State of Louisiana v. Dewayne Lakeith Joseph
State of Louisiana v. Dewayne Lakeith Joseph, No. KA-0012-0466 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Mar. 6, 2013).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State Ex Rel. Graffagnino v. King 436 So. 2d 559
- State v. Duncan 420 So. 2d 1105
- State v. Moody 393 So. 2d 1212
- State v. Richardson 425 So. 2d 1228
- State v. Kennerson 695 So. 2d 1367
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
12-466
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
DEWAYNE LAKEITH JOSEPH
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 09-236292
HONORABLE GERARD B. WATTIGNY, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy H. Ezell, and
James T. Genovese, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 1641
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70602
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Dewayne Lakeith Joseph
J. Phil Haney
District Attorney—Sixteenth Judicial District
Angela B. Odinet
Assistant District Attorney
415 Main Street
St. Martinville, Louisiana 70582
(337) 394-2220
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana
GENOVESE, Judge.
In this criminal case, Defendant, Dewayne Lakeith Joseph, appeals his first
degree murder conviction, alleging insufficiency of the evidence. For the
following reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction in all respects.
FACTS
Defendant and the victim, Delores Roberson Joseph, were married but living
separate and apart. In the course of exchanging a series of text messages, on
February 26, 2009, they agreed to meet at Defendant’s place of employment in
Stephensville in lower St. Martin Parish.
When they met, Defendant was able to coax Mrs. Joseph into the shop where
he worked, and they engaged in sexual intercourse. Subsequent thereto,
Mrs. Joseph became aware that Defendant’s former girlfriend had recently texted
him, and she became upset. They got into an argument, the situation escalated, and
violence ensued. Defendant knocked Mrs. Joseph out, then duct-taped and chained
her to a dolly. After having secured her, he then dumped her into a nearby canal,
and she drowned.
ERRORS PATENT
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for
errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no
errors patent.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues the evidence adduced at
trial was insufficient to sustain his first degree murder conviction.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
The analysis for an insufficiency of the evidence claim is set forth as
follows:
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal,
the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100
S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King,
436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982);
State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact
finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility
determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations
under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino,
436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228
(La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however,
the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.
First degree murder is defined by La.R.S. 14:30. The State charged
Defendant pursuant to the following provision:
A. First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of . . . second degree kidnapping[.]
On appeal, Defendant concedes that he murdered his wife, but he argues that
he thought she was dead before he threw her in the water; thus, he contends that
the State failed to prove “first degree murder as there would be no kidnapping.”
Defendant further contends that since he believed the victim was already dead, that
would negate any specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. The flaw in
Defendant’s argument is that it assumes the truth of Defendant’s self-serving
testimony at trial. However, a Jackson analysis requires that this court, the
reviewing court, view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
as stated in Kennerson.
The question of whether Defendant knew Mrs. Joseph was still alive before
he dumped her in the water was the key issue. According to Defendant’s
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testimony at trial, he claimed that he thought she was already dead before he put
her in the canal; however, the jury made an assessment of weight and credibility
that was unfavorable to Defendant. Therefore, according to Jackson, we are not
allowed to second guess the credibility determination of the trier of fact.
At trial, the State argued that Defendant knew the victim was still alive when
he threw her in the water because he duct-taped her mouth, bound her hands
behind her, and bound her feet. Further, during Defendant’s video-recorded
statement to police, Detective Karen Mouton asked him whether he knew the
victim was still alive when he threw her in. He nodded affirmatively. Our review
of the DVD of his statement does reveal a slight affirmative nod. Also, Detective
Mouton and Detective James Thibodeaux testified that they took Defendant to the
canal, and he indicated to them that the victim was alive when he dumped her in
the water. Additionally, Dr. Joel Carney, a forensic pathologist, testified that the
victim died from drowning and that he detected no trauma which would have
caused her death.
Defendant noted at trial another part of his statement in which he told the
detective that the victim “was dead, knocked out. She was like [sic].” And, on the
DVD, Defendant makes a gesture with these sentences that appears to demonstrate
bodily stiffness. His trial counsel seized on the first sentence as evidence that
Defendant thought the victim was dead before he dumped her in the water.
However, the jury viewed the DVD and evidently did not believe Defendant’s
version of what took place.
Defendant also argues that even if he did have specific intent to commit the
offense, it was mitigated by “heat of blood” such that the conviction should be
reduced to manslaughter. However, the record indicates that he drowned his wife
after having time to duct-tape and chain her to a dolly, load her in a vehicle, select
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a dump site (the first one being too shallow), and then put her in a canal. Our
review of the record clearly indicates that the murder was committed in cold blood,
however “heated” the initial altercation may have been, and not in the heat of the
moment or in the heat of passion.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons set forth above, it is clear that the jury’s determination
regarding specific intent was rational and that there was sufficient evidence to
support its verdict of guilty of first degree murder. Therefore, pursuant to
Kennerson and Jackson, Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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