KA-0011-1428 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Pagel L. Arnold AKA Pagel Lynn Arnold

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed June 6, 2012

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-1428

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

PAGEL L. ARNOLD

AKA PAGEL LYNN ARNOLD

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 80849
HONORABLE JAMES RICHARD MITCHELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Asa Allen Skinner
District Attorney, 30th Judicial District Court
Terry Wayne Lambright
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71496-1188
(337) 239-2008
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward Kelly Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Pagel L. Arnold

PICKETT, Judge.

In August 2010, Pagel Arnold twice entered property owned by Randy

Ingalls and removed batteries and radiators from abandoned vehicles. He also

stole an air conditioning unit. He was charged by bill of information with one

count of theft of property valued over $1,500.00, a violation of La.R.S.

14:67(B)(1); one count of theft of property valued over $500.00, a violation of

La.R.S. 14:67(B)(2); and one count of simple criminal damage to property, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:56(B)(2). In a separate bill of information, the defendant

was charged with two misdemeanor counts of criminal trespass, in violation of

La.R.S. 14:63.

On June 1, 2011, the defendant pled guilty to one count of theft of property

over $1,500.00 and one count of criminal damage to property. In exchange for his

plea of guilty, the state agreed to dismiss one count of theft of property and the

trespassing charges. The state also agreed not to seek enhanced sentencing of the

defendant as a habitual offender. The trial court later sentenced the defendant to

serve five years at hard labor and pay a fine of $3,000.00 for theft of property and

serve two years at hard labor and pay a fine of $1,000.00 for criminal damage to

property. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The

defendant now appeals his sentence.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The defendant asserts one assignment of error:

The trial court erred in that the sentences imposed upon Pagel
Arnold are constitutionally excessive and imposed without sufficient
consideration of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by

this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record,

we find one error patent.

The bill of information charged the defendant in Count 3 with criminal

damage to property with damage in excess of $500.00. Louisiana Revised Statutes

14:56 provides three grades of the offense of simple criminal damage to property,

the latter two being $500.00 to less than $50,000.00 and $50,000.00 or more. We

note that the defendant was advised at the guilty plea proceeding of the possible

penalty, with the court using the penalty provision for the grade of criminal

damage to property where the damage amounts to $500.00 but less than

$50,000.00. La.R.S. 14:56. Thus, the defendant was apprised of the correct

sentencing range. He does not claim on appeal that he did not understand the

nature of the charge against him nor does he allege any prejudice resulting from

this error in the bill. Accordingly, we find the error is harmless. See State v.

Ferguson, 10-199 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/30/10), 43 So.3d 291, writ denied, 10-1744

(La. 1/28/11), 56 So.3d 965 and State v. Upchurch, 00-1290 (La.App. 5 Cir.

1/30/01), 783 So.2d 398.

DISCUSSION

The defendant failed to file a motion to reconsider the sentence in the trial

court. Our review, therefore, is limited to a bare claim of excessiveness. La.Code

Crim.P. art. 881.1, State v. Graves, 01-156 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/01), 798 So.2d

1090, writ denied, 02-29 (La. 10/14/02), 827 So.2d 420.

This court has set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

2

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, "[n]o law shall subject
any person to cruel or unusual punishment." To constitute an
excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our
sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a
needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404
So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the
imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence
shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746
So.2d 124
, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing
discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more
appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957,
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d

1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

In order to decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes

no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, we have held:

[A]n appellate court may consider several factors including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative
purpose behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences
imposed for similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00), 766
So.2d 501
. While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences
must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular
offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1
Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to
particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674
So.2d 957
, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ

denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

The maximum sentence for theft of property over $1,500.00 is a $3,000.00

fine and ten years at hard labor. The maximum sentence for simple criminal

damage to property is a $1,000.00 fine and two years at hard labor. The defendant

received the maximum fine and a midrange jail sentence of five years for theft of
3

property. He received the maximum sentence for simple criminal damage to

property. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. In exchange for

his plea of guilty, he was not exposed to a sentence for the second count of theft of

property, and he avoided a habitual-offender proceeding. We find that the trial

court did not abuse its broad discretion in sentencing the defendant.

We note that the trial court did make a mistake of fact when it stated

that the defendant had no children, when in fact he has two children with his

previous wife. The children did not live with the defendant, and he stated that he

did not provide regular support for them. This error does not change our

conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the

defendant.

DISPOSITION

The defendant’s sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is not designated for publication.
See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.

4