention is also the right to use reasonable force to effectuate the
detention. Mena, 544 U.S. at 99, 125 S.Ct. at 1470 (“„Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make
an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to
use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.‟”)
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865,
1871-72, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d
1455, 1462 (10th Cir.1993) (“Since police officers should not be

10

required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, they are
„authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect
their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course
of [a Terry ] stop.‟”) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 683-84, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)).

Nevertheless, the use of handcuffs incrementally increases the
degree of force used in detaining an individual. Mena, 544 U.S. at 99,
125 S.Ct. at 1470 (“The imposition of correctly applied handcuffs on
Mena, who was already being lawfully detained during a search of the
house, was undoubtedly a separate intrusion in addition to detention in
the converted garage.”); State v. Broussard, 00-3230, p. 4
(La.5/24/02), 816 So.2d 1284, 1287 (“„There is no question that the
use of handcuffs, being one of the most recognizable indicia of a
traditional arrest, substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of a
putative Terry stop.‟” (quoting United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157
F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.1998)(internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus,
because the police conducting an investigatory stop “may not . . . seek
to verify their suspicions by means that approach the conditions of
arrest,” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), the use of handcuffs must appear objectively
reasonable “in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [the
police],” taking into account “the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force that
is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109
S.Ct. at 1872; Broussard, 00-3230 at 4, 816 So.2d at 1287 (“„Thus,
when the government seeks to prove that an investigatory detention
involving the use of handcuffs did not exceed the limits of a Terry
stop, it must be able to point to some specific fact or circumstance that
could have supported a reasonable belief that the use of such restraints
was necessary to carry out the legitimate purpose of the stop without
exposing law enforcement officers, the public, or the suspect himself
to an undue risk of harm.‟”) (quoting Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 18-
19). If the added intrusion is not warranted under particular
circumstances, a Terry stop may escalate into a de facto arrest
requiring probable cause to render it valid. United States v. Melendez-
Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir.1994)(“Because the specific
nature of this stop [in which defendant was handcuffed and strapped
into a police cruiser] was not justified under the Terry doctrine, we
must treat it as an arrest, requiring probable cause.”); Broussard, 00-
3230, pp. 3-4, 816 So.2d at 1287 (“[B]revity alone does not always
distinguish investigatory stops from arrests, as the former may be
accompanied by arrest-like features, e.g., use of drawn weapons and
handcuffs, which may, but do not invariably, render the seizure a de

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facto arrest.”) (citing Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d at 18-19)(emphasis
added).

While the deputy testified the three men were handcuffed for officer safety,

he had also stated that they waited until the rifle had been placed into the trunk of

the vehicle before they approached. There was no testimony otherwise that the

deputies had any reason to believe Defendant or the two men were armed and

violent. This was not suspected drug activity or any other reported violent crime,

and possession of a firearm is not necessarily indicative of a violent nature.

In Fisher, 720 So.2d 1179, 1185-86, the supreme court went on to determine

whether the statements made by the defendant were the result of an independent

act of free will:

Statements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible,
even though voluntarily given, if they are the product of illegal
detention and not the result of an independent act of free will. Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416
(1975).

The fact that the accused would not have made a statement “but
for” the illegal arrest does not alone establish a causal link sufficient
to require exclusion of the statement. Brown, 422 U.S. at 602-03, 95
S.Ct. 2254. On the other hand, the fact that an accused may have been
properly informed of his constitutional rights and waived them, while
relevant, does not alone break the causal link. Taylor [v. Alabama],
457 U.S. [687] at 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664; Brown, 422 U.S. at 601, 603,
95 S.Ct. 2254 (holding Miranda warnings are not a “talisman”). Other
factors in assessing the link between the illegal arrest and the
statements are the existence of intervening circumstances, the
“temporal proximity” of the arrest and the statements, and the
“purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Brown, 422 U.S.
at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254. See also Taylor, 457 U.S. at 690-91, 102 S.Ct.
2664; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218-19, 99 S.Ct. 2248,
60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).

In the present case, there was no significant time lapse between
the unlawful arrest and the statements in the back of the police car and
at the police station, which were made shortly after the arrest.
Moreover, there were no significant intervening circumstances.

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While the deputy testified that the three men had been Mirandized, the fact

they may have been advised of their rights, in this case, did not break the causal

link. There were no intervening circumstances. The men were ordered to their

knees at gunpoint by numerous law enforcement officers, handcuffed, and

immediately questioned, all without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that

they had committed, were committing, or about to commit a crime. The evidence

and statements were inadmissible for the reason the detention was illegal and that

there were no intervening circumstances between the discovery of the rifle and

Defendant‟s statements which would show an independent act of free will.

Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied Defendant‟s motion to suppress

the evidence.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we find reverse the trial court‟s denial of the

motion to suppress. As a result, Defendant‟s guilty plea must be vacated and the

matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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