State of Louisiana v. Tameshia Taylor

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-99

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TAMESHIA TAYLOR

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, DOCKET NOS. 15034-07
HONORABLE D. KENT SAVOIE, DISTRICT JUDGE
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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

James E. Beal
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 307
Jonesboro, LA 71251-0307
(318) 259-2391
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Tameshia Taylor

John F. Derosier, District Attorney
Karen C. McLellan, Assistant District Attorney
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-3400
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
State of Louisiana

COOKS, Judge.

Defendant appeals as excessive her twenty-year sentence for committing

manslaughter in violation of La.R.S. 14:31. For the following reasons, we affirm

the sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 11, 2007, an altercation began between Defendant, Tameshia

Taylor, and the victim, Darrell Thomas, who were living together. The altercation

ended with Defendant stabbing and fatally wounding the victim. At the guilty plea

proceeding, the factual basis was set forth in the following exchange:

MR. KIMBALL:

This happened on June the 11th, 2007. The defendant and the
victim, Darrell Thomas, apparently had been living together and they
had been drinking and smoking narcotics earlier that night, which was
confirmed by a neighbor who lived next door, Dexter Ned, -

MS. TAYLOR:

He was there in the house. He was staying there.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KIMBALL:

And there was a fight and apparently this was a pretty volatile
relationship, from what I‟m gathering from the report, a physical fight
that erupted between Tameshia Taylor and Darrell Thomas, wherein
she was physically battered by the defendant, she grabbed a knife in
the heat of that moment and stabbed in the chest, it was a steak knife
from the house there.

THE COURT:

And he died as a result of that?

MR. KIMBALL:

That‟s correct, Your Honor. Both individuals were tested,
obviously the victim, after he was deceased they drew his blood, he
tested positive for cocaine, as well as alcohol. Mr. Ned did not get

tested, but the defendant was tested and she tested positive for
cocaine, but no alcohol.

Defendant was charged by indictment with second degree murder, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. She pled guilty to the amended charge of

manslaughter. A sentencing hearing was held on August 12, 2009, and the trial

court sentenced Defendant to twenty years with the Department of Corrections.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied by the trial

court.

Defendant lodged this appeal, asserting her twenty-year sentence is

excessive. Specifically, she contends the trial court failed to give sufficient

consideration to mitigating factors in fashioning the sentence in this case.

ANALYSIS
Defendant complains her sentence is excessive for a “twenty-two year old

second offender, who had only a burglary on her record for which she had served

two years probation.” Defendant argues she did not intend to kill her boyfriend

when she stabbed him with a steak knife in self-defense. In her brief to this court,

Defendant states, “[t]hough she had been beaten many times, and was being beaten

on the night of the tragic incident, she loved and expressed extreme remorse for the

victim, whom she never intended to kill.” Defendant points out, at the hearing on

the motion to reconsider sentence, an expert in battered spouse syndrome, Ann

Polak, testified that records from the women‟s shelter indicated previously the

victim had choked and beaten her. Defendant argues a lesser sentence including a

period of supervised release would be appropriate for this second offender.

The State responds that the trial court gave sufficient reasons for imposing

the twenty-year sentence. The State argues Defendant fails to show how the

sentence is constitutionally excessive and states in pertinent part:

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Moreover, this defendant has utterly failed to establish that the
sentence imposed on her was constitutionally excessive. After a three
day long drug binge, the defendant and her boyfriend began arguing.
According to the defendant‟s own statement, the victim slapped the
defendant, and the defendant retaliated by stabbing the victim in the
chest with a steak knife, killing him. The statute required that the
defendant receive no more than 40 years, and she was sentenced to 20
years, which is half of the maximum sentence. The sentence the trial
judge imposed neither shock[s] one‟s sense of justice, nor
constitute[s] cruel, unusual, or excessive punishment. A lesser
sentence would have deprecated the seriousness of the offense this
defendant committed. Clearly, the trial court imposed the proper
sentence for manslaughter. (Record citations omitted.)

The trial court set forth the following oral reasons for imposing Defendant‟s

sentence:

THE COURT:

All right. The Court has considered the statement of Patti
McKeiver with the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff‟s Office, who is a
volunteer, concerning classes that Tameshia has taken, considered the
pre-sentence investigation.

The defendant pled guilty to the charge of manslaughter which
seems appropriate to the way it appears that this event happened. She
is a second-time felony offender having previously been convicted of
simple burglary.

And I take into consideration the fact that the evidence would
indicate that there was drug abuse by both parties on this occasion and
that there was an argument but certainly not anything, which I know
of, which would be sufficient to cause her to have to pull a knife to
defend herself. All I heard was arguments. I heard nothing that
would indicate that there was [sic] threats or abuse toward her.

I‟m going to sentence her to serve 20 years with the Department
of Corrections.

