State of Louisiana v. Rodney Bernard Newton, Sr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-511

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RODNEY BERNARD NEWTON, SR.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, DOCKET NO. 16048-10
HONORABLE CLAYTON DAVIS, DISTRICT JUDGE
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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Billy Howard Ezell and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

John F. DeRosier, District Attorney
Carla S. Sigler, Assistant District Attorney
Karen C. McLellan, Assistant District Attorney
901 Lakeshore Street, Suite 600
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-3400
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
State of Louisiana

Todd S. Clemons
Todd Clemons & Associates, APLC
1740 Ryan Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 477-0000
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Rodney Bernard Newton, Sr.

COOKS, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, Rodney Bernard Newton, Sr., is the father of Sean and Brandon

Newton. Sean and Brandon, their cousin, Joshua Lambert, and three friends,

became involved in a gang dispute at Prien Lake Mall. The two gangs decided to

continue their confrontation in a neighborhood behind the mall. The six young

men were all in Defendant‟s car, and Sean Newton was driving. The boys drove

through the neighborhood looking for the other gang. When they saw the men,

Sean fired a gun into the crowd, and a fourteen-year-old girl who happened to be

walking through the neighborhood was shot in the head. She died as a result of the

gunshot wound. Defendant and his wife, Nina Newton, attempted to cover up their

two sons‟ drive-by shooting by concocting a story and lying to the police about

their sons‟ whereabouts at the time of the shooting.

Defendant was charged with accessory after the fact, a violation of La.R.S.

14:25. All the Newtons (Rodney, Nina, Sean, and Brandon) were tried together as

co-defendants. A jury trial commenced on May 16, 2011, and on May 24, 2011,

Defendant was found guilty as charged. Defendant filed a “Motion for Judgment

of Acquittal with Incorporated Memorandum.” The motion was heard and denied.

After waiving all delays, Defendant was sentenced to three years incarceration in

the parish jail and credit for time served.

Defendant has perfected a timely appeal, and he alleges the evidence was

insufficient to sustain the verdict of accessory after the fact. For the following

reasons, we affirm the conviction.

ANALYSIS

Defendant asserts his wife, Nina Newton, was the one who told the police

officers their sons were not at the scene of the shooting. He contends he was

merely present when she discussed lying to the police but had encouraged the boys

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to tell the truth. Defendant argues there was nothing put into evidence that would

have supported a conviction for accessory after the fact.

The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a

conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved

the all of the requisite elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). The Jackson standard of review is an

objective standard for testing all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for

reasonable doubt. State v. Marcantel, 00-1629 (La. 4/3/02), 815 So.2d 50. The

trier of fact is presumed to have acted rationally until it appears otherwise. State v.

Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La.1988).

An accessory after the fact is defined as “any person who, after the

commission of a felony, shall harbor, conceal, or aid the offender, knowing or

having reasonable ground to believe that he has committed the felony, and with the

intent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment.”

La.R.S. 14:25. The statute requires only the general intent of the offender that the

person who committed the felony will escape arrest, trial, conviction or

punishment. The intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence or inferred.

Finally, there must be a completed felony. The defendant who was accused of

being an accessory after the fact must have known or had reasonable grounds to

know of the commission of the felony and gave aid personally under circumstances

that indicated either that he actively desired that the felon avoid arrest, conviction,

or punishment, or that he believed that one of these consequences was substantially

certain to result from his assistance. State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983).

Joshua Lambert, Defendant‟s nephew, was in the car with Sean Newton

when Newton fired the gun out the window into the crowd and testified

accordingly. Lambert stated at trial, after they drove away from the scene, Andre

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Broussard, who was also in the car, received a text that a little girl at the scene had

been shot. Newton then called his mother and told her they had been in an

altercation. She told them to hurry home, but they drove first to Lambert‟s house

where they hid the gun, and Newton burned his tee shirt.

Lambert and the two Newton boys then went to the Newton‟s apartment,

where Rodney and Nina Newton were waiting for them. After the Newtons heard

what had happened, Nina Newton said she was going to call the police and tell

them the boys were accosted by a gang at the mall and as they were leaving the

mall, they heard gun shots so they hurried home. Lambert testified Defendant was

present during this discussion. He stated that his uncle said “the story didn‟t make

any sense or anything, so we should have just told the truth.” However, “My Aunt

Nina was, like, „No, because our baby is going to get in trouble and everything

about the situation.‟ So after she said that, he just went with it.”

Lambert further testified, after his aunt called the police the evening of the

shooting, an officer came to the apartment and talked to them. After a while, the

officer asked them to go to the police station. His uncle drove them all to the

police station. Lambert stated after the police talked to his aunt and uncle, they all

went back to the apartment. He testified Nina Newton told the police she was

sending the boys to her brother in Lafayette the next day to get them out of harm‟s

way in light of the incident.

The next day, the three boys drove in Sean Newton‟s car to Iowa, Louisiana

where they met up with their uncle who then took them to his place in Lafayette.

Defendant and his wife followed the boys in their car to Iowa.

Defendant argues while he was present during the discussion of what to tell

the police, he merely listened. In fact, Defendant contends he told the boys to tell

the truth. He maintains the State failed to prove he had the requisite intent to aid or

harbor the boys‟ crimes from detection. He argues all the State proved at trial was

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he said nothing and that, in itself, is not a crime; accordingly, there was insufficient

evidence he acted as an accessory after the fact.