The Defendant timely filed a motion to reconsider sentence asserting

excessive sentence. In support of her claim, the Defendant asserted in pertinent

part:

a) She has no prior criminal history and made a full confession
when confronted about her activities herein. She has admitted to
some responsibility for her actions due to excessive drug use that
impaired her cognitive thinking, as well as giving a guilty plea on
August 12, 2009.
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b) There was a very long history of physical abuse between the
defendant and the victim that did not get presented to the Court.
Specifically, at the sentencing hearing, undersigned counsel attempted
to offer evidence in support of the assertion that defendant had been
abused by the deceased. The Court declined to allow Mr. Ron
Jackson, Lead Investigator for the Public Defenders‟ Office, to testify
in this regard purportedly for the reason that Ron Jackson‟s testimony
was likely to present in the form of hearsay. However, the Court
expressed its desire to review “documentary evidence.” Defendant
maintains that both documentary evidence and Ron Jackson‟s
testimony constitute hearsay and the Court‟s preference for one form
of hearsay over the other ultimately prejudiced the defendant.

A hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence was held on March 5, 2010

at which the Defendant testified she began dating the victim, Daryl Thomas, in

2006. She stated in 2006, she went to the Women‟s Shelter and spoke to Ann

Polak alleging physical abuse by Michael Marshal. Defendant contended it was

really Mr. Thomas, not Mr. Marshal, that abused her. Defendant acknowledged

the records from the women‟s shelter would reflect that her abuser was Mr.

Marshal.

The hearing continued on May 11, 2011, at which time Defendant called to

testify Ann Polak, director of the women‟s shelter. Ms. Polak testified the records

from the women‟s shelter indicated Defendant came to the shelter twice, in 2004

and 2006. In 2004 and 2006, Defendant filled out paper work for a restraining

order, and the paper work reflected someone other than the victim as her abuser.

The records from the shelter verified Defendant was in the shelter from July 1 to

August 1, 2006. However, there was nothing in the records showing Defendant

changed the name of the abuser to the victim. Ms. Polack did testify it was not

unusual for a woman who had been abused to give the incorrect name for her

abuser. According to Ms. Polak, battered women do not want to get the abuser in

trouble, although desiring to stop the abuse.

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Ms. Polak was of the opinion Defendant had been abused by the victim and

Defendant was likely to respond affirmatively to treatment. Ms. Polak testified in

pertinent part:

A woman who can walk away has a family who can support her. She
has resources where she can make her way. This woman tried
repeatedly in different jobs to get a job where she could stay there and
work, and it didn‟t work.

....

A Well, let me just say that there are a lot of women in abuse
situations that abuse drugs. There is [sic] many who don‟t. I don‟t --
does it change the way I look at it? I think that she still has reactions
to the abuse that are still within -- that are part of her whether she is
doing drugs or not doing drugs.

At the May 11, 2011 hearing, the Defendant testified again. She stated the

victim was hitting her, and the reason she cut him with a knife was to get the

victim to stop hitting her. She stated she had no intent to kill him.

The trial court denied the motion to reconsider sentence stating in pertinent

part:

THE COURT:

I would have liked to have heard some of this information as
part of the presentence; but listening to Ms. Polak and the
circumstances under which she has gone before about going to the
facility before, why she didn‟t choose that option on this occasion,
frankly, baffles me. I think in large part it‟s probably due to the
smoking of the crack cocaine.

....

I think it‟s in large part due to the decisions made with the
crack cocaine, because she certainty [sic] had the training to do
something different than what she did. I certainly don‟t think that
anything excuses her actions. I don‟t think there is justification for
her actions. And considering that she is a second felony offender, I
thought the sentence imposed of 20 years was entirely appropriate;
and I still think that after hearing all of the things that I heard today.
The motion to reconsider is denied.

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In State v. Decuir, 10-1112 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 61 So.3d 782, this court

explained in pertinent part:

The law is well settled concerning the standard to be used in
reviewing excessive sentence claims:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or
that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more
than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d
124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its
broad sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539
(1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01),
779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d
331.

. . . However, even when a sentence falls within the statutory
sentencing range, it still may be unconstitutionally excessive, and in
determining whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes
no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has
suggested that several factors may be considered:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors
including the nature of the offense, the circumstances of
the offender, the legislative purpose behind the
punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed
for similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00);
766 So.2d 501. While a comparison of sentences
imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it
is well settled that sentences must be individualized to
the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1
Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the
trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial
judge “remains in the best position to assess the
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aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by
each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674
So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786,
789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061. Still, “the
trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating
circumstance outlined in art. 894.1[;] the record must reflect that he
adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence
to the defendant.” State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983).

Id. at 790-91.

The maximum sentence that may be imposed on someone convicted of

manslaughter is forty years at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:31(B). Defendant‟s twenty-

year sentence falls within the middle of the sentencing range.

During a fight between Defendant and the victim, Defendant stabbed the

victim with a knife which resulted in the victim‟s death. Defendant was under the

influence of cocaine when the offense occurred.

In cases where there was a fight or abuse involved, this court has upheld

similar sentences as the one imposed in this case. In Decuir, 61 So.3d 782, the

defendant, who pled guilty to manslaughter, sought review of her thirty-five years

at hard labor sentence. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial court

imposed an excessive sentence “„considering the factual circumstances and history

of abuse between the appellant and the victim.‟” Id. at 790. Specifically, she

asserted that she was a “forty-four-year-old mother who has supported her family

through a life of abuse; that this is her first felony offense; and that the trial court

failed to give adequate weight to the mitigating circumstances in this case.” Id.

This court affirmed the sentence, writing in pertinent part:

A decision on point with the matter now before us is State v.
Russell, 42,479 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/07), 966 So.2d 154, writ denied,
07-2069 (La.3/7/08), 977 So.2d 897. In that case, the defendant shot
his stepfather twice in the head after an argument. The argument
began when the defendant confronted his stepfather about his
suspicions that the stepfather had been inappropriate with one of the
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defendant‟s children, and the defendant claimed the shooting was in
self-defense because his stepfather had been approaching him with a
machete at the time the defendant shot him. After the shooting, the
defendant concealed his actions by burying the victim‟s body, by
tidying the site, by burning the victim‟s personal effects, and by lying
about his stepfather‟s whereabouts. The defendant was convicted of
manslaughter and sentenced to forty years at hard labor.

The defendant in Russell asserted on appeal that his sentence
was excessive. Finding that the trial court had considered the violent
nature of the offense, the defendant‟s deliberate creation of the risk of
death or great bodily harm, the use of a dangerous weapon, the
permanent injury to the victim, the pattern of the bullets (two in the
head with one being a contact shot), and the defendant‟s attempts to
conceal the evidence, the second circuit affirmed the sentence
imposed. Noting that the penalty for second degree murder was life
imprisonment, the second circuit found no abuse of the trial court‟s
sentencing discretion.

As in Russell, the trial court in the instant case clearly stated
that this was a case of premeditated murder rather than manslaughter.
The record supports the trial court‟s conclusion; it reflects a history of
mutual physical abuse between the defendant and her husband,
including a prior instance when the defendant shot her husband and
another previous incident when the defendant attacked him in his
sleep. Moreover, the record also reflects that the defendant frequently
threatened to shoot her husband in the head. Additionally, by entering
into the plea agreement the defendant reduced her sentencing
exposure from life imprisonment to forty years. Because we conclude
thirty-five years at hard labor in the instant case does not constitute an
abuse of discretion and is neither shocking nor fails to make a
meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, we reject this
assignment of error.

Id. at 791-92 (footnote omitted).

In State v. Batiste, 07-482 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 969 So.2d 704, the

defendant, convicted after a bench trial of the lesser included offense of

manslaughter, was sentenced to serve twenty years at hard labor. On appeal, he

argued the sentence was excessive for a thirty-three-year-old first offender who

had no criminal record. This court affirmed the sentence. In the opinion, this court

set forth the trial court‟s reason which provided as follows:

The trial court stated the following at Defendant‟s sentencing
hearing:

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The Court found that the defendant in this case had
the last opportunity to either drive off to avoid the victim
and not exit from his vehicle but instead the defendant
exited his vehicle, walked around to the other side of the
vehicle where the victim was and struck him in the head
with one blow to the head.
The mitigating circumstances show that the victim
had been taunting the defendant and had been picking at
Chad to fight him the entire evening of the incident in
question. The victim entered the vehicle from the
passenger side with a forty (40) ounce beer in his hand
and threatened to do harm to the defendant.
The medical evidence showed that the victim, Tyra
Dale Hicks[,] had ingested cocaine, marijuana, alcohol
and some unknown substance captioned Benzu . . . in his
system at the time of his death.

Id. at 706.

In State v. Clements, 99-2005 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/00), 774 So.2d 263, writ

denied, 01-906 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 333, the defendant, convicted of

manslaughter, argued her sentence of eighteen years at hard labor was excessive.

In support of her assertion, the defendant argued she was forty-two years old, she

had no prior felony convictions, and her use of alcohol and Ativan caused her to

not recall the events leading up to and including the shooting. This court affirmed

the sentence, finding it was not constitutionally excessive.

After a review of the record, we find it adequately reflects the trial court

considered the mitigating and aggravating circumstances of Defendant‟s case and

did not abuse its discretion in the sentence imposed. Therefore, Defendant‟s

assertion that her sentence was excessive lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant‟s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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