In Chism, 436 So.2d 464, the defendant‟s conviction for accessory after the

fact was affirmed by the supreme court, and it was Chism‟s failure to say or do

anything that was discussed by the court. Chism, who was dressed as a woman, a

male friend, and Chism‟s uncle were driving around in a car, drinking beer. The

friend wanted to have sex with Chism, and the uncle wanted to find his ex-wife for

the same purpose. After they located the ex-wife, Chism and his friend sat in the

car while the uncle tried to convince the ex-wife to join them. When she refused,

he stabbed her several times. He then dragged her to the car, tossed her into the

front seat with Chism, and directed the two friends to drive out to the countryside.

There, he directed Chism and his friend to take the woman out of the car, and they

laid her in the grass. The two men then left the uncle with the ex-wife and drove

away. The next morning, Chism reported the incident to the police. The woman

was found dead. Chism was eventually convicted as an accessory after the fact to

second degree murder.

After noting there was overwhelming evidence that Chism‟s uncle had

committed a felony and Chism was aware of the offense, the supreme court

discussed how Chism‟s intent to assist his uncle escape arrest, trial, conviction, or

punishment or belief that one of these consequences was substantially certain to

result from his assistance, was established circumstantially:

Intent, like any other fact may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. La.R.S. 15:445. This is evidence of one fact, or a set of
facts, from which the existence of the fact to be determined may
reasonably be inferred. McCormick, Law of Evidence, p. 435 (2d ed.
1972); Prosser, Law of Torts, p. 212 (4th ed. 1971). In criminal cases,
the rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be
proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La.R.S. 15:438.

Circumstantial evidence involves, in addition to the assertion of
witnesses as to what they have observed, a process of reasoning, or

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inference by which a conclusion is drawn. Like all other evidence, it
may be strong or weak; it may be so unconvincing as to be quite
worthless, or it may be irresistible and overwhelming. There is still no
man who would not accept dog tracks in the mud against the sworn
testimony of a hundred eye-witnesses that no dog passed by. The gist
of circumstantial evidence, and the key to it, is the inference, or
process of reasoning by which the conclusion is reached. This must be
based on the evidence given, together with a sufficient background of
human experience to justify the conclusion. Prosser, supra, at 212.

Consequently, before a trier of fact can decide the ultimate
question of whether a reasonable hypothesis of innocence exists in a
criminal case based crucially on circumstantial evidence, a number of
preliminary findings must be made. In addition to assessing the
circumstantial evidence in light of the direct evidence, and vice versa,
the trier of fact must decide what reasonable inferences may be drawn
from the circumstantial evidence, the manner in which competing
inferences should be resolved, reconciled or compromised; and the
weight and effect to be given to each permissible inference. From
facts found from direct evidence and inferred from circumstantial
evidence, the trier of fact should proceed, keeping in mind the relative
strength and weakness of each inference and finding, to decide the
ultimate question of whether this body of preliminary facts excludes
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

In this case we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
support an ultimate finding that the reasonable findings and inferences
permitted by the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. Despite evidence supporting some contrary inferences, a
trier of fact reasonably could have found that Chism acted with at
least a general intent to help Lloyd avoid arrest because: (1) Chism
did not protest or attempt to leave the car when his uncle, Lloyd,
shoved the mortally wounded victim inside; (2) he did not attempt to
persuade Duke, his would-be lover, [to] exit out the driver‟s side of
the car and flee from his uncle, whom he knew to be one-legged and
armed only with a knife; (3) he did not take any of these actions at any
point during the considerable ride to Willow Point; (4) at their
destination, he docilely complied with Lloyd‟s directions to remove
the victim from the car and leave Lloyd with her, despite the fact that
Lloyd made no threats and that his wooden leg had become detached;
(5) after leaving Lloyd with the dying victim, he made no immediate
effort to report the victim‟s whereabouts or to obtain emergency
medical treatment for her; (6) before going home or reporting the
victim‟s dire condition he went to a friend‟s house, changed clothing
and discarded his own in a trash bin from which the police were
unable to recover them as evidence; (7) he went home without
reporting the victim‟s condition or location; (8) and he went to the
police station to report the crime only after arriving home and
discussing the matter with his mother.

Id. at 468-69 (footnote omitted).

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As in Chism, in the current case, the evidence establishing Sean Newton‟s

felony was overwhelming. Three of the five men in the vehicle with Newton

testified that he fired a single shot out of the car window into the crowd of men.

Defendant was fully aware of the felony after being apprised of it by his son.

Defendant‟s behavior exhibited, as in Chism, at least the general intent to aid his

son in avoiding the consequence of his actions. Defendant sat at his wife‟s side as

she lied to the officer at their apartment. He drove everyone to the police

department and, apparently, again sat at her side while she and the boys lied to a

different police officer. He signed a consent form for the officers to search his

vehicle for any evidence of the shooting and still did not say anything. In Chism,

the supreme court noted in a footnote an illustrative list of the type of “aid”

contemplated by La.R.S. 14:25 and included in the list was the volunteering of

false information to law enforcement officers. Id. at 467, n.1. Defendant‟s silence,

combined with the opportunities he had to demonstrate an intent not to acquiesce

in his wife‟s and his sons‟ cover-up, together with his overt act in following the

boys to Iowa for the sole purpose of secreting his sons away speaks for him now.

Therefore, we find no merit to this assignment of error.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant‟s conviction for accessory after the

fact is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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